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Update quic-go

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Frank Denis 2023-02-25 23:45:38 +01:00
parent 47e6a56b16
commit 15c87a68a1
55 changed files with 1448 additions and 12574 deletions
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27
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/LICENSE generated vendored
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Copyright (c) 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
met:
* Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
distribution.
* Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its
contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
this software without specific prior written permission.
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
"AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

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vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/README.md generated vendored
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# qtls
[![Go Reference](https://pkg.go.dev/badge/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18.svg)](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18)
[![.github/workflows/go-test.yml](https://github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/actions/workflows/go-test.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/actions/workflows/go-test.yml)
This repository contains a modified version of the standard library's TLS implementation, modified for the QUIC protocol. It is used by [quic-go](https://github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go).

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vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/alert.go generated vendored
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// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package qtls
import "strconv"
type alert uint8
// Alert is a TLS alert
type Alert = alert
const (
// alert level
alertLevelWarning = 1
alertLevelError = 2
)
const (
alertCloseNotify alert = 0
alertUnexpectedMessage alert = 10
alertBadRecordMAC alert = 20
alertDecryptionFailed alert = 21
alertRecordOverflow alert = 22
alertDecompressionFailure alert = 30
alertHandshakeFailure alert = 40
alertBadCertificate alert = 42
alertUnsupportedCertificate alert = 43
alertCertificateRevoked alert = 44
alertCertificateExpired alert = 45
alertCertificateUnknown alert = 46
alertIllegalParameter alert = 47
alertUnknownCA alert = 48
alertAccessDenied alert = 49
alertDecodeError alert = 50
alertDecryptError alert = 51
alertExportRestriction alert = 60
alertProtocolVersion alert = 70
alertInsufficientSecurity alert = 71
alertInternalError alert = 80
alertInappropriateFallback alert = 86
alertUserCanceled alert = 90
alertNoRenegotiation alert = 100
alertMissingExtension alert = 109
alertUnsupportedExtension alert = 110
alertCertificateUnobtainable alert = 111
alertUnrecognizedName alert = 112
alertBadCertificateStatusResponse alert = 113
alertBadCertificateHashValue alert = 114
alertUnknownPSKIdentity alert = 115
alertCertificateRequired alert = 116
alertNoApplicationProtocol alert = 120
)
var alertText = map[alert]string{
alertCloseNotify: "close notify",
alertUnexpectedMessage: "unexpected message",
alertBadRecordMAC: "bad record MAC",
alertDecryptionFailed: "decryption failed",
alertRecordOverflow: "record overflow",
alertDecompressionFailure: "decompression failure",
alertHandshakeFailure: "handshake failure",
alertBadCertificate: "bad certificate",
alertUnsupportedCertificate: "unsupported certificate",
alertCertificateRevoked: "revoked certificate",
alertCertificateExpired: "expired certificate",
alertCertificateUnknown: "unknown certificate",
alertIllegalParameter: "illegal parameter",
alertUnknownCA: "unknown certificate authority",
alertAccessDenied: "access denied",
alertDecodeError: "error decoding message",
alertDecryptError: "error decrypting message",
alertExportRestriction: "export restriction",
alertProtocolVersion: "protocol version not supported",
alertInsufficientSecurity: "insufficient security level",
alertInternalError: "internal error",
alertInappropriateFallback: "inappropriate fallback",
alertUserCanceled: "user canceled",
alertNoRenegotiation: "no renegotiation",
alertMissingExtension: "missing extension",
alertUnsupportedExtension: "unsupported extension",
alertCertificateUnobtainable: "certificate unobtainable",
alertUnrecognizedName: "unrecognized name",
alertBadCertificateStatusResponse: "bad certificate status response",
alertBadCertificateHashValue: "bad certificate hash value",
alertUnknownPSKIdentity: "unknown PSK identity",
alertCertificateRequired: "certificate required",
alertNoApplicationProtocol: "no application protocol",
}
func (e alert) String() string {
s, ok := alertText[e]
if ok {
return "tls: " + s
}
return "tls: alert(" + strconv.Itoa(int(e)) + ")"
}
func (e alert) Error() string {
return e.String()
}

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vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/auth.go generated vendored
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// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package qtls
import (
"bytes"
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rsa"
"errors"
"fmt"
"hash"
"io"
)
// verifyHandshakeSignature verifies a signature against pre-hashed
// (if required) handshake contents.
func verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType uint8, pubkey crypto.PublicKey, hashFunc crypto.Hash, signed, sig []byte) error {
switch sigType {
case signatureECDSA:
pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("expected an ECDSA public key, got %T", pubkey)
}
if !ecdsa.VerifyASN1(pubKey, signed, sig) {
return errors.New("ECDSA verification failure")
}
case signatureEd25519:
pubKey, ok := pubkey.(ed25519.PublicKey)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("expected an Ed25519 public key, got %T", pubkey)
}
if !ed25519.Verify(pubKey, signed, sig) {
return errors.New("Ed25519 verification failure")
}
case signaturePKCS1v15:
pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("expected an RSA public key, got %T", pubkey)
}
if err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pubKey, hashFunc, signed, sig); err != nil {
return err
}
case signatureRSAPSS:
pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("expected an RSA public key, got %T", pubkey)
}
signOpts := &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash}
if err := rsa.VerifyPSS(pubKey, hashFunc, signed, sig, signOpts); err != nil {
return err
}
default:
return errors.New("internal error: unknown signature type")
}
return nil
}
const (
serverSignatureContext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify\x00"
clientSignatureContext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify\x00"
)
var signaturePadding = []byte{
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
}
// signedMessage returns the pre-hashed (if necessary) message to be signed by
// certificate keys in TLS 1.3. See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3.
func signedMessage(sigHash crypto.Hash, context string, transcript hash.Hash) []byte {
if sigHash == directSigning {
b := &bytes.Buffer{}
b.Write(signaturePadding)
io.WriteString(b, context)
b.Write(transcript.Sum(nil))
return b.Bytes()
}
h := sigHash.New()
h.Write(signaturePadding)
io.WriteString(h, context)
h.Write(transcript.Sum(nil))
return h.Sum(nil)
}
// typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme returns the corresponding signature type and
// crypto.Hash for a given TLS SignatureScheme.
func typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme) (sigType uint8, hash crypto.Hash, err error) {
switch signatureAlgorithm {
case PKCS1WithSHA1, PKCS1WithSHA256, PKCS1WithSHA384, PKCS1WithSHA512:
sigType = signaturePKCS1v15
case PSSWithSHA256, PSSWithSHA384, PSSWithSHA512:
sigType = signatureRSAPSS
case ECDSAWithSHA1, ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512:
sigType = signatureECDSA
case Ed25519:
sigType = signatureEd25519
default:
return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("unsupported signature algorithm: %v", signatureAlgorithm)
}
switch signatureAlgorithm {
case PKCS1WithSHA1, ECDSAWithSHA1:
hash = crypto.SHA1
case PKCS1WithSHA256, PSSWithSHA256, ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256:
hash = crypto.SHA256
case PKCS1WithSHA384, PSSWithSHA384, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384:
hash = crypto.SHA384
case PKCS1WithSHA512, PSSWithSHA512, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512:
hash = crypto.SHA512
case Ed25519:
hash = directSigning
default:
return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("unsupported signature algorithm: %v", signatureAlgorithm)
}
return sigType, hash, nil
}
// legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey returns the fixed signature type and crypto.Hash for
// a given public key used with TLS 1.0 and 1.1, before the introduction of
// signature algorithm negotiation.
func legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(pub crypto.PublicKey) (sigType uint8, hash crypto.Hash, err error) {
switch pub.(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey:
return signaturePKCS1v15, crypto.MD5SHA1, nil
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
return signatureECDSA, crypto.SHA1, nil
case ed25519.PublicKey:
// RFC 8422 specifies support for Ed25519 in TLS 1.0 and 1.1,
// but it requires holding on to a handshake transcript to do a
// full signature, and not even OpenSSL bothers with the
// complexity, so we can't even test it properly.
return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("tls: Ed25519 public keys are not supported before TLS 1.2")
default:
return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported public key: %T", pub)
}
}
var rsaSignatureSchemes = []struct {
scheme SignatureScheme
minModulusBytes int
maxVersion uint16
}{
// RSA-PSS is used with PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, and requires
// emLen >= hLen + sLen + 2
{PSSWithSHA256, crypto.SHA256.Size()*2 + 2, VersionTLS13},
{PSSWithSHA384, crypto.SHA384.Size()*2 + 2, VersionTLS13},
{PSSWithSHA512, crypto.SHA512.Size()*2 + 2, VersionTLS13},
// PKCS #1 v1.5 uses prefixes from hashPrefixes in crypto/rsa, and requires
// emLen >= len(prefix) + hLen + 11
// TLS 1.3 dropped support for PKCS #1 v1.5 in favor of RSA-PSS.
{PKCS1WithSHA256, 19 + crypto.SHA256.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12},
{PKCS1WithSHA384, 19 + crypto.SHA384.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12},
{PKCS1WithSHA512, 19 + crypto.SHA512.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12},
{PKCS1WithSHA1, 15 + crypto.SHA1.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12},
}
// signatureSchemesForCertificate returns the list of supported SignatureSchemes
// for a given certificate, based on the public key and the protocol version,
// and optionally filtered by its explicit SupportedSignatureAlgorithms.
//
// This function must be kept in sync with supportedSignatureAlgorithms.
func signatureSchemesForCertificate(version uint16, cert *Certificate) []SignatureScheme {
priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
if !ok {
return nil
}
var sigAlgs []SignatureScheme
switch pub := priv.Public().(type) {
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
if version != VersionTLS13 {
// In TLS 1.2 and earlier, ECDSA algorithms are not
// constrained to a single curve.
sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{
ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256,
ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384,
ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512,
ECDSAWithSHA1,
}
break
}
switch pub.Curve {
case elliptic.P256():
sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256}
case elliptic.P384():
sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384}
case elliptic.P521():
sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512}
default:
return nil
}
case *rsa.PublicKey:
size := pub.Size()
sigAlgs = make([]SignatureScheme, 0, len(rsaSignatureSchemes))
for _, candidate := range rsaSignatureSchemes {
if size >= candidate.minModulusBytes && version <= candidate.maxVersion {
sigAlgs = append(sigAlgs, candidate.scheme)
}
}
case ed25519.PublicKey:
sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{Ed25519}
default:
return nil
}
if cert.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms != nil {
var filteredSigAlgs []SignatureScheme
for _, sigAlg := range sigAlgs {
if isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(sigAlg, cert.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
filteredSigAlgs = append(filteredSigAlgs, sigAlg)
}
}
return filteredSigAlgs
}
return sigAlgs
}
// selectSignatureScheme picks a SignatureScheme from the peer's preference list
// that works with the selected certificate. It's only called for protocol
// versions that support signature algorithms, so TLS 1.2 and 1.3.
func selectSignatureScheme(vers uint16, c *Certificate, peerAlgs []SignatureScheme) (SignatureScheme, error) {
supportedAlgs := signatureSchemesForCertificate(vers, c)
if len(supportedAlgs) == 0 {
return 0, unsupportedCertificateError(c)
}
if len(peerAlgs) == 0 && vers == VersionTLS12 {
// For TLS 1.2, if the client didn't send signature_algorithms then we
// can assume that it supports SHA1. See RFC 5246, Section 7.4.1.4.1.
peerAlgs = []SignatureScheme{PKCS1WithSHA1, ECDSAWithSHA1}
}
// Pick signature scheme in the peer's preference order, as our
// preference order is not configurable.
for _, preferredAlg := range peerAlgs {
if isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(preferredAlg, supportedAlgs) {
return preferredAlg, nil
}
}
return 0, errors.New("tls: peer doesn't support any of the certificate's signature algorithms")
}
// unsupportedCertificateError returns a helpful error for certificates with
// an unsupported private key.
func unsupportedCertificateError(cert *Certificate) error {
switch cert.PrivateKey.(type) {
case rsa.PrivateKey, ecdsa.PrivateKey:
return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate: private key is %T, expected *%T",
cert.PrivateKey, cert.PrivateKey)
case *ed25519.PrivateKey:
return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate: private key is *ed25519.PrivateKey, expected ed25519.PrivateKey")
}
signer, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("tls: certificate private key (%T) does not implement crypto.Signer",
cert.PrivateKey)
}
switch pub := signer.Public().(type) {
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
switch pub.Curve {
case elliptic.P256():
case elliptic.P384():
case elliptic.P521():
default:
return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate curve (%s)", pub.Curve.Params().Name)
}
case *rsa.PublicKey:
return fmt.Errorf("tls: certificate RSA key size too small for supported signature algorithms")
case ed25519.PublicKey:
default:
return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate key (%T)", pub)
}
if cert.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("tls: peer doesn't support the certificate custom signature algorithms")
}
return fmt.Errorf("tls: internal error: unsupported key (%T)", cert.PrivateKey)
}

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vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/cipher_suites.go generated vendored
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// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package qtls
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/des"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/rc4"
"crypto/sha1"
"crypto/sha256"
"fmt"
"hash"
"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305"
)
// CipherSuite is a TLS cipher suite. Note that most functions in this package
// accept and expose cipher suite IDs instead of this type.
type CipherSuite struct {
ID uint16
Name string
// Supported versions is the list of TLS protocol versions that can
// negotiate this cipher suite.
SupportedVersions []uint16
// Insecure is true if the cipher suite has known security issues
// due to its primitives, design, or implementation.
Insecure bool
}
var (
supportedUpToTLS12 = []uint16{VersionTLS10, VersionTLS11, VersionTLS12}
supportedOnlyTLS12 = []uint16{VersionTLS12}
supportedOnlyTLS13 = []uint16{VersionTLS13}
)
// CipherSuites returns a list of cipher suites currently implemented by this
// package, excluding those with security issues, which are returned by
// InsecureCipherSuites.
//
// The list is sorted by ID. Note that the default cipher suites selected by
// this package might depend on logic that can't be captured by a static list,
// and might not match those returned by this function.
func CipherSuites() []*CipherSuite {
return []*CipherSuite{
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
{TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS13, false},
{TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS13, false},
{TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS13, false},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
}
}
// InsecureCipherSuites returns a list of cipher suites currently implemented by
// this package and which have security issues.
//
// Most applications should not use the cipher suites in this list, and should
// only use those returned by CipherSuites.
func InsecureCipherSuites() []*CipherSuite {
// This list includes RC4, CBC_SHA256, and 3DES cipher suites. See
// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder for details.
return []*CipherSuite{
{TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true},
}
}
// CipherSuiteName returns the standard name for the passed cipher suite ID
// (e.g. "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"), or a fallback representation
// of the ID value if the cipher suite is not implemented by this package.
func CipherSuiteName(id uint16) string {
for _, c := range CipherSuites() {
if c.ID == id {
return c.Name
}
}
for _, c := range InsecureCipherSuites() {
if c.ID == id {
return c.Name
}
}
return fmt.Sprintf("0x%04X", id)
}
const (
// suiteECDHE indicates that the cipher suite involves elliptic curve
// Diffie-Hellman. This means that it should only be selected when the
// client indicates that it supports ECC with a curve and point format
// that we're happy with.
suiteECDHE = 1 << iota
// suiteECSign indicates that the cipher suite involves an ECDSA or
// EdDSA signature and therefore may only be selected when the server's
// certificate is ECDSA or EdDSA. If this is not set then the cipher suite
// is RSA based.
suiteECSign
// suiteTLS12 indicates that the cipher suite should only be advertised
// and accepted when using TLS 1.2.
suiteTLS12
// suiteSHA384 indicates that the cipher suite uses SHA384 as the
// handshake hash.
suiteSHA384
)
// A cipherSuite is a TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suite, and defines the key exchange
// mechanism, as well as the cipher+MAC pair or the AEAD.
type cipherSuite struct {
id uint16
// the lengths, in bytes, of the key material needed for each component.
keyLen int
macLen int
ivLen int
ka func(version uint16) keyAgreement
// flags is a bitmask of the suite* values, above.
flags int
cipher func(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any
mac func(key []byte) hash.Hash
aead func(key, fixedNonce []byte) aead
}
var cipherSuites = []*cipherSuite{ // TODO: replace with a map, since the order doesn't matter.
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, rsaKA, suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, rsaKA, 0, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, rsaKA, 0, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
}
// selectCipherSuite returns the first TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suite from ids which
// is also in supportedIDs and passes the ok filter.
func selectCipherSuite(ids, supportedIDs []uint16, ok func(*cipherSuite) bool) *cipherSuite {
for _, id := range ids {
candidate := cipherSuiteByID(id)
if candidate == nil || !ok(candidate) {
continue
}
for _, suppID := range supportedIDs {
if id == suppID {
return candidate
}
}
}
return nil
}
// A cipherSuiteTLS13 defines only the pair of the AEAD algorithm and hash
// algorithm to be used with HKDF. See RFC 8446, Appendix B.4.
type cipherSuiteTLS13 struct {
id uint16
keyLen int
aead func(key, fixedNonce []byte) aead
hash crypto.Hash
}
type CipherSuiteTLS13 struct {
ID uint16
KeyLen int
Hash crypto.Hash
AEAD func(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD
}
func (c *CipherSuiteTLS13) IVLen() int {
return aeadNonceLength
}
var cipherSuitesTLS13 = []*cipherSuiteTLS13{ // TODO: replace with a map.
{TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, aeadAESGCMTLS13, crypto.SHA256},
{TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, 32, aeadChaCha20Poly1305, crypto.SHA256},
{TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, aeadAESGCMTLS13, crypto.SHA384},
}
// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder is the order in which we'll select (on the
// server) or advertise (on the client) TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suites.
//
// Cipher suites are filtered but not reordered based on the application and
// peer's preferences, meaning we'll never select a suite lower in this list if
// any higher one is available. This makes it more defensible to keep weaker
// cipher suites enabled, especially on the server side where we get the last
// word, since there are no known downgrade attacks on cipher suites selection.
//
// The list is sorted by applying the following priority rules, stopping at the
// first (most important) applicable one:
//
// - Anything else comes before RC4
//
// RC4 has practically exploitable biases. See https://www.rc4nomore.com.
//
// - Anything else comes before CBC_SHA256
//
// SHA-256 variants of the CBC ciphersuites don't implement any Lucky13
// countermeasures. See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/Lucky13.html and
// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html.
//
// - Anything else comes before 3DES
//
// 3DES has 64-bit blocks, which makes it fundamentally susceptible to
// birthday attacks. See https://sweet32.info.
//
// - ECDHE comes before anything else
//
// Once we got the broken stuff out of the way, the most important
// property a cipher suite can have is forward secrecy. We don't
// implement FFDHE, so that means ECDHE.
//
// - AEADs come before CBC ciphers
//
// Even with Lucky13 countermeasures, MAC-then-Encrypt CBC cipher suites
// are fundamentally fragile, and suffered from an endless sequence of
// padding oracle attacks. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1129,
// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/12/08/poodleagain.html, and
// https://blog.cloudflare.com/yet-another-padding-oracle-in-openssl-cbc-ciphersuites/.
//
// - AES comes before ChaCha20
//
// When AES hardware is available, AES-128-GCM and AES-256-GCM are faster
// than ChaCha20Poly1305.
//
// When AES hardware is not available, AES-128-GCM is one or more of: much
// slower, way more complex, and less safe (because not constant time)
// than ChaCha20Poly1305.
//
// We use this list if we think both peers have AES hardware, and
// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES otherwise.
//
// - AES-128 comes before AES-256
//
// The only potential advantages of AES-256 are better multi-target
// margins, and hypothetical post-quantum properties. Neither apply to
// TLS, and AES-256 is slower due to its four extra rounds (which don't
// contribute to the advantages above).
//
// - ECDSA comes before RSA
//
// The relative order of ECDSA and RSA cipher suites doesn't matter,
// as they depend on the certificate. Pick one to get a stable order.
//
var cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder = []uint16{
// AEADs w/ ECDHE
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
// CBC w/ ECDHE
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
// AEADs w/o ECDHE
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
// CBC w/o ECDHE
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
// 3DES
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
// CBC_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
// RC4
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
}
var cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES = []uint16{
// ChaCha20Poly1305
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
// AES-GCM w/ ECDHE
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
// The rest of cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder.
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
}
// disabledCipherSuites are not used unless explicitly listed in
// Config.CipherSuites. They MUST be at the end of cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder.
var disabledCipherSuites = []uint16{
// CBC_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
// RC4
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
}
var (
defaultCipherSuitesLen = len(cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder) - len(disabledCipherSuites)
defaultCipherSuites = cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder[:defaultCipherSuitesLen]
)
// defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 is also the preference order, since there are no
// disabled by default TLS 1.3 cipher suites. The same AES vs ChaCha20 logic as
// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder applies.
var defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 = []uint16{
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
}
var defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES = []uint16{
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
}
var aesgcmCiphers = map[uint16]bool{
// TLS 1.2
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true,
// TLS 1.3
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true,
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true,
}
var nonAESGCMAEADCiphers = map[uint16]bool{
// TLS 1.2
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305: true,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305: true,
// TLS 1.3
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: true,
}
// aesgcmPreferred returns whether the first known cipher in the preference list
// is an AES-GCM cipher, implying the peer has hardware support for it.
func aesgcmPreferred(ciphers []uint16) bool {
for _, cID := range ciphers {
if c := cipherSuiteByID(cID); c != nil {
return aesgcmCiphers[cID]
}
if c := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(cID); c != nil {
return aesgcmCiphers[cID]
}
}
return false
}
func cipherRC4(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
cipher, _ := rc4.NewCipher(key)
return cipher
}
func cipher3DES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
block, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(key)
if isRead {
return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv)
}
return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv)
}
func cipherAES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
block, _ := aes.NewCipher(key)
if isRead {
return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv)
}
return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv)
}
// macSHA1 returns a SHA-1 based constant time MAC.
func macSHA1(key []byte) hash.Hash {
return hmac.New(newConstantTimeHash(sha1.New), key)
}
// macSHA256 returns a SHA-256 based MAC. This is only supported in TLS 1.2 and
// is currently only used in disabled-by-default cipher suites.
func macSHA256(key []byte) hash.Hash {
return hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
}
type aead interface {
cipher.AEAD
// explicitNonceLen returns the number of bytes of explicit nonce
// included in each record. This is eight for older AEADs and
// zero for modern ones.
explicitNonceLen() int
}
const (
aeadNonceLength = 12
noncePrefixLength = 4
)
// prefixNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD and prefixes a fixed portion of the nonce to
// each call.
type prefixNonceAEAD struct {
// nonce contains the fixed part of the nonce in the first four bytes.
nonce [aeadNonceLength]byte
aead cipher.AEAD
}
func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int { return aeadNonceLength - noncePrefixLength }
func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Overhead() int { return f.aead.Overhead() }
func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return f.NonceSize() }
func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce)
return f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonce[:], plaintext, additionalData)
}
func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce)
return f.aead.Open(out, f.nonce[:], ciphertext, additionalData)
}
// xoredNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD by XORing in a fixed pattern to the nonce
// before each call.
type xorNonceAEAD struct {
nonceMask [aeadNonceLength]byte
aead cipher.AEAD
}
func (f *xorNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int { return 8 } // 64-bit sequence number
func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Overhead() int { return f.aead.Overhead() }
func (f *xorNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return 0 }
func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
for i, b := range nonce {
f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
}
result := f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonceMask[:], plaintext, additionalData)
for i, b := range nonce {
f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
}
return result
}
func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
for i, b := range nonce {
f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
}
result, err := f.aead.Open(out, f.nonceMask[:], ciphertext, additionalData)
for i, b := range nonce {
f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
}
return result, err
}
func aeadAESGCM(key, noncePrefix []byte) aead {
if len(noncePrefix) != noncePrefixLength {
panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
}
aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(aes)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
ret := &prefixNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
copy(ret.nonce[:], noncePrefix)
return ret
}
// AEADAESGCMTLS13 creates a new AES-GCM AEAD for TLS 1.3
func AEADAESGCMTLS13(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD {
return aeadAESGCMTLS13(key, fixedNonce)
}
func aeadAESGCMTLS13(key, nonceMask []byte) aead {
if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength {
panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
}
aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(aes)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
copy(ret.nonceMask[:], nonceMask)
return ret
}
func aeadChaCha20Poly1305(key, nonceMask []byte) aead {
if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength {
panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
}
aead, err := chacha20poly1305.New(key)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
copy(ret.nonceMask[:], nonceMask)
return ret
}
type constantTimeHash interface {
hash.Hash
ConstantTimeSum(b []byte) []byte
}
// cthWrapper wraps any hash.Hash that implements ConstantTimeSum, and replaces
// with that all calls to Sum. It's used to obtain a ConstantTimeSum-based HMAC.
type cthWrapper struct {
h constantTimeHash
}
func (c *cthWrapper) Size() int { return c.h.Size() }
func (c *cthWrapper) BlockSize() int { return c.h.BlockSize() }
func (c *cthWrapper) Reset() { c.h.Reset() }
func (c *cthWrapper) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return c.h.Write(p) }
func (c *cthWrapper) Sum(b []byte) []byte { return c.h.ConstantTimeSum(b) }
func newConstantTimeHash(h func() hash.Hash) func() hash.Hash {
return func() hash.Hash {
return &cthWrapper{h().(constantTimeHash)}
}
}
// tls10MAC implements the TLS 1.0 MAC function. RFC 2246, Section 6.2.3.
func tls10MAC(h hash.Hash, out, seq, header, data, extra []byte) []byte {
h.Reset()
h.Write(seq)
h.Write(header)
h.Write(data)
res := h.Sum(out)
if extra != nil {
h.Write(extra)
}
return res
}
func rsaKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
return rsaKeyAgreement{}
}
func ecdheECDSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
return &ecdheKeyAgreement{
isRSA: false,
version: version,
}
}
func ecdheRSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
return &ecdheKeyAgreement{
isRSA: true,
version: version,
}
}
// mutualCipherSuite returns a cipherSuite given a list of supported
// ciphersuites and the id requested by the peer.
func mutualCipherSuite(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuite {
for _, id := range have {
if id == want {
return cipherSuiteByID(id)
}
}
return nil
}
func cipherSuiteByID(id uint16) *cipherSuite {
for _, cipherSuite := range cipherSuites {
if cipherSuite.id == id {
return cipherSuite
}
}
return nil
}
func mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 {
for _, id := range have {
if id == want {
return cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id)
}
}
return nil
}
func cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 {
for _, cipherSuite := range cipherSuitesTLS13 {
if cipherSuite.id == id {
return cipherSuite
}
}
return nil
}
// A list of cipher suite IDs that are, or have been, implemented by this
// package.
//
// See https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml
const (
// TLS 1.0 - 1.2 cipher suites.
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0x0005
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x000a
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x002f
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0035
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x003c
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x009c
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x009d
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xc007
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc009
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc00a
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xc011
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc012
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc013
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc014
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc023
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc027
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc02f
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc02b
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xc030
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xc02c
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xcca8
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xcca9
// TLS 1.3 cipher suites.
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x1301
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x1302
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0x1303
// TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV isn't a standard cipher suite but an indicator
// that the client is doing version fallback. See RFC 7507.
TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV uint16 = 0x5600
// Legacy names for the corresponding cipher suites with the correct _SHA256
// suffix, retained for backward compatibility.
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 = TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 = TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
)

