Update quic-go dependency to support go 1.20 (#2292)

dnscrypt-proxy/xtransport.go

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/jedisct1/dlog"
 	stamps "github.com/jedisct1/go-dnsstamps"
-	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/http3"
+	"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3"
 	"github.com/miekg/dns"
 	"golang.org/x/net/http2"
 	netproxy "golang.org/x/net/proxy"

go.mod

@@ -18,9 +18,9 @@ require (
 	github.com/jedisct1/xsecretbox v0.0.0-20210927135450-ebe41aef7bef
 	github.com/k-sone/critbitgo v1.4.0
 	github.com/kardianos/service v1.2.2
-	github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go v0.31.1
 	github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.50
 	github.com/powerman/check v1.6.0
+	github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.32.0
 	golang.org/x/crypto v0.5.0
 	golang.org/x/net v0.5.0
 	golang.org/x/sys v0.4.0
@@ -99,9 +99,6 @@ require (
 	github.com/ldez/tagliatelle v0.2.0 // indirect
 	github.com/magiconair/properties v1.8.1 // indirect
 	github.com/maratori/testpackage v1.0.1 // indirect
-	github.com/marten-seemann/qpack v0.3.0 // indirect
-	github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-18 v0.1.3 // indirect
-	github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19 v0.1.1 // indirect
 	github.com/matoous/godox v0.0.0-20210227103229-6504466cf951 // indirect
 	github.com/mattn/go-colorable v0.1.8 // indirect
 	github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.12 // indirect
@@ -132,6 +129,10 @@ require (
 	github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.1.3 // indirect
 	github.com/quasilyte/go-ruleguard v0.3.4 // indirect
 	github.com/quasilyte/regex/syntax v0.0.0-20200407221936-30656e2c4a95 // indirect
+	github.com/quic-go/qpack v0.4.0 // indirect
+	github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18 v0.2.0 // indirect
+	github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19 v0.2.0 // indirect
+	github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20 v0.1.0 // indirect
 	github.com/ryancurrah/gomodguard v1.2.2 // indirect
 	github.com/ryanrolds/sqlclosecheck v0.3.0 // indirect
 	github.com/sanposhiho/wastedassign/v2 v2.0.6 // indirect
@@ -160,10 +161,10 @@ require (
 	github.com/ultraware/whitespace v0.0.4 // indirect
 	github.com/uudashr/gocognit v1.0.1 // indirect
 	github.com/yeya24/promlinter v0.1.0 // indirect
-	golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20220722155223-a9213eeb770e // indirect
-	golang.org/x/mod v0.6.0-dev.0.20220419223038-86c51ed26bb4 // indirect
+	golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20221205204356-47842c84f3db // indirect
+	golang.org/x/mod v0.6.0 // indirect
 	golang.org/x/text v0.6.0 // indirect
-	golang.org/x/tools v0.1.12 // indirect
+	golang.org/x/tools v0.2.0 // indirect
 	google.golang.org/genproto v0.0.0-20200707001353-8e8330bf89df // indirect
 	google.golang.org/grpc v1.38.0 // indirect
 	google.golang.org/protobuf v1.28.0 // indirect

go.sum

@@ -432,19 +432,11 @@ github.com/lib/pq v1.0.0/go.mod h1:5WUZQaWbwv1U+lTReE5YruASi9Al49XbQIvNi/34Woo=
 github.com/lib/pq v1.8.0/go.mod h1:AlVN5x4E4T544tWzH6hKfbfQvm3HdbOxrmggDNAPY9o=
 github.com/lib/pq v1.9.0/go.mod h1:AlVN5x4E4T544tWzH6hKfbfQvm3HdbOxrmggDNAPY9o=
 github.com/logrusorgru/aurora v0.0.0-20181002194514-a7b3b318ed4e/go.mod h1:7rIyQOR62GCctdiQpZ/zOJlFyk6y+94wXzv6RNZgaR4=
-github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go v0.31.1 h1:O8Od7hfioqq0PMYHDyBkxU2aA7iZ2W9pjbrWuja2YR4=
-github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go v0.31.1/go.mod h1:0wFbizLgYzqHqtlyxyCaJKlE7bYgE6JQ+54TLd/Dq2g=
 github.com/magiconair/properties v1.8.0/go.mod h1:PppfXfuXeibc/6YijjN8zIbojt8czPbwD3XqdrwzmxQ=
 github.com/magiconair/properties v1.8.1 h1:ZC2Vc7/ZFkGmsVC9KvOjumD+G5lXy2RtTKyzRKO2BQ4=
 github.com/magiconair/properties v1.8.1/go.mod h1:PppfXfuXeibc/6YijjN8zIbojt8czPbwD3XqdrwzmxQ=
 github.com/maratori/testpackage v1.0.1 h1:QtJ5ZjqapShm0w5DosRjg0PRlSdAdlx+W6cCKoALdbQ=
 github.com/maratori/testpackage v1.0.1/go.mod h1:ddKdw+XG0Phzhx8BFDTKgpWP4i7MpApTE5fXSKAqwDU=
-github.com/marten-seemann/qpack v0.3.0 h1:UiWstOgT8+znlkDPOg2+3rIuYXJ2CnGDkGUXN6ki6hE=
-github.com/marten-seemann/qpack v0.3.0/go.mod h1:cGfKPBiP4a9EQdxCwEwI/GEeWAsjSekBvx/X8mh58+g=
-github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-18 v0.1.3 h1:R4H2Ks8P6pAtUagjFty2p7BVHn3XiwDAl7TTQf5h7TI=
-github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-18 v0.1.3/go.mod h1:mJttiymBAByA49mhlNZZGrH5u1uXYZJ+RW28Py7f4m4=
-github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19 v0.1.1 h1:mnbxeq3oEyQxQXwI4ReCgW9DPoPR94sNlqWoDZnjRIE=
-github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19 v0.1.1/go.mod h1:5HTDWtVudo/WFsHKRNuOhWlbdjrfs5JHrYb0wIJqGpI=
 github.com/matoous/godox v0.0.0-20210227103229-6504466cf951 h1:pWxk9e//NbPwfxat7RXkts09K+dEBJWakUWwICVqYbA=
 github.com/matoous/godox v0.0.0-20210227103229-6504466cf951/go.mod h1:1BELzlh859Sh1c6+90blK8lbYy0kwQf1bYlBhBysy1s=
 github.com/mattn/go-colorable v0.0.9/go.mod h1:9vuHe8Xs5qXnSaW/c/ABM9alt+Vo+STaOChaDxuIBZU=
@@ -593,6 +585,16 @@ github.com/quasilyte/go-ruleguard/rules v0.0.0-20201231183845-9e62ed36efe1/go.mo
 github.com/quasilyte/go-ruleguard/rules v0.0.0-20210203162857-b223e0831f88/go.mod h1:4cgAphtvu7Ftv7vOT2ZOYhC6CvBxZixcasr8qIOTA50=
 github.com/quasilyte/regex/syntax v0.0.0-20200407221936-30656e2c4a95 h1:L8QM9bvf68pVdQ3bCFZMDmnt9yqcMBro1pC7F+IPYMY=
 github.com/quasilyte/regex/syntax v0.0.0-20200407221936-30656e2c4a95/go.mod h1:rlzQ04UMyJXu/aOvhd8qT+hvDrFpiwqp8MRXDY9szc0=
+github.com/quic-go/qpack v0.4.0 h1:Cr9BXA1sQS2SmDUWjSofMPNKmvF6IiIfDRmgU0w1ZCo=
+github.com/quic-go/qpack v0.4.0/go.mod h1:UZVnYIfi5GRk+zI9UMaCPsmZ2xKJP7XBUvVyT1Knj9A=
+github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18 v0.2.0 h1:5ViXqBZ90wpUcZS0ge79rf029yx0dYB0McyPJwqqj7U=
+github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18 v0.2.0/go.mod h1:moGulGHK7o6O8lSPSZNoOwcLvJKJ85vVNc7oJFD65bc=
+github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19 v0.2.0 h1:Cvn2WdhyViFUHoOqK52i51k4nDX8EwIh5VJiVM4nttk=
+github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19 v0.2.0/go.mod h1:ySOI96ew8lnoKPtSqx2BlI5wCpUVPT05RMAlajtnyOI=
+github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20 v0.1.0 h1:d1PK3ErFy9t7zxKsG3NXBJXZjp/kMLoIb3y/kV54oAI=
+github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20 v0.1.0/go.mod h1:JKtK6mjbAVcUTN/9jZpvLbGxvdWIKS8uT7EiStoU1SM=
+github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.32.0 h1:lY02md31s1JgPiiyfqJijpu/UX/Iun304FI3yUqX7tA=
+github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.32.0/go.mod h1:/fCsKANhQIeD5l76c2JFU+07gVE3KaA0FP+0zMWwfwo=
 github.com/rogpeppe/fastuuid v0.0.0-20150106093220-6724a57986af/go.mod h1:XWv6SoW27p1b0cqNHllgS5HIMJraePCO15w5zCzIWYg=
 github.com/rogpeppe/fastuuid v1.2.0/go.mod h1:jVj6XXZzXRy/MSR5jhDC/2q6DgLz+nrA6LYCDYWNEvQ=
 github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.3.0/go.mod h1:M8bDsm7K2OlrFYOpmOWEs/qY81heoFRclV5y23lUDJ4=
@@ -752,8 +754,8 @@ golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20200119233911-0405dc783f0a/go.mod h1:2RIsYlXP63K8oxa1u0
 golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20200207192155-f17229e696bd/go.mod h1:J/WKrq2StrnmMY6+EHIKF9dgMWnmCNThgcyBT1FY9mM=
 golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20200224162631-6cc2880d07d6/go.mod h1:3jZMyOhIsHpP37uCMkUooju7aAi5cS1Q23tOzKc+0MU=
 golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20200331195152-e8c3332aa8e5/go.mod h1:4M0jN8W1tt0AVLNr8HDosyJCDCDuyL9N9+3m7wDWgKw=
-golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20220722155223-a9213eeb770e h1:+WEEuIdZHnUeJJmEUjyYC2gfUMj69yZXw17EnHg/otA=
-golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20220722155223-a9213eeb770e/go.mod h1:Kr81I6Kryrl9sr8s2FK3vxD90NdsKWRuOIl2O4CvYbA=
+golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20221205204356-47842c84f3db h1:D/cFflL63o2KSLJIwjlcIt8PR064j/xsmdEJL/YvY/o=
+golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20221205204356-47842c84f3db/go.mod h1:CxIveKay+FTh1D0yPZemJVgC/95VzuuOLq5Qi4xnoYc=
 golang.org/x/image v0.0.0-20190227222117-0694c2d4d067/go.mod h1:kZ7UVZpmo3dzQBMxlp+ypCbDeSB+sBbTgSJuh5dn5js=
 golang.org/x/image v0.0.0-20190802002840-cff245a6509b/go.mod h1:FeLwcggjj3mMvU+oOTbSwawSJRM1uh48EjtB4UJZlP0=
 golang.org/x/lint v0.0.0-20181026193005-c67002cb31c3/go.mod h1:UVdnD1Gm6xHRNCYTkRU2/jEulfH38KcIWyp/GAMgvoE=
@@ -777,8 +779,8 @@ golang.org/x/mod v0.3.0/go.mod h1:s0Qsj1ACt9ePp/hMypM3fl4fZqREWJwdYDEqhRiZZUA=
 golang.org/x/mod v0.4.0/go.mod h1:s0Qsj1ACt9ePp/hMypM3fl4fZqREWJwdYDEqhRiZZUA=
 golang.org/x/mod v0.4.1/go.mod h1:s0Qsj1ACt9ePp/hMypM3fl4fZqREWJwdYDEqhRiZZUA=
 golang.org/x/mod v0.4.2/go.mod h1:s0Qsj1ACt9ePp/hMypM3fl4fZqREWJwdYDEqhRiZZUA=
-golang.org/x/mod v0.6.0-dev.0.20220419223038-86c51ed26bb4 h1:6zppjxzCulZykYSLyVDYbneBfbaBIQPYMevg0bEwv2s=
-golang.org/x/mod v0.6.0-dev.0.20220419223038-86c51ed26bb4/go.mod h1:jJ57K6gSWd91VN4djpZkiMVwK6gcyfeH4XE8wZrZaV4=
+golang.org/x/mod v0.6.0 h1:b9gGHsz9/HhJ3HF5DHQytPpuwocVTChQJK3AvoLRD5I=
+golang.org/x/mod v0.6.0/go.mod h1:4mET923SAdbXp2ki8ey+zGs1SLqsuM2Y0uvdZR/fUNI=
 golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20180724234803-3673e40ba225/go.mod h1:mL1N/T3taQHkDXs73rZJwtUhF3w3ftmwwsq0BUmARs4=
 golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20180826012351-8a410e7b638d/go.mod h1:mL1N/T3taQHkDXs73rZJwtUhF3w3ftmwwsq0BUmARs4=
 golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20180906233101-161cd47e91fd/go.mod h1:mL1N/T3taQHkDXs73rZJwtUhF3w3ftmwwsq0BUmARs4=
@@ -839,7 +841,7 @@ golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20200317015054-43a5402ce75a/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJ
 golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20200625203802-6e8e738ad208/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20201020160332-67f06af15bc9/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20210220032951-036812b2e83c/go.mod h1:RxMgew5VJxzue5/jJTE5uejpjVlOe/izrB70Jof72aM=
-golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20220722155255-886fb9371eb4 h1:uVc8UZUe6tr40fFVnUP5Oj+veunVezqYl9z7DYw9xzw=
+golang.org/x/sync v0.1.0 h1:wsuoTGHzEhffawBOhz5CYhcrV4IdKZbEyZjBMuTp12o=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20180823144017-11551d06cbcc/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20180830151530-49385e6e1522/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20180905080454-ebe1bf3edb33/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
@@ -1002,8 +1004,8 @@ golang.org/x/tools v0.1.1/go.mod h1:o0xws9oXOQQZyjljx8fwUC0k7L1pTE6eaCbjGeHmOkk=
 golang.org/x/tools v0.1.2/go.mod h1:o0xws9oXOQQZyjljx8fwUC0k7L1pTE6eaCbjGeHmOkk=
 golang.org/x/tools v0.1.3/go.mod h1:o0xws9oXOQQZyjljx8fwUC0k7L1pTE6eaCbjGeHmOkk=
 golang.org/x/tools v0.1.6-0.20210726203631-07bc1bf47fb2/go.mod h1:o0xws9oXOQQZyjljx8fwUC0k7L1pTE6eaCbjGeHmOkk=
-golang.org/x/tools v0.1.12 h1:VveCTK38A2rkS8ZqFY25HIDFscX5X9OoEhJd3quQmXU=
-golang.org/x/tools v0.1.12/go.mod h1:hNGJHUnrk76NpqgfD5Aqm5Crs+Hm0VOH/i9J2+nxYbc=
+golang.org/x/tools v0.2.0 h1:G6AHpWxTMGY1KyEYoAQ5WTtIekUUvDNjan3ugu60JvE=
+golang.org/x/tools v0.2.0/go.mod h1:y4OqIKeOV/fWJetJ8bXPU1sEVniLMIyDAZWeHdV+NTA=
 golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20190717185122-a985d3407aa7/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=
 golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20191011141410-1b5146add898/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=
 golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20191204190536-9bdfabe68543/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/README.md

@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-# A QUIC implementation in pure Go
-
-<img src="docs/quic.png" width=303 height=124>
-
-[![PkgGoDev](https://pkg.go.dev/badge/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go)](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go)
-[![Code Coverage](https://img.shields.io/codecov/c/github/lucas-clemente/quic-go/master.svg?style=flat-square)](https://codecov.io/gh/lucas-clemente/quic-go/)
-
-quic-go is an implementation of the QUIC protocol ([RFC 9000](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000), [RFC 9001](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9001), [RFC 9002](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9002)) in Go, including the Unreliable Datagram Extension ([RFC 9221](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9221)) and Datagram Packetization Layer Path MTU
-   Discovery (DPLPMTUD, [RFC 8899](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8899)). It has support for HTTP/3 ([RFC 9114](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9114)), including QPACK ([RFC 9204](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9204)).
-
-In addition to the RFCs listed above, it currently implements the [IETF QUIC draft-29](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-transport-29). Support for draft-29 will eventually be dropped, as it is phased out of the ecosystem.
-
-## Guides
-
-*We currently support Go 1.18.x and Go 1.19.x.*
-
-Running tests:
-
-    go test ./...
-
-### QUIC without HTTP/3
-
-Take a look at [this echo example](example/echo/echo.go).
-
-## Usage
-
-### As a server
-
-See the [example server](example/main.go). Starting a QUIC server is very similar to the standard lib http in go:
-
-```go
-http.Handle("/", http.FileServer(http.Dir(wwwDir)))
-http3.ListenAndServeQUIC("localhost:4242", "/path/to/cert/chain.pem", "/path/to/privkey.pem", nil)
-```
-
-### As a client
-
-See the [example client](example/client/main.go). Use a `http3.RoundTripper` as a `Transport` in a `http.Client`.
-
-```go
-http.Client{
-  Transport: &http3.RoundTripper{},
-}
-```
-
-## Projects using quic-go
-
-| Project                                              | Description                                                                                            | Stars |
-|------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
-| [algernon](https://github.com/xyproto/algernon)      | Small self-contained pure-Go web server with Lua, Markdown, HTTP/2, QUIC, Redis and PostgreSQL support | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/xyproto/algernon?style=flat-square) |
-| [caddy](https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/)       | Fast, multi-platform web server with automatic HTTPS                                                   | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/caddyserver/caddy?style=flat-square) |
-| [go-ipfs](https://github.com/ipfs/go-ipfs)           | IPFS implementation in go                                                                              | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/ipfs/go-ipfs?style=flat-square) |
-| [syncthing](https://github.com/syncthing/syncthing/) | Open Source Continuous File Synchronization                                                            | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/syncthing/syncthing?style=flat-square) |
-| [traefik](https://github.com/traefik/traefik)        | The Cloud Native Application Proxy                                                                     | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/traefik/traefik?style=flat-square) |
-| [v2ray-core](https://github.com/v2fly/v2ray-core)    | A platform for building proxies to bypass network restrictions                                         | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/v2fly/v2ray-core?style=flat-square) |
-| [cloudflared](https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared)    | A tunneling daemon that proxies traffic from the Cloudflare network to your origins             | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/cloudflare/cloudflared?style=flat-square) |
-| [OONI Probe](https://github.com/ooni/probe-cli)            | The Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) aims to empower decentralized efforts in documenting Internet censorship around the world.   | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/ooni/probe-cli?style=flat-square) |
-| [YoMo](https://github.com/yomorun/yomo)    | Streaming Serverless Framework for Geo-distributed System | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/yomorun/yomo?style=flat-square) |
-
-## Contributing
-
-We are always happy to welcome new contributors! We have a number of self-contained issues that are suitable for first-time contributors, they are tagged with [help wanted](https://github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aopen+label%3A%22help+wanted%22). If you have any questions, please feel free to reach out by opening an issue or leaving a comment.

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/ackhandler/frame.go

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-package ackhandler
-
-import "github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/wire"
-
-type Frame struct {
-	wire.Frame // nil if the frame has already been acknowledged in another packet
-	OnLost     func(wire.Frame)
-	OnAcked    func(wire.Frame)
-}

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/ackhandler/mockgen.go

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-package ackhandler
-
-//go:generate sh -c "../../mockgen_private.sh ackhandler mock_sent_packet_tracker_test.go github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/ackhandler sentPacketTracker"

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/handshake/mockgen.go

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-package handshake
-
-//go:generate sh -c "../../mockgen_private.sh handshake mock_handshake_runner_test.go github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/handshake handshakeRunner"

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/handshake/retry.go

@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-package handshake
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"crypto/aes"
-	"crypto/cipher"
-	"fmt"
-	"sync"
-
-	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/protocol"
-)
-
-var (
-	oldRetryAEAD cipher.AEAD // used for QUIC draft versions up to 34
-	retryAEAD    cipher.AEAD // used for QUIC draft-34
-)
-
-func init() {
-	oldRetryAEAD = initAEAD([16]byte{0xcc, 0xce, 0x18, 0x7e, 0xd0, 0x9a, 0x09, 0xd0, 0x57, 0x28, 0x15, 0x5a, 0x6c, 0xb9, 0x6b, 0xe1})
-	retryAEAD = initAEAD([16]byte{0xbe, 0x0c, 0x69, 0x0b, 0x9f, 0x66, 0x57, 0x5a, 0x1d, 0x76, 0x6b, 0x54, 0xe3, 0x68, 0xc8, 0x4e})
-}
-
-func initAEAD(key [16]byte) cipher.AEAD {
-	aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key[:])
-	if err != nil {
-		panic(err)
-	}
-	aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(aes)
-	if err != nil {
-		panic(err)
-	}
-	return aead
-}
-
-var (
-	retryBuf      bytes.Buffer
-	retryMutex    sync.Mutex
-	oldRetryNonce = [12]byte{0xe5, 0x49, 0x30, 0xf9, 0x7f, 0x21, 0x36, 0xf0, 0x53, 0x0a, 0x8c, 0x1c}
-	retryNonce    = [12]byte{0x46, 0x15, 0x99, 0xd3, 0x5d, 0x63, 0x2b, 0xf2, 0x23, 0x98, 0x25, 0xbb}
-)
-
-// GetRetryIntegrityTag calculates the integrity tag on a Retry packet
-func GetRetryIntegrityTag(retry []byte, origDestConnID protocol.ConnectionID, version protocol.VersionNumber) *[16]byte {
-	retryMutex.Lock()
-	retryBuf.WriteByte(uint8(origDestConnID.Len()))
-	retryBuf.Write(origDestConnID.Bytes())
-	retryBuf.Write(retry)
-
-	var tag [16]byte
-	var sealed []byte
-	if version != protocol.Version1 {
-		sealed = oldRetryAEAD.Seal(tag[:0], oldRetryNonce[:], nil, retryBuf.Bytes())
-	} else {
-		sealed = retryAEAD.Seal(tag[:0], retryNonce[:], nil, retryBuf.Bytes())
-	}
-	if len(sealed) != 16 {
-		panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected Retry integrity tag length: %d", len(sealed)))
-	}
-	retryBuf.Reset()
-	retryMutex.Unlock()
-	return &tag
-}

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/qtls/go120.go

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-//go:build go1.20
-
-package qtls
-
-var _ int = "The version of quic-go you're using can't be built on Go 1.20 yet. For more details, please see https://github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/wiki/quic-go-and-Go-versions."

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/utils/linkedlist/README.md

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-# Usage
-
-This is the Go standard library implementation of a linked list 
-(https://golang.org/src/container/list/list.go), modified to use Go generics.

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/wire/extended_header.go

@@ -1,249 +0,0 @@
-package wire
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"io"
-
-	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/protocol"
-	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/utils"
-	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/quicvarint"
-)
-
-// ErrInvalidReservedBits is returned when the reserved bits are incorrect.
-// When this error is returned, parsing continues, and an ExtendedHeader is returned.
-// This is necessary because we need to decrypt the packet in that case,
-// in order to avoid a timing side-channel.
-var ErrInvalidReservedBits = errors.New("invalid reserved bits")
-
-// ExtendedHeader is the header of a QUIC packet.
-type ExtendedHeader struct {
-	Header
-
-	typeByte byte
-
-	KeyPhase protocol.KeyPhaseBit
-
-	PacketNumberLen protocol.PacketNumberLen
-	PacketNumber    protocol.PacketNumber
-
-	parsedLen protocol.ByteCount
-}
-
-func (h *ExtendedHeader) parse(b *bytes.Reader, v protocol.VersionNumber) (bool /* reserved bits valid */, error) {
-	startLen := b.Len()
-	// read the (now unencrypted) first byte
-	var err error
-	h.typeByte, err = b.ReadByte()
-	if err != nil {
-		return false, err
-	}
-	if _, err := b.Seek(int64(h.Header.ParsedLen())-1, io.SeekCurrent); err != nil {
-		return false, err
-	}
-	var reservedBitsValid bool
-	if h.IsLongHeader {
-		reservedBitsValid, err = h.parseLongHeader(b, v)
-	} else {
-		reservedBitsValid, err = h.parseShortHeader(b, v)
-	}
-	if err != nil {
-		return false, err
-	}
-	h.parsedLen = protocol.ByteCount(startLen - b.Len())
-	return reservedBitsValid, err
-}
-
-func (h *ExtendedHeader) parseLongHeader(b *bytes.Reader, _ protocol.VersionNumber) (bool /* reserved bits valid */, error) {
-	if err := h.readPacketNumber(b); err != nil {
-		return false, err
-	}
-	if h.typeByte&0xc != 0 {
-		return false, nil
-	}
-	return true, nil
-}
-
-func (h *ExtendedHeader) parseShortHeader(b *bytes.Reader, _ protocol.VersionNumber) (bool /* reserved bits valid */, error) {
-	h.KeyPhase = protocol.KeyPhaseZero
-	if h.typeByte&0x4 > 0 {
-		h.KeyPhase = protocol.KeyPhaseOne
-	}
-
-	if err := h.readPacketNumber(b); err != nil {
-		return false, err
-	}
-	if h.typeByte&0x18 != 0 {
-		return false, nil
-	}
-	return true, nil
-}
-
-func (h *ExtendedHeader) readPacketNumber(b *bytes.Reader) error {
-	h.PacketNumberLen = protocol.PacketNumberLen(h.typeByte&0x3) + 1
-	switch h.PacketNumberLen {
-	case protocol.PacketNumberLen1:
-		n, err := b.ReadByte()
-		if err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		h.PacketNumber = protocol.PacketNumber(n)
-	case protocol.PacketNumberLen2:
-		n, err := utils.BigEndian.ReadUint16(b)
-		if err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		h.PacketNumber = protocol.PacketNumber(n)
-	case protocol.PacketNumberLen3:
-		n, err := utils.BigEndian.ReadUint24(b)
-		if err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		h.PacketNumber = protocol.PacketNumber(n)
-	case protocol.PacketNumberLen4:
-		n, err := utils.BigEndian.ReadUint32(b)
-		if err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		h.PacketNumber = protocol.PacketNumber(n)
-	default:
-		return fmt.Errorf("invalid packet number length: %d", h.PacketNumberLen)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// Write writes the Header.
-func (h *ExtendedHeader) Write(b *bytes.Buffer, ver protocol.VersionNumber) error {
-	if h.DestConnectionID.Len() > protocol.MaxConnIDLen {
-		return fmt.Errorf("invalid connection ID length: %d bytes", h.DestConnectionID.Len())
-	}
-	if h.SrcConnectionID.Len() > protocol.MaxConnIDLen {
-		return fmt.Errorf("invalid connection ID length: %d bytes", h.SrcConnectionID.Len())
-	}
-	if h.IsLongHeader {
-		return h.writeLongHeader(b, ver)
-	}
-	return h.writeShortHeader(b, ver)
-}
-
-func (h *ExtendedHeader) writeLongHeader(b *bytes.Buffer, version protocol.VersionNumber) error {
-	var packetType uint8
-	if version == protocol.Version2 {
-		//nolint:exhaustive
-		switch h.Type {
-		case protocol.PacketTypeInitial:
-			packetType = 0b01
-		case protocol.PacketType0RTT:
-			packetType = 0b10
-		case protocol.PacketTypeHandshake:
-			packetType = 0b11
-		case protocol.PacketTypeRetry:
-			packetType = 0b00
-		}
-	} else {
-		//nolint:exhaustive
-		switch h.Type {
-		case protocol.PacketTypeInitial:
-			packetType = 0b00
-		case protocol.PacketType0RTT:
-			packetType = 0b01
-		case protocol.PacketTypeHandshake:
-			packetType = 0b10
-		case protocol.PacketTypeRetry:
-			packetType = 0b11
-		}
-	}
-	firstByte := 0xc0 | packetType<<4
-	if h.Type != protocol.PacketTypeRetry {
-		// Retry packets don't have a packet number
-		firstByte |= uint8(h.PacketNumberLen - 1)
-	}
-
-	b.WriteByte(firstByte)
-	utils.BigEndian.WriteUint32(b, uint32(h.Version))
-	b.WriteByte(uint8(h.DestConnectionID.Len()))
-	b.Write(h.DestConnectionID.Bytes())
-	b.WriteByte(uint8(h.SrcConnectionID.Len()))
-	b.Write(h.SrcConnectionID.Bytes())
-
-	//nolint:exhaustive
-	switch h.Type {
-	case protocol.PacketTypeRetry:
-		b.Write(h.Token)
-		return nil
-	case protocol.PacketTypeInitial:
-		quicvarint.Write(b, uint64(len(h.Token)))
-		b.Write(h.Token)
-	}
-	quicvarint.WriteWithLen(b, uint64(h.Length), 2)
-	return h.writePacketNumber(b)
-}
-
-func (h *ExtendedHeader) writeShortHeader(b *bytes.Buffer, _ protocol.VersionNumber) error {
-	typeByte := 0x40 | uint8(h.PacketNumberLen-1)
-	if h.KeyPhase == protocol.KeyPhaseOne {
-		typeByte |= byte(1 << 2)
-	}
-
-	b.WriteByte(typeByte)
-	b.Write(h.DestConnectionID.Bytes())
-	return h.writePacketNumber(b)
-}
-
-func (h *ExtendedHeader) writePacketNumber(b *bytes.Buffer) error {
-	switch h.PacketNumberLen {
-	case protocol.PacketNumberLen1:
-		b.WriteByte(uint8(h.PacketNumber))
-	case protocol.PacketNumberLen2:
-		utils.BigEndian.WriteUint16(b, uint16(h.PacketNumber))
-	case protocol.PacketNumberLen3:
-		utils.BigEndian.WriteUint24(b, uint32(h.PacketNumber))
-	case protocol.PacketNumberLen4:
-		utils.BigEndian.WriteUint32(b, uint32(h.PacketNumber))
-	default:
-		return fmt.Errorf("invalid packet number length: %d", h.PacketNumberLen)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// ParsedLen returns the number of bytes that were consumed when parsing the header
-func (h *ExtendedHeader) ParsedLen() protocol.ByteCount {
-	return h.parsedLen
-}
-
-// GetLength determines the length of the Header.
-func (h *ExtendedHeader) GetLength(v protocol.VersionNumber) protocol.ByteCount {
-	if h.IsLongHeader {
-		length := 1 /* type byte */ + 4 /* version */ + 1 /* dest conn ID len */ + protocol.ByteCount(h.DestConnectionID.Len()) + 1 /* src conn ID len */ + protocol.ByteCount(h.SrcConnectionID.Len()) + protocol.ByteCount(h.PacketNumberLen) + 2 /* length */
-		if h.Type == protocol.PacketTypeInitial {
-			length += quicvarint.Len(uint64(len(h.Token))) + protocol.ByteCount(len(h.Token))
-		}
-		return length
-	}
-
-	length := protocol.ByteCount(1 /* type byte */ + h.DestConnectionID.Len())
-	length += protocol.ByteCount(h.PacketNumberLen)
-	return length
-}
-
-// Log logs the Header
-func (h *ExtendedHeader) Log(logger utils.Logger) {
-	if h.IsLongHeader {
-		var token string
-		if h.Type == protocol.PacketTypeInitial || h.Type == protocol.PacketTypeRetry {
-			if len(h.Token) == 0 {
-				token = "Token: (empty), "
-			} else {
-				token = fmt.Sprintf("Token: %#x, ", h.Token)
-			}
-			if h.Type == protocol.PacketTypeRetry {
-				logger.Debugf("\tLong Header{Type: %s, DestConnectionID: %s, SrcConnectionID: %s, %sVersion: %s}", h.Type, h.DestConnectionID, h.SrcConnectionID, token, h.Version)
-				return
-			}
-		}
-		logger.Debugf("\tLong Header{Type: %s, DestConnectionID: %s, SrcConnectionID: %s, %sPacketNumber: %d, PacketNumberLen: %d, Length: %d, Version: %s}", h.Type, h.DestConnectionID, h.SrcConnectionID, token, h.PacketNumber, h.PacketNumberLen, h.Length, h.Version)
-	} else {
-		logger.Debugf("\tShort Header{DestConnectionID: %s, PacketNumber: %d, PacketNumberLen: %d, KeyPhase: %s}", h.DestConnectionID, h.PacketNumber, h.PacketNumberLen, h.KeyPhase)
-	}
-}

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/logging/mockgen.go

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-package logging
-
-//go:generate sh -c "go run github.com/golang/mock/mockgen -package logging -self_package github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/logging -destination mock_connection_tracer_test.go github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/logging ConnectionTracer"
-//go:generate sh -c "go run github.com/golang/mock/mockgen -package logging -self_package github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/logging -destination mock_tracer_test.go github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/logging Tracer"

vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/packet_packer.go

@@ -1,827 +0,0 @@
-package quic
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/ackhandler"
-	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/handshake"
-	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/protocol"
-	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/qerr"
-	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/utils"
-	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/wire"
-)
-
-type packer interface {
-	PackCoalescedPacket(onlyAck bool) (*coalescedPacket, error)
-	PackPacket(onlyAck bool) (*packedPacket, error)
-	MaybePackProbePacket(protocol.EncryptionLevel) (*packedPacket, error)
-	PackConnectionClose(*qerr.TransportError) (*coalescedPacket, error)
-	PackApplicationClose(*qerr.ApplicationError) (*coalescedPacket, error)
-
-	SetMaxPacketSize(protocol.ByteCount)
-	PackMTUProbePacket(ping ackhandler.Frame, size protocol.ByteCount) (*packedPacket, error)
-
-	HandleTransportParameters(*wire.TransportParameters)
-	SetToken([]byte)
-}
-
-type sealer interface {
-	handshake.LongHeaderSealer
-}
-
-type payload struct {
-	frames []ackhandler.Frame
-	ack    *wire.AckFrame
-	length protocol.ByteCount
-}
-
-type packedPacket struct {
-	buffer *packetBuffer
-	*packetContents
-}
-
-type packetContents struct {
-	header *wire.ExtendedHeader
-	ack    *wire.AckFrame
-	frames []ackhandler.Frame
-
-	length protocol.ByteCount
-
-	isMTUProbePacket bool
-}
-
-type coalescedPacket struct {
-	buffer  *packetBuffer
-	packets []*packetContents
-}
-
-func (p *packetContents) EncryptionLevel() protocol.EncryptionLevel {
-	if !p.header.IsLongHeader {
-		return protocol.Encryption1RTT
-	}
-	//nolint:exhaustive // Will never be called for Retry packets (and they don't have encrypted data).
-	switch p.header.Type {
-	case protocol.PacketTypeInitial:
-		return protocol.EncryptionInitial
-	case protocol.PacketTypeHandshake:
-		return protocol.EncryptionHandshake
-	case protocol.PacketType0RTT:
-		return protocol.Encryption0RTT
-	default:
-		panic("can't determine encryption level")
-	}
-}
-
-func (p *packetContents) IsAckEliciting() bool {
-	return ackhandler.HasAckElicitingFrames(p.frames)
-}
-
-func (p *packetContents) ToAckHandlerPacket(now time.Time, q *retransmissionQueue) *ackhandler.Packet {
-	largestAcked := protocol.InvalidPacketNumber
-	if p.ack != nil {
-		largestAcked = p.ack.LargestAcked()
-	}
-	encLevel := p.EncryptionLevel()
-	for i := range p.frames {
-		if p.frames[i].OnLost != nil {
-			continue
-		}
-		switch encLevel {
-		case protocol.EncryptionInitial:
-			p.frames[i].OnLost = q.AddInitial
-		case protocol.EncryptionHandshake:
-			p.frames[i].OnLost = q.AddHandshake
-		case protocol.Encryption0RTT, protocol.Encryption1RTT:
-			p.frames[i].OnLost = q.AddAppData
-		}
-	}
-
-	ap := ackhandler.GetPacket()
-	ap.PacketNumber = p.header.PacketNumber
-	ap.LargestAcked = largestAcked
-	ap.Frames = p.frames
-	ap.Length = p.length
-	ap.EncryptionLevel = encLevel
-	ap.SendTime = now
-	ap.IsPathMTUProbePacket = p.isMTUProbePacket
-	return ap
-}
-
-func getMaxPacketSize(addr net.Addr) protocol.ByteCount {
-	maxSize := protocol.ByteCount(protocol.MinInitialPacketSize)
-	// If this is not a UDP address, we don't know anything about the MTU.
-	// Use the minimum size of an Initial packet as the max packet size.
-	if udpAddr, ok := addr.(*net.UDPAddr); ok {
-		if utils.IsIPv4(udpAddr.IP) {
-			maxSize = protocol.InitialPacketSizeIPv4
-		} else {
-			maxSize = protocol.InitialPacketSizeIPv6
-		}
-	}
-	return maxSize
-}
-
-type packetNumberManager interface {
-	PeekPacketNumber(protocol.EncryptionLevel) (protocol.PacketNumber, protocol.PacketNumberLen)
-	PopPacketNumber(protocol.EncryptionLevel) protocol.PacketNumber
-}
-
-type sealingManager interface {
-	GetInitialSealer() (handshake.LongHeaderSealer, error)
-	GetHandshakeSealer() (handshake.LongHeaderSealer, error)
-	Get0RTTSealer() (handshake.LongHeaderSealer, error)
-	Get1RTTSealer() (handshake.ShortHeaderSealer, error)
-}
-
-type frameSource interface {
-	HasData() bool
-	AppendStreamFrames([]ackhandler.Frame, protocol.ByteCount) ([]ackhandler.Frame, protocol.ByteCount)
-	AppendControlFrames([]ackhandler.Frame, protocol.ByteCount) ([]ackhandler.Frame, protocol.ByteCount)
-}
-
-type ackFrameSource interface {
-	GetAckFrame(encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel, onlyIfQueued bool) *wire.AckFrame
-}
-
-type packetPacker struct {
-	srcConnID     protocol.ConnectionID
-	getDestConnID func() protocol.ConnectionID
-
-	perspective protocol.Perspective
-	version     protocol.VersionNumber
-	cryptoSetup sealingManager
-
-	initialStream   cryptoStream
-	handshakeStream cryptoStream
-
-	token []byte
-
-	pnManager           packetNumberManager
-	framer              frameSource
-	acks                ackFrameSource
-	datagramQueue       *datagramQueue
-	retransmissionQueue *retransmissionQueue
-
-	maxPacketSize          protocol.ByteCount
-	numNonAckElicitingAcks int
-}
-
-var _ packer = &packetPacker{}
-
-func newPacketPacker(
-	srcConnID protocol.ConnectionID,
-	getDestConnID func() protocol.ConnectionID,
-	initialStream cryptoStream,
-	handshakeStream cryptoStream,
-	packetNumberManager packetNumberManager,
-	retransmissionQueue *retransmissionQueue,
-	remoteAddr net.Addr, // only used for determining the max packet size
-	cryptoSetup sealingManager,
-	framer frameSource,
-	acks ackFrameSource,
-	datagramQueue *datagramQueue,
-	perspective protocol.Perspective,
-	version protocol.VersionNumber,
-) *packetPacker {
-	return &packetPacker{
-		cryptoSetup:         cryptoSetup,
-		getDestConnID:       getDestConnID,
-		srcConnID:           srcConnID,
-		initialStream:       initialStream,
-		handshakeStream:     handshakeStream,
-		retransmissionQueue: retransmissionQueue,
-		datagramQueue:       datagramQueue,
-		perspective:         perspective,
-		version:             version,
-		framer:              framer,
-		acks:                acks,
-		pnManager:           packetNumberManager,
-		maxPacketSize:       getMaxPacketSize(remoteAddr),
-	}
-}
-
-// PackConnectionClose packs a packet that closes the connection with a transport error.
-func (p *packetPacker) PackConnectionClose(e *qerr.TransportError) (*coalescedPacket, error) {
-	var reason string
-	// don't send details of crypto errors
-	if !e.ErrorCode.IsCryptoError() {
-		reason = e.ErrorMessage
-	}
-	return p.packConnectionClose(false, uint64(e.ErrorCode), e.FrameType, reason)
-}
-
-// PackApplicationClose packs a packet that closes the connection with an application error.
-func (p *packetPacker) PackApplicationClose(e *qerr.ApplicationError) (*coalescedPacket, error) {
-	return p.packConnectionClose(true, uint64(e.ErrorCode), 0, e.ErrorMessage)
-}
-
-func (p *packetPacker) packConnectionClose(
-	isApplicationError bool,
-	errorCode uint64,
-	frameType uint64,
-	reason string,
-) (*coalescedPacket, error) {
-	var sealers [4]sealer
-	var hdrs [4]*wire.ExtendedHeader
-	var payloads [4]*payload
-	var size protocol.ByteCount
-	var numPackets uint8
-	encLevels := [4]protocol.EncryptionLevel{protocol.EncryptionInitial, protocol.EncryptionHandshake, protocol.Encryption0RTT, protocol.Encryption1RTT}
-	for i, encLevel := range encLevels {
-		if p.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveServer && encLevel == protocol.Encryption0RTT {
-			continue
-		}
-		ccf := &wire.ConnectionCloseFrame{
-			IsApplicationError: isApplicationError,
-			ErrorCode:          errorCode,
-			FrameType:          frameType,
-			ReasonPhrase:       reason,
-		}
-		// don't send application errors in Initial or Handshake packets
-		if isApplicationError && (encLevel == protocol.EncryptionInitial || encLevel == protocol.EncryptionHandshake) {
-			ccf.IsApplicationError = false
-			ccf.ErrorCode = uint64(qerr.ApplicationErrorErrorCode)
-			ccf.ReasonPhrase = ""
-		}
-		payload := &payload{
-			frames: []ackhandler.Frame{{Frame: ccf}},
-			length: ccf.Length(p.version),
-		}
-
-		var sealer sealer
-		var err error
-		var keyPhase protocol.KeyPhaseBit // only set for 1-RTT
-		switch encLevel {
-		case protocol.EncryptionInitial:
-			sealer, err = p.cryptoSetup.GetInitialSealer()
-		case protocol.EncryptionHandshake:
-			sealer, err = p.cryptoSetup.GetHandshakeSealer()
-		case protocol.Encryption0RTT:
-			sealer, err = p.cryptoSetup.Get0RTTSealer()
-		case protocol.Encryption1RTT:
-			var s handshake.ShortHeaderSealer
-			s, err = p.cryptoSetup.Get1RTTSealer()
-			if err == nil {
-				keyPhase = s.KeyPhase()
-			}
-			sealer = s
-		}
-		if err == handshake.ErrKeysNotYetAvailable || err == handshake.ErrKeysDropped {
-			continue
-		}
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		sealers[i] = sealer
-		var hdr *wire.ExtendedHeader
-		if encLevel == protocol.Encryption1RTT {
-			hdr = p.getShortHeader(keyPhase)
-		} else {
-			hdr = p.getLongHeader(encLevel)
-		}
-		hdrs[i] = hdr
-		payloads[i] = payload
-		size += p.packetLength(hdr, payload) + protocol.ByteCount(sealer.Overhead())
-		numPackets++
-	}
-	contents := make([]*packetContents, 0, numPackets)
-	buffer := getPacketBuffer()
-	for i, encLevel := range encLevels {
-		if sealers[i] == nil {
-			continue
-		}
-		var paddingLen protocol.ByteCount
-		if encLevel == protocol.EncryptionInitial {
-			paddingLen = p.initialPaddingLen(payloads[i].frames, size)
-		}
-		c, err := p.appendPacket(buffer, hdrs[i], payloads[i], paddingLen, encLevel, sealers[i], false)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		contents = append(contents, c)
-	}
-	return &coalescedPacket{buffer: buffer, packets: contents}, nil
-}
-
-// packetLength calculates the length of the serialized packet.
-// It takes into account that packets that have a tiny payload need to be padded,
-// such that len(payload) + packet number len >= 4 + AEAD overhead
-func (p *packetPacker) packetLength(hdr *wire.ExtendedHeader, payload *payload) protocol.ByteCount {
-	var paddingLen protocol.ByteCount
-	pnLen := protocol.ByteCount(hdr.PacketNumberLen)
-	if payload.length < 4-pnLen {
-		paddingLen = 4 - pnLen - payload.length
-	}
-	return hdr.GetLength(p.version) + payload.length + paddingLen
-}
-
-// size is the expected size of the packet, if no padding was applied.
-func (p *packetPacker) initialPaddingLen(frames []ackhandler.Frame, size protocol.ByteCount) protocol.ByteCount {
-	// For the server, only ack-eliciting Initial packets need to be padded.
-	if p.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveServer && !ackhandler.HasAckElicitingFrames(frames) {
-		return 0
-	}
-	if size >= p.maxPacketSize {
-		return 0
-	}
-	return p.maxPacketSize - size
-}
-
-// PackCoalescedPacket packs a new packet.
-// It packs an Initial / Handshake if there is data to send in these packet number spaces.
-// It should only be called before the handshake is confirmed.
-func (p *packetPacker) PackCoalescedPacket(onlyAck bool) (*coalescedPacket, error) {
-	maxPacketSize := p.maxPacketSize
-	if p.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient {
-		maxPacketSize = protocol.MinInitialPacketSize
-	}
-	var initialHdr, handshakeHdr, appDataHdr *wire.ExtendedHeader
-	var initialPayload, handshakePayload, appDataPayload *payload
-	var numPackets int
-	// Try packing an Initial packet.
-	initialSealer, err := p.cryptoSetup.GetInitialSealer()
-	if err != nil && err != handshake.ErrKeysDropped {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	var size protocol.ByteCount
-	if initialSealer != nil {
-		initialHdr, initialPayload = p.maybeGetCryptoPacket(maxPacketSize-protocol.ByteCount(initialSealer.Overhead()), protocol.EncryptionInitial, onlyAck, true)
-		if initialPayload != nil {
-			size += p.packetLength(initialHdr, initialPayload) + protocol.ByteCount(initialSealer.Overhead())
-			numPackets++
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Add a Handshake packet.
-	var handshakeSealer sealer
-	if (onlyAck && size == 0) || (!onlyAck && size < maxPacketSize-protocol.MinCoalescedPacketSize) {
-		var err error
-		handshakeSealer, err = p.cryptoSetup.GetHandshakeSealer()
-		if err != nil && err != handshake.ErrKeysDropped && err != handshake.ErrKeysNotYetAvailable {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		if handshakeSealer != nil {
-			handshakeHdr, handshakePayload = p.maybeGetCryptoPacket(maxPacketSize-size-protocol.ByteCount(handshakeSealer.Overhead()), protocol.EncryptionHandshake, onlyAck, size == 0)
-			if handshakePayload != nil {
-				s := p.packetLength(handshakeHdr, handshakePayload) + protocol.ByteCount(handshakeSealer.Overhead())
-				size += s
-				numPackets++
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Add a 0-RTT / 1-RTT packet.
-	var appDataSealer sealer
-	appDataEncLevel := protocol.Encryption1RTT
-	if (onlyAck && size == 0) || (!onlyAck && size < maxPacketSize-protocol.MinCoalescedPacketSize) {
-		var sErr error
-		var oneRTTSealer handshake.ShortHeaderSealer
-		oneRTTSealer, sErr = p.cryptoSetup.Get1RTTSealer()
-		appDataSealer = oneRTTSealer
-		if sErr != nil && p.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient {
-			appDataSealer, sErr = p.cryptoSetup.Get0RTTSealer()
-			appDataEncLevel = protocol.Encryption0RTT
-		}
-		if appDataSealer != nil && sErr == nil {
-			//nolint:exhaustive // 0-RTT and 1-RTT are the only two application data encryption levels.
-			switch appDataEncLevel {
-			case protocol.Encryption0RTT:
-				appDataHdr, appDataPayload = p.maybeGetAppDataPacketFor0RTT(appDataSealer, maxPacketSize-size)
-			case protocol.Encryption1RTT:
-				appDataHdr, appDataPayload = p.maybeGetShortHeaderPacket(oneRTTSealer, maxPacketSize-size, onlyAck, size == 0)
-			}
-			if appDataHdr != nil && appDataPayload != nil {
-				size += p.packetLength(appDataHdr, appDataPayload) + protocol.ByteCount(appDataSealer.Overhead())
-				numPackets++
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
-	if numPackets == 0 {
-		return nil, nil
-	}
-
-	buffer := getPacketBuffer()
-	packet := &coalescedPacket{
-		buffer:  buffer,
-		packets: make([]*packetContents, 0, numPackets),
-	}
-	if initialPayload != nil {
-		padding := p.initialPaddingLen(initialPayload.frames, size)
-		cont, err := p.appendPacket(buffer, initialHdr, initialPayload, padding, protocol.EncryptionInitial, initialSealer, false)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		packet.packets = append(packet.packets, cont)
-	}
-	if handshakePayload != nil {
-		cont, err := p.appendPacket(buffer, handshakeHdr, handshakePayload, 0, protocol.EncryptionHandshake, handshakeSealer, false)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		packet.packets = append(packet.packets, cont)
-	}
-	if appDataPayload != nil {
-		cont, err := p.appendPacket(buffer, appDataHdr, appDataPayload, 0, appDataEncLevel, appDataSealer, false)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		packet.packets = append(packet.packets, cont)
-	}
-	return packet, nil
-}
-
-// PackPacket packs a packet in the application data packet number space.
-// It should be called after the handshake is confirmed.
-func (p *packetPacker) PackPacket(onlyAck bool) (*packedPacket, error) {
-	sealer, err := p.cryptoSetup.Get1RTTSealer()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	hdr, payload := p.maybeGetShortHeaderPacket(sealer, p.maxPacketSize, onlyAck, true)
-	if payload == nil {
-		return nil, nil
-	}
-	buffer := getPacketBuffer()
-	cont, err := p.appendPacket(buffer, hdr, payload, 0, protocol.Encryption1RTT, sealer, false)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	return &packedPacket{
-		buffer:         buffer,
-		packetContents: cont,
-	}, nil
-}
-
-func (p *packetPacker) maybeGetCryptoPacket(maxPacketSize protocol.ByteCount, encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel, onlyAck, ackAllowed bool) (*wire.ExtendedHeader, *payload) {
-	if onlyAck {
-		if ack := p.acks.GetAckFrame(encLevel, true); ack != nil {
-			var payload payload
-			payload.ack = ack
-			payload.length = ack.Length(p.version)
-			return p.getLongHeader(encLevel), &payload
-		}
-		return nil, nil
-	}
-
-	var s cryptoStream
-	var hasRetransmission bool
-	//nolint:exhaustive // Initial and Handshake are the only two encryption levels here.
-	switch encLevel {
-	case protocol.EncryptionInitial:
-		s = p.initialStream
-		hasRetransmission = p.retransmissionQueue.HasInitialData()
-	case protocol.EncryptionHandshake:
-		s = p.handshakeStream
-		hasRetransmission = p.retransmissionQueue.HasHandshakeData()
-	}
-
-	hasData := s.HasData()
-	var ack *wire.AckFrame
-	if ackAllowed {
-		ack = p.acks.GetAckFrame(encLevel, !hasRetransmission && !hasData)
-	}
-	if !hasData && !hasRetransmission && ack == nil {
-		// nothing to send
-		return nil, nil
-	}
-
-	var payload payload
-	if ack != nil {
-		payload.ack = ack
-		payload.length = ack.Length(p.version)
-		maxPacketSize -= payload.length
-	}
-	hdr := p.getLongHeader(encLevel)
-	maxPacketSize -= hdr.GetLength(p.version)
-	if hasRetransmission {
-		for {
-			var f wire.Frame
-			//nolint:exhaustive // 0-RTT packets can't contain any retransmission.s
-			switch encLevel {
-			case protocol.EncryptionInitial:
-				f = p.retransmissionQueue.GetInitialFrame(maxPacketSize)
-			case protocol.EncryptionHandshake:
-				f = p.retransmissionQueue.GetHandshakeFrame(maxPacketSize)
-			}
-			if f == nil {
-				break
-			}
-			payload.frames = append(payload.frames, ackhandler.Frame{Frame: f})
-			frameLen := f.Length(p.version)
-			payload.length += frameLen
-			maxPacketSize -= frameLen
-		}
-	} else if s.HasData() {
-		cf := s.PopCryptoFrame(maxPacketSize)
-		payload.frames = []ackhandler.Frame{{Frame: cf}}
-		payload.length += cf.Length(p.version)
-	}
-	return hdr, &payload
-}
-
-func (p *packetPacker) maybeGetAppDataPacketFor0RTT(sealer sealer, maxPacketSize protocol.ByteCount) (*wire.ExtendedHeader, *payload) {
-	if p.perspective != protocol.PerspectiveClient {
-		return nil, nil
-	}
-
-	hdr := p.getLongHeader(protocol.Encryption0RTT)
-	maxPayloadSize := maxPacketSize - hdr.GetLength(p.version) - protocol.ByteCount(sealer.Overhead())
-	payload := p.maybeGetAppDataPacket(maxPayloadSize, false, false)
-	return hdr, payload
-}
-
-func (p *packetPacker) maybeGetShortHeaderPacket(sealer handshake.ShortHeaderSealer, maxPacketSize protocol.ByteCount, onlyAck, ackAllowed bool) (*wire.ExtendedHeader, *payload) {
-	hdr := p.getShortHeader(sealer.KeyPhase())
-	maxPayloadSize := maxPacketSize - hdr.GetLength(p.version) - protocol.ByteCount(sealer.Overhead())
-	payload := p.maybeGetAppDataPacket(maxPayloadSize, onlyAck, ackAllowed)
-	return hdr, payload
-}
-
-func (p *packetPacker) maybeGetAppDataPacket(maxPayloadSize protocol.ByteCount, onlyAck, ackAllowed bool) *payload {
-	payload := p.composeNextPacket(maxPayloadSize, onlyAck, ackAllowed)
-
-	// check if we have anything to send
-	if len(payload.frames) == 0 {
-		if payload.ack == nil {
-			return nil
-		}
-		// the packet only contains an ACK
-		if p.numNonAckElicitingAcks >= protocol.MaxNonAckElicitingAcks {
-			ping := &wire.PingFrame{}
-			// don't retransmit the PING frame when it is lost
-			payload.frames = append(payload.frames, ackhandler.Frame{Frame: ping, OnLost: func(wire.Frame) {}})
-			payload.length += ping.Length(p.version)
-			p.numNonAckElicitingAcks = 0
-		} else {
-			p.numNonAckElicitingAcks++
-		}
-	} else {
-		p.numNonAckElicitingAcks = 0
-	}
-	return payload
-}
-
-func (p *packetPacker) composeNextPacket(maxFrameSize protocol.ByteCount, onlyAck, ackAllowed bool) *payload {
-	if onlyAck {
-		if ack := p.acks.GetAckFrame(protocol.Encryption1RTT, true); ack != nil {
-			payload := &payload{}
-			payload.ack = ack
-			payload.length += ack.Length(p.version)
-			return payload
-		}
-		return &payload{}
-	}
-
-	payload := &payload{frames: make([]ackhandler.Frame, 0, 1)}
-
-	hasData := p.framer.HasData()
-	hasRetransmission := p.retransmissionQueue.HasAppData()
-
-	var hasAck bool
-	if ackAllowed {
-		if ack := p.acks.GetAckFrame(protocol.Encryption1RTT, !hasRetransmission && !hasData); ack != nil {
-			payload.ack = ack
-			payload.length += ack.Length(p.version)
-			hasAck = true
-		}
-	}
-
-	if p.datagramQueue != nil {
-		if f := p.datagramQueue.Peek(); f != nil {
-			size := f.Length(p.version)
-			if size <= maxFrameSize-payload.length {
-				payload.frames = append(payload.frames, ackhandler.Frame{
-					Frame: f,
-					// set it to a no-op. Then we won't set the default callback, which would retransmit the frame.
-					OnLost: func(wire.Frame) {},
-				})
-				payload.length += size
-				p.datagramQueue.Pop()
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
-	if hasAck && !hasData && !hasRetransmission {
-		return payload
-	}
-
-	if hasRetransmission {
-		for {
-			remainingLen := maxFrameSize - payload.length
-			if remainingLen < protocol.MinStreamFrameSize {
-				break
-			}
-			f := p.retransmissionQueue.GetAppDataFrame(remainingLen)
-			if f == nil {
-				break
-			}
-			payload.frames = append(payload.frames, ackhandler.Frame{Frame: f})
-			payload.length += f.Length(p.version)
-		}
-	}
-
-	if hasData {
-		var lengthAdded protocol.ByteCount
-		payload.frames, lengthAdded = p.framer.AppendControlFrames(payload.frames, maxFrameSize-payload.length)
-		payload.length += lengthAdded
-
-		payload.frames, lengthAdded = p.framer.AppendStreamFrames(payload.frames, maxFrameSize-payload.length)
-		payload.length += lengthAdded
-	}
-	return payload
-}
-
-func (p *packetPacker) MaybePackProbePacket(encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel) (*packedPacket, error) {
-	var hdr *wire.ExtendedHeader
-	var payload *payload
-	var sealer sealer
-	//nolint:exhaustive // Probe packets are never sent for 0-RTT.
-	switch encLevel {
-	case protocol.EncryptionInitial:
-		var err error
-		sealer, err = p.cryptoSetup.GetInitialSealer()
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		hdr, payload = p.maybeGetCryptoPacket(p.maxPacketSize-protocol.ByteCount(sealer.Overhead()), protocol.EncryptionInitial, false, true)
-	case protocol.EncryptionHandshake:
-		var err error
-		sealer, err = p.cryptoSetup.GetHandshakeSealer()
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		hdr, payload = p.maybeGetCryptoPacket(p.maxPacketSize-protocol.ByteCount(sealer.Overhead()), protocol.EncryptionHandshake, false, true)
-	case protocol.Encryption1RTT:
-		oneRTTSealer, err := p.cryptoSetup.Get1RTTSealer()
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		sealer = oneRTTSealer
-		hdr = p.getShortHeader(oneRTTSealer.KeyPhase())
-		payload = p.maybeGetAppDataPacket(p.maxPacketSize-protocol.ByteCount(sealer.Overhead())-hdr.GetLength(p.version), false, true)
-	default:
-		panic("unknown encryption level")
-	}
-	if payload == nil {
-		return nil, nil
-	}
-	size := p.packetLength(hdr, payload) + protocol.ByteCount(sealer.Overhead())
-	var padding protocol.ByteCount
-	if encLevel == protocol.EncryptionInitial {
-		padding = p.initialPaddingLen(payload.frames, size)
-	}
-	buffer := getPacketBuffer()
-	cont, err := p.appendPacket(buffer, hdr, payload, padding, encLevel, sealer, false)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	return &packedPacket{
-		buffer:         buffer,
-		packetContents: cont,
-	}, nil
-}
-
-func (p *packetPacker) PackMTUProbePacket(ping ackhandler.Frame, size protocol.ByteCount) (*packedPacket, error) {
-	payload := &payload{
-		frames: []ackhandler.Frame{ping},
-		length: ping.Length(p.version),
-	}
-	buffer := getPacketBuffer()
-	sealer, err := p.cryptoSetup.Get1RTTSealer()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	hdr := p.getShortHeader(sealer.KeyPhase())
-	padding := size - p.packetLength(hdr, payload) - protocol.ByteCount(sealer.Overhead())
-	contents, err := p.appendPacket(buffer, hdr, payload, padding, protocol.Encryption1RTT, sealer, true)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	contents.isMTUProbePacket = true
-	return &packedPacket{
-		buffer:         buffer,
-		packetContents: contents,
-	}, nil
-}
-
-func (p *packetPacker) getShortHeader(kp protocol.KeyPhaseBit) *wire.ExtendedHeader {
-	pn, pnLen := p.pnManager.PeekPacketNumber(protocol.Encryption1RTT)
-	hdr := &wire.ExtendedHeader{}
-	hdr.PacketNumber = pn
-	hdr.PacketNumberLen = pnLen
-	hdr.DestConnectionID = p.getDestConnID()
-	hdr.KeyPhase = kp
-	return hdr
-}
-
-func (p *packetPacker) getLongHeader(encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel) *wire.ExtendedHeader {
-	pn, pnLen := p.pnManager.PeekPacketNumber(encLevel)
-	hdr := &wire.ExtendedHeader{
-		PacketNumber:    pn,
-		PacketNumberLen: pnLen,
-	}
-	hdr.IsLongHeader = true
-	hdr.Version = p.version
-	hdr.SrcConnectionID = p.srcConnID
-	hdr.DestConnectionID = p.getDestConnID()
-
-	//nolint:exhaustive // 1-RTT packets are not long header packets.
-	switch encLevel {
-	case protocol.EncryptionInitial:
-		hdr.Type = protocol.PacketTypeInitial
-		hdr.Token = p.token
-	case protocol.EncryptionHandshake:
-		hdr.Type = protocol.PacketTypeHandshake
-	case protocol.Encryption0RTT:
-		hdr.Type = protocol.PacketType0RTT
-	}
-	return hdr
-}
-
-func (p *packetPacker) appendPacket(buffer *packetBuffer, header *wire.ExtendedHeader, payload *payload, padding protocol.ByteCount, encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel, sealer sealer, isMTUProbePacket bool) (*packetContents, error) {
-	var paddingLen protocol.ByteCount
-	pnLen := protocol.ByteCount(header.PacketNumberLen)
-	if payload.length < 4-pnLen {
-		paddingLen = 4 - pnLen - payload.length
-	}
-	paddingLen += padding
-	if header.IsLongHeader {
-		header.Length = pnLen + protocol.ByteCount(sealer.Overhead()) + payload.length + paddingLen
-	}
-
-	hdrOffset := buffer.Len()
-	buf := bytes.NewBuffer(buffer.Data)
-	if err := header.Write(buf, p.version); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	payloadOffset := buf.Len()
-	raw := buffer.Data[:payloadOffset]
-
-	if payload.ack != nil {
-		var err error
-		raw, err = payload.ack.Append(raw, p.version)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-	}
-	if paddingLen > 0 {
-		raw = append(raw, make([]byte, paddingLen)...)
-	}
-	for _, frame := range payload.frames {
-		var err error
-		raw, err = frame.Append(raw, p.version)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-	}
-
-	if payloadSize := protocol.ByteCount(len(raw)-payloadOffset) - paddingLen; payloadSize != payload.length {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("PacketPacker BUG: payload size inconsistent (expected %d, got %d bytes)", payload.length, payloadSize)
-	}
-	if !isMTUProbePacket {
-		if size := protocol.ByteCount(len(raw) + sealer.Overhead()); size > p.maxPacketSize {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("PacketPacker BUG: packet too large (%d bytes, allowed %d bytes)", size, p.maxPacketSize)
-		}
-	}
-
-	// encrypt the packet
-	_ = sealer.Seal(raw[payloadOffset:payloadOffset], raw[payloadOffset:], header.PacketNumber, raw[hdrOffset:payloadOffset])
-	raw = raw[0 : len(raw)+sealer.Overhead()]
-	// apply header protection
-	pnOffset := payloadOffset - int(header.PacketNumberLen)
-	sealer.EncryptHeader(raw[pnOffset+4:pnOffset+4+16], &raw[hdrOffset], raw[pnOffset:payloadOffset])
-	buffer.Data = raw
-
-	num := p.pnManager.PopPacketNumber(encLevel)
-	if num != header.PacketNumber {
-		return nil, errors.New("packetPacker BUG: Peeked and Popped packet numbers do not match")
-	}
-	return &packetContents{
-		header: header,
-		ack:    payload.ack,
-		frames: payload.frames,
-		length: buffer.Len() - hdrOffset,
-	}, nil
-}
-
-func (p *packetPacker) SetToken(token []byte) {
-	p.token = token
-}
-
-// When a higher MTU is discovered, use it.
-func (p *packetPacker) SetMaxPacketSize(s protocol.ByteCount) {
-	p.maxPacketSize = s
-}
-
-// If the peer sets a max_packet_size that's smaller than the size we're currently using,
-// we need to reduce the size of packets we send.
-func (p *packetPacker) HandleTransportParameters(params *wire.TransportParameters) {
-	if params.MaxUDPPayloadSize != 0 {
-		p.maxPacketSize = utils.Min(p.maxPacketSize, params.MaxUDPPayloadSize)
-	}
-}