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vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/common.go generated vendored
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22
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/cpu.go generated vendored
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@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
//go:build !js
// +build !js
package qtls
import (
"runtime"
"golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
)
var (
hasGCMAsmAMD64 = cpu.X86.HasAES && cpu.X86.HasPCLMULQDQ
hasGCMAsmARM64 = cpu.ARM64.HasAES && cpu.ARM64.HasPMULL
// Keep in sync with crypto/aes/cipher_s390x.go.
hasGCMAsmS390X = cpu.S390X.HasAES && cpu.S390X.HasAESCBC && cpu.S390X.HasAESCTR &&
(cpu.S390X.HasGHASH || cpu.S390X.HasAESGCM)
hasAESGCMHardwareSupport = runtime.GOARCH == "amd64" && hasGCMAsmAMD64 ||
runtime.GOARCH == "arm64" && hasGCMAsmARM64 ||
runtime.GOARCH == "s390x" && hasGCMAsmS390X
)

12
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/cpu_other.go generated vendored
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@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
//go:build js
// +build js
package qtls
var (
hasGCMAsmAMD64 = false
hasGCMAsmARM64 = false
hasGCMAsmS390X = false
hasAESGCMHardwareSupport = false
)

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// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package qtls
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/rsa"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"hash"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
)
type clientHandshakeStateTLS13 struct {
c *Conn
ctx context.Context
serverHello *serverHelloMsg
hello *clientHelloMsg
ecdheParams ecdheParameters
session *clientSessionState
earlySecret []byte
binderKey []byte
certReq *certificateRequestMsgTLS13
usingPSK bool
sentDummyCCS bool
suite *cipherSuiteTLS13
transcript hash.Hash
masterSecret []byte
trafficSecret []byte // client_application_traffic_secret_0
}
// handshake requires hs.c, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, hs.ecdheParams, and,
// optionally, hs.session, hs.earlySecret and hs.binderKey to be set.
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
c := hs.c
// The server must not select TLS 1.3 in a renegotiation. See RFC 8446,
// sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3.
if c.handshakes > 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
return errors.New("tls: server selected TLS 1.3 in a renegotiation")
}
// Consistency check on the presence of a keyShare and its parameters.
if hs.ecdheParams == nil || len(hs.hello.keyShares) != 1 {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
if err := hs.checkServerHelloOrHRR(); err != nil {
return err
}
hs.transcript = hs.suite.hash.New()
hs.transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
if bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.random, helloRetryRequestRandom) {
if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.processHelloRetryRequest(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
hs.transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
c.buffering = true
if err := hs.processServerHello(); err != nil {
return err
}
c.updateConnectionState()
if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.establishHandshakeKeys(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.readServerParameters(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.readServerCertificate(); err != nil {
return err
}
c.updateConnectionState()
if err := hs.readServerFinished(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendClientCertificate(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendClientFinished(); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
return err
}
atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1)
c.updateConnectionState()
return nil
}
// checkServerHelloOrHRR does validity checks that apply to both ServerHello and
// HelloRetryRequest messages. It sets hs.suite.
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) checkServerHelloOrHRR() error {
c := hs.c
if hs.serverHello.supportedVersion == 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertMissingExtension)
return errors.New("tls: server selected TLS 1.3 using the legacy version field")
}
if hs.serverHello.supportedVersion != VersionTLS13 {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid version after a HelloRetryRequest")
}
if hs.serverHello.vers != VersionTLS12 {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server sent an incorrect legacy version")
}
if hs.serverHello.ocspStapling ||
hs.serverHello.ticketSupported ||
hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiationSupported ||
len(hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 ||
len(hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol) != 0 ||
len(hs.serverHello.scts) != 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
return errors.New("tls: server sent a ServerHello extension forbidden in TLS 1.3")
}
if !bytes.Equal(hs.hello.sessionId, hs.serverHello.sessionId) {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server did not echo the legacy session ID")
}
if hs.serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported compression format")
}
selectedSuite := mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(hs.hello.cipherSuites, hs.serverHello.cipherSuite)
if hs.suite != nil && selectedSuite != hs.suite {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server changed cipher suite after a HelloRetryRequest")
}
if selectedSuite == nil {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server chose an unconfigured cipher suite")
}
hs.suite = selectedSuite
c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
return nil
}
// sendDummyChangeCipherSpec sends a ChangeCipherSpec record for compatibility
// with middleboxes that didn't implement TLS correctly. See RFC 8446, Appendix D.4.
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendDummyChangeCipherSpec() error {
if hs.sentDummyCCS {
return nil
}
hs.sentDummyCCS = true
_, err := hs.c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
return err
}
// processHelloRetryRequest handles the HRR in hs.serverHello, modifies and
// resends hs.hello, and reads the new ServerHello into hs.serverHello.
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processHelloRetryRequest() error {
c := hs.c
// The first ClientHello gets double-hashed into the transcript upon a
// HelloRetryRequest. (The idea is that the server might offload transcript
// storage to the client in the cookie.) See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.1.
chHash := hs.transcript.Sum(nil)
hs.transcript.Reset()
hs.transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
hs.transcript.Write(chHash)
hs.transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
// The only HelloRetryRequest extensions we support are key_share and
// cookie, and clients must abort the handshake if the HRR would not result
// in any change in the ClientHello.
if hs.serverHello.selectedGroup == 0 && hs.serverHello.cookie == nil {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server sent an unnecessary HelloRetryRequest message")
}
if hs.serverHello.cookie != nil {
hs.hello.cookie = hs.serverHello.cookie
}
if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group != 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
return errors.New("tls: received malformed key_share extension")
}
// If the server sent a key_share extension selecting a group, ensure it's
// a group we advertised but did not send a key share for, and send a key
// share for it this time.
if curveID := hs.serverHello.selectedGroup; curveID != 0 {
curveOK := false
for _, id := range hs.hello.supportedCurves {
if id == curveID {
curveOK = true
break
}
}
if !curveOK {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported group")
}
if hs.ecdheParams.CurveID() == curveID {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server sent an unnecessary HelloRetryRequest key_share")
}
if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); curveID != X25519 && !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve")
}
params, err := generateECDHEParameters(c.config.rand(), curveID)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
hs.ecdheParams = params
hs.hello.keyShares = []keyShare{{group: curveID, data: params.PublicKey()}}
}
hs.hello.raw = nil
if len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) > 0 {
pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(hs.session.cipherSuite)
if pskSuite == nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
if pskSuite.hash == hs.suite.hash {
// Update binders and obfuscated_ticket_age.
ticketAge := uint32(c.config.time().Sub(hs.session.receivedAt) / time.Millisecond)
hs.hello.pskIdentities[0].obfuscatedTicketAge = ticketAge + hs.session.ageAdd
transcript := hs.suite.hash.New()
transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
transcript.Write(chHash)
transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshalWithoutBinders())
pskBinders := [][]byte{hs.suite.finishedHash(hs.binderKey, transcript)}
hs.hello.updateBinders(pskBinders)
} else {
// Server selected a cipher suite incompatible with the PSK.
hs.hello.pskIdentities = nil
hs.hello.pskBinders = nil
}
}
if hs.hello.earlyData && c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT != nil {
c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT()
}
hs.hello.earlyData = false // disable 0-RTT
hs.transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
serverHello, ok := msg.(*serverHelloMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(serverHello, msg)
}
hs.serverHello = serverHello
if err := hs.checkServerHelloOrHRR(); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processServerHello() error {
c := hs.c
if bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.random, helloRetryRequestRandom) {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return errors.New("tls: server sent two HelloRetryRequest messages")
}
if len(hs.serverHello.cookie) != 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
return errors.New("tls: server sent a cookie in a normal ServerHello")
}
if hs.serverHello.selectedGroup != 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
return errors.New("tls: malformed key_share extension")
}
if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group == 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server did not send a key share")
}
if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group != hs.ecdheParams.CurveID() {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported group")
}
if !hs.serverHello.selectedIdentityPresent {
return nil
}
if int(hs.serverHello.selectedIdentity) >= len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid PSK")
}
if len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) != 1 || hs.session == nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(hs.session.cipherSuite)
if pskSuite == nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
if pskSuite.hash != hs.suite.hash {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid PSK and cipher suite pair")
}
hs.usingPSK = true
c.didResume = true
c.peerCertificates = hs.session.serverCertificates
c.verifiedChains = hs.session.verifiedChains
c.ocspResponse = hs.session.ocspResponse
c.scts = hs.session.scts
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) establishHandshakeKeys() error {
c := hs.c
sharedKey := hs.ecdheParams.SharedKey(hs.serverHello.serverShare.data)
if sharedKey == nil {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: invalid server key share")
}
earlySecret := hs.earlySecret
if !hs.usingPSK {
earlySecret = hs.suite.extract(nil, nil)
}
handshakeSecret := hs.suite.extract(sharedKey,
hs.suite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, "derived", nil))
clientSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(handshakeSecret,
clientHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
c.out.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, clientSecret)
c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, clientSecret)
serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(handshakeSecret,
serverHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
c.in.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, serverSecret)
c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret)
err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientHandshake, hs.hello.random, clientSecret)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerHandshake, hs.hello.random, serverSecret)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
hs.masterSecret = hs.suite.extract(nil,
hs.suite.deriveSecret(handshakeSecret, "derived", nil))
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerParameters() error {
c := hs.c
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
encryptedExtensions, ok := msg.(*encryptedExtensionsMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(encryptedExtensions, msg)
}
// Notify the caller if 0-RTT was rejected.
if !encryptedExtensions.earlyData && hs.hello.earlyData && c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT != nil {
c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT()
}
c.used0RTT = encryptedExtensions.earlyData
if hs.c.extraConfig != nil && hs.c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions != nil {
hs.c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions(typeEncryptedExtensions, encryptedExtensions.additionalExtensions)
}
hs.transcript.Write(encryptedExtensions.marshal())
if err := checkALPN(hs.hello.alpnProtocols, encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
return err
}
c.clientProtocol = encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol
if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.EnforceNextProtoSelection {
if len(encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol) == 0 {
// the server didn't select an ALPN
c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol)
return errors.New("ALPN negotiation failed. Server didn't offer any protocols")
}
}
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerCertificate() error {
c := hs.c
// Either a PSK or a certificate is always used, but not both.
// See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.1.
if hs.usingPSK {
// Make sure the connection is still being verified whether or not this
// is a resumption. Resumptions currently don't reverify certificates so
// they don't call verifyServerCertificate. See Issue 31641.
if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return err
}
}
return nil
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsgTLS13)
if ok {
hs.transcript.Write(certReq.marshal())
hs.certReq = certReq
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsgTLS13)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
}
if len(certMsg.certificate.Certificate) == 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
return errors.New("tls: received empty certificates message")
}
hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
c.scts = certMsg.certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps
c.ocspResponse = certMsg.certificate.OCSPStaple
if err := c.verifyServerCertificate(certMsg.certificate.Certificate); err != nil {
return err
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
}
// See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3.
if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, supportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
}
sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm)
if err != nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
if sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigHash == crypto.SHA1 {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
}
signed := signedMessage(sigHash, serverSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey,
sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the server certificate: " + err.Error())
}
hs.transcript.Write(certVerify.marshal())
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerFinished() error {
c := hs.c
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
finished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(finished, msg)
}
expectedMAC := hs.suite.finishedHash(c.in.trafficSecret, hs.transcript)
if !hmac.Equal(expectedMAC, finished.verifyData) {
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
return errors.New("tls: invalid server finished hash")
}
hs.transcript.Write(finished.marshal())
// Derive secrets that take context through the server Finished.
hs.trafficSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
clientApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
serverApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
c.in.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, serverSecret)
c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret)
err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientTraffic, hs.hello.random, hs.trafficSecret)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerTraffic, hs.hello.random, serverSecret)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
c.ekm = hs.suite.exportKeyingMaterial(hs.masterSecret, hs.transcript)
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientCertificate() error {
c := hs.c
if hs.certReq == nil {
return nil
}
cert, err := c.getClientCertificate(toCertificateRequestInfo(&certificateRequestInfo{
AcceptableCAs: hs.certReq.certificateAuthorities,
SignatureSchemes: hs.certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms,
Version: c.vers,
ctx: hs.ctx,
}))
if err != nil {
return err
}
certMsg := new(certificateMsgTLS13)
certMsg.certificate = *cert
certMsg.scts = hs.certReq.scts && len(cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps) > 0
certMsg.ocspStapling = hs.certReq.ocspStapling && len(cert.OCSPStaple) > 0
hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
// If we sent an empty certificate message, skip the CertificateVerify.
if len(cert.Certificate) == 0 {
return nil
}
certVerifyMsg := new(certificateVerifyMsg)
certVerifyMsg.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true
certVerifyMsg.signatureAlgorithm, err = selectSignatureScheme(c.vers, cert, hs.certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms)
if err != nil {
// getClientCertificate returned a certificate incompatible with the
// CertificateRequestInfo supported signature algorithms.
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return err
}
sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerifyMsg.signatureAlgorithm)
if err != nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
signed := signedMessage(sigHash, clientSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash)
if sigType == signatureRSAPSS {
signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash}
}
sig, err := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Sign(c.config.rand(), signed, signOpts)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return errors.New("tls: failed to sign handshake: " + err.Error())
}
certVerifyMsg.signature = sig
hs.transcript.Write(certVerifyMsg.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerifyMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientFinished() error {
c := hs.c
finished := &finishedMsg{
verifyData: hs.suite.finishedHash(c.out.trafficSecret, hs.transcript),
}
hs.transcript.Write(finished.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
c.out.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret)
c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret)
if !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled && c.config.ClientSessionCache != nil {
c.resumptionSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
resumptionLabel, hs.transcript)
}
return nil
}
func (c *Conn) handleNewSessionTicket(msg *newSessionTicketMsgTLS13) error {
if !c.isClient {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return errors.New("tls: received new session ticket from a client")
}
if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled || c.config.ClientSessionCache == nil {
return nil
}
// See RFC 8446, Section 4.6.1.
if msg.lifetime == 0 {
return nil
}
lifetime := time.Duration(msg.lifetime) * time.Second
if lifetime > maxSessionTicketLifetime {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: received a session ticket with invalid lifetime")
}
cipherSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(c.cipherSuite)
if cipherSuite == nil || c.resumptionSecret == nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
// We need to save the max_early_data_size that the server sent us, in order
// to decide if we're going to try 0-RTT with this ticket.
// However, at the same time, the qtls.ClientSessionTicket needs to be equal to
// the tls.ClientSessionTicket, so we can't just add a new field to the struct.
// We therefore abuse the nonce field (which is a byte slice)
nonceWithEarlyData := make([]byte, len(msg.nonce)+4)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(nonceWithEarlyData, msg.maxEarlyData)
copy(nonceWithEarlyData[4:], msg.nonce)
var appData []byte
if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.GetAppDataForSessionState != nil {
appData = c.extraConfig.GetAppDataForSessionState()
}
var b cryptobyte.Builder
b.AddUint16(clientSessionStateVersion) // revision
b.AddUint32(msg.maxEarlyData)
b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(appData)
})
b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(msg.nonce)
})
// Save the resumption_master_secret and nonce instead of deriving the PSK
// to do the least amount of work on NewSessionTicket messages before we
// know if the ticket will be used. Forward secrecy of resumed connections
// is guaranteed by the requirement for pskModeDHE.
session := &clientSessionState{
sessionTicket: msg.label,
vers: c.vers,
cipherSuite: c.cipherSuite,
masterSecret: c.resumptionSecret,
serverCertificates: c.peerCertificates,
verifiedChains: c.verifiedChains,
receivedAt: c.config.time(),
nonce: b.BytesOrPanic(),
useBy: c.config.time().Add(lifetime),
ageAdd: msg.ageAdd,
ocspResponse: c.ocspResponse,
scts: c.scts,
}
cacheKey := clientSessionCacheKey(c.conn.RemoteAddr(), c.config)
c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, toClientSessionState(session))
return nil
}

1831
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/handshake_messages.go generated vendored
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913
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/handshake_server.go generated vendored
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@ -1,913 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package qtls
import (
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/subtle"
"crypto/x509"
"errors"
"fmt"
"hash"
"io"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
)
// serverHandshakeState contains details of a server handshake in progress.
// It's discarded once the handshake has completed.
type serverHandshakeState struct {
c *Conn
ctx context.Context
clientHello *clientHelloMsg
hello *serverHelloMsg
suite *cipherSuite
ecdheOk bool
ecSignOk bool
rsaDecryptOk bool
rsaSignOk bool
sessionState *sessionState
finishedHash finishedHash
masterSecret []byte
cert *Certificate
}
// serverHandshake performs a TLS handshake as a server.
func (c *Conn) serverHandshake(ctx context.Context) error {
c.setAlternativeRecordLayer()
clientHello, err := c.readClientHello(ctx)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if c.vers == VersionTLS13 {
hs := serverHandshakeStateTLS13{
c: c,
ctx: ctx,
clientHello: clientHello,
}
return hs.handshake()
} else if c.extraConfig.usesAlternativeRecordLayer() {
// This should already have been caught by the check that the ClientHello doesn't
// offer any (supported) versions older than TLS 1.3.
// Check again to make sure we can't be tricked into using an older version.
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
return errors.New("tls: negotiated TLS < 1.3 when using QUIC")
}
hs := serverHandshakeState{
c: c,
ctx: ctx,
clientHello: clientHello,
}
return hs.handshake()
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) handshake() error {
c := hs.c
if err := hs.processClientHello(); err != nil {
return err
}
// For an overview of TLS handshaking, see RFC 5246, Section 7.3.
c.buffering = true
if hs.checkForResumption() {
// The client has included a session ticket and so we do an abbreviated handshake.
c.didResume = true
if err := hs.doResumeHandshake(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
return err
}
c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false
if err := hs.readFinished(nil); err != nil {
return err
}
} else {
// The client didn't include a session ticket, or it wasn't
// valid so we do a full handshake.
if err := hs.pickCipherSuite(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.readFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil {
return err
}
c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true
c.buffering = true
if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendFinished(nil); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1)
c.updateConnectionState()
return nil
}
// readClientHello reads a ClientHello message and selects the protocol version.
func (c *Conn) readClientHello(ctx context.Context) (*clientHelloMsg, error) {
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
clientHello, ok := msg.(*clientHelloMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return nil, unexpectedMessageError(clientHello, msg)
}
var configForClient *config
originalConfig := c.config
if c.config.GetConfigForClient != nil {
chi := newClientHelloInfo(ctx, c, clientHello)
if cfc, err := c.config.GetConfigForClient(chi); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return nil, err
} else if cfc != nil {
configForClient = fromConfig(cfc)
c.config = configForClient
}
}
c.ticketKeys = originalConfig.ticketKeys(configForClient)
clientVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions
if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 {
clientVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers)
}
if c.extraConfig.usesAlternativeRecordLayer() {
// In QUIC, the client MUST NOT offer any old TLS versions.
// Here, we can only check that none of the other supported versions of this library
// (TLS 1.0 - TLS 1.2) is offered. We don't check for any SSL versions here.
for _, ver := range clientVersions {
if ver == VersionTLS13 {
continue
}
for _, v := range supportedVersions {
if ver == v {
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered old TLS version %#x", ver)
}
}
}
// Make the config we're using allows us to use TLS 1.3.
if c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer) < VersionTLS13 {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return nil, errors.New("tls: MaxVersion prevents QUIC from using TLS 1.3")
}
}
c.vers, ok = c.config.mutualVersion(roleServer, clientVersions)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered only unsupported versions: %x", clientVersions)
}
c.haveVers = true
c.in.version = c.vers
c.out.version = c.vers
return clientHello, nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) processClientHello() error {
c := hs.c
hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg)
hs.hello.vers = c.vers
foundCompression := false
// We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it.
for _, compression := range hs.clientHello.compressionMethods {
if compression == compressionNone {
foundCompression = true
break
}
}
if !foundCompression {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: client does not support uncompressed connections")
}
hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32)
serverRandom := hs.hello.random
// Downgrade protection canaries. See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.3.
maxVers := c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer)
if maxVers >= VersionTLS12 && c.vers < maxVers || testingOnlyForceDowngradeCanary {
if c.vers == VersionTLS12 {
copy(serverRandom[24:], downgradeCanaryTLS12)
} else {
copy(serverRandom[24:], downgradeCanaryTLS11)
}
serverRandom = serverRandom[:24]
}
_, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), serverRandom)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension")
}
hs.hello.secureRenegotiationSupported = hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiationSupported
hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone
if len(hs.clientHello.serverName) > 0 {
c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName
}
selectedProto, err := negotiateALPN(c.config.NextProtos, hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol)
return err
}
hs.hello.alpnProtocol = selectedProto
c.clientProtocol = selectedProto
hs.cert, err = c.config.getCertificate(newClientHelloInfo(hs.ctx, c, hs.clientHello))
if err != nil {
if err == errNoCertificates {
c.sendAlert(alertUnrecognizedName)
} else {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
return err
}
if hs.clientHello.scts {
hs.hello.scts = hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps
}
hs.ecdheOk = supportsECDHE(c.config, hs.clientHello.supportedCurves, hs.clientHello.supportedPoints)
if hs.ecdheOk && len(hs.clientHello.supportedPoints) > 0 {
// Although omitting the ec_point_formats extension is permitted, some
// old OpenSSL version will refuse to handshake if not present.
//
// Per RFC 4492, section 5.1.2, implementations MUST support the
// uncompressed point format. See golang.org/issue/31943.
hs.hello.supportedPoints = []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed}
}
if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer); ok {
switch priv.Public().(type) {
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
hs.ecSignOk = true
case ed25519.PublicKey:
hs.ecSignOk = true
case *rsa.PublicKey:
hs.rsaSignOk = true
default:
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported signing key type (%T)", priv.Public())
}
}
if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter); ok {
switch priv.Public().(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey:
hs.rsaDecryptOk = true
default:
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported decryption key type (%T)", priv.Public())
}
}
return nil
}
// negotiateALPN picks a shared ALPN protocol that both sides support in server
// preference order. If ALPN is not configured or the peer doesn't support it,
// it returns "" and no error.
func negotiateALPN(serverProtos, clientProtos []string) (string, error) {
if len(serverProtos) == 0 || len(clientProtos) == 0 {
return "", nil
}
var http11fallback bool
for _, s := range serverProtos {
for _, c := range clientProtos {
if s == c {
return s, nil
}
if s == "h2" && c == "http/1.1" {
http11fallback = true
}
}
}
// As a special case, let http/1.1 clients connect to h2 servers as if they
// didn't support ALPN. We used not to enforce protocol overlap, so over
// time a number of HTTP servers were configured with only "h2", but
// expected to accept connections from "http/1.1" clients. See Issue 46310.
if http11fallback {
return "", nil
}
return "", fmt.Errorf("tls: client requested unsupported application protocols (%s)", clientProtos)
}
// supportsECDHE returns whether ECDHE key exchanges can be used with this
// pre-TLS 1.3 client.
func supportsECDHE(c *config, supportedCurves []CurveID, supportedPoints []uint8) bool {
supportsCurve := false
for _, curve := range supportedCurves {
if c.supportsCurve(curve) {
supportsCurve = true
break
}
}
supportsPointFormat := false
for _, pointFormat := range supportedPoints {
if pointFormat == pointFormatUncompressed {
supportsPointFormat = true
break
}
}
// Per RFC 8422, Section 5.1.2, if the Supported Point Formats extension is
// missing, uncompressed points are supported. If supportedPoints is empty,
// the extension must be missing, as an empty extension body is rejected by
// the parser. See https://go.dev/issue/49126.
if len(supportedPoints) == 0 {
supportsPointFormat = true
}
return supportsCurve && supportsPointFormat
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) pickCipherSuite() error {
c := hs.c
preferenceOrder := cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder
if !hasAESGCMHardwareSupport || !aesgcmPreferred(hs.clientHello.cipherSuites) {
preferenceOrder = cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES
}
configCipherSuites := c.config.cipherSuites()
preferenceList := make([]uint16, 0, len(configCipherSuites))
for _, suiteID := range preferenceOrder {
for _, id := range configCipherSuites {
if id == suiteID {
preferenceList = append(preferenceList, id)
break
}
}
}
hs.suite = selectCipherSuite(preferenceList, hs.clientHello.cipherSuites, hs.cipherSuiteOk)
if hs.suite == nil {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server")
}
c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV {
// The client is doing a fallback connection. See RFC 7507.
if hs.clientHello.vers < c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer) {
c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback)
return errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback")
}
break
}
}
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) cipherSuiteOk(c *cipherSuite) bool {
if c.flags&suiteECDHE != 0 {
if !hs.ecdheOk {
return false
}
if c.flags&suiteECSign != 0 {
if !hs.ecSignOk {
return false
}
} else if !hs.rsaSignOk {
return false
}
} else if !hs.rsaDecryptOk {
return false
}
if hs.c.vers < VersionTLS12 && c.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 {
return false
}
return true
}
// checkForResumption reports whether we should perform resumption on this connection.
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkForResumption() bool {
c := hs.c
if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
return false
}
plaintext, usedOldKey := c.decryptTicket(hs.clientHello.sessionTicket)
if plaintext == nil {
return false
}
hs.sessionState = &sessionState{usedOldKey: usedOldKey}
ok := hs.sessionState.unmarshal(plaintext)
if !ok {
return false
}
createdAt := time.Unix(int64(hs.sessionState.createdAt), 0)
if c.config.time().Sub(createdAt) > maxSessionTicketLifetime {
return false
}
// Never resume a session for a different TLS version.
if c.vers != hs.sessionState.vers {
return false
}
cipherSuiteOk := false
// Check that the client is still offering the ciphersuite in the session.
for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
if id == hs.sessionState.cipherSuite {
cipherSuiteOk = true
break
}
}
if !cipherSuiteOk {
return false
}
// Check that we also support the ciphersuite from the session.
hs.suite = selectCipherSuite([]uint16{hs.sessionState.cipherSuite},
c.config.cipherSuites(), hs.cipherSuiteOk)
if hs.suite == nil {
return false
}
sessionHasClientCerts := len(hs.sessionState.certificates) != 0
needClientCerts := requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth)
if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts {
return false
}
if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
return false
}
return true
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doResumeHandshake() error {
c := hs.c
hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
// We echo the client's session ID in the ServerHello to let it know
// that we're doing a resumption.
hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId
hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.sessionState.usedOldKey
hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite)
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{
Certificate: hs.sessionState.certificates,
}); err != nil {
return err
}
if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return err
}
}
hs.masterSecret = hs.sessionState.masterSecret
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
c := hs.c
if hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0 {
hs.hello.ocspStapling = true
}
hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.clientHello.ticketSupported && !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled
hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(hs.c.vers, hs.suite)
if c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
// No need to keep a full record of the handshake if client
// certificates won't be used.
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
certMsg := new(certificateMsg)
certMsg.certificates = hs.cert.Certificate
hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
if hs.hello.ocspStapling {
certStatus := new(certificateStatusMsg)
certStatus.response = hs.cert.OCSPStaple
hs.finishedHash.Write(certStatus.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certStatus.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
}
keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers)
skx, err := keyAgreement.generateServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, hs.clientHello, hs.hello)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return err
}
if skx != nil {
hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, skx.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
}
var certReq *certificateRequestMsg
if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
// Request a client certificate
certReq = new(certificateRequestMsg)
certReq.certificateTypes = []byte{
byte(certTypeRSASign),
byte(certTypeECDSASign),
}
if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
certReq.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true
certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms
}
// An empty list of certificateAuthorities signals to
// the client that it may send any certificate in response
// to our request. When we know the CAs we trust, then
// we can send them down, so that the client can choose
// an appropriate certificate to give to us.
if c.config.ClientCAs != nil {
certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects()
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
}
helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg)
hs.finishedHash.Write(helloDone.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloDone.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
return err
}
var pub crypto.PublicKey // public key for client auth, if any
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
// If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a
// certificate message, even if it's empty.
if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{
Certificate: certMsg.certificates,
}); err != nil {
return err
}
if len(certMsg.certificates) != 0 {
pub = c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return err
}
}
// Get client key exchange
ckx, ok := msg.(*clientKeyExchangeMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(ckx, msg)
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
preMasterSecret, err := keyAgreement.processClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, ckx, c.vers)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return err
}
hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelTLS12, hs.clientHello.random, hs.masterSecret); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
// If we received a client cert in response to our certificate request message,
// the client will send us a certificateVerifyMsg immediately after the
// clientKeyExchangeMsg. This message is a digest of all preceding
// handshake-layer messages that is signed using the private key corresponding
// to the client's certificate. This allows us to verify that the client is in
// possession of the private key of the certificate.
if len(c.peerCertificates) > 0 {
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
}
var sigType uint8
var sigHash crypto.Hash
if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: client certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
}
sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm)
if err != nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
} else {
sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(pub)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return err
}
}
signed := hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(sigType, sigHash, hs.masterSecret)
if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, pub, sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the client certificate: " + err.Error())
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
}
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) establishKeys() error {
c := hs.c
clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen)
var clientCipher, serverCipher any
var clientHash, serverHash hash.Hash
if hs.suite.aead == nil {
clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, true /* for reading */)
clientHash = hs.suite.mac(clientMAC)
serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, false /* not for reading */)
serverHash = hs.suite.mac(serverMAC)
} else {
clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV)
serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV)
}
c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash)
c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash)
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error {
c := hs.c
if err := c.readChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
return err
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
clientFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(clientFinished, msg)
}
verify := hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret)
if len(verify) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) ||
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: client's Finished message is incorrect")
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(clientFinished.marshal())
copy(out, verify)
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendSessionTicket() error {
// ticketSupported is set in a resumption handshake if the
// ticket from the client was encrypted with an old session
// ticket key and thus a refreshed ticket should be sent.
if !hs.hello.ticketSupported {
return nil
}
c := hs.c
m := new(newSessionTicketMsg)
createdAt := uint64(c.config.time().Unix())
if hs.sessionState != nil {
// If this is re-wrapping an old key, then keep
// the original time it was created.
createdAt = hs.sessionState.createdAt
}
var certsFromClient [][]byte
for _, cert := range c.peerCertificates {
certsFromClient = append(certsFromClient, cert.Raw)
}
state := sessionState{
vers: c.vers,
cipherSuite: hs.suite.id,
createdAt: createdAt,
masterSecret: hs.masterSecret,
certificates: certsFromClient,
}
var err error
m.ticket, err = c.encryptTicket(state.marshal())
if err != nil {
return err
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(m.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error {
c := hs.c
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil {
return err
}
finished := new(finishedMsg)
finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret)
hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
copy(out, finished.verifyData)
return nil
}
// processCertsFromClient takes a chain of client certificates either from a
// Certificates message or from a sessionState and verifies them. It returns
// the public key of the leaf certificate.
func (c *Conn) processCertsFromClient(certificate Certificate) error {
certificates := certificate.Certificate
certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certificates))
var err error
for i, asn1Data := range certificates {
if certs[i], err = x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate: " + err.Error())
}
}
if len(certs) == 0 && requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth) {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return errors.New("tls: client didn't provide a certificate")
}
if c.config.ClientAuth >= VerifyClientCertIfGiven && len(certs) > 0 {
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
Roots: c.config.ClientCAs,
CurrentTime: c.config.time(),
Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth},
}
for _, cert := range certs[1:] {
opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
}
chains, err := certs[0].Verify(opts)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return errors.New("tls: failed to verify client certificate: " + err.Error())
}
c.verifiedChains = chains
}
c.peerCertificates = certs
c.ocspResponse = certificate.OCSPStaple
c.scts = certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps
if len(certs) > 0 {
switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) {
case *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey, ed25519.PublicKey:
default:
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
return fmt.Errorf("tls: client certificate contains an unsupported public key of type %T", certs[0].PublicKey)
}
}
if c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil {
if err := c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate(certificates, c.verifiedChains); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func newClientHelloInfo(ctx context.Context, c *Conn, clientHello *clientHelloMsg) *ClientHelloInfo {
supportedVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions
if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 {
supportedVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers)
}
return toClientHelloInfo(&clientHelloInfo{
CipherSuites: clientHello.cipherSuites,
ServerName: clientHello.serverName,
SupportedCurves: clientHello.supportedCurves,
SupportedPoints: clientHello.supportedPoints,
SignatureSchemes: clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms,
SupportedProtos: clientHello.alpnProtocols,
SupportedVersions: supportedVersions,
Conn: c.conn,
config: toConfig(c.config),
ctx: ctx,
})
}

898
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/handshake_server_tls13.go generated vendored
View file

@ -1,898 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package qtls
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/rsa"
"errors"
"hash"
"io"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
)
// maxClientPSKIdentities is the number of client PSK identities the server will
// attempt to validate. It will ignore the rest not to let cheap ClientHello
// messages cause too much work in session ticket decryption attempts.
const maxClientPSKIdentities = 5
type serverHandshakeStateTLS13 struct {
c *Conn
ctx context.Context
clientHello *clientHelloMsg
hello *serverHelloMsg
alpnNegotiationErr error
encryptedExtensions *encryptedExtensionsMsg
sentDummyCCS bool
usingPSK bool
suite *cipherSuiteTLS13
cert *Certificate
sigAlg SignatureScheme
earlySecret []byte
sharedKey []byte
handshakeSecret []byte
masterSecret []byte
trafficSecret []byte // client_application_traffic_secret_0
transcript hash.Hash
clientFinished []byte
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
c := hs.c
// For an overview of the TLS 1.3 handshake, see RFC 8446, Section 2.
if err := hs.processClientHello(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.checkForResumption(); err != nil {
return err
}
c.updateConnectionState()
if err := hs.pickCertificate(); err != nil {
return err
}
c.buffering = true
if err := hs.sendServerParameters(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendServerCertificate(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendServerFinished(); err != nil {
return err
}
// Note that at this point we could start sending application data without
// waiting for the client's second flight, but the application might not
// expect the lack of replay protection of the ClientHello parameters.
if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.readClientCertificate(); err != nil {
return err
}
c.updateConnectionState()
if err := hs.readClientFinished(); err != nil {
return err
}
atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1)
c.updateConnectionState()
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) processClientHello() error {
c := hs.c
hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg)
hs.encryptedExtensions = new(encryptedExtensionsMsg)
// TLS 1.3 froze the ServerHello.legacy_version field, and uses
// supported_versions instead. See RFC 8446, sections 4.1.3 and 4.2.1.
hs.hello.vers = VersionTLS12
hs.hello.supportedVersion = c.vers
if len(hs.clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: client used the legacy version field to negotiate TLS 1.3")
}
// Abort if the client is doing a fallback and landing lower than what we
// support. See RFC 7507, which however does not specify the interaction
// with supported_versions. The only difference is that with
// supported_versions a client has a chance to attempt a [TLS 1.2, TLS 1.4]
// handshake in case TLS 1.3 is broken but 1.2 is not. Alas, in that case,
// it will have to drop the TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV protection if it falls back to
// TLS 1.2, because a TLS 1.3 server would abort here. The situation before
// supported_versions was not better because there was just no way to do a
// TLS 1.4 handshake without risking the server selecting TLS 1.3.
for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV {
// Use c.vers instead of max(supported_versions) because an attacker
// could defeat this by adding an arbitrary high version otherwise.
if c.vers < c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer) {
c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback)
return errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback")
}
break
}
}
if len(hs.clientHello.compressionMethods) != 1 ||
hs.clientHello.compressionMethods[0] != compressionNone {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: TLS 1.3 client supports illegal compression methods")
}
hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hs.hello.random); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension")
}
hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId
hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone
if hs.suite == nil {
var preferenceList []uint16
for _, suiteID := range c.config.CipherSuites {
for _, suite := range cipherSuitesTLS13 {
if suite.id == suiteID {
preferenceList = append(preferenceList, suiteID)
break
}
}
}
if len(preferenceList) == 0 {
preferenceList = defaultCipherSuitesTLS13
if !hasAESGCMHardwareSupport || !aesgcmPreferred(hs.clientHello.cipherSuites) {
preferenceList = defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES
}
}
for _, suiteID := range preferenceList {
hs.suite = mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(hs.clientHello.cipherSuites, suiteID)
if hs.suite != nil {
break
}
}
}
if hs.suite == nil {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server")
}
c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
hs.transcript = hs.suite.hash.New()
// Pick the ECDHE group in server preference order, but give priority to
// groups with a key share, to avoid a HelloRetryRequest round-trip.
var selectedGroup CurveID
var clientKeyShare *keyShare
GroupSelection:
for _, preferredGroup := range c.config.curvePreferences() {
for _, ks := range hs.clientHello.keyShares {
if ks.group == preferredGroup {
selectedGroup = ks.group
clientKeyShare = &ks
break GroupSelection
}
}
if selectedGroup != 0 {
continue
}
for _, group := range hs.clientHello.supportedCurves {
if group == preferredGroup {
selectedGroup = group
break
}
}
}
if selectedGroup == 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: no ECDHE curve supported by both client and server")
}
if clientKeyShare == nil {
if err := hs.doHelloRetryRequest(selectedGroup); err != nil {
return err
}
clientKeyShare = &hs.clientHello.keyShares[0]
}
if _, ok := curveForCurveID(selectedGroup); selectedGroup != X25519 && !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve")
}
params, err := generateECDHEParameters(c.config.rand(), selectedGroup)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
hs.hello.serverShare = keyShare{group: selectedGroup, data: params.PublicKey()}
hs.sharedKey = params.SharedKey(clientKeyShare.data)
if hs.sharedKey == nil {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: invalid client key share")
}
c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName
if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions != nil {
c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions(typeClientHello, hs.clientHello.additionalExtensions)
}
selectedProto, err := negotiateALPN(c.config.NextProtos, hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols)
if err != nil {
hs.alpnNegotiationErr = err
}
hs.encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol = selectedProto
c.clientProtocol = selectedProto
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) checkForResumption() error {
c := hs.c
if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
return nil
}
modeOK := false
for _, mode := range hs.clientHello.pskModes {
if mode == pskModeDHE {
modeOK = true
break
}
}
if !modeOK {
return nil
}
if len(hs.clientHello.pskIdentities) != len(hs.clientHello.pskBinders) {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: invalid or missing PSK binders")
}
if len(hs.clientHello.pskIdentities) == 0 {
return nil
}
for i, identity := range hs.clientHello.pskIdentities {
if i >= maxClientPSKIdentities {
break
}
plaintext, _ := c.decryptTicket(identity.label)
if plaintext == nil {
continue
}
sessionState := new(sessionStateTLS13)
if ok := sessionState.unmarshal(plaintext); !ok {
continue
}
if hs.clientHello.earlyData {
if sessionState.maxEarlyData == 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
return errors.New("tls: client sent unexpected early data")
}
if hs.alpnNegotiationErr == nil && sessionState.alpn == c.clientProtocol &&
c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.MaxEarlyData > 0 &&
c.extraConfig.Accept0RTT != nil && c.extraConfig.Accept0RTT(sessionState.appData) {
hs.encryptedExtensions.earlyData = true
c.used0RTT = true
}
}
createdAt := time.Unix(int64(sessionState.createdAt), 0)
if c.config.time().Sub(createdAt) > maxSessionTicketLifetime {
continue
}
// We don't check the obfuscated ticket age because it's affected by
// clock skew and it's only a freshness signal useful for shrinking the
// window for replay attacks, which don't affect us as we don't do 0-RTT.
pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(sessionState.cipherSuite)
if pskSuite == nil || pskSuite.hash != hs.suite.hash {
continue
}
// PSK connections don't re-establish client certificates, but carry
// them over in the session ticket. Ensure the presence of client certs
// in the ticket is consistent with the configured requirements.
sessionHasClientCerts := len(sessionState.certificate.Certificate) != 0
needClientCerts := requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth)
if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts {
continue
}
if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
continue
}
psk := hs.suite.expandLabel(sessionState.resumptionSecret, "resumption",
nil, hs.suite.hash.Size())
hs.earlySecret = hs.suite.extract(psk, nil)
binderKey := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.earlySecret, resumptionBinderLabel, nil)
// Clone the transcript in case a HelloRetryRequest was recorded.
transcript := cloneHash(hs.transcript, hs.suite.hash)
if transcript == nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return errors.New("tls: internal error: failed to clone hash")
}
transcript.Write(hs.clientHello.marshalWithoutBinders())
pskBinder := hs.suite.finishedHash(binderKey, transcript)
if !hmac.Equal(hs.clientHello.pskBinders[i], pskBinder) {
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
return errors.New("tls: invalid PSK binder")
}
c.didResume = true
if err := c.processCertsFromClient(sessionState.certificate); err != nil {
return err
}
h := cloneHash(hs.transcript, hs.suite.hash)
h.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
if hs.encryptedExtensions.earlyData {
clientEarlySecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.earlySecret, "c e traffic", h)
c.in.exportKey(Encryption0RTT, hs.suite, clientEarlySecret)
if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelEarlyTraffic, hs.clientHello.random, clientEarlySecret); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
}
hs.hello.selectedIdentityPresent = true
hs.hello.selectedIdentity = uint16(i)
hs.usingPSK = true
return nil
}
return nil
}
// cloneHash uses the encoding.BinaryMarshaler and encoding.BinaryUnmarshaler
// interfaces implemented by standard library hashes to clone the state of in
// to a new instance of h. It returns nil if the operation fails.
func cloneHash(in hash.Hash, h crypto.Hash) hash.Hash {
// Recreate the interface to avoid importing encoding.
type binaryMarshaler interface {
MarshalBinary() (data []byte, err error)
UnmarshalBinary(data []byte) error
}
marshaler, ok := in.(binaryMarshaler)
if !ok {
return nil
}
state, err := marshaler.MarshalBinary()
if err != nil {
return nil
}
out := h.New()
unmarshaler, ok := out.(binaryMarshaler)
if !ok {
return nil
}
if err := unmarshaler.UnmarshalBinary(state); err != nil {
return nil
}
return out
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) pickCertificate() error {
c := hs.c
// Only one of PSK and certificates are used at a time.
if hs.usingPSK {
return nil
}
// signature_algorithms is required in TLS 1.3. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.3.
if len(hs.clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) == 0 {
return c.sendAlert(alertMissingExtension)
}
certificate, err := c.config.getCertificate(newClientHelloInfo(hs.ctx, c, hs.clientHello))
if err != nil {
if err == errNoCertificates {
c.sendAlert(alertUnrecognizedName)
} else {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
return err
}
hs.sigAlg, err = selectSignatureScheme(c.vers, certificate, hs.clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms)
if err != nil {
// getCertificate returned a certificate that is unsupported or
// incompatible with the client's signature algorithms.
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return err
}
hs.cert = certificate
return nil
}
// sendDummyChangeCipherSpec sends a ChangeCipherSpec record for compatibility
// with middleboxes that didn't implement TLS correctly. See RFC 8446, Appendix D.4.
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendDummyChangeCipherSpec() error {
if hs.sentDummyCCS {
return nil
}
hs.sentDummyCCS = true
_, err := hs.c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
return err
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) doHelloRetryRequest(selectedGroup CurveID) error {
c := hs.c
// The first ClientHello gets double-hashed into the transcript upon a
// HelloRetryRequest. See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.1.
hs.transcript.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
chHash := hs.transcript.Sum(nil)
hs.transcript.Reset()
hs.transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
hs.transcript.Write(chHash)
helloRetryRequest := &serverHelloMsg{
vers: hs.hello.vers,
random: helloRetryRequestRandom,
sessionId: hs.hello.sessionId,
cipherSuite: hs.hello.cipherSuite,
compressionMethod: hs.hello.compressionMethod,
supportedVersion: hs.hello.supportedVersion,
selectedGroup: selectedGroup,
}
hs.transcript.Write(helloRetryRequest.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloRetryRequest.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
return err
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
clientHello, ok := msg.(*clientHelloMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(clientHello, msg)
}
if len(clientHello.keyShares) != 1 || clientHello.keyShares[0].group != selectedGroup {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: client sent invalid key share in second ClientHello")
}
if clientHello.earlyData {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: client indicated early data in second ClientHello")
}
if illegalClientHelloChange(clientHello, hs.clientHello) {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: client illegally modified second ClientHello")
}
if clientHello.earlyData {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: client offered 0-RTT data in second ClientHello")
}
hs.clientHello = clientHello
return nil
}
// illegalClientHelloChange reports whether the two ClientHello messages are
// different, with the exception of the changes allowed before and after a
// HelloRetryRequest. See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.2.
func illegalClientHelloChange(ch, ch1 *clientHelloMsg) bool {
if len(ch.supportedVersions) != len(ch1.supportedVersions) ||
len(ch.cipherSuites) != len(ch1.cipherSuites) ||
len(ch.supportedCurves) != len(ch1.supportedCurves) ||
len(ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) != len(ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) ||
len(ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert) != len(ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert) ||
len(ch.alpnProtocols) != len(ch1.alpnProtocols) {
return true
}
for i := range ch.supportedVersions {
if ch.supportedVersions[i] != ch1.supportedVersions[i] {
return true
}
}
for i := range ch.cipherSuites {
if ch.cipherSuites[i] != ch1.cipherSuites[i] {
return true
}
}
for i := range ch.supportedCurves {
if ch.supportedCurves[i] != ch1.supportedCurves[i] {
return true
}
}
for i := range ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithms {
if ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithms[i] != ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithms[i] {
return true
}
}
for i := range ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert {
if ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert[i] != ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert[i] {
return true
}
}
for i := range ch.alpnProtocols {
if ch.alpnProtocols[i] != ch1.alpnProtocols[i] {
return true
}
}
return ch.vers != ch1.vers ||
!bytes.Equal(ch.random, ch1.random) ||
!bytes.Equal(ch.sessionId, ch1.sessionId) ||
!bytes.Equal(ch.compressionMethods, ch1.compressionMethods) ||
ch.serverName != ch1.serverName ||
ch.ocspStapling != ch1.ocspStapling ||
!bytes.Equal(ch.supportedPoints, ch1.supportedPoints) ||
ch.ticketSupported != ch1.ticketSupported ||
!bytes.Equal(ch.sessionTicket, ch1.sessionTicket) ||
ch.secureRenegotiationSupported != ch1.secureRenegotiationSupported ||
!bytes.Equal(ch.secureRenegotiation, ch1.secureRenegotiation) ||
ch.scts != ch1.scts ||
!bytes.Equal(ch.cookie, ch1.cookie) ||
!bytes.Equal(ch.pskModes, ch1.pskModes)
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerParameters() error {
c := hs.c
hs.transcript.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
hs.transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
return err
}
earlySecret := hs.earlySecret
if earlySecret == nil {
earlySecret = hs.suite.extract(nil, nil)
}
hs.handshakeSecret = hs.suite.extract(hs.sharedKey,
hs.suite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, "derived", nil))
clientSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.handshakeSecret,
clientHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
c.in.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, clientSecret)
c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, clientSecret)
serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.handshakeSecret,
serverHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
c.out.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, serverSecret)
c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret)
err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientHandshake, hs.clientHello.random, clientSecret)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerHandshake, hs.clientHello.random, serverSecret)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
if hs.alpnNegotiationErr != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol)
return hs.alpnNegotiationErr
}
if hs.c.extraConfig != nil && hs.c.extraConfig.GetExtensions != nil {
hs.encryptedExtensions.additionalExtensions = hs.c.extraConfig.GetExtensions(typeEncryptedExtensions)
}
hs.transcript.Write(hs.encryptedExtensions.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.encryptedExtensions.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) requestClientCert() bool {
return hs.c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert && !hs.usingPSK
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerCertificate() error {
c := hs.c
// Only one of PSK and certificates are used at a time.
if hs.usingPSK {
return nil
}
if hs.requestClientCert() {
// Request a client certificate
certReq := new(certificateRequestMsgTLS13)
certReq.ocspStapling = true
certReq.scts = true
certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms
if c.config.ClientCAs != nil {
certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects()
}
hs.transcript.Write(certReq.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
}
certMsg := new(certificateMsgTLS13)
certMsg.certificate = *hs.cert
certMsg.scts = hs.clientHello.scts && len(hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps) > 0
certMsg.ocspStapling = hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0
hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
certVerifyMsg := new(certificateVerifyMsg)
certVerifyMsg.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true
certVerifyMsg.signatureAlgorithm = hs.sigAlg
sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(hs.sigAlg)
if err != nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
signed := signedMessage(sigHash, serverSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash)
if sigType == signatureRSAPSS {
signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash}
}
sig, err := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Sign(c.config.rand(), signed, signOpts)
if err != nil {
public := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Public()
if rsaKey, ok := public.(*rsa.PublicKey); ok && sigType == signatureRSAPSS &&
rsaKey.N.BitLen()/8 < sigHash.Size()*2+2 { // key too small for RSA-PSS
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
} else {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
return errors.New("tls: failed to sign handshake: " + err.Error())
}
certVerifyMsg.signature = sig
hs.transcript.Write(certVerifyMsg.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerifyMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerFinished() error {
c := hs.c
finished := &finishedMsg{
verifyData: hs.suite.finishedHash(c.out.trafficSecret, hs.transcript),
}
hs.transcript.Write(finished.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
// Derive secrets that take context through the server Finished.
hs.masterSecret = hs.suite.extract(nil,
hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.handshakeSecret, "derived", nil))
hs.trafficSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
clientApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
serverApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
c.out.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, serverSecret)
c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret)
err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientTraffic, hs.clientHello.random, hs.trafficSecret)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerTraffic, hs.clientHello.random, serverSecret)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
c.ekm = hs.suite.exportKeyingMaterial(hs.masterSecret, hs.transcript)
// If we did not request client certificates, at this point we can
// precompute the client finished and roll the transcript forward to send
// session tickets in our first flight.
if !hs.requestClientCert() {
if err := hs.sendSessionTickets(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) shouldSendSessionTickets() bool {
if hs.c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
return false
}
// Don't send tickets the client wouldn't use. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.9.
for _, pskMode := range hs.clientHello.pskModes {
if pskMode == pskModeDHE {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendSessionTickets() error {
c := hs.c
hs.clientFinished = hs.suite.finishedHash(c.in.trafficSecret, hs.transcript)
finishedMsg := &finishedMsg{
verifyData: hs.clientFinished,
}
hs.transcript.Write(finishedMsg.marshal())
if !hs.shouldSendSessionTickets() {
return nil
}
c.resumptionSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
resumptionLabel, hs.transcript)
// Don't send session tickets when the alternative record layer is set.
// Instead, save the resumption secret on the Conn.
// Session tickets can then be generated by calling Conn.GetSessionTicket().
if hs.c.extraConfig != nil && hs.c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil {
return nil
}
m, err := hs.c.getSessionTicketMsg(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientCertificate() error {
c := hs.c
if !hs.requestClientCert() {
// Make sure the connection is still being verified whether or not
// the server requested a client certificate.
if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a
// certificate message. If it's empty, no CertificateVerify is sent.
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsgTLS13)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
}
hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
if err := c.processCertsFromClient(certMsg.certificate); err != nil {
return err
}
if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return err
}
}
if len(certMsg.certificate.Certificate) != 0 {
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
}
// See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3.
if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, supportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: client certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
}
sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm)
if err != nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
if sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigHash == crypto.SHA1 {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: client certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
}
signed := signedMessage(sigHash, clientSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey,
sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the client certificate: " + err.Error())
}
hs.transcript.Write(certVerify.marshal())
}
// If we waited until the client certificates to send session tickets, we
// are ready to do it now.
if err := hs.sendSessionTickets(); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientFinished() error {
c := hs.c
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
finished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(finished, msg)
}
if !hmac.Equal(hs.clientFinished, finished.verifyData) {
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
return errors.New("tls: invalid client finished hash")
}
c.in.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret)
c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret)
return nil
}