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-18/README.md

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-# qtls
-
-[![Go Reference](https://pkg.go.dev/badge/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17.svg)](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17)
-[![.github/workflows/go-test.yml](https://github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17/actions/workflows/go-test.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17/actions/workflows/go-test.yml)
-
-This repository contains a modified version of the standard library's TLS implementation, modified for the QUIC protocol. It is used by [quic-go](https://github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go).

vendor/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-19/README.md

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-# qtls
-
-[![Go Reference](https://pkg.go.dev/badge/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17.svg)](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17)
-[![.github/workflows/go-test.yml](https://github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17/actions/workflows/go-test.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17/actions/workflows/go-test.yml)
-
-This repository contains a modified version of the standard library's TLS implementation, modified for the QUIC protocol. It is used by [quic-go](https://github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go).

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qpack/tools.go

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+//go:build tools
+
+package qpack
+
+import _ "github.com/onsi/ginkgo/v2/ginkgo"

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# qtls
+
+[![Go Reference](https://pkg.go.dev/badge/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18.svg)](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18)
+[![.github/workflows/go-test.yml](https://github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/actions/workflows/go-test.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/actions/workflows/go-test.yml)
+
+This repository contains a modified version of the standard library's TLS implementation, modified for the QUIC protocol. It is used by [quic-go](https://github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go).

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/common.go

@@ -345,7 +345,8 @@ type clientSessionState struct {
 // goroutines. Up to TLS 1.2, only ticket-based resumption is supported, not
 // SessionID-based resumption. In TLS 1.3 they were merged into PSK modes, which
 // are supported via this interface.
-//go:generate sh -c "mockgen -package qtls -destination mock_client_session_cache_test.go github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17 ClientSessionCache"
+//
+//go:generate sh -c "mockgen -package qtls -destination mock_client_session_cache_test.go github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18 ClientSessionCache"
 type ClientSessionCache = tls.ClientSessionCache
 
 // SignatureScheme is a tls.SignatureScheme

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/conn.go

@@ -125,6 +125,9 @@ type Conn struct {
 	used0RTT bool
 
 	tmp [16]byte
+
+	connStateMutex sync.Mutex
+	connState      ConnectionStateWith0RTT
 }
 
 // Access to net.Conn methods.
@@ -1533,19 +1536,16 @@ func (c *Conn) handshakeContext(ctx context.Context) (ret error) {
 
 // ConnectionState returns basic TLS details about the connection.
 func (c *Conn) ConnectionState() ConnectionState {
-	c.handshakeMutex.Lock()
-	defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock()
-	return c.connectionStateLocked()
+	c.connStateMutex.Lock()
+	defer c.connStateMutex.Unlock()
+	return c.connState.ConnectionState
 }
 
 // ConnectionStateWith0RTT returns basic TLS details (incl. 0-RTT status) about the connection.
 func (c *Conn) ConnectionStateWith0RTT() ConnectionStateWith0RTT {
-	c.handshakeMutex.Lock()
-	defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock()
-	return ConnectionStateWith0RTT{
-		ConnectionState: c.connectionStateLocked(),
-		Used0RTT:        c.used0RTT,
-	}
+	c.connStateMutex.Lock()
+	defer c.connStateMutex.Unlock()
+	return c.connState
 }
 
 func (c *Conn) connectionStateLocked() ConnectionState {
@@ -1576,6 +1576,15 @@ func (c *Conn) connectionStateLocked() ConnectionState {
 	return toConnectionState(state)
 }
 
+func (c *Conn) updateConnectionState() {
+	c.connStateMutex.Lock()
+	defer c.connStateMutex.Unlock()
+	c.connState = ConnectionStateWith0RTT{
+		Used0RTT:        c.used0RTT,
+		ConnectionState: c.connectionStateLocked(),
+	}
+}
+
 // OCSPResponse returns the stapled OCSP response from the TLS server, if
 // any. (Only valid for client connections.)
 func (c *Conn) OCSPResponse() []byte {

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/handshake_client.go

@@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ func (c *Conn) clientHandshake(ctx context.Context) (err error) {
 		c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, toClientSessionState(hs.session))
 	}
 
+	c.updateConnectionState()
 	return nil
 }
 

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/handshake_client_tls13.go

@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
 	if err := hs.processServerHello(); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
+	c.updateConnectionState()
 	if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -90,6 +91,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
 	if err := hs.readServerCertificate(); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
+	c.updateConnectionState()
 	if err := hs.readServerFinished(); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -104,7 +106,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
 	}
 
 	atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1)
-
+	c.updateConnectionState()
 	return nil
 }
 

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/handshake_server.go

@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) handshake() error {
 	c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
 	atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1)
 
+	c.updateConnectionState()
 	return nil
 }
 

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-18/handshake_server_tls13.go

@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
 	if err := hs.checkForResumption(); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
+	c.updateConnectionState()
 	if err := hs.pickCertificate(); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -75,12 +76,13 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
 	if err := hs.readClientCertificate(); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
+	c.updateConnectionState()
 	if err := hs.readClientFinished(); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 
 	atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1)
-
+	c.updateConnectionState()
 	return nil
 }
 

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# qtls
+
+[![Go Reference](https://pkg.go.dev/badge/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19.svg)](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19)
+[![.github/workflows/go-test.yml](https://github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/actions/workflows/go-test.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/actions/workflows/go-test.yml)
+
+This repository contains a modified version of the standard library's TLS implementation, modified for the QUIC protocol. It is used by [quic-go](https://github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go).

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/common.go

@@ -345,7 +345,8 @@ type clientSessionState struct {
 // goroutines. Up to TLS 1.2, only ticket-based resumption is supported, not
 // SessionID-based resumption. In TLS 1.3 they were merged into PSK modes, which
 // are supported via this interface.
-//go:generate sh -c "mockgen -package qtls -destination mock_client_session_cache_test.go github.com/marten-seemann/qtls-go1-17 ClientSessionCache"
+//
+//go:generate sh -c "mockgen -package qtls -destination mock_client_session_cache_test.go github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19 ClientSessionCache"
 type ClientSessionCache = tls.ClientSessionCache
 
 // SignatureScheme is a tls.SignatureScheme

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/conn.go

@@ -125,6 +125,9 @@ type Conn struct {
 	used0RTT bool
 
 	tmp [16]byte
+
+	connStateMutex sync.Mutex
+	connState      ConnectionStateWith0RTT
 }
 
 // Access to net.Conn methods.
@@ -1535,19 +1538,16 @@ func (c *Conn) handshakeContext(ctx context.Context) (ret error) {
 
 // ConnectionState returns basic TLS details about the connection.
 func (c *Conn) ConnectionState() ConnectionState {
-	c.handshakeMutex.Lock()
-	defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock()
-	return c.connectionStateLocked()
+	c.connStateMutex.Lock()
+	defer c.connStateMutex.Unlock()
+	return c.connState.ConnectionState
 }
 
 // ConnectionStateWith0RTT returns basic TLS details (incl. 0-RTT status) about the connection.
 func (c *Conn) ConnectionStateWith0RTT() ConnectionStateWith0RTT {
-	c.handshakeMutex.Lock()
-	defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock()
-	return ConnectionStateWith0RTT{
-		ConnectionState: c.connectionStateLocked(),
-		Used0RTT:        c.used0RTT,
-	}
+	c.connStateMutex.Lock()
+	defer c.connStateMutex.Unlock()
+	return c.connState
 }
 
 func (c *Conn) connectionStateLocked() ConnectionState {
@@ -1578,6 +1578,15 @@ func (c *Conn) connectionStateLocked() ConnectionState {
 	return toConnectionState(state)
 }
 
+func (c *Conn) updateConnectionState() {
+	c.connStateMutex.Lock()
+	defer c.connStateMutex.Unlock()
+	c.connState = ConnectionStateWith0RTT{
+		Used0RTT:        c.used0RTT,
+		ConnectionState: c.connectionStateLocked(),
+	}
+}
+
 // OCSPResponse returns the stapled OCSP response from the TLS server, if
 // any. (Only valid for client connections.)
 func (c *Conn) OCSPResponse() []byte {

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_client.go

@@ -295,6 +295,7 @@ func (c *Conn) clientHandshake(ctx context.Context) (err error) {
 		c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, toClientSessionState(hs.session))
 	}
 
+	c.updateConnectionState()
 	return nil
 }
 

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_client_tls13.go

@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
 	if err := hs.processServerHello(); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
+	c.updateConnectionState()
 	if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -94,6 +95,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
 	if err := hs.readServerCertificate(); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
+	c.updateConnectionState()
 	if err := hs.readServerFinished(); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -108,7 +110,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
 	}
 
 	atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1)
-
+	c.updateConnectionState()
 	return nil
 }
 

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_server.go

@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) handshake() error {
 	c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
 	atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1)
 
+	c.updateConnectionState()
 	return nil
 }
 

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_server_tls13.go

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
 	if err := hs.checkForResumption(); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
+	c.updateConnectionState()
 	if err := hs.pickCertificate(); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -79,12 +80,13 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
 	if err := hs.readClientCertificate(); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
+	c.updateConnectionState()
 	if err := hs.readClientFinished(); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 
 	atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1)
-
+	c.updateConnectionState()
 	return nil
 }
 

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+Copyright (c) 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+
+Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
+met:
+
+   * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+   * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
+copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
+in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+distribution.
+   * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its
+contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
+this software without specific prior written permission.
+
+THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+"AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# qtls
+
+[![Go Reference](https://pkg.go.dev/badge/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20.svg)](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20)
+[![.github/workflows/go-test.yml](https://github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/actions/workflows/go-test.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/actions/workflows/go-test.yml)
+
+This repository contains a modified version of the standard library's TLS implementation, modified for the QUIC protocol. It is used by [quic-go](https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go).

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/alert.go

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package qtls
+
+import "strconv"
+
+type alert uint8
+
+// Alert is a TLS alert
+type Alert = alert
+
+const (
+	// alert level
+	alertLevelWarning = 1
+	alertLevelError   = 2
+)
+
+const (
+	alertCloseNotify                  alert = 0
+	alertUnexpectedMessage            alert = 10
+	alertBadRecordMAC                 alert = 20
+	alertDecryptionFailed             alert = 21
+	alertRecordOverflow               alert = 22
+	alertDecompressionFailure         alert = 30
+	alertHandshakeFailure             alert = 40
+	alertBadCertificate               alert = 42
+	alertUnsupportedCertificate       alert = 43
+	alertCertificateRevoked           alert = 44
+	alertCertificateExpired           alert = 45
+	alertCertificateUnknown           alert = 46
+	alertIllegalParameter             alert = 47
+	alertUnknownCA                    alert = 48
+	alertAccessDenied                 alert = 49
+	alertDecodeError                  alert = 50
+	alertDecryptError                 alert = 51
+	alertExportRestriction            alert = 60
+	alertProtocolVersion              alert = 70
+	alertInsufficientSecurity         alert = 71
+	alertInternalError                alert = 80
+	alertInappropriateFallback        alert = 86
+	alertUserCanceled                 alert = 90
+	alertNoRenegotiation              alert = 100
+	alertMissingExtension             alert = 109
+	alertUnsupportedExtension         alert = 110
+	alertCertificateUnobtainable      alert = 111
+	alertUnrecognizedName             alert = 112
+	alertBadCertificateStatusResponse alert = 113
+	alertBadCertificateHashValue      alert = 114
+	alertUnknownPSKIdentity           alert = 115
+	alertCertificateRequired          alert = 116
+	alertNoApplicationProtocol        alert = 120
+)
+
+var alertText = map[alert]string{
+	alertCloseNotify:                  "close notify",
+	alertUnexpectedMessage:            "unexpected message",
+	alertBadRecordMAC:                 "bad record MAC",
+	alertDecryptionFailed:             "decryption failed",
+	alertRecordOverflow:               "record overflow",
+	alertDecompressionFailure:         "decompression failure",
+	alertHandshakeFailure:             "handshake failure",
+	alertBadCertificate:               "bad certificate",
+	alertUnsupportedCertificate:       "unsupported certificate",
+	alertCertificateRevoked:           "revoked certificate",
+	alertCertificateExpired:           "expired certificate",
+	alertCertificateUnknown:           "unknown certificate",
+	alertIllegalParameter:             "illegal parameter",
+	alertUnknownCA:                    "unknown certificate authority",
+	alertAccessDenied:                 "access denied",
+	alertDecodeError:                  "error decoding message",
+	alertDecryptError:                 "error decrypting message",
+	alertExportRestriction:            "export restriction",
+	alertProtocolVersion:              "protocol version not supported",
+	alertInsufficientSecurity:         "insufficient security level",
+	alertInternalError:                "internal error",
+	alertInappropriateFallback:        "inappropriate fallback",
+	alertUserCanceled:                 "user canceled",
+	alertNoRenegotiation:              "no renegotiation",
+	alertMissingExtension:             "missing extension",
+	alertUnsupportedExtension:         "unsupported extension",
+	alertCertificateUnobtainable:      "certificate unobtainable",
+	alertUnrecognizedName:             "unrecognized name",
+	alertBadCertificateStatusResponse: "bad certificate status response",
+	alertBadCertificateHashValue:      "bad certificate hash value",
+	alertUnknownPSKIdentity:           "unknown PSK identity",
+	alertCertificateRequired:          "certificate required",
+	alertNoApplicationProtocol:        "no application protocol",
+}
+
+func (e alert) String() string {
+	s, ok := alertText[e]
+	if ok {
+		return "tls: " + s
+	}
+	return "tls: alert(" + strconv.Itoa(int(e)) + ")"
+}
+
+func (e alert) Error() string {
+	return e.String()
+}