357
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/key_agreement.go generated vendored
View file

@ -1,357 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package qtls
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/md5"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/sha1"
"crypto/x509"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
)
// a keyAgreement implements the client and server side of a TLS key agreement
// protocol by generating and processing key exchange messages.
type keyAgreement interface {
// On the server side, the first two methods are called in order.
// In the case that the key agreement protocol doesn't use a
// ServerKeyExchange message, generateServerKeyExchange can return nil,
// nil.
generateServerKeyExchange(*config, *Certificate, *clientHelloMsg, *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error)
processClientKeyExchange(*config, *Certificate, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, uint16) ([]byte, error)
// On the client side, the next two methods are called in order.
// This method may not be called if the server doesn't send a
// ServerKeyExchange message.
processServerKeyExchange(*config, *clientHelloMsg, *serverHelloMsg, *x509.Certificate, *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error
generateClientKeyExchange(*config, *clientHelloMsg, *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error)
}
var errClientKeyExchange = errors.New("tls: invalid ClientKeyExchange message")
var errServerKeyExchange = errors.New("tls: invalid ServerKeyExchange message")
// rsaKeyAgreement implements the standard TLS key agreement where the client
// encrypts the pre-master secret to the server's public key.
type rsaKeyAgreement struct{}
func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) generateServerKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, hello *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error) {
return nil, nil
}
func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) processClientKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg, version uint16) ([]byte, error) {
if len(ckx.ciphertext) < 2 {
return nil, errClientKeyExchange
}
ciphertextLen := int(ckx.ciphertext[0])<<8 | int(ckx.ciphertext[1])
if ciphertextLen != len(ckx.ciphertext)-2 {
return nil, errClientKeyExchange
}
ciphertext := ckx.ciphertext[2:]
priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter)
if !ok {
return nil, errors.New("tls: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Decrypter")
}
// Perform constant time RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 decryption
preMasterSecret, err := priv.Decrypt(config.rand(), ciphertext, &rsa.PKCS1v15DecryptOptions{SessionKeyLen: 48})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// We don't check the version number in the premaster secret. For one,
// by checking it, we would leak information about the validity of the
// encrypted pre-master secret. Secondly, it provides only a small
// benefit against a downgrade attack and some implementations send the
// wrong version anyway. See the discussion at the end of section
// 7.4.7.1 of RFC 4346.
return preMasterSecret, nil
}
func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) processServerKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, serverHello *serverHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate, skx *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error {
return errors.New("tls: unexpected ServerKeyExchange")
}
func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) generateClientKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error) {
preMasterSecret := make([]byte, 48)
preMasterSecret[0] = byte(clientHello.vers >> 8)
preMasterSecret[1] = byte(clientHello.vers)
_, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), preMasterSecret[2:])
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
rsaKey, ok := cert.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
if !ok {
return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: server certificate contains incorrect key type for selected ciphersuite")
}
encrypted, err := rsa.EncryptPKCS1v15(config.rand(), rsaKey, preMasterSecret)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
ckx := new(clientKeyExchangeMsg)
ckx.ciphertext = make([]byte, len(encrypted)+2)
ckx.ciphertext[0] = byte(len(encrypted) >> 8)
ckx.ciphertext[1] = byte(len(encrypted))
copy(ckx.ciphertext[2:], encrypted)
return preMasterSecret, ckx, nil
}
// sha1Hash calculates a SHA1 hash over the given byte slices.
func sha1Hash(slices [][]byte) []byte {
hsha1 := sha1.New()
for _, slice := range slices {
hsha1.Write(slice)
}
return hsha1.Sum(nil)
}
// md5SHA1Hash implements TLS 1.0's hybrid hash function which consists of the
// concatenation of an MD5 and SHA1 hash.
func md5SHA1Hash(slices [][]byte) []byte {
md5sha1 := make([]byte, md5.Size+sha1.Size)
hmd5 := md5.New()
for _, slice := range slices {
hmd5.Write(slice)
}
copy(md5sha1, hmd5.Sum(nil))
copy(md5sha1[md5.Size:], sha1Hash(slices))
return md5sha1
}
// hashForServerKeyExchange hashes the given slices and returns their digest
// using the given hash function (for >= TLS 1.2) or using a default based on
// the sigType (for earlier TLS versions). For Ed25519 signatures, which don't
// do pre-hashing, it returns the concatenation of the slices.
func hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType uint8, hashFunc crypto.Hash, version uint16, slices ...[]byte) []byte {
if sigType == signatureEd25519 {
var signed []byte
for _, slice := range slices {
signed = append(signed, slice...)
}
return signed
}
if version >= VersionTLS12 {
h := hashFunc.New()
for _, slice := range slices {
h.Write(slice)
}
digest := h.Sum(nil)
return digest
}
if sigType == signatureECDSA {
return sha1Hash(slices)
}
return md5SHA1Hash(slices)
}
// ecdheKeyAgreement implements a TLS key agreement where the server
// generates an ephemeral EC public/private key pair and signs it. The
// pre-master secret is then calculated using ECDH. The signature may
// be ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA.
type ecdheKeyAgreement struct {
version uint16
isRSA bool
params ecdheParameters
// ckx and preMasterSecret are generated in processServerKeyExchange
// and returned in generateClientKeyExchange.
ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg
preMasterSecret []byte
}
func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) generateServerKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, hello *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error) {
var curveID CurveID
for _, c := range clientHello.supportedCurves {
if config.supportsCurve(c) {
curveID = c
break
}
}
if curveID == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("tls: no supported elliptic curves offered")
}
if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); curveID != X25519 && !ok {
return nil, errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve")
}
params, err := generateECDHEParameters(config.rand(), curveID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
ka.params = params
// See RFC 4492, Section 5.4.
ecdhePublic := params.PublicKey()
serverECDHEParams := make([]byte, 1+2+1+len(ecdhePublic))
serverECDHEParams[0] = 3 // named curve
serverECDHEParams[1] = byte(curveID >> 8)
serverECDHEParams[2] = byte(curveID)
serverECDHEParams[3] = byte(len(ecdhePublic))
copy(serverECDHEParams[4:], ecdhePublic)
priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: certificate private key of type %T does not implement crypto.Signer", cert.PrivateKey)
}
var signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme
var sigType uint8
var sigHash crypto.Hash
if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 {
signatureAlgorithm, err = selectSignatureScheme(ka.version, cert, clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
} else {
sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(priv.Public())
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
if (sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigType == signatureRSAPSS) != ka.isRSA {
return nil, errors.New("tls: certificate cannot be used with the selected cipher suite")
}
signed := hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType, sigHash, ka.version, clientHello.random, hello.random, serverECDHEParams)
signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash)
if sigType == signatureRSAPSS {
signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash}
}
sig, err := priv.Sign(config.rand(), signed, signOpts)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to sign ECDHE parameters: " + err.Error())
}
skx := new(serverKeyExchangeMsg)
sigAndHashLen := 0
if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 {
sigAndHashLen = 2
}
skx.key = make([]byte, len(serverECDHEParams)+sigAndHashLen+2+len(sig))
copy(skx.key, serverECDHEParams)
k := skx.key[len(serverECDHEParams):]
if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 {
k[0] = byte(signatureAlgorithm >> 8)
k[1] = byte(signatureAlgorithm)
k = k[2:]
}
k[0] = byte(len(sig) >> 8)
k[1] = byte(len(sig))
copy(k[2:], sig)
return skx, nil
}
func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) processClientKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg, version uint16) ([]byte, error) {
if len(ckx.ciphertext) == 0 || int(ckx.ciphertext[0]) != len(ckx.ciphertext)-1 {
return nil, errClientKeyExchange
}
preMasterSecret := ka.params.SharedKey(ckx.ciphertext[1:])
if preMasterSecret == nil {
return nil, errClientKeyExchange
}
return preMasterSecret, nil
}
func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) processServerKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, serverHello *serverHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate, skx *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error {
if len(skx.key) < 4 {
return errServerKeyExchange
}
if skx.key[0] != 3 { // named curve
return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported curve")
}
curveID := CurveID(skx.key[1])<<8 | CurveID(skx.key[2])
publicLen := int(skx.key[3])
if publicLen+4 > len(skx.key) {
return errServerKeyExchange
}
serverECDHEParams := skx.key[:4+publicLen]
publicKey := serverECDHEParams[4:]
sig := skx.key[4+publicLen:]
if len(sig) < 2 {
return errServerKeyExchange
}
if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); curveID != X25519 && !ok {
return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported curve")
}
params, err := generateECDHEParameters(config.rand(), curveID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
ka.params = params
ka.preMasterSecret = params.SharedKey(publicKey)
if ka.preMasterSecret == nil {
return errServerKeyExchange
}
ourPublicKey := params.PublicKey()
ka.ckx = new(clientKeyExchangeMsg)
ka.ckx.ciphertext = make([]byte, 1+len(ourPublicKey))
ka.ckx.ciphertext[0] = byte(len(ourPublicKey))
copy(ka.ckx.ciphertext[1:], ourPublicKey)
var sigType uint8
var sigHash crypto.Hash
if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 {
signatureAlgorithm := SignatureScheme(sig[0])<<8 | SignatureScheme(sig[1])
sig = sig[2:]
if len(sig) < 2 {
return errServerKeyExchange
}
if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(signatureAlgorithm, clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
return errors.New("tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
}
sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm)
if err != nil {
return err
}
} else {
sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(cert.PublicKey)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
if (sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigType == signatureRSAPSS) != ka.isRSA {
return errServerKeyExchange
}
sigLen := int(sig[0])<<8 | int(sig[1])
if sigLen+2 != len(sig) {
return errServerKeyExchange
}
sig = sig[2:]
signed := hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType, sigHash, ka.version, clientHello.random, serverHello.random, serverECDHEParams)
if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, cert.PublicKey, sigHash, signed, sig); err != nil {
return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the server certificate: " + err.Error())
}
return nil
}
func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) generateClientKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error) {
if ka.ckx == nil {
return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: missing ServerKeyExchange message")
}
return ka.preMasterSecret, ka.ckx, nil
}

199
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/key_schedule.go generated vendored
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@ -1,199 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package qtls
import (
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/hmac"
"errors"
"hash"
"io"
"math/big"
"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
"golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519"
"golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf"
)
// This file contains the functions necessary to compute the TLS 1.3 key
// schedule. See RFC 8446, Section 7.
const (
resumptionBinderLabel = "res binder"
clientHandshakeTrafficLabel = "c hs traffic"
serverHandshakeTrafficLabel = "s hs traffic"
clientApplicationTrafficLabel = "c ap traffic"
serverApplicationTrafficLabel = "s ap traffic"
exporterLabel = "exp master"
resumptionLabel = "res master"
trafficUpdateLabel = "traffic upd"
)
// expandLabel implements HKDF-Expand-Label from RFC 8446, Section 7.1.
func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) expandLabel(secret []byte, label string, context []byte, length int) []byte {
var hkdfLabel cryptobyte.Builder
hkdfLabel.AddUint16(uint16(length))
hkdfLabel.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes([]byte("tls13 "))
b.AddBytes([]byte(label))
})
hkdfLabel.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(context)
})
out := make([]byte, length)
n, err := hkdf.Expand(c.hash.New, secret, hkdfLabel.BytesOrPanic()).Read(out)
if err != nil || n != length {
panic("tls: HKDF-Expand-Label invocation failed unexpectedly")
}
return out
}
// deriveSecret implements Derive-Secret from RFC 8446, Section 7.1.
func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) deriveSecret(secret []byte, label string, transcript hash.Hash) []byte {
if transcript == nil {
transcript = c.hash.New()
}
return c.expandLabel(secret, label, transcript.Sum(nil), c.hash.Size())
}
// extract implements HKDF-Extract with the cipher suite hash.
func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) extract(newSecret, currentSecret []byte) []byte {
if newSecret == nil {
newSecret = make([]byte, c.hash.Size())
}
return hkdf.Extract(c.hash.New, newSecret, currentSecret)
}
// nextTrafficSecret generates the next traffic secret, given the current one,
// according to RFC 8446, Section 7.2.
func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) nextTrafficSecret(trafficSecret []byte) []byte {
return c.expandLabel(trafficSecret, trafficUpdateLabel, nil, c.hash.Size())
}
// trafficKey generates traffic keys according to RFC 8446, Section 7.3.
func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) trafficKey(trafficSecret []byte) (key, iv []byte) {
key = c.expandLabel(trafficSecret, "key", nil, c.keyLen)
iv = c.expandLabel(trafficSecret, "iv", nil, aeadNonceLength)
return
}
// finishedHash generates the Finished verify_data or PskBinderEntry according
// to RFC 8446, Section 4.4.4. See sections 4.4 and 4.2.11.2 for the baseKey
// selection.
func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) finishedHash(baseKey []byte, transcript hash.Hash) []byte {
finishedKey := c.expandLabel(baseKey, "finished", nil, c.hash.Size())
verifyData := hmac.New(c.hash.New, finishedKey)
verifyData.Write(transcript.Sum(nil))
return verifyData.Sum(nil)
}
// exportKeyingMaterial implements RFC5705 exporters for TLS 1.3 according to
// RFC 8446, Section 7.5.
func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) exportKeyingMaterial(masterSecret []byte, transcript hash.Hash) func(string, []byte, int) ([]byte, error) {
expMasterSecret := c.deriveSecret(masterSecret, exporterLabel, transcript)
return func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) {
secret := c.deriveSecret(expMasterSecret, label, nil)
h := c.hash.New()
h.Write(context)
return c.expandLabel(secret, "exporter", h.Sum(nil), length), nil
}
}
// ecdheParameters implements Diffie-Hellman with either NIST curves or X25519,
// according to RFC 8446, Section 4.2.8.2.
type ecdheParameters interface {
CurveID() CurveID
PublicKey() []byte
SharedKey(peerPublicKey []byte) []byte
}
func generateECDHEParameters(rand io.Reader, curveID CurveID) (ecdheParameters, error) {
if curveID == X25519 {
privateKey := make([]byte, curve25519.ScalarSize)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, privateKey); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
publicKey, err := curve25519.X25519(privateKey, curve25519.Basepoint)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &x25519Parameters{privateKey: privateKey, publicKey: publicKey}, nil
}
curve, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID)
if !ok {
return nil, errors.New("tls: internal error: unsupported curve")
}
p := &nistParameters{curveID: curveID}
var err error
p.privateKey, p.x, p.y, err = elliptic.GenerateKey(curve, rand)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return p, nil
}
func curveForCurveID(id CurveID) (elliptic.Curve, bool) {
switch id {
case CurveP256:
return elliptic.P256(), true
case CurveP384:
return elliptic.P384(), true
case CurveP521:
return elliptic.P521(), true
default:
return nil, false
}
}
type nistParameters struct {
privateKey []byte
x, y *big.Int // public key
curveID CurveID
}
func (p *nistParameters) CurveID() CurveID {
return p.curveID
}
func (p *nistParameters) PublicKey() []byte {
curve, _ := curveForCurveID(p.curveID)
return elliptic.Marshal(curve, p.x, p.y)
}
func (p *nistParameters) SharedKey(peerPublicKey []byte) []byte {
curve, _ := curveForCurveID(p.curveID)
// Unmarshal also checks whether the given point is on the curve.
x, y := elliptic.Unmarshal(curve, peerPublicKey)
if x == nil {
return nil
}
xShared, _ := curve.ScalarMult(x, y, p.privateKey)
sharedKey := make([]byte, (curve.Params().BitSize+7)/8)
return xShared.FillBytes(sharedKey)
}
type x25519Parameters struct {
privateKey []byte
publicKey []byte
}
func (p *x25519Parameters) CurveID() CurveID {
return X25519
}
func (p *x25519Parameters) PublicKey() []byte {
return p.publicKey[:]
}
func (p *x25519Parameters) SharedKey(peerPublicKey []byte) []byte {
sharedKey, err := curve25519.X25519(p.privateKey, peerPublicKey)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
return sharedKey
}

283
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/prf.go generated vendored
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@ -1,283 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package qtls
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/md5"
"crypto/sha1"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/sha512"
"errors"
"fmt"
"hash"
)
// Split a premaster secret in two as specified in RFC 4346, Section 5.
func splitPreMasterSecret(secret []byte) (s1, s2 []byte) {
s1 = secret[0 : (len(secret)+1)/2]
s2 = secret[len(secret)/2:]
return
}
// pHash implements the P_hash function, as defined in RFC 4346, Section 5.
func pHash(result, secret, seed []byte, hash func() hash.Hash) {
h := hmac.New(hash, secret)
h.Write(seed)
a := h.Sum(nil)
j := 0
for j < len(result) {
h.Reset()
h.Write(a)
h.Write(seed)
b := h.Sum(nil)
copy(result[j:], b)
j += len(b)
h.Reset()
h.Write(a)
a = h.Sum(nil)
}
}
// prf10 implements the TLS 1.0 pseudo-random function, as defined in RFC 2246, Section 5.
func prf10(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
hashSHA1 := sha1.New
hashMD5 := md5.New
labelAndSeed := make([]byte, len(label)+len(seed))
copy(labelAndSeed, label)
copy(labelAndSeed[len(label):], seed)
s1, s2 := splitPreMasterSecret(secret)
pHash(result, s1, labelAndSeed, hashMD5)
result2 := make([]byte, len(result))
pHash(result2, s2, labelAndSeed, hashSHA1)
for i, b := range result2 {
result[i] ^= b
}
}
// prf12 implements the TLS 1.2 pseudo-random function, as defined in RFC 5246, Section 5.
func prf12(hashFunc func() hash.Hash) func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
return func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
labelAndSeed := make([]byte, len(label)+len(seed))
copy(labelAndSeed, label)
copy(labelAndSeed[len(label):], seed)
pHash(result, secret, labelAndSeed, hashFunc)
}
}
const (
masterSecretLength = 48 // Length of a master secret in TLS 1.1.
finishedVerifyLength = 12 // Length of verify_data in a Finished message.
)
var masterSecretLabel = []byte("master secret")
var keyExpansionLabel = []byte("key expansion")
var clientFinishedLabel = []byte("client finished")
var serverFinishedLabel = []byte("server finished")
func prfAndHashForVersion(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite) (func(result, secret, label, seed []byte), crypto.Hash) {
switch version {
case VersionTLS10, VersionTLS11:
return prf10, crypto.Hash(0)
case VersionTLS12:
if suite.flags&suiteSHA384 != 0 {
return prf12(sha512.New384), crypto.SHA384
}
return prf12(sha256.New), crypto.SHA256
default:
panic("unknown version")
}
}
func prfForVersion(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite) func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
prf, _ := prfAndHashForVersion(version, suite)
return prf
}
// masterFromPreMasterSecret generates the master secret from the pre-master
// secret. See RFC 5246, Section 8.1.
func masterFromPreMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, preMasterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte) []byte {
seed := make([]byte, 0, len(clientRandom)+len(serverRandom))
seed = append(seed, clientRandom...)
seed = append(seed, serverRandom...)
masterSecret := make([]byte, masterSecretLength)
prfForVersion(version, suite)(masterSecret, preMasterSecret, masterSecretLabel, seed)
return masterSecret
}
// keysFromMasterSecret generates the connection keys from the master
// secret, given the lengths of the MAC key, cipher key and IV, as defined in
// RFC 2246, Section 6.3.
func keysFromMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte, macLen, keyLen, ivLen int) (clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV []byte) {
seed := make([]byte, 0, len(serverRandom)+len(clientRandom))
seed = append(seed, serverRandom...)
seed = append(seed, clientRandom...)
n := 2*macLen + 2*keyLen + 2*ivLen
keyMaterial := make([]byte, n)
prfForVersion(version, suite)(keyMaterial, masterSecret, keyExpansionLabel, seed)
clientMAC = keyMaterial[:macLen]
keyMaterial = keyMaterial[macLen:]
serverMAC = keyMaterial[:macLen]
keyMaterial = keyMaterial[macLen:]
clientKey = keyMaterial[:keyLen]
keyMaterial = keyMaterial[keyLen:]
serverKey = keyMaterial[:keyLen]
keyMaterial = keyMaterial[keyLen:]
clientIV = keyMaterial[:ivLen]
keyMaterial = keyMaterial[ivLen:]
serverIV = keyMaterial[:ivLen]
return
}
func newFinishedHash(version uint16, cipherSuite *cipherSuite) finishedHash {
var buffer []byte
if version >= VersionTLS12 {
buffer = []byte{}
}
prf, hash := prfAndHashForVersion(version, cipherSuite)
if hash != 0 {
return finishedHash{hash.New(), hash.New(), nil, nil, buffer, version, prf}
}
return finishedHash{sha1.New(), sha1.New(), md5.New(), md5.New(), buffer, version, prf}
}
// A finishedHash calculates the hash of a set of handshake messages suitable
// for including in a Finished message.
type finishedHash struct {
client hash.Hash
server hash.Hash
// Prior to TLS 1.2, an additional MD5 hash is required.
clientMD5 hash.Hash
serverMD5 hash.Hash
// In TLS 1.2, a full buffer is sadly required.
buffer []byte
version uint16
prf func(result, secret, label, seed []byte)
}
func (h *finishedHash) Write(msg []byte) (n int, err error) {
h.client.Write(msg)
h.server.Write(msg)
if h.version < VersionTLS12 {
h.clientMD5.Write(msg)
h.serverMD5.Write(msg)
}
if h.buffer != nil {
h.buffer = append(h.buffer, msg...)
}
return len(msg), nil
}
func (h finishedHash) Sum() []byte {
if h.version >= VersionTLS12 {
return h.client.Sum(nil)
}
out := make([]byte, 0, md5.Size+sha1.Size)
out = h.clientMD5.Sum(out)
return h.client.Sum(out)
}
// clientSum returns the contents of the verify_data member of a client's
// Finished message.
func (h finishedHash) clientSum(masterSecret []byte) []byte {
out := make([]byte, finishedVerifyLength)
h.prf(out, masterSecret, clientFinishedLabel, h.Sum())
return out
}
// serverSum returns the contents of the verify_data member of a server's
// Finished message.
func (h finishedHash) serverSum(masterSecret []byte) []byte {
out := make([]byte, finishedVerifyLength)
h.prf(out, masterSecret, serverFinishedLabel, h.Sum())
return out
}
// hashForClientCertificate returns the handshake messages so far, pre-hashed if
// necessary, suitable for signing by a TLS client certificate.
func (h finishedHash) hashForClientCertificate(sigType uint8, hashAlg crypto.Hash, masterSecret []byte) []byte {
if (h.version >= VersionTLS12 || sigType == signatureEd25519) && h.buffer == nil {
panic("tls: handshake hash for a client certificate requested after discarding the handshake buffer")
}
if sigType == signatureEd25519 {
return h.buffer
}
if h.version >= VersionTLS12 {
hash := hashAlg.New()
hash.Write(h.buffer)
return hash.Sum(nil)
}
if sigType == signatureECDSA {
return h.server.Sum(nil)
}
return h.Sum()
}
// discardHandshakeBuffer is called when there is no more need to
// buffer the entirety of the handshake messages.
func (h *finishedHash) discardHandshakeBuffer() {
h.buffer = nil
}
// noExportedKeyingMaterial is used as a value of
// ConnectionState.ekm when renegotiation is enabled and thus
// we wish to fail all key-material export requests.
func noExportedKeyingMaterial(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) {
return nil, errors.New("crypto/tls: ExportKeyingMaterial is unavailable when renegotiation is enabled")
}
// ekmFromMasterSecret generates exported keying material as defined in RFC 5705.
func ekmFromMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte) func(string, []byte, int) ([]byte, error) {
return func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) {
switch label {
case "client finished", "server finished", "master secret", "key expansion":
// These values are reserved and may not be used.
return nil, fmt.Errorf("crypto/tls: reserved ExportKeyingMaterial label: %s", label)
}
seedLen := len(serverRandom) + len(clientRandom)
if context != nil {
seedLen += 2 + len(context)
}
seed := make([]byte, 0, seedLen)
seed = append(seed, clientRandom...)
seed = append(seed, serverRandom...)
if context != nil {
if len(context) >= 1<<16 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("crypto/tls: ExportKeyingMaterial context too long")
}
seed = append(seed, byte(len(context)>>8), byte(len(context)))
seed = append(seed, context...)
}
keyMaterial := make([]byte, length)
prfForVersion(version, suite)(keyMaterial, masterSecret, []byte(label), seed)
return keyMaterial, nil
}
}