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/auth.go

@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package qtls
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+)
+
+// verifyHandshakeSignature verifies a signature against pre-hashed
+// (if required) handshake contents.
+func verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType uint8, pubkey crypto.PublicKey, hashFunc crypto.Hash, signed, sig []byte) error {
+	switch sigType {
+	case signatureECDSA:
+		pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
+		if !ok {
+			return fmt.Errorf("expected an ECDSA public key, got %T", pubkey)
+		}
+		if !ecdsa.VerifyASN1(pubKey, signed, sig) {
+			return errors.New("ECDSA verification failure")
+		}
+	case signatureEd25519:
+		pubKey, ok := pubkey.(ed25519.PublicKey)
+		if !ok {
+			return fmt.Errorf("expected an Ed25519 public key, got %T", pubkey)
+		}
+		if !ed25519.Verify(pubKey, signed, sig) {
+			return errors.New("Ed25519 verification failure")
+		}
+	case signaturePKCS1v15:
+		pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
+		if !ok {
+			return fmt.Errorf("expected an RSA public key, got %T", pubkey)
+		}
+		if err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pubKey, hashFunc, signed, sig); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	case signatureRSAPSS:
+		pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
+		if !ok {
+			return fmt.Errorf("expected an RSA public key, got %T", pubkey)
+		}
+		signOpts := &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash}
+		if err := rsa.VerifyPSS(pubKey, hashFunc, signed, sig, signOpts); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	default:
+		return errors.New("internal error: unknown signature type")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+const (
+	serverSignatureContext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify\x00"
+	clientSignatureContext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify\x00"
+)
+
+var signaturePadding = []byte{
+	0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+	0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+	0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+	0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+	0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+	0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+	0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+	0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20,
+}
+
+// signedMessage returns the pre-hashed (if necessary) message to be signed by
+// certificate keys in TLS 1.3. See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3.
+func signedMessage(sigHash crypto.Hash, context string, transcript hash.Hash) []byte {
+	if sigHash == directSigning {
+		b := &bytes.Buffer{}
+		b.Write(signaturePadding)
+		io.WriteString(b, context)
+		b.Write(transcript.Sum(nil))
+		return b.Bytes()
+	}
+	h := sigHash.New()
+	h.Write(signaturePadding)
+	io.WriteString(h, context)
+	h.Write(transcript.Sum(nil))
+	return h.Sum(nil)
+}
+
+// typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme returns the corresponding signature type and
+// crypto.Hash for a given TLS SignatureScheme.
+func typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme) (sigType uint8, hash crypto.Hash, err error) {
+	switch signatureAlgorithm {
+	case PKCS1WithSHA1, PKCS1WithSHA256, PKCS1WithSHA384, PKCS1WithSHA512:
+		sigType = signaturePKCS1v15
+	case PSSWithSHA256, PSSWithSHA384, PSSWithSHA512:
+		sigType = signatureRSAPSS
+	case ECDSAWithSHA1, ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512:
+		sigType = signatureECDSA
+	case Ed25519:
+		sigType = signatureEd25519
+	default:
+		return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("unsupported signature algorithm: %v", signatureAlgorithm)
+	}
+	switch signatureAlgorithm {
+	case PKCS1WithSHA1, ECDSAWithSHA1:
+		hash = crypto.SHA1
+	case PKCS1WithSHA256, PSSWithSHA256, ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256:
+		hash = crypto.SHA256
+	case PKCS1WithSHA384, PSSWithSHA384, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384:
+		hash = crypto.SHA384
+	case PKCS1WithSHA512, PSSWithSHA512, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512:
+		hash = crypto.SHA512
+	case Ed25519:
+		hash = directSigning
+	default:
+		return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("unsupported signature algorithm: %v", signatureAlgorithm)
+	}
+	return sigType, hash, nil
+}
+
+// legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey returns the fixed signature type and crypto.Hash for
+// a given public key used with TLS 1.0 and 1.1, before the introduction of
+// signature algorithm negotiation.
+func legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(pub crypto.PublicKey) (sigType uint8, hash crypto.Hash, err error) {
+	switch pub.(type) {
+	case *rsa.PublicKey:
+		return signaturePKCS1v15, crypto.MD5SHA1, nil
+	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
+		return signatureECDSA, crypto.SHA1, nil
+	case ed25519.PublicKey:
+		// RFC 8422 specifies support for Ed25519 in TLS 1.0 and 1.1,
+		// but it requires holding on to a handshake transcript to do a
+		// full signature, and not even OpenSSL bothers with the
+		// complexity, so we can't even test it properly.
+		return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("tls: Ed25519 public keys are not supported before TLS 1.2")
+	default:
+		return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported public key: %T", pub)
+	}
+}
+
+var rsaSignatureSchemes = []struct {
+	scheme          SignatureScheme
+	minModulusBytes int
+	maxVersion      uint16
+}{
+	// RSA-PSS is used with PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, and requires
+	//    emLen >= hLen + sLen + 2
+	{PSSWithSHA256, crypto.SHA256.Size()*2 + 2, VersionTLS13},
+	{PSSWithSHA384, crypto.SHA384.Size()*2 + 2, VersionTLS13},
+	{PSSWithSHA512, crypto.SHA512.Size()*2 + 2, VersionTLS13},
+	// PKCS #1 v1.5 uses prefixes from hashPrefixes in crypto/rsa, and requires
+	//    emLen >= len(prefix) + hLen + 11
+	// TLS 1.3 dropped support for PKCS #1 v1.5 in favor of RSA-PSS.
+	{PKCS1WithSHA256, 19 + crypto.SHA256.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12},
+	{PKCS1WithSHA384, 19 + crypto.SHA384.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12},
+	{PKCS1WithSHA512, 19 + crypto.SHA512.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12},
+	{PKCS1WithSHA1, 15 + crypto.SHA1.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12},
+}
+
+// signatureSchemesForCertificate returns the list of supported SignatureSchemes
+// for a given certificate, based on the public key and the protocol version,
+// and optionally filtered by its explicit SupportedSignatureAlgorithms.
+//
+// This function must be kept in sync with supportedSignatureAlgorithms.
+// FIPS filtering is applied in the caller, selectSignatureScheme.
+func signatureSchemesForCertificate(version uint16, cert *Certificate) []SignatureScheme {
+	priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	var sigAlgs []SignatureScheme
+	switch pub := priv.Public().(type) {
+	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
+		if version != VersionTLS13 {
+			// In TLS 1.2 and earlier, ECDSA algorithms are not
+			// constrained to a single curve.
+			sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{
+				ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256,
+				ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384,
+				ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512,
+				ECDSAWithSHA1,
+			}
+			break
+		}
+		switch pub.Curve {
+		case elliptic.P256():
+			sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256}
+		case elliptic.P384():
+			sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384}
+		case elliptic.P521():
+			sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512}
+		default:
+			return nil
+		}
+	case *rsa.PublicKey:
+		size := pub.Size()
+		sigAlgs = make([]SignatureScheme, 0, len(rsaSignatureSchemes))
+		for _, candidate := range rsaSignatureSchemes {
+			if size >= candidate.minModulusBytes && version <= candidate.maxVersion {
+				sigAlgs = append(sigAlgs, candidate.scheme)
+			}
+		}
+	case ed25519.PublicKey:
+		sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{Ed25519}
+	default:
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	if cert.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms != nil {
+		var filteredSigAlgs []SignatureScheme
+		for _, sigAlg := range sigAlgs {
+			if isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(sigAlg, cert.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
+				filteredSigAlgs = append(filteredSigAlgs, sigAlg)
+			}
+		}
+		return filteredSigAlgs
+	}
+	return sigAlgs
+}
+
+// selectSignatureScheme picks a SignatureScheme from the peer's preference list
+// that works with the selected certificate. It's only called for protocol
+// versions that support signature algorithms, so TLS 1.2 and 1.3.
+func selectSignatureScheme(vers uint16, c *Certificate, peerAlgs []SignatureScheme) (SignatureScheme, error) {
+	supportedAlgs := signatureSchemesForCertificate(vers, c)
+	if len(supportedAlgs) == 0 {
+		return 0, unsupportedCertificateError(c)
+	}
+	if len(peerAlgs) == 0 && vers == VersionTLS12 {
+		// For TLS 1.2, if the client didn't send signature_algorithms then we
+		// can assume that it supports SHA1. See RFC 5246, Section 7.4.1.4.1.
+		peerAlgs = []SignatureScheme{PKCS1WithSHA1, ECDSAWithSHA1}
+	}
+	// Pick signature scheme in the peer's preference order, as our
+	// preference order is not configurable.
+	for _, preferredAlg := range peerAlgs {
+		if needFIPS() && !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(preferredAlg, fipsSupportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
+			continue
+		}
+		if isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(preferredAlg, supportedAlgs) {
+			return preferredAlg, nil
+		}
+	}
+	return 0, errors.New("tls: peer doesn't support any of the certificate's signature algorithms")
+}
+
+// unsupportedCertificateError returns a helpful error for certificates with
+// an unsupported private key.
+func unsupportedCertificateError(cert *Certificate) error {
+	switch cert.PrivateKey.(type) {
+	case rsa.PrivateKey, ecdsa.PrivateKey:
+		return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate: private key is %T, expected *%T",
+			cert.PrivateKey, cert.PrivateKey)
+	case *ed25519.PrivateKey:
+		return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate: private key is *ed25519.PrivateKey, expected ed25519.PrivateKey")
+	}
+
+	signer, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
+	if !ok {
+		return fmt.Errorf("tls: certificate private key (%T) does not implement crypto.Signer",
+			cert.PrivateKey)
+	}
+
+	switch pub := signer.Public().(type) {
+	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
+		switch pub.Curve {
+		case elliptic.P256():
+		case elliptic.P384():
+		case elliptic.P521():
+		default:
+			return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate curve (%s)", pub.Curve.Params().Name)
+		}
+	case *rsa.PublicKey:
+		return fmt.Errorf("tls: certificate RSA key size too small for supported signature algorithms")
+	case ed25519.PublicKey:
+	default:
+		return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate key (%T)", pub)
+	}
+
+	if cert.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("tls: peer doesn't support the certificate custom signature algorithms")
+	}
+
+	return fmt.Errorf("tls: internal error: unsupported key (%T)", cert.PrivateKey)
+}

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cache.go

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package qtls
+
+import (
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"runtime"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+)
+
+type cacheEntry struct {
+	refs atomic.Int64
+	cert *x509.Certificate
+}
+
+// certCache implements an intern table for reference counted x509.Certificates,
+// implemented in a similar fashion to BoringSSL's CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL. This
+// allows for a single x509.Certificate to be kept in memory and referenced from
+// multiple Conns. Returned references should not be mutated by callers. Certificates
+// are still safe to use after they are removed from the cache.
+//
+// Certificates are returned wrapped in a activeCert struct that should be held by
+// the caller. When references to the activeCert are freed, the number of references
+// to the certificate in the cache is decremented. Once the number of references
+// reaches zero, the entry is evicted from the cache.
+//
+// The main difference between this implementation and CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL is that
+// CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL is a more  generic structure which supports blobs of data,
+// rather than specific structures. Since we only care about x509.Certificates,
+// certCache is implemented as a specific cache, rather than a generic one.
+//
+// See https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/master/include/openssl/pool.h
+// and https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/master/crypto/pool/pool.c
+// for the BoringSSL reference.
+type certCache struct {
+	sync.Map
+}
+
+var clientCertCache = new(certCache)
+
+// activeCert is a handle to a certificate held in the cache. Once there are
+// no alive activeCerts for a given certificate, the certificate is removed
+// from the cache by a finalizer.
+type activeCert struct {
+	cert *x509.Certificate
+}
+
+// active increments the number of references to the entry, wraps the
+// certificate in the entry in a activeCert, and sets the finalizer.
+//
+// Note that there is a race between active and the finalizer set on the
+// returned activeCert, triggered if active is called after the ref count is
+// decremented such that refs may be > 0 when evict is called. We consider this
+// safe, since the caller holding an activeCert for an entry that is no longer
+// in the cache is fine, with the only side effect being the memory overhead of
+// there being more than one distinct reference to a certificate alive at once.
+func (cc *certCache) active(e *cacheEntry) *activeCert {
+	e.refs.Add(1)
+	a := &activeCert{e.cert}
+	runtime.SetFinalizer(a, func(_ *activeCert) {
+		if e.refs.Add(-1) == 0 {
+			cc.evict(e)
+		}
+	})
+	return a
+}
+
+// evict removes a cacheEntry from the cache.
+func (cc *certCache) evict(e *cacheEntry) {
+	cc.Delete(string(e.cert.Raw))
+}
+
+// newCert returns a x509.Certificate parsed from der. If there is already a copy
+// of the certificate in the cache, a reference to the existing certificate will
+// be returned. Otherwise, a fresh certificate will be added to the cache, and
+// the reference returned. The returned reference should not be mutated.
+func (cc *certCache) newCert(der []byte) (*activeCert, error) {
+	if entry, ok := cc.Load(string(der)); ok {
+		return cc.active(entry.(*cacheEntry)), nil
+	}
+
+	cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	entry := &cacheEntry{cert: cert}
+	if entry, loaded := cc.LoadOrStore(string(der), entry); loaded {
+		return cc.active(entry.(*cacheEntry)), nil
+	}
+	return cc.active(entry), nil
+}