274
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/ticket.go generated vendored
View file

@ -1,274 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package qtls
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"io"
"time"
"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
)
// sessionState contains the information that is serialized into a session
// ticket in order to later resume a connection.
type sessionState struct {
vers uint16
cipherSuite uint16
createdAt uint64
masterSecret []byte // opaque master_secret<1..2^16-1>;
// struct { opaque certificate<1..2^24-1> } Certificate;
certificates [][]byte // Certificate certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
// usedOldKey is true if the ticket from which this session came from
// was encrypted with an older key and thus should be refreshed.
usedOldKey bool
}
func (m *sessionState) marshal() []byte {
var b cryptobyte.Builder
b.AddUint16(m.vers)
b.AddUint16(m.cipherSuite)
addUint64(&b, m.createdAt)
b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(m.masterSecret)
})
b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
for _, cert := range m.certificates {
b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(cert)
})
}
})
return b.BytesOrPanic()
}
func (m *sessionState) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
*m = sessionState{usedOldKey: m.usedOldKey}
s := cryptobyte.String(data)
if ok := s.ReadUint16(&m.vers) &&
s.ReadUint16(&m.cipherSuite) &&
readUint64(&s, &m.createdAt) &&
readUint16LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.masterSecret) &&
len(m.masterSecret) != 0; !ok {
return false
}
var certList cryptobyte.String
if !s.ReadUint24LengthPrefixed(&certList) {
return false
}
for !certList.Empty() {
var cert []byte
if !readUint24LengthPrefixed(&certList, &cert) {
return false
}
m.certificates = append(m.certificates, cert)
}
return s.Empty()
}
// sessionStateTLS13 is the content of a TLS 1.3 session ticket. Its first
// version (revision = 0) doesn't carry any of the information needed for 0-RTT
// validation and the nonce is always empty.
// version (revision = 1) carries the max_early_data_size sent in the ticket.
// version (revision = 2) carries the ALPN sent in the ticket.
type sessionStateTLS13 struct {
// uint8 version = 0x0304;
// uint8 revision = 2;
cipherSuite uint16
createdAt uint64
resumptionSecret []byte // opaque resumption_master_secret<1..2^8-1>;
certificate Certificate // CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
maxEarlyData uint32
alpn string
appData []byte
}
func (m *sessionStateTLS13) marshal() []byte {
var b cryptobyte.Builder
b.AddUint16(VersionTLS13)
b.AddUint8(2) // revision
b.AddUint16(m.cipherSuite)
addUint64(&b, m.createdAt)
b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(m.resumptionSecret)
})
marshalCertificate(&b, m.certificate)
b.AddUint32(m.maxEarlyData)
b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes([]byte(m.alpn))
})
b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(m.appData)
})
return b.BytesOrPanic()
}
func (m *sessionStateTLS13) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
*m = sessionStateTLS13{}
s := cryptobyte.String(data)
var version uint16
var revision uint8
var alpn []byte
ret := s.ReadUint16(&version) &&
version == VersionTLS13 &&
s.ReadUint8(&revision) &&
revision == 2 &&
s.ReadUint16(&m.cipherSuite) &&
readUint64(&s, &m.createdAt) &&
readUint8LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.resumptionSecret) &&
len(m.resumptionSecret) != 0 &&
unmarshalCertificate(&s, &m.certificate) &&
s.ReadUint32(&m.maxEarlyData) &&
readUint8LengthPrefixed(&s, &alpn) &&
readUint16LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.appData) &&
s.Empty()
m.alpn = string(alpn)
return ret
}
func (c *Conn) encryptTicket(state []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if len(c.ticketKeys) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("tls: internal error: session ticket keys unavailable")
}
encrypted := make([]byte, ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize+len(state)+sha256.Size)
keyName := encrypted[:ticketKeyNameLen]
iv := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen : ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize]
macBytes := encrypted[len(encrypted)-sha256.Size:]
if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), iv); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
key := c.ticketKeys[0]
copy(keyName, key.keyName[:])
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key.aesKey[:])
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to create cipher while encrypting ticket: " + err.Error())
}
cipher.NewCTR(block, iv).XORKeyStream(encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize:], state)
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key.hmacKey[:])
mac.Write(encrypted[:len(encrypted)-sha256.Size])
mac.Sum(macBytes[:0])
return encrypted, nil
}
func (c *Conn) decryptTicket(encrypted []byte) (plaintext []byte, usedOldKey bool) {
if len(encrypted) < ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize+sha256.Size {
return nil, false
}
keyName := encrypted[:ticketKeyNameLen]
iv := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen : ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize]
macBytes := encrypted[len(encrypted)-sha256.Size:]
ciphertext := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize : len(encrypted)-sha256.Size]
keyIndex := -1
for i, candidateKey := range c.ticketKeys {
if bytes.Equal(keyName, candidateKey.keyName[:]) {
keyIndex = i
break
}
}
if keyIndex == -1 {
return nil, false
}
key := &c.ticketKeys[keyIndex]
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key.hmacKey[:])
mac.Write(encrypted[:len(encrypted)-sha256.Size])
expected := mac.Sum(nil)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(macBytes, expected) != 1 {
return nil, false
}
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key.aesKey[:])
if err != nil {
return nil, false
}
plaintext = make([]byte, len(ciphertext))
cipher.NewCTR(block, iv).XORKeyStream(plaintext, ciphertext)
return plaintext, keyIndex > 0
}
func (c *Conn) getSessionTicketMsg(appData []byte) (*newSessionTicketMsgTLS13, error) {
m := new(newSessionTicketMsgTLS13)
var certsFromClient [][]byte
for _, cert := range c.peerCertificates {
certsFromClient = append(certsFromClient, cert.Raw)
}
state := sessionStateTLS13{
cipherSuite: c.cipherSuite,
createdAt: uint64(c.config.time().Unix()),
resumptionSecret: c.resumptionSecret,
certificate: Certificate{
Certificate: certsFromClient,
OCSPStaple: c.ocspResponse,
SignedCertificateTimestamps: c.scts,
},
appData: appData,
alpn: c.clientProtocol,
}
if c.extraConfig != nil {
state.maxEarlyData = c.extraConfig.MaxEarlyData
}
var err error
m.label, err = c.encryptTicket(state.marshal())
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
m.lifetime = uint32(maxSessionTicketLifetime / time.Second)
// ticket_age_add is a random 32-bit value. See RFC 8446, section 4.6.1
// The value is not stored anywhere; we never need to check the ticket age
// because 0-RTT is not supported.
ageAdd := make([]byte, 4)
_, err = c.config.rand().Read(ageAdd)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
m.ageAdd = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(ageAdd)
// ticket_nonce, which must be unique per connection, is always left at
// zero because we only ever send one ticket per connection.
if c.extraConfig != nil {
m.maxEarlyData = c.extraConfig.MaxEarlyData
}
return m, nil
}
// GetSessionTicket generates a new session ticket.
// It should only be called after the handshake completes.
// It can only be used for servers, and only if the alternative record layer is set.
// The ticket may be nil if config.SessionTicketsDisabled is set,
// or if the client isn't able to receive session tickets.
func (c *Conn) GetSessionTicket(appData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if c.isClient || !c.handshakeComplete() || c.extraConfig == nil || c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer == nil {
return nil, errors.New("GetSessionTicket is only valid for servers after completion of the handshake, and if an alternative record layer is set.")
}
if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
return nil, nil
}
m, err := c.getSessionTicketMsg(appData)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return m.marshal(), nil
}

362
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/tls.go generated vendored
View file

@ -1,362 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// package qtls partially implements TLS 1.2, as specified in RFC 5246,
// and TLS 1.3, as specified in RFC 8446.
package qtls
// BUG(agl): The crypto/tls package only implements some countermeasures
// against Lucky13 attacks on CBC-mode encryption, and only on SHA1
// variants. See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/TLStiming.pdf and
// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html.
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"os"
"strings"
)
// Server returns a new TLS server side connection
// using conn as the underlying transport.
// The configuration config must be non-nil and must include
// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate.
func Server(conn net.Conn, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *Conn {
c := &Conn{
conn: conn,
config: fromConfig(config),
extraConfig: extraConfig,
}
c.handshakeFn = c.serverHandshake
return c
}
// Client returns a new TLS client side connection
// using conn as the underlying transport.
// The config cannot be nil: users must set either ServerName or
// InsecureSkipVerify in the config.
func Client(conn net.Conn, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *Conn {
c := &Conn{
conn: conn,
config: fromConfig(config),
extraConfig: extraConfig,
isClient: true,
}
c.handshakeFn = c.clientHandshake
return c
}
// A listener implements a network listener (net.Listener) for TLS connections.
type listener struct {
net.Listener
config *Config
extraConfig *ExtraConfig
}
// Accept waits for and returns the next incoming TLS connection.
// The returned connection is of type *Conn.
func (l *listener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) {
c, err := l.Listener.Accept()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return Server(c, l.config, l.extraConfig), nil
}
// NewListener creates a Listener which accepts connections from an inner
// Listener and wraps each connection with Server.
// The configuration config must be non-nil and must include
// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate.
func NewListener(inner net.Listener, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) net.Listener {
l := new(listener)
l.Listener = inner
l.config = config
l.extraConfig = extraConfig
return l
}
// Listen creates a TLS listener accepting connections on the
// given network address using net.Listen.
// The configuration config must be non-nil and must include
// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate.
func Listen(network, laddr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (net.Listener, error) {
if config == nil || len(config.Certificates) == 0 &&
config.GetCertificate == nil && config.GetConfigForClient == nil {
return nil, errors.New("tls: neither Certificates, GetCertificate, nor GetConfigForClient set in Config")
}
l, err := net.Listen(network, laddr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return NewListener(l, config, extraConfig), nil
}
type timeoutError struct{}
func (timeoutError) Error() string { return "tls: DialWithDialer timed out" }
func (timeoutError) Timeout() bool { return true }
func (timeoutError) Temporary() bool { return true }
// DialWithDialer connects to the given network address using dialer.Dial and
// then initiates a TLS handshake, returning the resulting TLS connection. Any
// timeout or deadline given in the dialer apply to connection and TLS
// handshake as a whole.
//
// DialWithDialer interprets a nil configuration as equivalent to the zero
// configuration; see the documentation of Config for the defaults.
//
// DialWithDialer uses context.Background internally; to specify the context,
// use Dialer.DialContext with NetDialer set to the desired dialer.
func DialWithDialer(dialer *net.Dialer, network, addr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (*Conn, error) {
return dial(context.Background(), dialer, network, addr, config, extraConfig)
}
func dial(ctx context.Context, netDialer *net.Dialer, network, addr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (*Conn, error) {
if netDialer.Timeout != 0 {
var cancel context.CancelFunc
ctx, cancel = context.WithTimeout(ctx, netDialer.Timeout)
defer cancel()
}
if !netDialer.Deadline.IsZero() {
var cancel context.CancelFunc
ctx, cancel = context.WithDeadline(ctx, netDialer.Deadline)
defer cancel()
}
rawConn, err := netDialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
colonPos := strings.LastIndex(addr, ":")
if colonPos == -1 {
colonPos = len(addr)
}
hostname := addr[:colonPos]
if config == nil {
config = defaultConfig()
}
// If no ServerName is set, infer the ServerName
// from the hostname we're connecting to.
if config.ServerName == "" {
// Make a copy to avoid polluting argument or default.
c := config.Clone()
c.ServerName = hostname
config = c
}
conn := Client(rawConn, config, extraConfig)
if err := conn.HandshakeContext(ctx); err != nil {
rawConn.Close()
return nil, err
}
return conn, nil
}
// Dial connects to the given network address using net.Dial
// and then initiates a TLS handshake, returning the resulting
// TLS connection.
// Dial interprets a nil configuration as equivalent to
// the zero configuration; see the documentation of Config
// for the defaults.
func Dial(network, addr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (*Conn, error) {
return DialWithDialer(new(net.Dialer), network, addr, config, extraConfig)
}
// Dialer dials TLS connections given a configuration and a Dialer for the
// underlying connection.
type Dialer struct {
// NetDialer is the optional dialer to use for the TLS connections'
// underlying TCP connections.
// A nil NetDialer is equivalent to the net.Dialer zero value.
NetDialer *net.Dialer
// Config is the TLS configuration to use for new connections.
// A nil configuration is equivalent to the zero
// configuration; see the documentation of Config for the
// defaults.
Config *Config
ExtraConfig *ExtraConfig
}
// Dial connects to the given network address and initiates a TLS
// handshake, returning the resulting TLS connection.
//
// The returned Conn, if any, will always be of type *Conn.
//
// Dial uses context.Background internally; to specify the context,
// use DialContext.
func (d *Dialer) Dial(network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
return d.DialContext(context.Background(), network, addr)
}
func (d *Dialer) netDialer() *net.Dialer {
if d.NetDialer != nil {
return d.NetDialer
}
return new(net.Dialer)
}
// DialContext connects to the given network address and initiates a TLS
// handshake, returning the resulting TLS connection.
//
// The provided Context must be non-nil. If the context expires before
// the connection is complete, an error is returned. Once successfully
// connected, any expiration of the context will not affect the
// connection.
//
// The returned Conn, if any, will always be of type *Conn.
func (d *Dialer) DialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
c, err := dial(ctx, d.netDialer(), network, addr, d.Config, d.ExtraConfig)
if err != nil {
// Don't return c (a typed nil) in an interface.
return nil, err
}
return c, nil
}
// LoadX509KeyPair reads and parses a public/private key pair from a pair
// of files. The files must contain PEM encoded data. The certificate file
// may contain intermediate certificates following the leaf certificate to
// form a certificate chain. On successful return, Certificate.Leaf will
// be nil because the parsed form of the certificate is not retained.
func LoadX509KeyPair(certFile, keyFile string) (Certificate, error) {
certPEMBlock, err := os.ReadFile(certFile)
if err != nil {
return Certificate{}, err
}
keyPEMBlock, err := os.ReadFile(keyFile)
if err != nil {
return Certificate{}, err
}
return X509KeyPair(certPEMBlock, keyPEMBlock)
}
// X509KeyPair parses a public/private key pair from a pair of
// PEM encoded data. On successful return, Certificate.Leaf will be nil because
// the parsed form of the certificate is not retained.
func X509KeyPair(certPEMBlock, keyPEMBlock []byte) (Certificate, error) {
fail := func(err error) (Certificate, error) { return Certificate{}, err }
var cert Certificate
var skippedBlockTypes []string
for {
var certDERBlock *pem.Block
certDERBlock, certPEMBlock = pem.Decode(certPEMBlock)
if certDERBlock == nil {
break
}
if certDERBlock.Type == "CERTIFICATE" {
cert.Certificate = append(cert.Certificate, certDERBlock.Bytes)
} else {
skippedBlockTypes = append(skippedBlockTypes, certDERBlock.Type)
}
}
if len(cert.Certificate) == 0 {
if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 0 {
return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find any PEM data in certificate input"))
}
if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 1 && strings.HasSuffix(skippedBlockTypes[0], "PRIVATE KEY") {
return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find certificate PEM data in certificate input, but did find a private key; PEM inputs may have been switched"))
}
return fail(fmt.Errorf("tls: failed to find \"CERTIFICATE\" PEM block in certificate input after skipping PEM blocks of the following types: %v", skippedBlockTypes))
}
skippedBlockTypes = skippedBlockTypes[:0]
var keyDERBlock *pem.Block
for {
keyDERBlock, keyPEMBlock = pem.Decode(keyPEMBlock)
if keyDERBlock == nil {
if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 0 {
return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find any PEM data in key input"))
}
if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 1 && skippedBlockTypes[0] == "CERTIFICATE" {
return fail(errors.New("tls: found a certificate rather than a key in the PEM for the private key"))
}
return fail(fmt.Errorf("tls: failed to find PEM block with type ending in \"PRIVATE KEY\" in key input after skipping PEM blocks of the following types: %v", skippedBlockTypes))
}
if keyDERBlock.Type == "PRIVATE KEY" || strings.HasSuffix(keyDERBlock.Type, " PRIVATE KEY") {
break
}
skippedBlockTypes = append(skippedBlockTypes, keyDERBlock.Type)
}
// We don't need to parse the public key for TLS, but we so do anyway
// to check that it looks sane and matches the private key.
x509Cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(cert.Certificate[0])
if err != nil {
return fail(err)
}
cert.PrivateKey, err = parsePrivateKey(keyDERBlock.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return fail(err)
}
switch pub := x509Cert.PublicKey.(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey:
priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
if !ok {
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type"))
}
if pub.N.Cmp(priv.N) != 0 {
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key"))
}
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey)
if !ok {
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type"))
}
if pub.X.Cmp(priv.X) != 0 || pub.Y.Cmp(priv.Y) != 0 {
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key"))
}
case ed25519.PublicKey:
priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(ed25519.PrivateKey)
if !ok {
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type"))
}
if !bytes.Equal(priv.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey), pub) {
return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key"))
}
default:
return fail(errors.New("tls: unknown public key algorithm"))
}
return cert, nil
}
// Attempt to parse the given private key DER block. OpenSSL 0.9.8 generates
// PKCS #1 private keys by default, while OpenSSL 1.0.0 generates PKCS #8 keys.
// OpenSSL ecparam generates SEC1 EC private keys for ECDSA. We try all three.
func parsePrivateKey(der []byte) (crypto.PrivateKey, error) {
if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(der); err == nil {
return key, nil
}
if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(der); err == nil {
switch key := key.(type) {
case *rsa.PrivateKey, *ecdsa.PrivateKey, ed25519.PrivateKey:
return key, nil
default:
return nil, errors.New("tls: found unknown private key type in PKCS#8 wrapping")
}
}
if key, err := x509.ParseECPrivateKey(der); err == nil {
return key, nil
}
return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to parse private key")
}

96
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/unsafe.go generated vendored
View file

@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
package qtls
import (
"crypto/tls"
"reflect"
"unsafe"
)
func init() {
if !structsEqual(&tls.ConnectionState{}, &connectionState{}) {
panic("qtls.ConnectionState doesn't match")
}
if !structsEqual(&tls.ClientSessionState{}, &clientSessionState{}) {
panic("qtls.ClientSessionState doesn't match")
}
if !structsEqual(&tls.CertificateRequestInfo{}, &certificateRequestInfo{}) {
panic("qtls.CertificateRequestInfo doesn't match")
}
if !structsEqual(&tls.Config{}, &config{}) {
panic("qtls.Config doesn't match")
}
if !structsEqual(&tls.ClientHelloInfo{}, &clientHelloInfo{}) {
panic("qtls.ClientHelloInfo doesn't match")
}
}
func toConnectionState(c connectionState) ConnectionState {
return *(*ConnectionState)(unsafe.Pointer(&c))
}
func toClientSessionState(s *clientSessionState) *ClientSessionState {
return (*ClientSessionState)(unsafe.Pointer(s))
}
func fromClientSessionState(s *ClientSessionState) *clientSessionState {
return (*clientSessionState)(unsafe.Pointer(s))
}
func toCertificateRequestInfo(i *certificateRequestInfo) *CertificateRequestInfo {
return (*CertificateRequestInfo)(unsafe.Pointer(i))
}
func toConfig(c *config) *Config {
return (*Config)(unsafe.Pointer(c))
}
func fromConfig(c *Config) *config {
return (*config)(unsafe.Pointer(c))
}
func toClientHelloInfo(chi *clientHelloInfo) *ClientHelloInfo {
return (*ClientHelloInfo)(unsafe.Pointer(chi))
}
func structsEqual(a, b interface{}) bool {
return compare(reflect.ValueOf(a), reflect.ValueOf(b))
}
func compare(a, b reflect.Value) bool {
sa := a.Elem()
sb := b.Elem()
if sa.NumField() != sb.NumField() {
return false
}
for i := 0; i < sa.NumField(); i++ {
fa := sa.Type().Field(i)
fb := sb.Type().Field(i)
if !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Index, fb.Index) || fa.Name != fb.Name || fa.Anonymous != fb.Anonymous || fa.Offset != fb.Offset || !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Type, fb.Type) {
if fa.Type.Kind() != fb.Type.Kind() {
return false
}
if fa.Type.Kind() == reflect.Slice {
if !compareStruct(fa.Type.Elem(), fb.Type.Elem()) {
return false
}
continue
}
return false
}
}
return true
}
func compareStruct(a, b reflect.Type) bool {
if a.NumField() != b.NumField() {
return false
}
for i := 0; i < a.NumField(); i++ {
fa := a.Field(i)
fb := b.Field(i)
if !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Index, fb.Index) || fa.Name != fb.Name || fa.Anonymous != fb.Anonymous || fa.Offset != fb.Offset || !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Type, fb.Type) {
return false
}
}
return true
}

2
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/common.go generated vendored
View file

@ -1412,7 +1412,7 @@ func leafCertificate(c *Certificate) (*x509.Certificate, error) {
}
type handshakeMessage interface {
marshal() []byte
marshal() ([]byte, error)
unmarshal([]byte) bool
}

58
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/conn.go generated vendored
View file

@ -1041,25 +1041,46 @@ func (c *Conn) writeRecordLocked(typ recordType, data []byte) (int, error) {
return n, nil
}
// writeRecord writes a TLS record with the given type and payload to the
// connection and updates the record layer state.
func (c *Conn) writeRecord(typ recordType, data []byte) (int, error) {
if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil {
if typ == recordTypeChangeCipherSpec {
return len(data), nil
}
return c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer.WriteRecord(data)
// writeHandshakeRecord writes a handshake message to the connection and updates
// the record layer state. If transcript is non-nil the marshalled message is
// written to it.
func (c *Conn) writeHandshakeRecord(msg handshakeMessage, transcript transcriptHash) (int, error) {
data, err := msg.marshal()
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
c.out.Lock()
defer c.out.Unlock()
return c.writeRecordLocked(typ, data)
if transcript != nil {
transcript.Write(data)
}
if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil {
return c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer.WriteRecord(data)
}
return c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeHandshake, data)
}
// writeChangeCipherRecord writes a ChangeCipherSpec message to the connection and
// updates the record layer state.
func (c *Conn) writeChangeCipherRecord() error {
if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil {
return nil
}
c.out.Lock()
defer c.out.Unlock()
_, err := c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
return err
}
// readHandshake reads the next handshake message from
// the record layer.
func (c *Conn) readHandshake() (any, error) {
// the record layer. If transcript is non-nil, the message
// is written to the passed transcriptHash.
func (c *Conn) readHandshake(transcript transcriptHash) (any, error) {
var data []byte
if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil {
var err error
@ -1147,6 +1168,11 @@ func (c *Conn) readHandshake() (any, error) {
if !m.unmarshal(data) {
return nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage))
}
if transcript != nil {
transcript.Write(data)
}
return m, nil
}
@ -1222,7 +1248,7 @@ func (c *Conn) handleRenegotiation() error {
return errors.New("tls: internal error: unexpected renegotiation")
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -1272,7 +1298,7 @@ func (c *Conn) handlePostHandshakeMessage() error {
return c.handleRenegotiation()
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -1308,7 +1334,11 @@ func (c *Conn) handleKeyUpdate(keyUpdate *keyUpdateMsg) error {
defer c.out.Unlock()
msg := &keyUpdateMsg{}
_, err := c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeHandshake, msg.marshal())
msgBytes, err := msg.marshal()
if err != nil {
return err
}
_, err = c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeHandshake, msgBytes)
if err != nil {
// Surface the error at the next write.
c.out.setErrorLocked(err)

104
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_client.go generated vendored
View file

@ -196,7 +196,10 @@ func (c *Conn) clientHandshake(ctx context.Context) (err error) {
}
c.serverName = hello.serverName
cacheKey, session, earlySecret, binderKey := c.loadSession(hello)
cacheKey, session, earlySecret, binderKey, err := c.loadSession(hello)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if cacheKey != "" && session != nil {
var deletedTicket bool
if session.vers == VersionTLS13 && hello.earlyData && c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.Enable0RTT {
@ -206,11 +209,14 @@ func (c *Conn) clientHandshake(ctx context.Context) (err error) {
if suite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(session.cipherSuite); suite != nil {
h := suite.hash.New()
h.Write(hello.marshal())
helloBytes, err := hello.marshal()
if err != nil {
return err
}
h.Write(helloBytes)
clientEarlySecret := suite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, "c e traffic", h)
c.out.exportKey(Encryption0RTT, suite, clientEarlySecret)
if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelEarlyTraffic, hello.random, clientEarlySecret); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
}
@ -230,11 +236,12 @@ func (c *Conn) clientHandshake(ctx context.Context) (err error) {
}
}
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hello.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := c.writeHandshakeRecord(hello, nil); err != nil {
return err
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
// serverHelloMsg is not included in the transcript
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -327,9 +334,9 @@ func (c *Conn) decodeSessionState(session *clientSessionState) (uint32 /* max ea
}
func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string,
session *clientSessionState, earlySecret, binderKey []byte) {
session *clientSessionState, earlySecret, binderKey []byte, err error) {
if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled || c.config.ClientSessionCache == nil {
return "", nil, nil, nil
return "", nil, nil, nil, nil
}
hello.ticketSupported = true
@ -344,14 +351,14 @@ func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string,
// renegotiation is primarily used to allow a client to send a client
// certificate, which would be skipped if session resumption occurred.
if c.handshakes != 0 {
return "", nil, nil, nil
return "", nil, nil, nil, nil
}
// Try to resume a previously negotiated TLS session, if available.
cacheKey = clientSessionCacheKey(c.conn.RemoteAddr(), c.config)
sess, ok := c.config.ClientSessionCache.Get(cacheKey)
if !ok || sess == nil {
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil
}
session = fromClientSessionState(sess)
@ -362,7 +369,7 @@ func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string,
maxEarlyData, appData, ok = c.decodeSessionState(session)
if !ok { // delete it, if parsing failed
c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, nil)
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil
}
}
@ -375,7 +382,7 @@ func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string,
}
}
if !versOk {
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil
}
// Check that the cached server certificate is not expired, and that it's
@ -384,16 +391,16 @@ func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string,
if !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify {
if len(session.verifiedChains) == 0 {
// The original connection had InsecureSkipVerify, while this doesn't.
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil
}
serverCert := session.serverCertificates[0]
if c.config.time().After(serverCert.NotAfter) {
// Expired certificate, delete the entry.
c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, nil)
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil
}
if err := serverCert.VerifyHostname(c.config.ServerName); err != nil {
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil
}
}
@ -401,7 +408,7 @@ func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string,
// In TLS 1.2 the cipher suite must match the resumed session. Ensure we
// are still offering it.
if mutualCipherSuite(hello.cipherSuites, session.cipherSuite) == nil {
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil
}
hello.sessionTicket = session.sessionTicket
@ -411,14 +418,14 @@ func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string,
// Check that the session ticket is not expired.
if c.config.time().After(session.useBy) {
c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, nil)
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil
}
// In TLS 1.3 the KDF hash must match the resumed session. Ensure we
// offer at least one cipher suite with that hash.
cipherSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(session.cipherSuite)
if cipherSuite == nil {
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil
}
cipherSuiteOk := false
for _, offeredID := range hello.cipherSuites {
@ -429,7 +436,7 @@ func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string,
}
}
if !cipherSuiteOk {
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil
}
// Set the pre_shared_key extension. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.11.1.
@ -450,9 +457,15 @@ func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string,
hello.earlyData = c.extraConfig.Enable0RTT && maxEarlyData > 0
}
transcript := cipherSuite.hash.New()
transcript.Write(hello.marshalWithoutBinders())
helloBytes, err := hello.marshalWithoutBinders()
if err != nil {
return "", nil, nil, nil, err
}
transcript.Write(helloBytes)
pskBinders := [][]byte{cipherSuite.finishedHash(binderKey, transcript)}
hello.updateBinders(pskBinders)
if err := hello.updateBinders(pskBinders); err != nil {
return "", nil, nil, nil, err
}
if session.vers == VersionTLS13 && c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.SetAppDataFromSessionState != nil {
c.extraConfig.SetAppDataFromSessionState(appData)
@ -500,8 +513,12 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) handshake() error {
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.hello, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.serverHello, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
c.buffering = true
c.didResume = isResume
@ -572,7 +589,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) pickCipherSuite() error {
func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
c := hs.c
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
msg, err := c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -581,9 +598,8 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
msg, err = c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -601,11 +617,10 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return errors.New("tls: received unexpected CertificateStatus message")
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(cs.marshal())
c.ocspResponse = cs.response
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
msg, err = c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -634,14 +649,13 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
skx, ok := msg.(*serverKeyExchangeMsg)
if ok {
hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
err = keyAgreement.processServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, c.peerCertificates[0], skx)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return err
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
msg, err = c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -652,7 +666,6 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsg)
if ok {
certRequested = true
hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
cri := certificateRequestInfoFromMsg(hs.ctx, c.vers, certReq)
if chainToSend, err = c.getClientCertificate(cri); err != nil {
@ -660,7 +673,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
return err
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
msg, err = c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -671,7 +684,6 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(shd, msg)
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(shd.marshal())
// If the server requested a certificate then we have to send a
// Certificate message, even if it's empty because we don't have a
@ -679,8 +691,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
if certRequested {
certMsg = new(certificateMsg)
certMsg.certificates = chainToSend.Certificate
hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certMsg, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
}
@ -691,8 +702,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
return err
}
if ckx != nil {
hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, ckx.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(ckx, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
}
@ -739,8 +749,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
return err
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerify.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certVerify, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
}
@ -875,7 +884,10 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error {
return err
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
// finishedMsg is included in the transcript, but not until after we
// check the client version, since the state before this message was
// sent is used during verification.
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -891,7 +903,11 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: server's Finished message was incorrect")
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(serverFinished.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(serverFinished, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
copy(out, verify)
return nil
}
@ -902,7 +918,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readSessionTicket() error {
}
c := hs.c
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
msg, err := c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -911,7 +927,6 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readSessionTicket() error {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(sessionTicketMsg, msg)
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(sessionTicketMsg.marshal())
hs.session = &clientSessionState{
sessionTicket: sessionTicketMsg.ticket,
@ -931,14 +946,13 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readSessionTicket() error {
func (hs *clientHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error {
c := hs.c
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil {
if err := c.writeChangeCipherRecord(); err != nil {
return err
}
finished := new(finishedMsg)
finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret)
hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(finished, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
copy(out, finished.verifyData)

75
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_client_tls13.go generated vendored
View file

@ -65,7 +65,10 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
}
hs.transcript = hs.suite.hash.New()
hs.transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.hello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
if bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.random, helloRetryRequestRandom) {
if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
@ -76,7 +79,9 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
}
}
hs.transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.serverHello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
c.buffering = true
if err := hs.processServerHello(); err != nil {
@ -177,8 +182,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendDummyChangeCipherSpec() error {
}
hs.sentDummyCCS = true
_, err := hs.c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
return err
return hs.c.writeChangeCipherRecord()
}
// processHelloRetryRequest handles the HRR in hs.serverHello, modifies and
@ -193,7 +197,9 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processHelloRetryRequest() error {
hs.transcript.Reset()
hs.transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
hs.transcript.Write(chHash)
hs.transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.serverHello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
// The only HelloRetryRequest extensions we support are key_share and
// cookie, and clients must abort the handshake if the HRR would not result
@ -258,10 +264,18 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processHelloRetryRequest() error {
transcript := hs.suite.hash.New()
transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
transcript.Write(chHash)
transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshalWithoutBinders())
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.serverHello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
helloBytes, err := hs.hello.marshalWithoutBinders()
if err != nil {
return err
}
transcript.Write(helloBytes)
pskBinders := [][]byte{hs.suite.finishedHash(hs.binderKey, transcript)}
hs.hello.updateBinders(pskBinders)
if err := hs.hello.updateBinders(pskBinders); err != nil {
return err
}
} else {
// Server selected a cipher suite incompatible with the PSK.
hs.hello.pskIdentities = nil
@ -273,13 +287,12 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processHelloRetryRequest() error {
c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT()
}
hs.hello.earlyData = false // disable 0-RTT
hs.transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(hs.hello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
// serverHelloMsg is not included in the transcript
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -368,6 +381,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) establishHandshakeKeys() error {
if !hs.usingPSK {
earlySecret = hs.suite.extract(nil, nil)
}
handshakeSecret := hs.suite.extract(sharedKey,
hs.suite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, "derived", nil))
@ -400,7 +414,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) establishHandshakeKeys() error {
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerParameters() error {
c := hs.c
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
msg, err := c.readHandshake(hs.transcript)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -418,7 +432,6 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerParameters() error {
if hs.c.extraConfig != nil && hs.c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions != nil {
hs.c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions(typeEncryptedExtensions, encryptedExtensions.additionalExtensions)
}
hs.transcript.Write(encryptedExtensions.marshal())
if err := checkALPN(hs.hello.alpnProtocols, encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
@ -454,18 +467,16 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerCertificate() error {
return nil
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
msg, err := c.readHandshake(hs.transcript)
if err != nil {
return err
}
certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsgTLS13)
if ok {
hs.transcript.Write(certReq.marshal())
hs.certReq = certReq
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
msg, err = c.readHandshake(hs.transcript)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -480,7 +491,6 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerCertificate() error {
c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
return errors.New("tls: received empty certificates message")
}
hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
c.scts = certMsg.certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps
c.ocspResponse = certMsg.certificate.OCSPStaple
@ -489,7 +499,10 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerCertificate() error {
return err
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
// certificateVerifyMsg is included in the transcript, but not until
// after we verify the handshake signature, since the state before
// this message was sent is used.
msg, err = c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -520,7 +533,9 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerCertificate() error {
return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the server certificate: " + err.Error())
}
hs.transcript.Write(certVerify.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(certVerify, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
@ -528,7 +543,10 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerCertificate() error {
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerFinished() error {
c := hs.c
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
// finishedMsg is included in the transcript, but not until after we
// check the client version, since the state before this message was
// sent is used during verification.
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -545,7 +563,9 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerFinished() error {
return errors.New("tls: invalid server finished hash")
}
hs.transcript.Write(finished.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(finished, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
// Derive secrets that take context through the server Finished.
@ -595,8 +615,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientCertificate() error {
certMsg.scts = hs.certReq.scts && len(cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps) > 0
certMsg.ocspStapling = hs.certReq.ocspStapling && len(cert.OCSPStaple) > 0
hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certMsg, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -633,8 +652,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientCertificate() error {
}
certVerifyMsg.signature = sig
hs.transcript.Write(certVerifyMsg.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerifyMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certVerifyMsg, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -648,8 +666,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientFinished() error {
verifyData: hs.suite.finishedHash(c.out.trafficSecret, hs.transcript),
}
hs.transcript.Write(finished.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(finished, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}

728
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_messages.go generated vendored
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

73
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_server.go generated vendored
View file

@ -138,7 +138,9 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) handshake() error {
// readClientHello reads a ClientHello message and selects the protocol version.
func (c *Conn) readClientHello(ctx context.Context) (*clientHelloMsg, error) {
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
// clientHelloMsg is included in the transcript, but we haven't initialized
// it yet. The respective handshake functions will record it themselves.
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@ -494,9 +496,10 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doResumeHandshake() error {
hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.sessionState.usedOldKey
hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite)
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.clientHello, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(hs.hello, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -534,24 +537,23 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
// certificates won't be used.
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.clientHello, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(hs.hello, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
certMsg := new(certificateMsg)
certMsg.certificates = hs.cert.Certificate
hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certMsg, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
if hs.hello.ocspStapling {
certStatus := new(certificateStatusMsg)
certStatus.response = hs.cert.OCSPStaple
hs.finishedHash.Write(certStatus.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certStatus.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certStatus, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
}
@ -563,8 +565,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
return err
}
if skx != nil {
hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, skx.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(skx, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
}
@ -590,15 +591,13 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
if c.config.ClientCAs != nil {
certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects()
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certReq, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
}
helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg)
hs.finishedHash.Write(helloDone.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloDone.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(helloDone, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -608,7 +607,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
var pub crypto.PublicKey // public key for client auth, if any
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
msg, err := c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -621,7 +620,6 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{
Certificate: certMsg.certificates,
@ -632,7 +630,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
pub = c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
msg, err = c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -650,7 +648,6 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(ckx, msg)
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
preMasterSecret, err := keyAgreement.processClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, ckx, c.vers)
if err != nil {
@ -670,7 +667,10 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
// to the client's certificate. This allows us to verify that the client is in
// possession of the private key of the certificate.
if len(c.peerCertificates) > 0 {
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
// certificateVerifyMsg is included in the transcript, but not until
// after we verify the handshake signature, since the state before
// this message was sent is used.
msg, err = c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -705,7 +705,9 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the client certificate: " + err.Error())
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(certVerify, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
}
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
@ -745,7 +747,10 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error {
return err
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
// finishedMsg is included in the transcript, but not until after we
// check the client version, since the state before this message was
// sent is used during verification.
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -762,7 +767,10 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error {
return errors.New("tls: client's Finished message is incorrect")
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(clientFinished.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(clientFinished, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
copy(out, verify)
return nil
}
@ -796,14 +804,16 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendSessionTicket() error {
masterSecret: hs.masterSecret,
certificates: certsFromClient,
}
var err error
m.ticket, err = c.encryptTicket(state.marshal())
stateBytes, err := state.marshal()
if err != nil {
return err
}
m.ticket, err = c.encryptTicket(stateBytes)
if err != nil {
return err
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(m.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(m, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -813,14 +823,13 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendSessionTicket() error {
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error {
c := hs.c
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil {
if err := c.writeChangeCipherRecord(); err != nil {
return err
}
finished := new(finishedMsg)
finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret)
hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(finished, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}

70
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_server_tls13.go generated vendored
View file

@ -334,7 +334,12 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) checkForResumption() error {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return errors.New("tls: internal error: failed to clone hash")
}
transcript.Write(hs.clientHello.marshalWithoutBinders())
clientHelloBytes, err := hs.clientHello.marshalWithoutBinders()
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
transcript.Write(clientHelloBytes)
pskBinder := hs.suite.finishedHash(binderKey, transcript)
if !hmac.Equal(hs.clientHello.pskBinders[i], pskBinder) {
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
@ -347,7 +352,12 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) checkForResumption() error {
}
h := cloneHash(hs.transcript, hs.suite.hash)
h.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
clientHelloWithBindersBytes, err := hs.clientHello.marshal()
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
h.Write(clientHelloWithBindersBytes)
if hs.encryptedExtensions.earlyData {
clientEarlySecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.earlySecret, "c e traffic", h)
c.in.exportKey(Encryption0RTT, hs.suite, clientEarlySecret)
@ -436,8 +446,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendDummyChangeCipherSpec() error {
}
hs.sentDummyCCS = true
_, err := hs.c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
return err
return hs.c.writeChangeCipherRecord()
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) doHelloRetryRequest(selectedGroup CurveID) error {
@ -445,7 +454,9 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) doHelloRetryRequest(selectedGroup CurveID)
// The first ClientHello gets double-hashed into the transcript upon a
// HelloRetryRequest. See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.1.
hs.transcript.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.clientHello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
chHash := hs.transcript.Sum(nil)
hs.transcript.Reset()
hs.transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
@ -461,8 +472,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) doHelloRetryRequest(selectedGroup CurveID)
selectedGroup: selectedGroup,
}
hs.transcript.Write(helloRetryRequest.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloRetryRequest.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(helloRetryRequest, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -470,7 +480,8 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) doHelloRetryRequest(selectedGroup CurveID)
return err
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
// clientHelloMsg is not included in the transcript.
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -566,9 +577,10 @@ func illegalClientHelloChange(ch, ch1 *clientHelloMsg) bool {
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerParameters() error {
c := hs.c
hs.transcript.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
hs.transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.clientHello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(hs.hello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -611,8 +623,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerParameters() error {
hs.encryptedExtensions.additionalExtensions = hs.c.extraConfig.GetExtensions(typeEncryptedExtensions)
}
hs.transcript.Write(hs.encryptedExtensions.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.encryptedExtensions.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(hs.encryptedExtensions, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -641,8 +652,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerCertificate() error {
certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects()
}
hs.transcript.Write(certReq.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certReq, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
}
@ -653,8 +663,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerCertificate() error {
certMsg.scts = hs.clientHello.scts && len(hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps) > 0
certMsg.ocspStapling = hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0
hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certMsg, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -685,8 +694,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerCertificate() error {
}
certVerifyMsg.signature = sig
hs.transcript.Write(certVerifyMsg.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerifyMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certVerifyMsg, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -700,8 +708,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerFinished() error {
verifyData: hs.suite.finishedHash(c.out.trafficSecret, hs.transcript),
}
hs.transcript.Write(finished.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(finished, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -763,7 +770,9 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendSessionTickets() error {
finishedMsg := &finishedMsg{
verifyData: hs.clientFinished,
}
hs.transcript.Write(finishedMsg.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(finishedMsg, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
if !hs.shouldSendSessionTickets() {
return nil
@ -784,7 +793,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendSessionTickets() error {
return err
}
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := c.writeHandshakeRecord(m, nil); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -809,7 +818,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientCertificate() error {
// If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a
// certificate message. If it's empty, no CertificateVerify is sent.
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
msg, err := c.readHandshake(hs.transcript)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -819,7 +828,6 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientCertificate() error {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
}
hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
if err := c.processCertsFromClient(certMsg.certificate); err != nil {
return err
@ -833,7 +841,10 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientCertificate() error {
}
if len(certMsg.certificate.Certificate) != 0 {
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
// certificateVerifyMsg is included in the transcript, but not until
// after we verify the handshake signature, since the state before
// this message was sent is used.
msg, err = c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -864,7 +875,9 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientCertificate() error {
return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the client certificate: " + err.Error())
}
hs.transcript.Write(certVerify.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(certVerify, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
}
// If we waited until the client certificates to send session tickets, we
@ -879,7 +892,8 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientCertificate() error {
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientFinished() error {
c := hs.c
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
// finishedMsg is not included in the transcript.
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}

19
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/key_schedule.go generated vendored
View file

@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/hmac"
"errors"
"fmt"
"hash"
"io"
"math/big"
@ -42,8 +43,24 @@ func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) expandLabel(secret []byte, label string, context []by
hkdfLabel.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(context)
})
hkdfLabelBytes, err := hkdfLabel.Bytes()
if err != nil {
// Rather than calling BytesOrPanic, we explicitly handle this error, in
// order to provide a reasonable error message. It should be basically
// impossible for this to panic, and routing errors back through the
// tree rooted in this function is quite painful. The labels are fixed
// size, and the context is either a fixed-length computed hash, or
// parsed from a field which has the same length limitation. As such, an
// error here is likely to only be caused during development.
//
// NOTE: another reasonable approach here might be to return a
// randomized slice if we encounter an error, which would break the
// connection, but avoid panicking. This would perhaps be safer but
// significantly more confusing to users.
panic(fmt.Errorf("failed to construct HKDF label: %s", err))
}
out := make([]byte, length)
n, err := hkdf.Expand(c.hash.New, secret, hkdfLabel.BytesOrPanic()).Read(out)
n, err := hkdf.Expand(c.hash.New, secret, hkdfLabelBytes).Read(out)
if err != nil || n != length {
panic("tls: HKDF-Expand-Label invocation failed unexpectedly")
}

17
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/ticket.go generated vendored
View file

@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ type sessionState struct {
usedOldKey bool
}
func (m *sessionState) marshal() []byte {
func (m *sessionState) marshal() ([]byte, error) {
var b cryptobyte.Builder
b.AddUint16(m.vers)
b.AddUint16(m.cipherSuite)
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ func (m *sessionState) marshal() []byte {
})
}
})
return b.BytesOrPanic()
return b.Bytes()
}
func (m *sessionState) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ type sessionStateTLS13 struct {
appData []byte
}
func (m *sessionStateTLS13) marshal() []byte {
func (m *sessionStateTLS13) marshal() ([]byte, error) {
var b cryptobyte.Builder
b.AddUint16(VersionTLS13)
b.AddUint8(2) // revision
@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ func (m *sessionStateTLS13) marshal() []byte {
b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(m.appData)
})
return b.BytesOrPanic()
return b.Bytes()
}
func (m *sessionStateTLS13) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
@ -227,8 +227,11 @@ func (c *Conn) getSessionTicketMsg(appData []byte) (*newSessionTicketMsgTLS13, e
if c.extraConfig != nil {
state.maxEarlyData = c.extraConfig.MaxEarlyData
}
var err error
m.label, err = c.encryptTicket(state.marshal())
stateBytes, err := state.marshal()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
m.label, err = c.encryptTicket(stateBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@ -270,5 +273,5 @@ func (c *Conn) GetSessionTicket(appData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return m.marshal(), nil
return m.marshal()
}

2
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/common.go generated vendored
View file

@ -1422,7 +1422,7 @@ func leafCertificate(c *Certificate) (*x509.Certificate, error) {
}
type handshakeMessage interface {
marshal() []byte
marshal() ([]byte, error)
unmarshal([]byte) bool
}

58
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/conn.go generated vendored
View file

@ -1042,25 +1042,46 @@ func (c *Conn) writeRecordLocked(typ recordType, data []byte) (int, error) {
return n, nil
}
// writeRecord writes a TLS record with the given type and payload to the
// connection and updates the record layer state.
func (c *Conn) writeRecord(typ recordType, data []byte) (int, error) {
if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil {
if typ == recordTypeChangeCipherSpec {
return len(data), nil
}
return c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer.WriteRecord(data)
// writeHandshakeRecord writes a handshake message to the connection and updates
// the record layer state. If transcript is non-nil the marshalled message is
// written to it.
func (c *Conn) writeHandshakeRecord(msg handshakeMessage, transcript transcriptHash) (int, error) {
data, err := msg.marshal()
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
c.out.Lock()
defer c.out.Unlock()
return c.writeRecordLocked(typ, data)
if transcript != nil {
transcript.Write(data)
}
if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil {
return c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer.WriteRecord(data)
}
return c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeHandshake, data)
}
// writeChangeCipherRecord writes a ChangeCipherSpec message to the connection and
// updates the record layer state.
func (c *Conn) writeChangeCipherRecord() error {
if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil {
return nil
}
c.out.Lock()
defer c.out.Unlock()
_, err := c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
return err
}
// readHandshake reads the next handshake message from
// the record layer.
func (c *Conn) readHandshake() (any, error) {
// the record layer. If transcript is non-nil, the message
// is written to the passed transcriptHash.
func (c *Conn) readHandshake(transcript transcriptHash) (any, error) {
var data []byte
if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil {
var err error
@ -1148,6 +1169,11 @@ func (c *Conn) readHandshake() (any, error) {
if !m.unmarshal(data) {
return nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage))
}
if transcript != nil {
transcript.Write(data)
}
return m, nil
}
@ -1223,7 +1249,7 @@ func (c *Conn) handleRenegotiation() error {
return errors.New("tls: internal error: unexpected renegotiation")
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -1273,7 +1299,7 @@ func (c *Conn) handlePostHandshakeMessage() error {
return c.handleRenegotiation()
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -1309,7 +1335,11 @@ func (c *Conn) handleKeyUpdate(keyUpdate *keyUpdateMsg) error {
defer c.out.Unlock()
msg := &keyUpdateMsg{}
_, err := c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeHandshake, msg.marshal())
msgBytes, err := msg.marshal()
if err != nil {
return err
}
_, err = c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeHandshake, msgBytes)
if err != nil {
// Surface the error at the next write.
c.out.setErrorLocked(err)

104
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_client.go generated vendored
View file