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cipher_suites.go

@@ -0,0 +1,693 @@
+// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package qtls
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/des"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/rc4"
+	"crypto/sha1"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"fmt"
+	"hash"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305"
+)
+
+// CipherSuite is a TLS cipher suite. Note that most functions in this package
+// accept and expose cipher suite IDs instead of this type.
+type CipherSuite struct {
+	ID   uint16
+	Name string
+
+	// Supported versions is the list of TLS protocol versions that can
+	// negotiate this cipher suite.
+	SupportedVersions []uint16
+
+	// Insecure is true if the cipher suite has known security issues
+	// due to its primitives, design, or implementation.
+	Insecure bool
+}
+
+var (
+	supportedUpToTLS12 = []uint16{VersionTLS10, VersionTLS11, VersionTLS12}
+	supportedOnlyTLS12 = []uint16{VersionTLS12}
+	supportedOnlyTLS13 = []uint16{VersionTLS13}
+)
+
+// CipherSuites returns a list of cipher suites currently implemented by this
+// package, excluding those with security issues, which are returned by
+// InsecureCipherSuites.
+//
+// The list is sorted by ID. Note that the default cipher suites selected by
+// this package might depend on logic that can't be captured by a static list,
+// and might not match those returned by this function.
+func CipherSuites() []*CipherSuite {
+	return []*CipherSuite{
+		{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
+
+		{TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS13, false},
+		{TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS13, false},
+		{TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS13, false},
+
+		{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false},
+	}
+}
+
+// InsecureCipherSuites returns a list of cipher suites currently implemented by
+// this package and which have security issues.
+//
+// Most applications should not use the cipher suites in this list, and should
+// only use those returned by CipherSuites.
+func InsecureCipherSuites() []*CipherSuite {
+	// This list includes RC4, CBC_SHA256, and 3DES cipher suites. See
+	// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder for details.
+	return []*CipherSuite{
+		{TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
+		{TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
+		{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true},
+		{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true},
+	}
+}
+
+// CipherSuiteName returns the standard name for the passed cipher suite ID
+// (e.g. "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"), or a fallback representation
+// of the ID value if the cipher suite is not implemented by this package.
+func CipherSuiteName(id uint16) string {
+	for _, c := range CipherSuites() {
+		if c.ID == id {
+			return c.Name
+		}
+	}
+	for _, c := range InsecureCipherSuites() {
+		if c.ID == id {
+			return c.Name
+		}
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("0x%04X", id)
+}
+
+const (
+	// suiteECDHE indicates that the cipher suite involves elliptic curve
+	// Diffie-Hellman. This means that it should only be selected when the
+	// client indicates that it supports ECC with a curve and point format
+	// that we're happy with.
+	suiteECDHE = 1 << iota
+	// suiteECSign indicates that the cipher suite involves an ECDSA or
+	// EdDSA signature and therefore may only be selected when the server's
+	// certificate is ECDSA or EdDSA. If this is not set then the cipher suite
+	// is RSA based.
+	suiteECSign
+	// suiteTLS12 indicates that the cipher suite should only be advertised
+	// and accepted when using TLS 1.2.
+	suiteTLS12
+	// suiteSHA384 indicates that the cipher suite uses SHA384 as the
+	// handshake hash.
+	suiteSHA384
+)
+
+// A cipherSuite is a TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suite, and defines the key exchange
+// mechanism, as well as the cipher+MAC pair or the AEAD.
+type cipherSuite struct {
+	id uint16
+	// the lengths, in bytes, of the key material needed for each component.
+	keyLen int
+	macLen int
+	ivLen  int
+	ka     func(version uint16) keyAgreement
+	// flags is a bitmask of the suite* values, above.
+	flags  int
+	cipher func(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any
+	mac    func(key []byte) hash.Hash
+	aead   func(key, fixedNonce []byte) aead
+}
+
+var cipherSuites = []*cipherSuite{ // TODO: replace with a map, since the order doesn't matter.
+	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
+	{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
+	{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
+	{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, rsaKA, suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
+	{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
+	{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil},
+	{TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, rsaKA, 0, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil},
+	{TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, rsaKA, 0, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
+	{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
+}
+
+// selectCipherSuite returns the first TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suite from ids which
+// is also in supportedIDs and passes the ok filter.
+func selectCipherSuite(ids, supportedIDs []uint16, ok func(*cipherSuite) bool) *cipherSuite {
+	for _, id := range ids {
+		candidate := cipherSuiteByID(id)
+		if candidate == nil || !ok(candidate) {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		for _, suppID := range supportedIDs {
+			if id == suppID {
+				return candidate
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// A cipherSuiteTLS13 defines only the pair of the AEAD algorithm and hash
+// algorithm to be used with HKDF. See RFC 8446, Appendix B.4.
+type cipherSuiteTLS13 struct {
+	id     uint16
+	keyLen int
+	aead   func(key, fixedNonce []byte) aead
+	hash   crypto.Hash
+}
+
+type CipherSuiteTLS13 struct {
+	ID     uint16
+	KeyLen int
+	Hash   crypto.Hash
+	AEAD   func(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD
+}
+
+func (c *CipherSuiteTLS13) IVLen() int {
+	return aeadNonceLength
+}
+
+var cipherSuitesTLS13 = []*cipherSuiteTLS13{ // TODO: replace with a map.
+	{TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, aeadAESGCMTLS13, crypto.SHA256},
+	{TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, 32, aeadChaCha20Poly1305, crypto.SHA256},
+	{TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, aeadAESGCMTLS13, crypto.SHA384},
+}
+
+// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder is the order in which we'll select (on the
+// server) or advertise (on the client) TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suites.
+//
+// Cipher suites are filtered but not reordered based on the application and
+// peer's preferences, meaning we'll never select a suite lower in this list if
+// any higher one is available. This makes it more defensible to keep weaker
+// cipher suites enabled, especially on the server side where we get the last
+// word, since there are no known downgrade attacks on cipher suites selection.
+//
+// The list is sorted by applying the following priority rules, stopping at the
+// first (most important) applicable one:
+//
+//   - Anything else comes before RC4
+//
+//     RC4 has practically exploitable biases. See https://www.rc4nomore.com.
+//
+//   - Anything else comes before CBC_SHA256
+//
+//     SHA-256 variants of the CBC ciphersuites don't implement any Lucky13
+//     countermeasures. See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/Lucky13.html and
+//     https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html.
+//
+//   - Anything else comes before 3DES
+//
+//     3DES has 64-bit blocks, which makes it fundamentally susceptible to
+//     birthday attacks. See https://sweet32.info.
+//
+//   - ECDHE comes before anything else
+//
+//     Once we got the broken stuff out of the way, the most important
+//     property a cipher suite can have is forward secrecy. We don't
+//     implement FFDHE, so that means ECDHE.
+//
+//   - AEADs come before CBC ciphers
+//
+//     Even with Lucky13 countermeasures, MAC-then-Encrypt CBC cipher suites
+//     are fundamentally fragile, and suffered from an endless sequence of
+//     padding oracle attacks. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1129,
+//     https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/12/08/poodleagain.html, and
+//     https://blog.cloudflare.com/yet-another-padding-oracle-in-openssl-cbc-ciphersuites/.
+//
+//   - AES comes before ChaCha20
+//
+//     When AES hardware is available, AES-128-GCM and AES-256-GCM are faster
+//     than ChaCha20Poly1305.
+//
+//     When AES hardware is not available, AES-128-GCM is one or more of: much
+//     slower, way more complex, and less safe (because not constant time)
+//     than ChaCha20Poly1305.
+//
+//     We use this list if we think both peers have AES hardware, and
+//     cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES otherwise.
+//
+//   - AES-128 comes before AES-256
+//
+//     The only potential advantages of AES-256 are better multi-target
+//     margins, and hypothetical post-quantum properties. Neither apply to
+//     TLS, and AES-256 is slower due to its four extra rounds (which don't
+//     contribute to the advantages above).
+//
+//   - ECDSA comes before RSA
+//
+//     The relative order of ECDSA and RSA cipher suites doesn't matter,
+//     as they depend on the certificate. Pick one to get a stable order.
+var cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder = []uint16{
+	// AEADs w/ ECDHE
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+
+	// CBC w/ ECDHE
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+
+	// AEADs w/o ECDHE
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+
+	// CBC w/o ECDHE
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+
+	// 3DES
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+
+	// CBC_SHA256
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+
+	// RC4
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+}
+
+var cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES = []uint16{
+	// ChaCha20Poly1305
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+
+	// AES-GCM w/ ECDHE
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+
+	// The rest of cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder.
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+}
+
+// disabledCipherSuites are not used unless explicitly listed in
+// Config.CipherSuites. They MUST be at the end of cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder.
+var disabledCipherSuites = []uint16{
+	// CBC_SHA256
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+
+	// RC4
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+}
+
+var (
+	defaultCipherSuitesLen = len(cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder) - len(disabledCipherSuites)
+	defaultCipherSuites    = cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder[:defaultCipherSuitesLen]
+)
+
+// defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 is also the preference order, since there are no
+// disabled by default TLS 1.3 cipher suites. The same AES vs ChaCha20 logic as
+// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder applies.
+var defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 = []uint16{
+	TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+	TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+}
+
+var defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES = []uint16{
+	TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+	TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+	TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+}
+
+var aesgcmCiphers = map[uint16]bool{
+	// TLS 1.2
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:   true,
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:   true,
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true,
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true,
+	// TLS 1.3
+	TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true,
+	TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true,
+}
+
+var nonAESGCMAEADCiphers = map[uint16]bool{
+	// TLS 1.2
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305:   true,
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305: true,
+	// TLS 1.3
+	TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: true,
+}
+
+// aesgcmPreferred returns whether the first known cipher in the preference list
+// is an AES-GCM cipher, implying the peer has hardware support for it.
+func aesgcmPreferred(ciphers []uint16) bool {
+	for _, cID := range ciphers {
+		if c := cipherSuiteByID(cID); c != nil {
+			return aesgcmCiphers[cID]
+		}
+		if c := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(cID); c != nil {
+			return aesgcmCiphers[cID]
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func cipherRC4(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
+	cipher, _ := rc4.NewCipher(key)
+	return cipher
+}
+
+func cipher3DES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
+	block, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(key)
+	if isRead {
+		return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv)
+	}
+	return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv)
+}
+
+func cipherAES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
+	block, _ := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if isRead {
+		return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv)
+	}
+	return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv)
+}
+
+// macSHA1 returns a SHA-1 based constant time MAC.
+func macSHA1(key []byte) hash.Hash {
+	h := sha1.New
+	h = newConstantTimeHash(h)
+	return hmac.New(h, key)
+}
+
+// macSHA256 returns a SHA-256 based MAC. This is only supported in TLS 1.2 and
+// is currently only used in disabled-by-default cipher suites.
+func macSHA256(key []byte) hash.Hash {
+	return hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
+}
+
+type aead interface {
+	cipher.AEAD
+
+	// explicitNonceLen returns the number of bytes of explicit nonce
+	// included in each record. This is eight for older AEADs and
+	// zero for modern ones.
+	explicitNonceLen() int
+}
+
+const (
+	aeadNonceLength   = 12
+	noncePrefixLength = 4
+)
+
+// prefixNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD and prefixes a fixed portion of the nonce to
+// each call.
+type prefixNonceAEAD struct {
+	// nonce contains the fixed part of the nonce in the first four bytes.
+	nonce [aeadNonceLength]byte
+	aead  cipher.AEAD
+}
+
+func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int        { return aeadNonceLength - noncePrefixLength }
+func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Overhead() int         { return f.aead.Overhead() }
+func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return f.NonceSize() }
+
+func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
+	copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce)
+	return f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonce[:], plaintext, additionalData)
+}
+
+func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce)
+	return f.aead.Open(out, f.nonce[:], ciphertext, additionalData)
+}
+
+// xorNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD by XORing in a fixed pattern to the nonce
+// before each call.
+type xorNonceAEAD struct {
+	nonceMask [aeadNonceLength]byte
+	aead      cipher.AEAD
+}
+
+func (f *xorNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int        { return 8 } // 64-bit sequence number
+func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Overhead() int         { return f.aead.Overhead() }
+func (f *xorNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return 0 }
+
+func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
+	for i, b := range nonce {
+		f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
+	}
+	result := f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonceMask[:], plaintext, additionalData)
+	for i, b := range nonce {
+		f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
+	}
+
+	return result
+}
+
+func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	for i, b := range nonce {
+		f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
+	}
+	result, err := f.aead.Open(out, f.nonceMask[:], ciphertext, additionalData)
+	for i, b := range nonce {
+		f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b
+	}
+
+	return result, err
+}
+
+func aeadAESGCM(key, noncePrefix []byte) aead {
+	if len(noncePrefix) != noncePrefixLength {
+		panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
+	}
+	aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+	var aead cipher.AEAD
+	aead, err = cipher.NewGCM(aes)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+
+	ret := &prefixNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
+	copy(ret.nonce[:], noncePrefix)
+	return ret
+}
+
+// AEADAESGCMTLS13 creates a new AES-GCM AEAD for TLS 1.3
+func AEADAESGCMTLS13(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD {
+	return aeadAESGCMTLS13(key, fixedNonce)
+}
+
+func aeadAESGCMTLS13(key, nonceMask []byte) aead {
+	if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength {
+		panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
+	}
+	aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+	aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(aes)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+
+	ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
+	copy(ret.nonceMask[:], nonceMask)
+	return ret
+}
+
+func aeadChaCha20Poly1305(key, nonceMask []byte) aead {
+	if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength {
+		panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length")
+	}
+	aead, err := chacha20poly1305.New(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err)
+	}
+
+	ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead}
+	copy(ret.nonceMask[:], nonceMask)
+	return ret
+}
+
+type constantTimeHash interface {
+	hash.Hash
+	ConstantTimeSum(b []byte) []byte
+}
+
+// cthWrapper wraps any hash.Hash that implements ConstantTimeSum, and replaces
+// with that all calls to Sum. It's used to obtain a ConstantTimeSum-based HMAC.
+type cthWrapper struct {
+	h constantTimeHash
+}
+
+func (c *cthWrapper) Size() int                   { return c.h.Size() }
+func (c *cthWrapper) BlockSize() int              { return c.h.BlockSize() }
+func (c *cthWrapper) Reset()                      { c.h.Reset() }
+func (c *cthWrapper) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return c.h.Write(p) }
+func (c *cthWrapper) Sum(b []byte) []byte         { return c.h.ConstantTimeSum(b) }
+
+func newConstantTimeHash(h func() hash.Hash) func() hash.Hash {
+	return func() hash.Hash {
+		return &cthWrapper{h().(constantTimeHash)}
+	}
+}
+
+// tls10MAC implements the TLS 1.0 MAC function. RFC 2246, Section 6.2.3.
+func tls10MAC(h hash.Hash, out, seq, header, data, extra []byte) []byte {
+	h.Reset()
+	h.Write(seq)
+	h.Write(header)
+	h.Write(data)
+	res := h.Sum(out)
+	if extra != nil {
+		h.Write(extra)
+	}
+	return res
+}
+
+func rsaKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
+	return rsaKeyAgreement{}
+}
+
+func ecdheECDSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
+	return &ecdheKeyAgreement{
+		isRSA:   false,
+		version: version,
+	}
+}
+
+func ecdheRSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
+	return &ecdheKeyAgreement{
+		isRSA:   true,
+		version: version,
+	}
+}
+
+// mutualCipherSuite returns a cipherSuite given a list of supported
+// ciphersuites and the id requested by the peer.
+func mutualCipherSuite(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuite {
+	for _, id := range have {
+		if id == want {
+			return cipherSuiteByID(id)
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func cipherSuiteByID(id uint16) *cipherSuite {
+	for _, cipherSuite := range cipherSuites {
+		if cipherSuite.id == id {
+			return cipherSuite
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 {
+	for _, id := range have {
+		if id == want {
+			return cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id)
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 {
+	for _, cipherSuite := range cipherSuitesTLS13 {
+		if cipherSuite.id == id {
+			return cipherSuite
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// A list of cipher suite IDs that are, or have been, implemented by this
+// package.
+//
+// See https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml
+const (
+	// TLS 1.0 - 1.2 cipher suites.
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                      uint16 = 0x0005
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA                 uint16 = 0x000a
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA                  uint16 = 0x002f
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA                  uint16 = 0x0035
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256               uint16 = 0x003c
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256               uint16 = 0x009c
+	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384               uint16 = 0x009d
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA              uint16 = 0xc007
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA          uint16 = 0xc009
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA          uint16 = 0xc00a
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                uint16 = 0xc011
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA           uint16 = 0xc012
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA            uint16 = 0xc013
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA            uint16 = 0xc014
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256       uint16 = 0xc023
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256         uint16 = 0xc027
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256         uint16 = 0xc02f
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256       uint16 = 0xc02b
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384         uint16 = 0xc030
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384       uint16 = 0xc02c
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256   uint16 = 0xcca8
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xcca9
+
+	// TLS 1.3 cipher suites.
+	TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256       uint16 = 0x1301
+	TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384       uint16 = 0x1302
+	TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0x1303
+
+	// TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV isn't a standard cipher suite but an indicator
+	// that the client is doing version fallback. See RFC 7507.
+	TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV uint16 = 0x5600
+
+	// Legacy names for the corresponding cipher suites with the correct _SHA256
+	// suffix, retained for backward compatibility.
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305   = TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 = TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+)

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cpu.go

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+//go:build !js
+// +build !js
+
+package qtls
+
+import (
+	"runtime"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
+)
+
+var (
+	hasGCMAsmAMD64 = cpu.X86.HasAES && cpu.X86.HasPCLMULQDQ
+	hasGCMAsmARM64 = cpu.ARM64.HasAES && cpu.ARM64.HasPMULL
+	// Keep in sync with crypto/aes/cipher_s390x.go.
+	hasGCMAsmS390X = cpu.S390X.HasAES && cpu.S390X.HasAESCBC && cpu.S390X.HasAESCTR &&
+		(cpu.S390X.HasGHASH || cpu.S390X.HasAESGCM)
+
+	hasAESGCMHardwareSupport = runtime.GOARCH == "amd64" && hasGCMAsmAMD64 ||
+		runtime.GOARCH == "arm64" && hasGCMAsmARM64 ||
+		runtime.GOARCH == "s390x" && hasGCMAsmS390X
+)

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cpu_other.go

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+//go:build js
+// +build js
+
+package qtls
+
+var (
+	hasGCMAsmAMD64 = false
+	hasGCMAsmARM64 = false
+	hasGCMAsmS390X = false
+
+	hasAESGCMHardwareSupport = false
+)