@ -196,7 +196,10 @@ func (c *Conn) clientHandshake(ctx context.Context) (err error) {
}
c.serverName = hello.serverName
cacheKey, session, earlySecret, binderKey := c.loadSession(hello)
cacheKey, session, earlySecret, binderKey, err := c.loadSession(hello)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if cacheKey != "" && session != nil {
var deletedTicket bool
if session.vers == VersionTLS13 && hello.earlyData && c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.Enable0RTT {
@ -206,11 +209,14 @@ func (c *Conn) clientHandshake(ctx context.Context) (err error) {
if suite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(session.cipherSuite); suite != nil {
h := suite.hash.New()
h.Write(hello.marshal())
helloBytes, err := hello.marshal()
if err != nil {
return err
}
h.Write(helloBytes)
clientEarlySecret := suite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, "c e traffic", h)
c.out.exportKey(Encryption0RTT, suite, clientEarlySecret)
if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelEarlyTraffic, hello.random, clientEarlySecret); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
}
@ -230,11 +236,12 @@ func (c *Conn) clientHandshake(ctx context.Context) (err error) {
}
}
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hello.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := c.writeHandshakeRecord(hello, nil); err != nil {
return err
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
// serverHelloMsg is not included in the transcript
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -327,9 +334,9 @@ func (c *Conn) decodeSessionState(session *clientSessionState) (uint32 /* max ea
}
func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string,
session *clientSessionState, earlySecret, binderKey []byte) {
session *clientSessionState, earlySecret, binderKey []byte, err error) {
if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled || c.config.ClientSessionCache == nil {
return "", nil, nil, nil
return "", nil, nil, nil, nil
}
hello.ticketSupported = true
@ -344,14 +351,14 @@ func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string,
// renegotiation is primarily used to allow a client to send a client
// certificate, which would be skipped if session resumption occurred.
if c.handshakes != 0 {
return "", nil, nil, nil
return "", nil, nil, nil, nil
}
// Try to resume a previously negotiated TLS session, if available.
cacheKey = clientSessionCacheKey(c.conn.RemoteAddr(), c.config)
sess, ok := c.config.ClientSessionCache.Get(cacheKey)
if !ok || sess == nil {
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil
}
session = fromClientSessionState(sess)
@ -362,7 +369,7 @@ func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string,
maxEarlyData, appData, ok = c.decodeSessionState(session)
if !ok { // delete it, if parsing failed
c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, nil)
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil
}
}
@ -375,7 +382,7 @@ func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string,
}
}
if !versOk {
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil
}
// Check that the cached server certificate is not expired, and that it's
@ -384,16 +391,16 @@ func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string,
if !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify {
if len(session.verifiedChains) == 0 {
// The original connection had InsecureSkipVerify, while this doesn't.
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil
}
serverCert := session.serverCertificates[0]
if c.config.time().After(serverCert.NotAfter) {
// Expired certificate, delete the entry.
c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, nil)
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil
}
if err := serverCert.VerifyHostname(c.config.ServerName); err != nil {
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil
}
}
@ -401,7 +408,7 @@ func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string,
// In TLS 1.2 the cipher suite must match the resumed session. Ensure we
// are still offering it.
if mutualCipherSuite(hello.cipherSuites, session.cipherSuite) == nil {
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil
}
hello.sessionTicket = session.sessionTicket
@ -411,14 +418,14 @@ func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string,
// Check that the session ticket is not expired.
if c.config.time().After(session.useBy) {
c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, nil)
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil
}
// In TLS 1.3 the KDF hash must match the resumed session. Ensure we
// offer at least one cipher suite with that hash.
cipherSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(session.cipherSuite)
if cipherSuite == nil {
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil
}
cipherSuiteOk := false
for _, offeredID := range hello.cipherSuites {
@ -429,7 +436,7 @@ func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string,
}
}
if !cipherSuiteOk {
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil
}
// Set the pre_shared_key extension. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.11.1.
@ -450,9 +457,15 @@ func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string,
hello.earlyData = c.extraConfig.Enable0RTT && maxEarlyData > 0
}
transcript := cipherSuite.hash.New()
transcript.Write(hello.marshalWithoutBinders())
helloBytes, err := hello.marshalWithoutBinders()
if err != nil {
return "", nil, nil, nil, err
}
transcript.Write(helloBytes)
pskBinders := [][]byte{cipherSuite.finishedHash(binderKey, transcript)}
hello.updateBinders(pskBinders)
if err := hello.updateBinders(pskBinders); err != nil {
return "", nil, nil, nil, err
}
if session.vers == VersionTLS13 && c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.SetAppDataFromSessionState != nil {
c.extraConfig.SetAppDataFromSessionState(appData)
@ -500,8 +513,12 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) handshake() error {
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.hello, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.serverHello, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
c.buffering = true
c.didResume = isResume
@ -572,7 +589,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) pickCipherSuite() error {
func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
c := hs.c
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
msg, err := c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -581,9 +598,8 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
msg, err = c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -601,11 +617,10 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return errors.New("tls: received unexpected CertificateStatus message")
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(cs.marshal())
c.ocspResponse = cs.response
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
msg, err = c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -634,14 +649,13 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
skx, ok := msg.(*serverKeyExchangeMsg)
if ok {
hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
err = keyAgreement.processServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, c.peerCertificates[0], skx)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return err
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
msg, err = c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -652,7 +666,6 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsg)
if ok {
certRequested = true
hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
cri := certificateRequestInfoFromMsg(hs.ctx, c.vers, certReq)
if chainToSend, err = c.getClientCertificate(cri); err != nil {
@ -660,7 +673,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
return err
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
msg, err = c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -671,7 +684,6 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(shd, msg)
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(shd.marshal())
// If the server requested a certificate then we have to send a
// Certificate message, even if it's empty because we don't have a
@ -679,8 +691,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
if certRequested {
certMsg = new(certificateMsg)
certMsg.certificates = chainToSend.Certificate
hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certMsg, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
}
@ -691,8 +702,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
return err
}
if ckx != nil {
hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, ckx.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(ckx, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
}
@ -739,8 +749,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
return err
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerify.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certVerify, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
}
@ -875,7 +884,10 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error {
return err
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
// finishedMsg is included in the transcript, but not until after we
// check the client version, since the state before this message was
// sent is used during verification.
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -891,7 +903,11 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: server's Finished message was incorrect")
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(serverFinished.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(serverFinished, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
copy(out, verify)
return nil
}
@ -902,7 +918,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readSessionTicket() error {
}
c := hs.c
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
msg, err := c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -911,7 +927,6 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readSessionTicket() error {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(sessionTicketMsg, msg)
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(sessionTicketMsg.marshal())
hs.session = &clientSessionState{
sessionTicket: sessionTicketMsg.ticket,
@ -931,14 +946,13 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readSessionTicket() error {
func (hs *clientHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error {
c := hs.c
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil {
if err := c.writeChangeCipherRecord(); err != nil {
return err
}
finished := new(finishedMsg)
finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret)
hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(finished, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
copy(out, finished.verifyData)

75
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_client_tls13.go generated vendored
View file

@ -65,7 +65,10 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
}
hs.transcript = hs.suite.hash.New()
hs.transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.hello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
if bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.random, helloRetryRequestRandom) {
if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
@ -76,7 +79,9 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
}
}
hs.transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.serverHello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
c.buffering = true
if err := hs.processServerHello(); err != nil {
@ -177,8 +182,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendDummyChangeCipherSpec() error {
}
hs.sentDummyCCS = true
_, err := hs.c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
return err
return hs.c.writeChangeCipherRecord()
}
// processHelloRetryRequest handles the HRR in hs.serverHello, modifies and
@ -193,7 +197,9 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processHelloRetryRequest() error {
hs.transcript.Reset()
hs.transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
hs.transcript.Write(chHash)
hs.transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.serverHello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
// The only HelloRetryRequest extensions we support are key_share and
// cookie, and clients must abort the handshake if the HRR would not result
@ -258,10 +264,18 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processHelloRetryRequest() error {
transcript := hs.suite.hash.New()
transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
transcript.Write(chHash)
transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshalWithoutBinders())
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.serverHello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
helloBytes, err := hs.hello.marshalWithoutBinders()
if err != nil {
return err
}
transcript.Write(helloBytes)
pskBinders := [][]byte{hs.suite.finishedHash(hs.binderKey, transcript)}
hs.hello.updateBinders(pskBinders)
if err := hs.hello.updateBinders(pskBinders); err != nil {
return err
}
} else {
// Server selected a cipher suite incompatible with the PSK.
hs.hello.pskIdentities = nil
@ -273,13 +287,12 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processHelloRetryRequest() error {
c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT()
}
hs.hello.earlyData = false // disable 0-RTT
hs.transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(hs.hello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
// serverHelloMsg is not included in the transcript
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -373,6 +386,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) establishHandshakeKeys() error {
if !hs.usingPSK {
earlySecret = hs.suite.extract(nil, nil)
}
handshakeSecret := hs.suite.extract(sharedKey,
hs.suite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, "derived", nil))
@ -405,7 +419,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) establishHandshakeKeys() error {
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerParameters() error {
c := hs.c
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
msg, err := c.readHandshake(hs.transcript)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -423,7 +437,6 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerParameters() error {
if hs.c.extraConfig != nil && hs.c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions != nil {
hs.c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions(typeEncryptedExtensions, encryptedExtensions.additionalExtensions)
}
hs.transcript.Write(encryptedExtensions.marshal())
if err := checkALPN(hs.hello.alpnProtocols, encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
@ -459,18 +472,16 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerCertificate() error {
return nil
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
msg, err := c.readHandshake(hs.transcript)
if err != nil {
return err
}
certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsgTLS13)
if ok {
hs.transcript.Write(certReq.marshal())
hs.certReq = certReq
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
msg, err = c.readHandshake(hs.transcript)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -485,7 +496,6 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerCertificate() error {
c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
return errors.New("tls: received empty certificates message")
}
hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
c.scts = certMsg.certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps
c.ocspResponse = certMsg.certificate.OCSPStaple
@ -494,7 +504,10 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerCertificate() error {
return err
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
// certificateVerifyMsg is included in the transcript, but not until
// after we verify the handshake signature, since the state before
// this message was sent is used.
msg, err = c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -525,7 +538,9 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerCertificate() error {
return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the server certificate: " + err.Error())
}
hs.transcript.Write(certVerify.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(certVerify, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
@ -533,7 +548,10 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerCertificate() error {
func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerFinished() error {
c := hs.c
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
// finishedMsg is included in the transcript, but not until after we
// check the client version, since the state before this message was
// sent is used during verification.
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -550,7 +568,9 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerFinished() error {
return errors.New("tls: invalid server finished hash")
}
hs.transcript.Write(finished.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(finished, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
// Derive secrets that take context through the server Finished.
@ -600,8 +620,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientCertificate() error {
certMsg.scts = hs.certReq.scts && len(cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps) > 0
certMsg.ocspStapling = hs.certReq.ocspStapling && len(cert.OCSPStaple) > 0
hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certMsg, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -638,8 +657,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientCertificate() error {
}
certVerifyMsg.signature = sig
hs.transcript.Write(certVerifyMsg.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerifyMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certVerifyMsg, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -653,8 +671,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientFinished() error {
verifyData: hs.suite.finishedHash(c.out.trafficSecret, hs.transcript),
}
hs.transcript.Write(finished.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(finished, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}

728
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_messages.go generated vendored
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

73
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_server.go generated vendored
View file

@ -137,7 +137,9 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) handshake() error {
// readClientHello reads a ClientHello message and selects the protocol version.
func (c *Conn) readClientHello(ctx context.Context) (*clientHelloMsg, error) {
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
// clientHelloMsg is included in the transcript, but we haven't initialized
// it yet. The respective handshake functions will record it themselves.
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@ -493,9 +495,10 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doResumeHandshake() error {
hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.sessionState.usedOldKey
hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite)
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.clientHello, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(hs.hello, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -533,24 +536,23 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
// certificates won't be used.
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.clientHello, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(hs.hello, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
certMsg := new(certificateMsg)
certMsg.certificates = hs.cert.Certificate
hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certMsg, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
if hs.hello.ocspStapling {
certStatus := new(certificateStatusMsg)
certStatus.response = hs.cert.OCSPStaple
hs.finishedHash.Write(certStatus.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certStatus.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certStatus, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
}
@ -562,8 +564,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
return err
}
if skx != nil {
hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, skx.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(skx, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
}
@ -589,15 +590,13 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
if c.config.ClientCAs != nil {
certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects()
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certReq, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
}
helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg)
hs.finishedHash.Write(helloDone.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloDone.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(helloDone, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -607,7 +606,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
var pub crypto.PublicKey // public key for client auth, if any
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
msg, err := c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -620,7 +619,6 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{
Certificate: certMsg.certificates,
@ -631,7 +629,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
pub = c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
msg, err = c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -649,7 +647,6 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(ckx, msg)
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
preMasterSecret, err := keyAgreement.processClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, ckx, c.vers)
if err != nil {
@ -669,7 +666,10 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
// to the client's certificate. This allows us to verify that the client is in
// possession of the private key of the certificate.
if len(c.peerCertificates) > 0 {
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
// certificateVerifyMsg is included in the transcript, but not until
// after we verify the handshake signature, since the state before
// this message was sent is used.
msg, err = c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -704,7 +704,9 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the client certificate: " + err.Error())
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(certVerify, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
}
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
@ -744,7 +746,10 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error {
return err
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
// finishedMsg is included in the transcript, but not until after we
// check the client version, since the state before this message was
// sent is used during verification.
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -761,7 +766,10 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error {
return errors.New("tls: client's Finished message is incorrect")
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(clientFinished.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(clientFinished, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
copy(out, verify)
return nil
}
@ -795,14 +803,16 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendSessionTicket() error {
masterSecret: hs.masterSecret,
certificates: certsFromClient,
}
var err error
m.ticket, err = c.encryptTicket(state.marshal())
stateBytes, err := state.marshal()
if err != nil {
return err
}
m.ticket, err = c.encryptTicket(stateBytes)
if err != nil {
return err
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(m.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(m, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -812,14 +822,13 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendSessionTicket() error {
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error {
c := hs.c
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil {
if err := c.writeChangeCipherRecord(); err != nil {
return err
}
finished := new(finishedMsg)
finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret)
hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(finished, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil {
return err
}

70
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_server_tls13.go generated vendored
View file

@ -338,7 +338,12 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) checkForResumption() error {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return errors.New("tls: internal error: failed to clone hash")
}
transcript.Write(hs.clientHello.marshalWithoutBinders())
clientHelloBytes, err := hs.clientHello.marshalWithoutBinders()
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
transcript.Write(clientHelloBytes)
pskBinder := hs.suite.finishedHash(binderKey, transcript)
if !hmac.Equal(hs.clientHello.pskBinders[i], pskBinder) {
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
@ -351,7 +356,12 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) checkForResumption() error {
}
h := cloneHash(hs.transcript, hs.suite.hash)
h.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
clientHelloWithBindersBytes, err := hs.clientHello.marshal()
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
h.Write(clientHelloWithBindersBytes)
if hs.encryptedExtensions.earlyData {
clientEarlySecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.earlySecret, "c e traffic", h)
c.in.exportKey(Encryption0RTT, hs.suite, clientEarlySecret)
@ -440,8 +450,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendDummyChangeCipherSpec() error {
}
hs.sentDummyCCS = true
_, err := hs.c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
return err
return hs.c.writeChangeCipherRecord()
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) doHelloRetryRequest(selectedGroup CurveID) error {
@ -449,7 +458,9 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) doHelloRetryRequest(selectedGroup CurveID)
// The first ClientHello gets double-hashed into the transcript upon a
// HelloRetryRequest. See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.1.
hs.transcript.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.clientHello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
chHash := hs.transcript.Sum(nil)
hs.transcript.Reset()
hs.transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
@ -465,8 +476,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) doHelloRetryRequest(selectedGroup CurveID)
selectedGroup: selectedGroup,
}
hs.transcript.Write(helloRetryRequest.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloRetryRequest.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(helloRetryRequest, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -474,7 +484,8 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) doHelloRetryRequest(selectedGroup CurveID)
return err
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
// clientHelloMsg is not included in the transcript.
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -570,9 +581,10 @@ func illegalClientHelloChange(ch, ch1 *clientHelloMsg) bool {
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerParameters() error {
c := hs.c
hs.transcript.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
hs.transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
if err := transcriptMsg(hs.clientHello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(hs.hello, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -615,8 +627,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerParameters() error {
hs.encryptedExtensions.additionalExtensions = hs.c.extraConfig.GetExtensions(typeEncryptedExtensions)
}
hs.transcript.Write(hs.encryptedExtensions.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.encryptedExtensions.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(hs.encryptedExtensions, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -645,8 +656,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerCertificate() error {
certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects()
}
hs.transcript.Write(certReq.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certReq, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
}
@ -657,8 +667,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerCertificate() error {
certMsg.scts = hs.clientHello.scts && len(hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps) > 0
certMsg.ocspStapling = hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0
hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certMsg, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -689,8 +698,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerCertificate() error {
}
certVerifyMsg.signature = sig
hs.transcript.Write(certVerifyMsg.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerifyMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certVerifyMsg, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -704,8 +712,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerFinished() error {
verifyData: hs.suite.finishedHash(c.out.trafficSecret, hs.transcript),
}
hs.transcript.Write(finished.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(finished, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -767,7 +774,9 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendSessionTickets() error {
finishedMsg := &finishedMsg{
verifyData: hs.clientFinished,
}
hs.transcript.Write(finishedMsg.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(finishedMsg, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
if !hs.shouldSendSessionTickets() {
return nil
@ -788,7 +797,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendSessionTickets() error {
return err
}
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil {
if _, err := c.writeHandshakeRecord(m, nil); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -813,7 +822,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientCertificate() error {
// If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a
// certificate message. If it's empty, no CertificateVerify is sent.
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
msg, err := c.readHandshake(hs.transcript)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -823,7 +832,6 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientCertificate() error {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
}
hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
if err := c.processCertsFromClient(certMsg.certificate); err != nil {
return err
@ -837,7 +845,10 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientCertificate() error {
}
if len(certMsg.certificate.Certificate) != 0 {
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
// certificateVerifyMsg is included in the transcript, but not until
// after we verify the handshake signature, since the state before
// this message was sent is used.
msg, err = c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -868,7 +879,9 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientCertificate() error {
return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the client certificate: " + err.Error())
}
hs.transcript.Write(certVerify.marshal())
if err := transcriptMsg(certVerify, hs.transcript); err != nil {
return err
}
}
// If we waited until the client certificates to send session tickets, we
@ -883,7 +896,8 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientCertificate() error {
func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientFinished() error {
c := hs.c
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
// finishedMsg is not included in the transcript.
msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}

19
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/key_schedule.go generated vendored
View file

@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"crypto/ecdh"
"crypto/hmac"
"errors"
"fmt"
"hash"
"io"
@ -40,8 +41,24 @@ func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) expandLabel(secret []byte, label string, context []by
hkdfLabel.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(context)
})
hkdfLabelBytes, err := hkdfLabel.Bytes()
if err != nil {
// Rather than calling BytesOrPanic, we explicitly handle this error, in
// order to provide a reasonable error message. It should be basically
// impossible for this to panic, and routing errors back through the
// tree rooted in this function is quite painful. The labels are fixed
// size, and the context is either a fixed-length computed hash, or
// parsed from a field which has the same length limitation. As such, an
// error here is likely to only be caused during development.
//
// NOTE: another reasonable approach here might be to return a
// randomized slice if we encounter an error, which would break the
// connection, but avoid panicking. This would perhaps be safer but
// significantly more confusing to users.
panic(fmt.Errorf("failed to construct HKDF label: %s", err))
}
out := make([]byte, length)
n, err := hkdf.Expand(c.hash.New, secret, hkdfLabel.BytesOrPanic()).Read(out)
n, err := hkdf.Expand(c.hash.New, secret, hkdfLabelBytes).Read(out)
if err != nil || n != length {
panic("tls: HKDF-Expand-Label invocation failed unexpectedly")
}

17
vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/ticket.go generated vendored
View file

@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ type sessionState struct {
usedOldKey bool
}
func (m *sessionState) marshal() []byte {
func (m *sessionState) marshal() ([]byte, error) {
var b cryptobyte.Builder
b.AddUint16(m.vers)
b.AddUint16(m.cipherSuite)
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ func (m *sessionState) marshal() []byte {
})
}
})
return b.BytesOrPanic()
return b.Bytes()
}
func (m *sessionState) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ type sessionStateTLS13 struct {
appData []byte
}
func (m *sessionStateTLS13) marshal() []byte {
func (m *sessionStateTLS13) marshal() ([]byte, error) {
var b cryptobyte.Builder
b.AddUint16(VersionTLS13)
b.AddUint8(2) // revision
@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ func (m *sessionStateTLS13) marshal() []byte {
b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
b.AddBytes(m.appData)
})
return b.BytesOrPanic()
return b.Bytes()
}
func (m *sessionStateTLS13) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
@ -227,8 +227,11 @@ func (c *Conn) getSessionTicketMsg(appData []byte) (*newSessionTicketMsgTLS13, e
if c.extraConfig != nil {
state.maxEarlyData = c.extraConfig.MaxEarlyData
}
var err error
m.label, err = c.encryptTicket(state.marshal())
stateBytes, err := state.marshal()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
m.label, err = c.encryptTicket(stateBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@ -270,5 +273,5 @@ func (c *Conn) GetSessionTicket(appData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return m.marshal(), nil
return m.marshal()
}

2
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/README.md generated vendored
View file

@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ In addition to the RFCs listed above, it currently implements the [IETF QUIC dra
## Guides
*We currently support Go 1.18.x and Go 1.19.x.*
*We currently support Go 1.19.x and Go 1.20.x*
Running tests:

16
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/connection.go generated vendored
View file

@ -1659,6 +1659,7 @@ func (s *connection) handleTransportParameters(params *wire.TransportParameters)
ErrorCode: qerr.TransportParameterError,
ErrorMessage: err.Error(),
})
return
}
s.peerParams = params
// On the client side we have to wait for handshake completion.
@ -2026,6 +2027,21 @@ func (s *connection) logShortHeaderPacket(
func (s *connection) logCoalescedPacket(packet *coalescedPacket) {
if s.logger.Debug() {
// There's a short period between dropping both Initial and Handshake keys and completion of the handshake,
// during which we might call PackCoalescedPacket but just pack a short header packet.
if len(packet.longHdrPackets) == 0 && packet.shortHdrPacket != nil {
s.logShortHeaderPacket(
packet.shortHdrPacket.DestConnID,
packet.shortHdrPacket.Ack,
packet.shortHdrPacket.Frames,
packet.shortHdrPacket.PacketNumber,
packet.shortHdrPacket.PacketNumberLen,
packet.shortHdrPacket.KeyPhase,
packet.shortHdrPacket.Length,
false,
)
return
}
if len(packet.longHdrPackets) > 1 {
s.logger.Debugf("-> Sending coalesced packet (%d parts, %d bytes) for connection %s", len(packet.longHdrPackets), packet.buffer.Len(), s.logID)
} else {

44
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/datagram_queue.go generated vendored
View file

@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
package quic
import (
"sync"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/wire"
@ -9,7 +11,10 @@ import (
type datagramQueue struct {
sendQueue chan *wire.DatagramFrame
nextFrame *wire.DatagramFrame
rcvQueue chan []byte
rcvMx sync.Mutex
rcvQueue [][]byte
rcvd chan struct{} // used to notify Receive that a new datagram was received
closeErr error
closed chan struct{}
@ -25,7 +30,7 @@ func newDatagramQueue(hasData func(), logger utils.Logger) *datagramQueue {
return &datagramQueue{
hasData: hasData,
sendQueue: make(chan *wire.DatagramFrame, 1),
rcvQueue: make(chan []byte, protocol.DatagramRcvQueueLen),
rcvd: make(chan struct{}, 1),
dequeued: make(chan struct{}),
closed: make(chan struct{}),
logger: logger,
@ -76,20 +81,39 @@ func (h *datagramQueue) Pop() {
func (h *datagramQueue) HandleDatagramFrame(f *wire.DatagramFrame) {
data := make([]byte, len(f.Data))
copy(data, f.Data)
select {
case h.rcvQueue <- data:
default:
var queued bool
h.rcvMx.Lock()
if len(h.rcvQueue) < protocol.DatagramRcvQueueLen {
h.rcvQueue = append(h.rcvQueue, data)
queued = true
select {
case h.rcvd <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
}
h.rcvMx.Unlock()
if !queued && h.logger.Debug() {
h.logger.Debugf("Discarding DATAGRAM frame (%d bytes payload)", len(f.Data))
}
}
// Receive gets a received DATAGRAM frame.
func (h *datagramQueue) Receive() ([]byte, error) {
select {
case data := <-h.rcvQueue:
return data, nil
case <-h.closed:
return nil, h.closeErr
for {
h.rcvMx.Lock()
if len(h.rcvQueue) > 0 {
data := h.rcvQueue[0]
h.rcvQueue = h.rcvQueue[1:]
h.rcvMx.Unlock()
return data, nil
}
h.rcvMx.Unlock()
select {
case <-h.rcvd:
continue
case <-h.closed:
return nil, h.closeErr
}
}
}

77
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/client.go generated vendored
View file