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_client_tls13.go

@@ -0,0 +1,743 @@
+// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package qtls
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/ecdh"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"hash"
+	"time"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
+)
+
+type clientHandshakeStateTLS13 struct {
+	c           *Conn
+	ctx         context.Context
+	serverHello *serverHelloMsg
+	hello       *clientHelloMsg
+	ecdheKey    *ecdh.PrivateKey
+
+	session     *clientSessionState
+	earlySecret []byte
+	binderKey   []byte
+
+	certReq       *certificateRequestMsgTLS13
+	usingPSK      bool
+	sentDummyCCS  bool
+	suite         *cipherSuiteTLS13
+	transcript    hash.Hash
+	masterSecret  []byte
+	trafficSecret []byte // client_application_traffic_secret_0
+}
+
+// handshake requires hs.c, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, hs.ecdheKey, and,
+// optionally, hs.session, hs.earlySecret and hs.binderKey to be set.
+func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if needFIPS() {
+		return errors.New("tls: internal error: TLS 1.3 reached in FIPS mode")
+	}
+
+	// The server must not select TLS 1.3 in a renegotiation. See RFC 8446,
+	// sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3.
+	if c.handshakes > 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
+		return errors.New("tls: server selected TLS 1.3 in a renegotiation")
+	}
+
+	// Consistency check on the presence of a keyShare and its parameters.
+	if hs.ecdheKey == nil || len(hs.hello.keyShares) != 1 {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+	}
+
+	if err := hs.checkServerHelloOrHRR(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	hs.transcript = hs.suite.hash.New()
+	hs.transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
+
+	if bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.random, helloRetryRequestRandom) {
+		if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := hs.processHelloRetryRequest(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
+
+	c.buffering = true
+	if err := hs.processServerHello(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	c.updateConnectionState()
+	if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := hs.establishHandshakeKeys(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := hs.readServerParameters(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := hs.readServerCertificate(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	c.updateConnectionState()
+	if err := hs.readServerFinished(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := hs.sendClientCertificate(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := hs.sendClientFinished(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	c.isHandshakeComplete.Store(true)
+	c.updateConnectionState()
+	return nil
+}
+
+// checkServerHelloOrHRR does validity checks that apply to both ServerHello and
+// HelloRetryRequest messages. It sets hs.suite.
+func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) checkServerHelloOrHRR() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if hs.serverHello.supportedVersion == 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertMissingExtension)
+		return errors.New("tls: server selected TLS 1.3 using the legacy version field")
+	}
+
+	if hs.serverHello.supportedVersion != VersionTLS13 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid version after a HelloRetryRequest")
+	}
+
+	if hs.serverHello.vers != VersionTLS12 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server sent an incorrect legacy version")
+	}
+
+	if hs.serverHello.ocspStapling ||
+		hs.serverHello.ticketSupported ||
+		hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiationSupported ||
+		len(hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 ||
+		len(hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol) != 0 ||
+		len(hs.serverHello.scts) != 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
+		return errors.New("tls: server sent a ServerHello extension forbidden in TLS 1.3")
+	}
+
+	if !bytes.Equal(hs.hello.sessionId, hs.serverHello.sessionId) {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server did not echo the legacy session ID")
+	}
+
+	if hs.serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported compression format")
+	}
+
+	selectedSuite := mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(hs.hello.cipherSuites, hs.serverHello.cipherSuite)
+	if hs.suite != nil && selectedSuite != hs.suite {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server changed cipher suite after a HelloRetryRequest")
+	}
+	if selectedSuite == nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server chose an unconfigured cipher suite")
+	}
+	hs.suite = selectedSuite
+	c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// sendDummyChangeCipherSpec sends a ChangeCipherSpec record for compatibility
+// with middleboxes that didn't implement TLS correctly. See RFC 8446, Appendix D.4.
+func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendDummyChangeCipherSpec() error {
+	if hs.sentDummyCCS {
+		return nil
+	}
+	hs.sentDummyCCS = true
+
+	_, err := hs.c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
+	return err
+}
+
+// processHelloRetryRequest handles the HRR in hs.serverHello, modifies and
+// resends hs.hello, and reads the new ServerHello into hs.serverHello.
+func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processHelloRetryRequest() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	// The first ClientHello gets double-hashed into the transcript upon a
+	// HelloRetryRequest. (The idea is that the server might offload transcript
+	// storage to the client in the cookie.) See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.1.
+	chHash := hs.transcript.Sum(nil)
+	hs.transcript.Reset()
+	hs.transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
+	hs.transcript.Write(chHash)
+	hs.transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
+
+	// The only HelloRetryRequest extensions we support are key_share and
+	// cookie, and clients must abort the handshake if the HRR would not result
+	// in any change in the ClientHello.
+	if hs.serverHello.selectedGroup == 0 && hs.serverHello.cookie == nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server sent an unnecessary HelloRetryRequest message")
+	}
+
+	if hs.serverHello.cookie != nil {
+		hs.hello.cookie = hs.serverHello.cookie
+	}
+
+	if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group != 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
+		return errors.New("tls: received malformed key_share extension")
+	}
+
+	// If the server sent a key_share extension selecting a group, ensure it's
+	// a group we advertised but did not send a key share for, and send a key
+	// share for it this time.
+	if curveID := hs.serverHello.selectedGroup; curveID != 0 {
+		curveOK := false
+		for _, id := range hs.hello.supportedCurves {
+			if id == curveID {
+				curveOK = true
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		if !curveOK {
+			c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+			return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported group")
+		}
+		if sentID, _ := curveIDForCurve(hs.ecdheKey.Curve()); sentID == curveID {
+			c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+			return errors.New("tls: server sent an unnecessary HelloRetryRequest key_share")
+		}
+		if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); !ok {
+			c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+			return errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve")
+		}
+		key, err := generateECDHEKey(c.config.rand(), curveID)
+		if err != nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+			return err
+		}
+		hs.ecdheKey = key
+		hs.hello.keyShares = []keyShare{{group: curveID, data: key.PublicKey().Bytes()}}
+	}
+
+	hs.hello.raw = nil
+	if len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) > 0 {
+		pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(hs.session.cipherSuite)
+		if pskSuite == nil {
+			return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		}
+		if pskSuite.hash == hs.suite.hash {
+			// Update binders and obfuscated_ticket_age.
+			ticketAge := uint32(c.config.time().Sub(hs.session.receivedAt) / time.Millisecond)
+			hs.hello.pskIdentities[0].obfuscatedTicketAge = ticketAge + hs.session.ageAdd
+
+			transcript := hs.suite.hash.New()
+			transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
+			transcript.Write(chHash)
+			transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
+			transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshalWithoutBinders())
+			pskBinders := [][]byte{hs.suite.finishedHash(hs.binderKey, transcript)}
+			hs.hello.updateBinders(pskBinders)
+		} else {
+			// Server selected a cipher suite incompatible with the PSK.
+			hs.hello.pskIdentities = nil
+			hs.hello.pskBinders = nil
+		}
+	}
+
+	if hs.hello.earlyData && c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT != nil {
+		c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT()
+	}
+	hs.hello.earlyData = false // disable 0-RTT
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	serverHello, ok := msg.(*serverHelloMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return unexpectedMessageError(serverHello, msg)
+	}
+	hs.serverHello = serverHello
+
+	if err := hs.checkServerHelloOrHRR(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processServerHello() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.random, helloRetryRequestRandom) {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return errors.New("tls: server sent two HelloRetryRequest messages")
+	}
+
+	if len(hs.serverHello.cookie) != 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
+		return errors.New("tls: server sent a cookie in a normal ServerHello")
+	}
+
+	if hs.serverHello.selectedGroup != 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
+		return errors.New("tls: malformed key_share extension")
+	}
+
+	if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group == 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server did not send a key share")
+	}
+	if sentID, _ := curveIDForCurve(hs.ecdheKey.Curve()); hs.serverHello.serverShare.group != sentID {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported group")
+	}
+
+	if !hs.serverHello.selectedIdentityPresent {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	if int(hs.serverHello.selectedIdentity) >= len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid PSK")
+	}
+
+	if len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) != 1 || hs.session == nil {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+	}
+	pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(hs.session.cipherSuite)
+	if pskSuite == nil {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+	}
+	if pskSuite.hash != hs.suite.hash {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid PSK and cipher suite pair")
+	}
+
+	hs.usingPSK = true
+	c.didResume = true
+	c.peerCertificates = hs.session.serverCertificates
+	c.verifiedChains = hs.session.verifiedChains
+	c.ocspResponse = hs.session.ocspResponse
+	c.scts = hs.session.scts
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) establishHandshakeKeys() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	peerKey, err := hs.ecdheKey.Curve().NewPublicKey(hs.serverHello.serverShare.data)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: invalid server key share")
+	}
+	sharedKey, err := hs.ecdheKey.ECDH(peerKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: invalid server key share")
+	}
+
+	earlySecret := hs.earlySecret
+	if !hs.usingPSK {
+		earlySecret = hs.suite.extract(nil, nil)
+	}
+	handshakeSecret := hs.suite.extract(sharedKey,
+		hs.suite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, "derived", nil))
+
+	clientSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(handshakeSecret,
+		clientHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
+	c.out.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, clientSecret)
+	c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, clientSecret)
+	serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(handshakeSecret,
+		serverHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
+	c.in.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, serverSecret)
+	c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret)
+
+	err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientHandshake, hs.hello.random, clientSecret)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+	err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerHandshake, hs.hello.random, serverSecret)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+
+	hs.masterSecret = hs.suite.extract(nil,
+		hs.suite.deriveSecret(handshakeSecret, "derived", nil))
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerParameters() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	encryptedExtensions, ok := msg.(*encryptedExtensionsMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return unexpectedMessageError(encryptedExtensions, msg)
+	}
+	// Notify the caller if 0-RTT was rejected.
+	if !encryptedExtensions.earlyData && hs.hello.earlyData && c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT != nil {
+		c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT()
+	}
+	c.used0RTT = encryptedExtensions.earlyData
+	if hs.c.extraConfig != nil && hs.c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions != nil {
+		hs.c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions(typeEncryptedExtensions, encryptedExtensions.additionalExtensions)
+	}
+	hs.transcript.Write(encryptedExtensions.marshal())
+
+	if err := checkALPN(hs.hello.alpnProtocols, encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol); err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
+		return err
+	}
+	c.clientProtocol = encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol
+
+	if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.EnforceNextProtoSelection {
+		if len(encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol) == 0 {
+			// the server didn't select an ALPN
+			c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol)
+			return errors.New("ALPN negotiation failed. Server didn't offer any protocols")
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerCertificate() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	// Either a PSK or a certificate is always used, but not both.
+	// See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.1.
+	if hs.usingPSK {
+		// Make sure the connection is still being verified whether or not this
+		// is a resumption. Resumptions currently don't reverify certificates so
+		// they don't call verifyServerCertificate. See Issue 31641.
+		if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
+			if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
+				c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsgTLS13)
+	if ok {
+		hs.transcript.Write(certReq.marshal())
+
+		hs.certReq = certReq
+
+		msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsgTLS13)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
+	}
+	if len(certMsg.certificate.Certificate) == 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
+		return errors.New("tls: received empty certificates message")
+	}
+	hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
+
+	c.scts = certMsg.certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps
+	c.ocspResponse = certMsg.certificate.OCSPStaple
+
+	if err := c.verifyServerCertificate(certMsg.certificate.Certificate); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
+	}
+
+	// See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3.
+	if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, supportedSignatureAlgorithms()) {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
+	}
+	sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm)
+	if err != nil {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+	}
+	if sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigHash == crypto.SHA1 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
+	}
+	signed := signedMessage(sigHash, serverSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
+	if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey,
+		sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
+		return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the server certificate: " + err.Error())
+	}
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(certVerify.marshal())
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerFinished() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	finished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return unexpectedMessageError(finished, msg)
+	}
+
+	expectedMAC := hs.suite.finishedHash(c.in.trafficSecret, hs.transcript)
+	if !hmac.Equal(expectedMAC, finished.verifyData) {
+		c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
+		return errors.New("tls: invalid server finished hash")
+	}
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(finished.marshal())
+
+	// Derive secrets that take context through the server Finished.
+
+	hs.trafficSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
+		clientApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
+	serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
+		serverApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
+	c.in.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, serverSecret)
+	c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret)
+
+	err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientTraffic, hs.hello.random, hs.trafficSecret)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+	err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerTraffic, hs.hello.random, serverSecret)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+
+	c.ekm = hs.suite.exportKeyingMaterial(hs.masterSecret, hs.transcript)
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientCertificate() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if hs.certReq == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	cert, err := c.getClientCertificate(toCertificateRequestInfo(&certificateRequestInfo{
+		AcceptableCAs:    hs.certReq.certificateAuthorities,
+		SignatureSchemes: hs.certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms,
+		Version:          c.vers,
+		ctx:              hs.ctx,
+	}))
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	certMsg := new(certificateMsgTLS13)
+
+	certMsg.certificate = *cert
+	certMsg.scts = hs.certReq.scts && len(cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps) > 0
+	certMsg.ocspStapling = hs.certReq.ocspStapling && len(cert.OCSPStaple) > 0
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// If we sent an empty certificate message, skip the CertificateVerify.
+	if len(cert.Certificate) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	certVerifyMsg := new(certificateVerifyMsg)
+	certVerifyMsg.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true
+
+	certVerifyMsg.signatureAlgorithm, err = selectSignatureScheme(c.vers, cert, hs.certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms)
+	if err != nil {
+		// getClientCertificate returned a certificate incompatible with the
+		// CertificateRequestInfo supported signature algorithms.
+		c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		return err
+	}
+
+	sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerifyMsg.signatureAlgorithm)
+	if err != nil {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+	}
+
+	signed := signedMessage(sigHash, clientSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
+	signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash)
+	if sigType == signatureRSAPSS {
+		signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash}
+	}
+	sig, err := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Sign(c.config.rand(), signed, signOpts)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return errors.New("tls: failed to sign handshake: " + err.Error())
+	}
+	certVerifyMsg.signature = sig
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(certVerifyMsg.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerifyMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientFinished() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	finished := &finishedMsg{
+		verifyData: hs.suite.finishedHash(c.out.trafficSecret, hs.transcript),
+	}
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(finished.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	c.out.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret)
+	c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret)
+
+	if !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled && c.config.ClientSessionCache != nil {
+		c.resumptionSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
+			resumptionLabel, hs.transcript)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c *Conn) handleNewSessionTicket(msg *newSessionTicketMsgTLS13) error {
+	if !c.isClient {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return errors.New("tls: received new session ticket from a client")
+	}
+
+	if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled || c.config.ClientSessionCache == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// See RFC 8446, Section 4.6.1.
+	if msg.lifetime == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	lifetime := time.Duration(msg.lifetime) * time.Second
+	if lifetime > maxSessionTicketLifetime {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: received a session ticket with invalid lifetime")
+	}
+
+	cipherSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(c.cipherSuite)
+	if cipherSuite == nil || c.resumptionSecret == nil {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+	}
+
+	// We need to save the max_early_data_size that the server sent us, in order
+	// to decide if we're going to try 0-RTT with this ticket.
+	// However, at the same time, the qtls.ClientSessionTicket needs to be equal to
+	// the tls.ClientSessionTicket, so we can't just add a new field to the struct.
+	// We therefore abuse the nonce field (which is a byte slice)
+	nonceWithEarlyData := make([]byte, len(msg.nonce)+4)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(nonceWithEarlyData, msg.maxEarlyData)
+	copy(nonceWithEarlyData[4:], msg.nonce)
+
+	var appData []byte
+	if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.GetAppDataForSessionState != nil {
+		appData = c.extraConfig.GetAppDataForSessionState()
+	}
+	var b cryptobyte.Builder
+	b.AddUint16(clientSessionStateVersion) // revision
+	b.AddUint32(msg.maxEarlyData)
+	b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		b.AddBytes(appData)
+	})
+	b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		b.AddBytes(msg.nonce)
+	})
+
+	// Save the resumption_master_secret and nonce instead of deriving the PSK
+	// to do the least amount of work on NewSessionTicket messages before we
+	// know if the ticket will be used. Forward secrecy of resumed connections
+	// is guaranteed by the requirement for pskModeDHE.
+	session := &clientSessionState{
+		sessionTicket:      msg.label,
+		vers:               c.vers,
+		cipherSuite:        c.cipherSuite,
+		masterSecret:       c.resumptionSecret,
+		serverCertificates: c.peerCertificates,
+		verifiedChains:     c.verifiedChains,
+		receivedAt:         c.config.time(),
+		nonce:              b.BytesOrPanic(),
+		useBy:              c.config.time().Add(lifetime),
+		ageAdd:             msg.ageAdd,
+		ocspResponse:       c.ocspResponse,
+		scts:               c.scts,
+	}
+
+	cacheKey := clientSessionCacheKey(c.conn.RemoteAddr(), c.config)
+	c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, toClientSessionState(session))
+
+	return nil
+}