@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"net/http"
"strconv"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go"
@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ type client struct {
decoder *qpack.Decoder
hostname string
conn quic.EarlyConnection
conn atomic.Pointer[quic.EarlyConnection]
logger utils.Logger
}
@ -108,33 +109,35 @@ func newClient(hostname string, tlsConf *tls.Config, opts *roundTripperOpts, con
func (c *client) dial(ctx context.Context) error {
var err error
var conn quic.EarlyConnection
if c.dialer != nil {
c.conn, err = c.dialer(ctx, c.hostname, c.tlsConf, c.config)
conn, err = c.dialer(ctx, c.hostname, c.tlsConf, c.config)
} else {
c.conn, err = dialAddr(ctx, c.hostname, c.tlsConf, c.config)
conn, err = dialAddr(ctx, c.hostname, c.tlsConf, c.config)
}
if err != nil {
return err
}
c.conn.Store(&conn)
// send the SETTINGs frame, using 0-RTT data, if possible
go func() {
if err := c.setupConn(); err != nil {
if err := c.setupConn(conn); err != nil {
c.logger.Debugf("Setting up connection failed: %s", err)
c.conn.CloseWithError(quic.ApplicationErrorCode(errorInternalError), "")
conn.CloseWithError(quic.ApplicationErrorCode(errorInternalError), "")
}
}()
if c.opts.StreamHijacker != nil {
go c.handleBidirectionalStreams()
go c.handleBidirectionalStreams(conn)
}
go c.handleUnidirectionalStreams()
go c.handleUnidirectionalStreams(conn)
return nil
}
func (c *client) setupConn() error {
func (c *client) setupConn(conn quic.EarlyConnection) error {
// open the control stream
str, err := c.conn.OpenUniStream()
str, err := conn.OpenUniStream()
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -146,16 +149,16 @@ func (c *client) setupConn() error {
return err
}
func (c *client) handleBidirectionalStreams() {
func (c *client) handleBidirectionalStreams(conn quic.EarlyConnection) {
for {
str, err := c.conn.AcceptStream(context.Background())
str, err := conn.AcceptStream(context.Background())
if err != nil {
c.logger.Debugf("accepting bidirectional stream failed: %s", err)
return
}
go func(str quic.Stream) {
_, err := parseNextFrame(str, func(ft FrameType, e error) (processed bool, err error) {
return c.opts.StreamHijacker(ft, c.conn, str, e)
return c.opts.StreamHijacker(ft, conn, str, e)
})
if err == errHijacked {
return
@ -163,14 +166,14 @@ func (c *client) handleBidirectionalStreams() {
if err != nil {
c.logger.Debugf("error handling stream: %s", err)
}
c.conn.CloseWithError(quic.ApplicationErrorCode(errorFrameUnexpected), "received HTTP/3 frame on bidirectional stream")
conn.CloseWithError(quic.ApplicationErrorCode(errorFrameUnexpected), "received HTTP/3 frame on bidirectional stream")
}(str)
}
}
func (c *client) handleUnidirectionalStreams() {
func (c *client) handleUnidirectionalStreams(conn quic.EarlyConnection) {
for {
str, err := c.conn.AcceptUniStream(context.Background())
str, err := conn.AcceptUniStream(context.Background())
if err != nil {
c.logger.Debugf("accepting unidirectional stream failed: %s", err)
return
@ -179,7 +182,7 @@ func (c *client) handleUnidirectionalStreams() {
go func(str quic.ReceiveStream) {
streamType, err := quicvarint.Read(quicvarint.NewReader(str))
if err != nil {
if c.opts.UniStreamHijacker != nil && c.opts.UniStreamHijacker(StreamType(streamType), c.conn, str, err) {
if c.opts.UniStreamHijacker != nil && c.opts.UniStreamHijacker(StreamType(streamType), conn, str, err) {
return
}
c.logger.Debugf("reading stream type on stream %d failed: %s", str.StreamID(), err)
@ -194,10 +197,10 @@ func (c *client) handleUnidirectionalStreams() {
return
case streamTypePushStream:
// We never increased the Push ID, so we don't expect any push streams.
c.conn.CloseWithError(quic.ApplicationErrorCode(errorIDError), "")
conn.CloseWithError(quic.ApplicationErrorCode(errorIDError), "")
return
default:
if c.opts.UniStreamHijacker != nil && c.opts.UniStreamHijacker(StreamType(streamType), c.conn, str, nil) {
if c.opts.UniStreamHijacker != nil && c.opts.UniStreamHijacker(StreamType(streamType), conn, str, nil) {
return
}
str.CancelRead(quic.StreamErrorCode(errorStreamCreationError))
@ -205,12 +208,12 @@ func (c *client) handleUnidirectionalStreams() {
}
f, err := parseNextFrame(str, nil)
if err != nil {
c.conn.CloseWithError(quic.ApplicationErrorCode(errorFrameError), "")
conn.CloseWithError(quic.ApplicationErrorCode(errorFrameError), "")
return
}
sf, ok := f.(*settingsFrame)
if !ok {
c.conn.CloseWithError(quic.ApplicationErrorCode(errorMissingSettings), "")
conn.CloseWithError(quic.ApplicationErrorCode(errorMissingSettings), "")
return
}
if !sf.Datagram {
@ -219,18 +222,19 @@ func (c *client) handleUnidirectionalStreams() {
// If datagram support was enabled on our side as well as on the server side,
// we can expect it to have been negotiated both on the transport and on the HTTP/3 layer.
// Note: ConnectionState() will block until the handshake is complete (relevant when using 0-RTT).
if c.opts.EnableDatagram && !c.conn.ConnectionState().SupportsDatagrams {
c.conn.CloseWithError(quic.ApplicationErrorCode(errorSettingsError), "missing QUIC Datagram support")
if c.opts.EnableDatagram && !conn.ConnectionState().SupportsDatagrams {
conn.CloseWithError(quic.ApplicationErrorCode(errorSettingsError), "missing QUIC Datagram support")
}
}(str)
}
}
func (c *client) Close() error {
if c.conn == nil {
conn := c.conn.Load()
if conn == nil {
return nil
}
return c.conn.CloseWithError(quic.ApplicationErrorCode(errorNoError), "")
return (*conn).CloseWithError(quic.ApplicationErrorCode(errorNoError), "")
}
func (c *client) maxHeaderBytes() uint64 {
@ -249,24 +253,26 @@ func (c *client) RoundTripOpt(req *http.Request, opt RoundTripOpt) (*http.Respon
c.dialOnce.Do(func() {
c.handshakeErr = c.dial(req.Context())
})
if c.handshakeErr != nil {
return nil, c.handshakeErr
}
// At this point, c.conn is guaranteed to be set.
conn := *c.conn.Load()
// Immediately send out this request, if this is a 0-RTT request.
if req.Method == MethodGet0RTT {
req.Method = http.MethodGet
} else {
// wait for the handshake to complete
select {
case <-c.conn.HandshakeComplete().Done():
case <-conn.HandshakeComplete().Done():
case <-req.Context().Done():
return nil, req.Context().Err()
}
}
str, err := c.conn.OpenStreamSync(req.Context())
str, err := conn.OpenStreamSync(req.Context())
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@ -290,7 +296,7 @@ func (c *client) RoundTripOpt(req *http.Request, opt RoundTripOpt) (*http.Respon
if opt.DontCloseRequestStream {
doneChan = nil
}
rsp, rerr := c.doRequest(req, str, opt, doneChan)
rsp, rerr := c.doRequest(req, conn, str, opt, doneChan)
if rerr.err != nil { // if any error occurred
close(reqDone)
<-done
@ -302,7 +308,7 @@ func (c *client) RoundTripOpt(req *http.Request, opt RoundTripOpt) (*http.Respon
if rerr.err != nil {
reason = rerr.err.Error()
}
c.conn.CloseWithError(quic.ApplicationErrorCode(rerr.connErr), reason)
conn.CloseWithError(quic.ApplicationErrorCode(rerr.connErr), reason)
}
return nil, rerr.err
}
@ -340,7 +346,7 @@ func (c *client) sendRequestBody(str Stream, body io.ReadCloser) error {
return nil
}
func (c *client) doRequest(req *http.Request, str quic.Stream, opt RoundTripOpt, reqDone chan<- struct{}) (*http.Response, requestError) {
func (c *client) doRequest(req *http.Request, conn quic.EarlyConnection, str quic.Stream, opt RoundTripOpt, reqDone chan<- struct{}) (*http.Response, requestError) {
var requestGzip bool
if !c.opts.DisableCompression && req.Method != "HEAD" && req.Header.Get("Accept-Encoding") == "" && req.Header.Get("Range") == "" {
requestGzip = true
@ -353,7 +359,7 @@ func (c *client) doRequest(req *http.Request, str quic.Stream, opt RoundTripOpt,
str.Close()
}
hstr := newStream(str, func() { c.conn.CloseWithError(quic.ApplicationErrorCode(errorFrameUnexpected), "") })
hstr := newStream(str, func() { conn.CloseWithError(quic.ApplicationErrorCode(errorFrameUnexpected), "") })
if req.Body != nil {
// send the request body asynchronously
go func() {
@ -387,7 +393,7 @@ func (c *client) doRequest(req *http.Request, str quic.Stream, opt RoundTripOpt,
return nil, newConnError(errorGeneralProtocolError, err)
}
connState := qtls.ToTLSConnectionState(c.conn.ConnectionState().TLS)
connState := qtls.ToTLSConnectionState(conn.ConnectionState().TLS)
res := &http.Response{
Proto: "HTTP/3.0",
ProtoMajor: 3,
@ -408,7 +414,7 @@ func (c *client) doRequest(req *http.Request, str quic.Stream, opt RoundTripOpt,
res.Header.Add(hf.Name, hf.Value)
}
}
respBody := newResponseBody(hstr, c.conn, reqDone)
respBody := newResponseBody(hstr, conn, reqDone)
// Rules for when to set Content-Length are defined in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-3.3.2.
_, hasTransferEncoding := res.Header["Transfer-Encoding"]
@ -438,11 +444,12 @@ func (c *client) doRequest(req *http.Request, str quic.Stream, opt RoundTripOpt,
}
func (c *client) HandshakeComplete() bool {
if c.conn == nil {
conn := c.conn.Load()
if conn == nil {
return false
}
select {
case <-c.conn.HandshakeComplete().Done():
case <-(*conn).HandshakeComplete().Done():
return true
default:
return false

18
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/response_writer.go generated vendored
View file

@ -80,10 +80,26 @@ func (w *responseWriter) WriteHeader(status int) {
}
func (w *responseWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
bodyAllowed := bodyAllowedForStatus(w.status)
if !w.headerWritten {
// If body is not allowed, we don't need to (and we can't) sniff the content type.
if bodyAllowed {
// If no content type, apply sniffing algorithm to body.
// We can't use `w.header.Get` here since if the Content-Type was set to nil, we shoundn't do sniffing.
_, haveType := w.header["Content-Type"]
// If the Transfer-Encoding or Content-Encoding was set and is non-blank,
// we shouldn't sniff the body.
hasTE := w.header.Get("Transfer-Encoding") != ""
hasCE := w.header.Get("Content-Encoding") != ""
if !hasCE && !haveType && !hasTE && len(p) > 0 {
w.header.Set("Content-Type", http.DetectContentType(p))
}
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
bodyAllowed = true
}
if !bodyAllowedForStatus(w.status) {
if !bodyAllowed {
return 0, http.ErrBodyNotAllowed
}
df := &dataFrame{Length: uint64(len(p))}

11
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/crypto_setup.go generated vendored
View file

@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ func newCryptoSetup(
alertChan: make(chan uint8),
clientHelloWrittenChan: make(chan struct{}),
zeroRTTParametersChan: zeroRTTParametersChan,
messageChan: make(chan []byte, 100),
messageChan: make(chan []byte, 1),
isReadingHandshakeMessage: make(chan struct{}),
closeChan: make(chan struct{}),
version: version,
@ -368,8 +368,15 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) HandleMessage(data []byte, encLevel protocol.EncryptionLev
h.onError(alertUnexpectedMessage, err.Error())
return false
}
h.messageChan <- data
if encLevel != protocol.Encryption1RTT {
select {
case h.messageChan <- data:
case <-h.handshakeDone: // handshake errored, nobody is going to consume this message
return false
}
}
if encLevel == protocol.Encryption1RTT {
h.messageChan <- data
h.handlePostHandshakeMessage()
return false
}

2
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/tls_extension_handler.go generated vendored
View file

@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ var _ tlsExtensionHandler = &extensionHandler{}
// newExtensionHandler creates a new extension handler
func newExtensionHandler(params []byte, pers protocol.Perspective, v protocol.VersionNumber) tlsExtensionHandler {
et := uint16(quicTLSExtensionType)
if v != protocol.Version1 {
if v == protocol.VersionDraft29 {
et = quicTLSExtensionTypeOldDrafts
}
return &extensionHandler{

99
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/go118.go generated vendored
View file

@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
//go:build go1.18 && !go1.19
package qtls
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/tls"
"net"
"unsafe"
"github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18"
)
type (
// Alert is a TLS alert
Alert = qtls.Alert
// A Certificate is qtls.Certificate.
Certificate = qtls.Certificate
// CertificateRequestInfo contains inforamtion about a certificate request.
CertificateRequestInfo = qtls.CertificateRequestInfo
// A CipherSuiteTLS13 is a cipher suite for TLS 1.3
CipherSuiteTLS13 = qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13
// ClientHelloInfo contains information about a ClientHello.
ClientHelloInfo = qtls.ClientHelloInfo
// ClientSessionCache is a cache used for session resumption.
ClientSessionCache = qtls.ClientSessionCache
// ClientSessionState is a state needed for session resumption.
ClientSessionState = qtls.ClientSessionState
// A Config is a qtls.Config.
Config = qtls.Config
// A Conn is a qtls.Conn.
Conn = qtls.Conn
// ConnectionState contains information about the state of the connection.
ConnectionState = qtls.ConnectionStateWith0RTT
// EncryptionLevel is the encryption level of a message.
EncryptionLevel = qtls.EncryptionLevel
// Extension is a TLS extension
Extension = qtls.Extension
// ExtraConfig is the qtls.ExtraConfig
ExtraConfig = qtls.ExtraConfig
// RecordLayer is a qtls RecordLayer.
RecordLayer = qtls.RecordLayer
)
const (
// EncryptionHandshake is the Handshake encryption level
EncryptionHandshake = qtls.EncryptionHandshake
// Encryption0RTT is the 0-RTT encryption level
Encryption0RTT = qtls.Encryption0RTT
// EncryptionApplication is the application data encryption level
EncryptionApplication = qtls.EncryptionApplication
)
// AEADAESGCMTLS13 creates a new AES-GCM AEAD for TLS 1.3
func AEADAESGCMTLS13(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD {
return qtls.AEADAESGCMTLS13(key, fixedNonce)
}
// Client returns a new TLS client side connection.
func Client(conn net.Conn, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *Conn {
return qtls.Client(conn, config, extraConfig)
}
// Server returns a new TLS server side connection.
func Server(conn net.Conn, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *Conn {
return qtls.Server(conn, config, extraConfig)
}
func GetConnectionState(conn *Conn) ConnectionState {
return conn.ConnectionStateWith0RTT()
}
// ToTLSConnectionState extracts the tls.ConnectionState
func ToTLSConnectionState(cs ConnectionState) tls.ConnectionState {
return cs.ConnectionState
}
type cipherSuiteTLS13 struct {
ID uint16
KeyLen int
AEAD func(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD
Hash crypto.Hash
}
//go:linkname cipherSuiteTLS13ByID github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18.cipherSuiteTLS13ByID
func cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13
// CipherSuiteTLS13ByID gets a TLS 1.3 cipher suite.
func CipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id uint16) *CipherSuiteTLS13 {
val := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id)
cs := (*cipherSuiteTLS13)(unsafe.Pointer(val))
return &qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13{
ID: cs.ID,
KeyLen: cs.KeyLen,
AEAD: cs.AEAD,
Hash: cs.Hash,
}
}

2
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/go_oldversion.go generated vendored
View file

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
//go:build !go1.18
//go:build !go1.19
package qtls

22
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils/atomic_bool.go generated vendored
View file

@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
package utils
import "sync/atomic"
// An AtomicBool is an atomic bool
type AtomicBool struct {
v int32
}
// Set sets the value
func (a *AtomicBool) Set(value bool) {
var n int32
if value {
n = 1
}
atomic.StoreInt32(&a.v, n)
}
// Get gets the value
func (a *AtomicBool) Get() bool {
return atomic.LoadInt32(&a.v) != 0
}

2
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/quicvarint/varint.go generated vendored
View file

@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ func Read(r io.ByteReader) (uint64, error) {
}
// Write writes i in the QUIC varint format to w.
// Deprecated: use Append instead.
func Write(w Writer, i uint64) {
if i <= maxVarInt1 {
w.WriteByte(uint8(i))
@ -88,6 +89,7 @@ func Write(w Writer, i uint64) {
}
}
// Append appends i in the QUIC varint format.
func Append(b []byte, i uint64) []byte {
if i <= maxVarInt1 {
return append(b, uint8(i))

36
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/receive_stream.go generated vendored
View file

@ -34,18 +34,14 @@ type receiveStream struct {
currentFrame []byte
currentFrameDone func()
currentFrameIsLast bool // is the currentFrame the last frame on this stream
readPosInFrame int
currentFrameIsLast bool // is the currentFrame the last frame on this stream
finRead bool // set once we read a frame with a Fin
closeForShutdownErr error
cancelReadErr error
resetRemotelyErr *StreamError
closedForShutdown bool // set when CloseForShutdown() is called
finRead bool // set once we read a frame with a Fin
canceledRead bool // set when CancelRead() is called
resetRemotely bool // set when handleResetStreamFrame() is called
readChan chan struct{}
readOnce chan struct{} // cap: 1, to protect against concurrent use of Read
deadline time.Time
@ -100,13 +96,13 @@ func (s *receiveStream) readImpl(p []byte) (bool /*stream completed */, int, err
if s.finRead {
return false, 0, io.EOF
}
if s.canceledRead {
if s.cancelReadErr != nil {
return false, 0, s.cancelReadErr
}
if s.resetRemotely {
if s.resetRemotelyErr != nil {
return false, 0, s.resetRemotelyErr
}
if s.closedForShutdown {
if s.closeForShutdownErr != nil {
return false, 0, s.closeForShutdownErr
}
@ -122,13 +118,13 @@ func (s *receiveStream) readImpl(p []byte) (bool /*stream completed */, int, err
for {
// Stop waiting on errors
if s.closedForShutdown {
if s.closeForShutdownErr != nil {
return false, bytesRead, s.closeForShutdownErr
}
if s.canceledRead {
if s.cancelReadErr != nil {
return false, bytesRead, s.cancelReadErr
}
if s.resetRemotely {
if s.resetRemotelyErr != nil {
return false, bytesRead, s.resetRemotelyErr
}
@ -175,8 +171,9 @@ func (s *receiveStream) readImpl(p []byte) (bool /*stream completed */, int, err
s.readPosInFrame += m
bytesRead += m
// when a RESET_STREAM was received, the was already informed about the final byteOffset for this stream
if !s.resetRemotely {
// when a RESET_STREAM was received, the flow controller was already
// informed about the final byteOffset for this stream
if s.resetRemotelyErr == nil {
s.flowController.AddBytesRead(protocol.ByteCount(m))
}
@ -211,10 +208,9 @@ func (s *receiveStream) CancelRead(errorCode StreamErrorCode) {
}
func (s *receiveStream) cancelReadImpl(errorCode qerr.StreamErrorCode) bool /* completed */ {
if s.finRead || s.canceledRead || s.resetRemotely {
if s.finRead || s.cancelReadErr != nil || s.resetRemotelyErr != nil {
return false
}
s.canceledRead = true
s.cancelReadErr = &StreamError{StreamID: s.streamID, ErrorCode: errorCode, Remote: false}
s.signalRead()
s.sender.queueControlFrame(&wire.StopSendingFrame{
@ -247,7 +243,7 @@ func (s *receiveStream) handleStreamFrameImpl(frame *wire.StreamFrame) (bool /*
newlyRcvdFinalOffset = s.finalOffset == protocol.MaxByteCount
s.finalOffset = maxOffset
}
if s.canceledRead {
if s.cancelReadErr != nil {
return newlyRcvdFinalOffset, nil
}
if err := s.frameQueue.Push(frame.Data, frame.Offset, frame.PutBack); err != nil {
@ -270,7 +266,7 @@ func (s *receiveStream) handleResetStreamFrame(frame *wire.ResetStreamFrame) err
}
func (s *receiveStream) handleResetStreamFrameImpl(frame *wire.ResetStreamFrame) (bool /*completed */, error) {
if s.closedForShutdown {
if s.closeForShutdownErr != nil {
return false, nil
}
if err := s.flowController.UpdateHighestReceived(frame.FinalSize, true); err != nil {
@ -280,10 +276,9 @@ func (s *receiveStream) handleResetStreamFrameImpl(frame *wire.ResetStreamFrame)
s.finalOffset = frame.FinalSize
// ignore duplicate RESET_STREAM frames for this stream (after checking their final offset)
if s.resetRemotely {
if s.resetRemotelyErr != nil {
return false, nil
}
s.resetRemotely = true
s.resetRemotelyErr = &StreamError{
StreamID: s.streamID,
ErrorCode: frame.ErrorCode,
@ -310,7 +305,6 @@ func (s *receiveStream) SetReadDeadline(t time.Time) error {
// The peer will NOT be informed about this: the stream is closed without sending a FIN or RESET.
func (s *receiveStream) closeForShutdown(err error) {
s.mutex.Lock()
s.closedForShutdown = true
s.closeForShutdownErr = err
s.mutex.Unlock()
s.signalRead()

28
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/send_stream.go generated vendored
View file

@ -40,11 +40,9 @@ type sendStream struct {
cancelWriteErr error
closeForShutdownErr error
closedForShutdown bool // set when CloseForShutdown() is called
finishedWriting bool // set once Close() is called
canceledWrite bool // set when CancelWrite() is called, or a STOP_SENDING frame is received
finSent bool // set when a STREAM_FRAME with FIN bit has been sent
completed bool // set when this stream has been reported to the streamSender as completed
finishedWriting bool // set once Close() is called
finSent bool // set when a STREAM_FRAME with FIN bit has been sent
completed bool // set when this stream has been reported to the streamSender as completed
dataForWriting []byte // during a Write() call, this slice is the part of p that still needs to be sent out
nextFrame *wire.StreamFrame
@ -94,7 +92,7 @@ func (s *sendStream) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
if s.finishedWriting {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("write on closed stream %d", s.streamID)
}
if s.canceledWrite {
if s.cancelWriteErr != nil {
return 0, s.cancelWriteErr
}
if s.closeForShutdownErr != nil {
@ -153,7 +151,7 @@ func (s *sendStream) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
}
deadlineTimer.Reset(deadline)
}
if s.dataForWriting == nil || s.canceledWrite || s.closedForShutdown {
if s.dataForWriting == nil || s.cancelWriteErr != nil || s.closeForShutdownErr != nil {
break
}
}
@ -219,7 +217,7 @@ func (s *sendStream) popStreamFrame(maxBytes protocol.ByteCount, v protocol.Vers
}
func (s *sendStream) popNewOrRetransmittedStreamFrame(maxBytes protocol.ByteCount, v protocol.VersionNumber) (*wire.StreamFrame, bool /* has more data to send */) {
if s.canceledWrite || s.closeForShutdownErr != nil {
if s.cancelWriteErr != nil || s.closeForShutdownErr != nil {
return nil, false
}
@ -354,7 +352,7 @@ func (s *sendStream) frameAcked(f wire.Frame) {
f.(*wire.StreamFrame).PutBack()
s.mutex.Lock()
if s.canceledWrite {
if s.cancelWriteErr != nil {
s.mutex.Unlock()
return
}
@ -371,7 +369,7 @@ func (s *sendStream) frameAcked(f wire.Frame) {
}
func (s *sendStream) isNewlyCompleted() bool {
completed := (s.finSent || s.canceledWrite) && s.numOutstandingFrames == 0 && len(s.retransmissionQueue) == 0
completed := (s.finSent || s.cancelWriteErr != nil) && s.numOutstandingFrames == 0 && len(s.retransmissionQueue) == 0
if completed && !s.completed {
s.completed = true
return true
@ -383,7 +381,7 @@ func (s *sendStream) queueRetransmission(f wire.Frame) {
sf := f.(*wire.StreamFrame)
sf.DataLenPresent = true
s.mutex.Lock()
if s.canceledWrite {
if s.cancelWriteErr != nil {
s.mutex.Unlock()
return
}
@ -399,11 +397,11 @@ func (s *sendStream) queueRetransmission(f wire.Frame) {
func (s *sendStream) Close() error {
s.mutex.Lock()
if s.closedForShutdown {
if s.closeForShutdownErr != nil {
s.mutex.Unlock()
return nil
}
if s.canceledWrite {
if s.cancelWriteErr != nil {
s.mutex.Unlock()
return fmt.Errorf("close called for canceled stream %d", s.streamID)
}
@ -422,12 +420,11 @@ func (s *sendStream) CancelWrite(errorCode StreamErrorCode) {
// must be called after locking the mutex
func (s *sendStream) cancelWriteImpl(errorCode qerr.StreamErrorCode, remote bool) {
s.mutex.Lock()
if s.canceledWrite {
if s.cancelWriteErr != nil {
s.mutex.Unlock()
return
}
s.ctxCancel()
s.canceledWrite = true
s.cancelWriteErr = &StreamError{StreamID: s.streamID, ErrorCode: errorCode, Remote: remote}
s.numOutstandingFrames = 0
s.retransmissionQueue = nil
@ -478,7 +475,6 @@ func (s *sendStream) SetWriteDeadline(t time.Time) error {
func (s *sendStream) closeForShutdown(err error) {
s.mutex.Lock()
s.ctxCancel()
s.closedForShutdown = true
s.closeForShutdownErr = err
s.mutex.Unlock()
s.signalWrite()

6
vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/server.go generated vendored
View file

@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ func (s *baseServer) handlePacketImpl(p *receivedPacket) bool /* is the buffer s
return false
}
if !s.config.DisableVersionNegotiationPackets {
go s.sendVersionNegotiationPacket(p.remoteAddr, src, dest, p.info.OOB())
go s.sendVersionNegotiationPacket(p.remoteAddr, src, dest, p.info.OOB(), v)
}
return false
}
@ -669,8 +669,8 @@ func (s *baseServer) sendError(remoteAddr net.Addr, hdr *wire.Header, sealer han
return err
}
func (s *baseServer) sendVersionNegotiationPacket(remote net.Addr, src, dest protocol.ArbitraryLenConnectionID, oob []byte) {
s.logger.Debugf("Client offered version %s, sending Version Negotiation")
func (s *baseServer) sendVersionNegotiationPacket(remote net.Addr, src, dest protocol.ArbitraryLenConnectionID, oob []byte, v protocol.VersionNumber) {
s.logger.Debugf("Client offered version %s, sending Version Negotiation", v)
data := wire.ComposeVersionNegotiation(dest, src, s.config.Versions)
if s.config.Tracer != nil {