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_server.go

@@ -0,0 +1,912 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package qtls
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// serverHandshakeState contains details of a server handshake in progress.
+// It's discarded once the handshake has completed.
+type serverHandshakeState struct {
+	c            *Conn
+	ctx          context.Context
+	clientHello  *clientHelloMsg
+	hello        *serverHelloMsg
+	suite        *cipherSuite
+	ecdheOk      bool
+	ecSignOk     bool
+	rsaDecryptOk bool
+	rsaSignOk    bool
+	sessionState *sessionState
+	finishedHash finishedHash
+	masterSecret []byte
+	cert         *Certificate
+}
+
+// serverHandshake performs a TLS handshake as a server.
+func (c *Conn) serverHandshake(ctx context.Context) error {
+	c.setAlternativeRecordLayer()
+
+	clientHello, err := c.readClientHello(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if c.vers == VersionTLS13 {
+		hs := serverHandshakeStateTLS13{
+			c:           c,
+			ctx:         ctx,
+			clientHello: clientHello,
+		}
+		return hs.handshake()
+	} else if c.extraConfig.usesAlternativeRecordLayer() {
+		// This should already have been caught by the check that the ClientHello doesn't
+		// offer any (supported) versions older than TLS 1.3.
+		// Check again to make sure we can't be tricked into using an older version.
+		c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
+		return errors.New("tls: negotiated TLS < 1.3 when using QUIC")
+	}
+
+	hs := serverHandshakeState{
+		c:           c,
+		ctx:         ctx,
+		clientHello: clientHello,
+	}
+	return hs.handshake()
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) handshake() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if err := hs.processClientHello(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// For an overview of TLS handshaking, see RFC 5246, Section 7.3.
+	c.buffering = true
+	if hs.checkForResumption() {
+		// The client has included a session ticket and so we do an abbreviated handshake.
+		c.didResume = true
+		if err := hs.doResumeHandshake(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := hs.sendFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false
+		if err := hs.readFinished(nil); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	} else {
+		// The client didn't include a session ticket, or it wasn't
+		// valid so we do a full handshake.
+		if err := hs.pickCipherSuite(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := hs.readFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true
+		c.buffering = true
+		if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := hs.sendFinished(nil); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
+	c.isHandshakeComplete.Store(true)
+
+	c.updateConnectionState()
+	return nil
+}
+
+// readClientHello reads a ClientHello message and selects the protocol version.
+func (c *Conn) readClientHello(ctx context.Context) (*clientHelloMsg, error) {
+	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	clientHello, ok := msg.(*clientHelloMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return nil, unexpectedMessageError(clientHello, msg)
+	}
+
+	var configForClient *config
+	originalConfig := c.config
+	if c.config.GetConfigForClient != nil {
+		chi := newClientHelloInfo(ctx, c, clientHello)
+		if cfc, err := c.config.GetConfigForClient(chi); err != nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+			return nil, err
+		} else if cfc != nil {
+			configForClient = fromConfig(cfc)
+			c.config = configForClient
+		}
+	}
+	c.ticketKeys = originalConfig.ticketKeys(configForClient)
+
+	clientVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions
+	if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 {
+		clientVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers)
+	}
+	if c.extraConfig.usesAlternativeRecordLayer() {
+		// In QUIC, the client MUST NOT offer any old TLS versions.
+		// Here, we can only check that none of the other supported versions of this library
+		// (TLS 1.0 - TLS 1.2) is offered. We don't check for any SSL versions here.
+		for _, ver := range clientVersions {
+			if ver == VersionTLS13 {
+				continue
+			}
+			for _, v := range supportedVersions {
+				if ver == v {
+					c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
+					return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered old TLS version %#x", ver)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		// Make the config we're using allows us to use TLS 1.3.
+		if c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer) < VersionTLS13 {
+			c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+			return nil, errors.New("tls: MaxVersion prevents QUIC from using TLS 1.3")
+		}
+	}
+	c.vers, ok = c.config.mutualVersion(roleServer, clientVersions)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered only unsupported versions: %x", clientVersions)
+	}
+	c.haveVers = true
+	c.in.version = c.vers
+	c.out.version = c.vers
+
+	return clientHello, nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) processClientHello() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg)
+	hs.hello.vers = c.vers
+
+	foundCompression := false
+	// We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it.
+	for _, compression := range hs.clientHello.compressionMethods {
+		if compression == compressionNone {
+			foundCompression = true
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	if !foundCompression {
+		c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		return errors.New("tls: client does not support uncompressed connections")
+	}
+
+	hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32)
+	serverRandom := hs.hello.random
+	// Downgrade protection canaries. See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.3.
+	maxVers := c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer)
+	if maxVers >= VersionTLS12 && c.vers < maxVers || testingOnlyForceDowngradeCanary {
+		if c.vers == VersionTLS12 {
+			copy(serverRandom[24:], downgradeCanaryTLS12)
+		} else {
+			copy(serverRandom[24:], downgradeCanaryTLS11)
+		}
+		serverRandom = serverRandom[:24]
+	}
+	_, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), serverRandom)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		return errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension")
+	}
+
+	hs.hello.secureRenegotiationSupported = hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiationSupported
+	hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone
+	if len(hs.clientHello.serverName) > 0 {
+		c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName
+	}
+
+	selectedProto, err := negotiateALPN(c.config.NextProtos, hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol)
+		return err
+	}
+	hs.hello.alpnProtocol = selectedProto
+	c.clientProtocol = selectedProto
+
+	hs.cert, err = c.config.getCertificate(newClientHelloInfo(hs.ctx, c, hs.clientHello))
+	if err != nil {
+		if err == errNoCertificates {
+			c.sendAlert(alertUnrecognizedName)
+		} else {
+			c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		}
+		return err
+	}
+	if hs.clientHello.scts {
+		hs.hello.scts = hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps
+	}
+
+	hs.ecdheOk = supportsECDHE(c.config, hs.clientHello.supportedCurves, hs.clientHello.supportedPoints)
+
+	if hs.ecdheOk && len(hs.clientHello.supportedPoints) > 0 {
+		// Although omitting the ec_point_formats extension is permitted, some
+		// old OpenSSL version will refuse to handshake if not present.
+		//
+		// Per RFC 4492, section 5.1.2, implementations MUST support the
+		// uncompressed point format. See golang.org/issue/31943.
+		hs.hello.supportedPoints = []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed}
+	}
+
+	if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer); ok {
+		switch priv.Public().(type) {
+		case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
+			hs.ecSignOk = true
+		case ed25519.PublicKey:
+			hs.ecSignOk = true
+		case *rsa.PublicKey:
+			hs.rsaSignOk = true
+		default:
+			c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+			return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported signing key type (%T)", priv.Public())
+		}
+	}
+	if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter); ok {
+		switch priv.Public().(type) {
+		case *rsa.PublicKey:
+			hs.rsaDecryptOk = true
+		default:
+			c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+			return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported decryption key type (%T)", priv.Public())
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// negotiateALPN picks a shared ALPN protocol that both sides support in server
+// preference order. If ALPN is not configured or the peer doesn't support it,
+// it returns "" and no error.
+func negotiateALPN(serverProtos, clientProtos []string) (string, error) {
+	if len(serverProtos) == 0 || len(clientProtos) == 0 {
+		return "", nil
+	}
+	var http11fallback bool
+	for _, s := range serverProtos {
+		for _, c := range clientProtos {
+			if s == c {
+				return s, nil
+			}
+			if s == "h2" && c == "http/1.1" {
+				http11fallback = true
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	// As a special case, let http/1.1 clients connect to h2 servers as if they
+	// didn't support ALPN. We used not to enforce protocol overlap, so over
+	// time a number of HTTP servers were configured with only "h2", but
+	// expected to accept connections from "http/1.1" clients. See Issue 46310.
+	if http11fallback {
+		return "", nil
+	}
+	return "", fmt.Errorf("tls: client requested unsupported application protocols (%s)", clientProtos)
+}
+
+// supportsECDHE returns whether ECDHE key exchanges can be used with this
+// pre-TLS 1.3 client.
+func supportsECDHE(c *config, supportedCurves []CurveID, supportedPoints []uint8) bool {
+	supportsCurve := false
+	for _, curve := range supportedCurves {
+		if c.supportsCurve(curve) {
+			supportsCurve = true
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	supportsPointFormat := false
+	for _, pointFormat := range supportedPoints {
+		if pointFormat == pointFormatUncompressed {
+			supportsPointFormat = true
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	// Per RFC 8422, Section 5.1.2, if the Supported Point Formats extension is
+	// missing, uncompressed points are supported. If supportedPoints is empty,
+	// the extension must be missing, as an empty extension body is rejected by
+	// the parser. See https://go.dev/issue/49126.
+	if len(supportedPoints) == 0 {
+		supportsPointFormat = true
+	}
+
+	return supportsCurve && supportsPointFormat
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) pickCipherSuite() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	preferenceOrder := cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder
+	if !hasAESGCMHardwareSupport || !aesgcmPreferred(hs.clientHello.cipherSuites) {
+		preferenceOrder = cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES
+	}
+
+	configCipherSuites := c.config.cipherSuites()
+	preferenceList := make([]uint16, 0, len(configCipherSuites))
+	for _, suiteID := range preferenceOrder {
+		for _, id := range configCipherSuites {
+			if id == suiteID {
+				preferenceList = append(preferenceList, id)
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	hs.suite = selectCipherSuite(preferenceList, hs.clientHello.cipherSuites, hs.cipherSuiteOk)
+	if hs.suite == nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		return errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server")
+	}
+	c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
+
+	for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
+		if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV {
+			// The client is doing a fallback connection. See RFC 7507.
+			if hs.clientHello.vers < c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer) {
+				c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback)
+				return errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback")
+			}
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) cipherSuiteOk(c *cipherSuite) bool {
+	if c.flags&suiteECDHE != 0 {
+		if !hs.ecdheOk {
+			return false
+		}
+		if c.flags&suiteECSign != 0 {
+			if !hs.ecSignOk {
+				return false
+			}
+		} else if !hs.rsaSignOk {
+			return false
+		}
+	} else if !hs.rsaDecryptOk {
+		return false
+	}
+	if hs.c.vers < VersionTLS12 && c.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// checkForResumption reports whether we should perform resumption on this connection.
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkForResumption() bool {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	plaintext, usedOldKey := c.decryptTicket(hs.clientHello.sessionTicket)
+	if plaintext == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	hs.sessionState = &sessionState{usedOldKey: usedOldKey}
+	ok := hs.sessionState.unmarshal(plaintext)
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	createdAt := time.Unix(int64(hs.sessionState.createdAt), 0)
+	if c.config.time().Sub(createdAt) > maxSessionTicketLifetime {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	// Never resume a session for a different TLS version.
+	if c.vers != hs.sessionState.vers {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	cipherSuiteOk := false
+	// Check that the client is still offering the ciphersuite in the session.
+	for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
+		if id == hs.sessionState.cipherSuite {
+			cipherSuiteOk = true
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if !cipherSuiteOk {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	// Check that we also support the ciphersuite from the session.
+	hs.suite = selectCipherSuite([]uint16{hs.sessionState.cipherSuite},
+		c.config.cipherSuites(), hs.cipherSuiteOk)
+	if hs.suite == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	sessionHasClientCerts := len(hs.sessionState.certificates) != 0
+	needClientCerts := requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth)
+	if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts {
+		return false
+	}
+	if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	return true
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doResumeHandshake() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
+	c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
+	// We echo the client's session ID in the ServerHello to let it know
+	// that we're doing a resumption.
+	hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId
+	hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.sessionState.usedOldKey
+	hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite)
+	hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
+	hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
+	hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{
+		Certificate: hs.sessionState.certificates,
+	}); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
+		if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	hs.masterSecret = hs.sessionState.masterSecret
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0 {
+		hs.hello.ocspStapling = true
+	}
+
+	hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.clientHello.ticketSupported && !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled
+	hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
+
+	hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(hs.c.vers, hs.suite)
+	if c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
+		// No need to keep a full record of the handshake if client
+		// certificates won't be used.
+		hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
+	}
+	hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
+	hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	certMsg := new(certificateMsg)
+	certMsg.certificates = hs.cert.Certificate
+	hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if hs.hello.ocspStapling {
+		certStatus := new(certificateStatusMsg)
+		certStatus.response = hs.cert.OCSPStaple
+		hs.finishedHash.Write(certStatus.marshal())
+		if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certStatus.marshal()); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers)
+	skx, err := keyAgreement.generateServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, hs.clientHello, hs.hello)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		return err
+	}
+	if skx != nil {
+		hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
+		if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, skx.marshal()); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	var certReq *certificateRequestMsg
+	if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
+		// Request a client certificate
+		certReq = new(certificateRequestMsg)
+		certReq.certificateTypes = []byte{
+			byte(certTypeRSASign),
+			byte(certTypeECDSASign),
+		}
+		if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
+			certReq.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true
+			certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms()
+		}
+
+		// An empty list of certificateAuthorities signals to
+		// the client that it may send any certificate in response
+		// to our request. When we know the CAs we trust, then
+		// we can send them down, so that the client can choose
+		// an appropriate certificate to give to us.
+		if c.config.ClientCAs != nil {
+			certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects()
+		}
+		hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
+		if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal()); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg)
+	hs.finishedHash.Write(helloDone.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloDone.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	var pub crypto.PublicKey // public key for client auth, if any
+
+	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a
+	// certificate message, even if it's empty.
+	if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
+		certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg)
+		if !ok {
+			c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+			return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
+		}
+		hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
+
+		if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{
+			Certificate: certMsg.certificates,
+		}); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if len(certMsg.certificates) != 0 {
+			pub = c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey
+		}
+
+		msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
+		if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Get client key exchange
+	ckx, ok := msg.(*clientKeyExchangeMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return unexpectedMessageError(ckx, msg)
+	}
+	hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
+
+	preMasterSecret, err := keyAgreement.processClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, ckx, c.vers)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		return err
+	}
+	hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
+	if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelTLS12, hs.clientHello.random, hs.masterSecret); err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// If we received a client cert in response to our certificate request message,
+	// the client will send us a certificateVerifyMsg immediately after the
+	// clientKeyExchangeMsg. This message is a digest of all preceding
+	// handshake-layer messages that is signed using the private key corresponding
+	// to the client's certificate. This allows us to verify that the client is in
+	// possession of the private key of the certificate.
+	if len(c.peerCertificates) > 0 {
+		msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
+		if !ok {
+			c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+			return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
+		}
+
+		var sigType uint8
+		var sigHash crypto.Hash
+		if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
+			if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
+				c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+				return errors.New("tls: client certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
+			}
+			sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm)
+			if err != nil {
+				return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+			}
+		} else {
+			sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(pub)
+			if err != nil {
+				c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+
+		signed := hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(sigType, sigHash)
+		if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, pub, sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
+			return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the client certificate: " + err.Error())
+		}
+
+		hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
+	}
+
+	hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) establishKeys() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
+		keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen)
+
+	var clientCipher, serverCipher any
+	var clientHash, serverHash hash.Hash
+
+	if hs.suite.aead == nil {
+		clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, true /* for reading */)
+		clientHash = hs.suite.mac(clientMAC)
+		serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, false /* not for reading */)
+		serverHash = hs.suite.mac(serverMAC)
+	} else {
+		clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV)
+		serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV)
+	}
+
+	c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash)
+	c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash)
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if err := c.readChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	clientFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return unexpectedMessageError(clientFinished, msg)
+	}
+
+	verify := hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret)
+	if len(verify) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) ||
+		subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		return errors.New("tls: client's Finished message is incorrect")
+	}
+
+	hs.finishedHash.Write(clientFinished.marshal())
+	copy(out, verify)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendSessionTicket() error {
+	// ticketSupported is set in a resumption handshake if the
+	// ticket from the client was encrypted with an old session
+	// ticket key and thus a refreshed ticket should be sent.
+	if !hs.hello.ticketSupported {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	c := hs.c
+	m := new(newSessionTicketMsg)
+
+	createdAt := uint64(c.config.time().Unix())
+	if hs.sessionState != nil {
+		// If this is re-wrapping an old key, then keep
+		// the original time it was created.
+		createdAt = hs.sessionState.createdAt
+	}
+
+	var certsFromClient [][]byte
+	for _, cert := range c.peerCertificates {
+		certsFromClient = append(certsFromClient, cert.Raw)
+	}
+	state := sessionState{
+		vers:         c.vers,
+		cipherSuite:  hs.suite.id,
+		createdAt:    createdAt,
+		masterSecret: hs.masterSecret,
+		certificates: certsFromClient,
+	}
+	var err error
+	m.ticket, err = c.encryptTicket(state.marshal())
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	hs.finishedHash.Write(m.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	finished := new(finishedMsg)
+	finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret)
+	hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	copy(out, finished.verifyData)
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// processCertsFromClient takes a chain of client certificates either from a
+// Certificates message or from a sessionState and verifies them. It returns
+// the public key of the leaf certificate.
+func (c *Conn) processCertsFromClient(certificate Certificate) error {
+	certificates := certificate.Certificate
+	certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certificates))
+	var err error
+	for i, asn1Data := range certificates {
+		if certs[i], err = x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data); err != nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+			return errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate: " + err.Error())
+		}
+	}
+
+	if len(certs) == 0 && requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth) {
+		c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+		return errors.New("tls: client didn't provide a certificate")
+	}
+
+	if c.config.ClientAuth >= VerifyClientCertIfGiven && len(certs) > 0 {
+		opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
+			Roots:         c.config.ClientCAs,
+			CurrentTime:   c.config.time(),
+			Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
+			KeyUsages:     []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth},
+		}
+
+		for _, cert := range certs[1:] {
+			opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
+		}
+
+		chains, err := certs[0].Verify(opts)
+		if err != nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+			return &CertificateVerificationError{UnverifiedCertificates: certs, Err: err}
+		}
+
+		c.verifiedChains = chains
+	}
+
+	c.peerCertificates = certs
+	c.ocspResponse = certificate.OCSPStaple
+	c.scts = certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps
+
+	if len(certs) > 0 {
+		switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) {
+		case *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey, ed25519.PublicKey:
+		default:
+			c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
+			return fmt.Errorf("tls: client certificate contains an unsupported public key of type %T", certs[0].PublicKey)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil {
+		if err := c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate(certificates, c.verifiedChains); err != nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func newClientHelloInfo(ctx context.Context, c *Conn, clientHello *clientHelloMsg) *ClientHelloInfo {
+	supportedVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions
+	if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 {
+		supportedVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers)
+	}
+
+	return toClientHelloInfo(&clientHelloInfo{
+		CipherSuites:      clientHello.cipherSuites,
+		ServerName:        clientHello.serverName,
+		SupportedCurves:   clientHello.supportedCurves,
+		SupportedPoints:   clientHello.supportedPoints,
+		SignatureSchemes:  clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms,
+		SupportedProtos:   clientHello.alpnProtocols,
+		SupportedVersions: supportedVersions,
+		Conn:              c.conn,
+		config:            toConfig(c.config),
+		ctx:               ctx,
+	})
+}

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_server_tls13.go

@@ -0,0 +1,906 @@
+// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package qtls
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"errors"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// maxClientPSKIdentities is the number of client PSK identities the server will
+// attempt to validate. It will ignore the rest not to let cheap ClientHello
+// messages cause too much work in session ticket decryption attempts.
+const maxClientPSKIdentities = 5
+
+type serverHandshakeStateTLS13 struct {
+	c                   *Conn
+	ctx                 context.Context
+	clientHello         *clientHelloMsg
+	hello               *serverHelloMsg
+	alpnNegotiationErr  error
+	encryptedExtensions *encryptedExtensionsMsg
+	sentDummyCCS        bool
+	usingPSK            bool
+	suite               *cipherSuiteTLS13
+	cert                *Certificate
+	sigAlg              SignatureScheme
+	earlySecret         []byte
+	sharedKey           []byte
+	handshakeSecret     []byte
+	masterSecret        []byte
+	trafficSecret       []byte // client_application_traffic_secret_0
+	transcript          hash.Hash
+	clientFinished      []byte
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if needFIPS() {
+		return errors.New("tls: internal error: TLS 1.3 reached in FIPS mode")
+	}
+
+	// For an overview of the TLS 1.3 handshake, see RFC 8446, Section 2.
+	if err := hs.processClientHello(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := hs.checkForResumption(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	c.updateConnectionState()
+	if err := hs.pickCertificate(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	c.buffering = true
+	if err := hs.sendServerParameters(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := hs.sendServerCertificate(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := hs.sendServerFinished(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	// Note that at this point we could start sending application data without
+	// waiting for the client's second flight, but the application might not
+	// expect the lack of replay protection of the ClientHello parameters.
+	if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := hs.readClientCertificate(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	c.updateConnectionState()
+	if err := hs.readClientFinished(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	c.isHandshakeComplete.Store(true)
+	c.updateConnectionState()
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) processClientHello() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg)
+	hs.encryptedExtensions = new(encryptedExtensionsMsg)
+
+	// TLS 1.3 froze the ServerHello.legacy_version field, and uses
+	// supported_versions instead. See RFC 8446, sections 4.1.3 and 4.2.1.
+	hs.hello.vers = VersionTLS12
+	hs.hello.supportedVersion = c.vers
+
+	if len(hs.clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: client used the legacy version field to negotiate TLS 1.3")
+	}
+
+	// Abort if the client is doing a fallback and landing lower than what we
+	// support. See RFC 7507, which however does not specify the interaction
+	// with supported_versions. The only difference is that with
+	// supported_versions a client has a chance to attempt a [TLS 1.2, TLS 1.4]
+	// handshake in case TLS 1.3 is broken but 1.2 is not. Alas, in that case,
+	// it will have to drop the TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV protection if it falls back to
+	// TLS 1.2, because a TLS 1.3 server would abort here. The situation before
+	// supported_versions was not better because there was just no way to do a
+	// TLS 1.4 handshake without risking the server selecting TLS 1.3.
+	for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
+		if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV {
+			// Use c.vers instead of max(supported_versions) because an attacker
+			// could defeat this by adding an arbitrary high version otherwise.
+			if c.vers < c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer) {
+				c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback)
+				return errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback")
+			}
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	if len(hs.clientHello.compressionMethods) != 1 ||
+		hs.clientHello.compressionMethods[0] != compressionNone {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: TLS 1.3 client supports illegal compression methods")
+	}
+
+	hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32)
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hs.hello.random); err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		return errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension")
+	}
+
+	hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId
+	hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone
+
+	if hs.suite == nil {
+		var preferenceList []uint16
+		for _, suiteID := range c.config.CipherSuites {
+			for _, suite := range cipherSuitesTLS13 {
+				if suite.id == suiteID {
+					preferenceList = append(preferenceList, suiteID)
+					break
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		if len(preferenceList) == 0 {
+			preferenceList = defaultCipherSuitesTLS13
+			if !hasAESGCMHardwareSupport || !aesgcmPreferred(hs.clientHello.cipherSuites) {
+				preferenceList = defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES
+			}
+		}
+		for _, suiteID := range preferenceList {
+			hs.suite = mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(hs.clientHello.cipherSuites, suiteID)
+			if hs.suite != nil {
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if hs.suite == nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		return errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server")
+	}
+	c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
+	hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
+	hs.transcript = hs.suite.hash.New()
+
+	// Pick the ECDHE group in server preference order, but give priority to
+	// groups with a key share, to avoid a HelloRetryRequest round-trip.
+	var selectedGroup CurveID
+	var clientKeyShare *keyShare
+GroupSelection:
+	for _, preferredGroup := range c.config.curvePreferences() {
+		for _, ks := range hs.clientHello.keyShares {
+			if ks.group == preferredGroup {
+				selectedGroup = ks.group
+				clientKeyShare = &ks
+				break GroupSelection
+			}
+		}
+		if selectedGroup != 0 {
+			continue
+		}
+		for _, group := range hs.clientHello.supportedCurves {
+			if group == preferredGroup {
+				selectedGroup = group
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if selectedGroup == 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		return errors.New("tls: no ECDHE curve supported by both client and server")
+	}
+	if clientKeyShare == nil {
+		if err := hs.doHelloRetryRequest(selectedGroup); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		clientKeyShare = &hs.clientHello.keyShares[0]
+	}
+
+	if _, ok := curveForCurveID(selectedGroup); !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve")
+	}
+	key, err := generateECDHEKey(c.config.rand(), selectedGroup)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+	hs.hello.serverShare = keyShare{group: selectedGroup, data: key.PublicKey().Bytes()}
+	peerKey, err := key.Curve().NewPublicKey(clientKeyShare.data)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: invalid client key share")
+	}
+	hs.sharedKey, err = key.ECDH(peerKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: invalid client key share")
+	}
+
+	c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName
+
+	if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions != nil {
+		c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions(typeClientHello, hs.clientHello.additionalExtensions)
+	}
+
+	selectedProto, err := negotiateALPN(c.config.NextProtos, hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols)
+	if err != nil {
+		hs.alpnNegotiationErr = err
+	}
+	hs.encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol = selectedProto
+	c.clientProtocol = selectedProto
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) checkForResumption() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	modeOK := false
+	for _, mode := range hs.clientHello.pskModes {
+		if mode == pskModeDHE {
+			modeOK = true
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if !modeOK {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	if len(hs.clientHello.pskIdentities) != len(hs.clientHello.pskBinders) {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: invalid or missing PSK binders")
+	}
+	if len(hs.clientHello.pskIdentities) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	for i, identity := range hs.clientHello.pskIdentities {
+		if i >= maxClientPSKIdentities {
+			break
+		}
+
+		plaintext, _ := c.decryptTicket(identity.label)
+		if plaintext == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		sessionState := new(sessionStateTLS13)
+		if ok := sessionState.unmarshal(plaintext); !ok {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		if hs.clientHello.earlyData {
+			if sessionState.maxEarlyData == 0 {
+				c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
+				return errors.New("tls: client sent unexpected early data")
+			}
+
+			if hs.alpnNegotiationErr == nil && sessionState.alpn == c.clientProtocol &&
+				c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.MaxEarlyData > 0 &&
+				c.extraConfig.Accept0RTT != nil && c.extraConfig.Accept0RTT(sessionState.appData) {
+				hs.encryptedExtensions.earlyData = true
+				c.used0RTT = true
+			}
+		}
+
+		createdAt := time.Unix(int64(sessionState.createdAt), 0)
+		if c.config.time().Sub(createdAt) > maxSessionTicketLifetime {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		// We don't check the obfuscated ticket age because it's affected by
+		// clock skew and it's only a freshness signal useful for shrinking the
+		// window for replay attacks, which don't affect us as we don't do 0-RTT.
+
+		pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(sessionState.cipherSuite)
+		if pskSuite == nil || pskSuite.hash != hs.suite.hash {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		// PSK connections don't re-establish client certificates, but carry
+		// them over in the session ticket. Ensure the presence of client certs
+		// in the ticket is consistent with the configured requirements.
+		sessionHasClientCerts := len(sessionState.certificate.Certificate) != 0
+		needClientCerts := requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth)
+		if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts {
+			continue
+		}
+		if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		psk := hs.suite.expandLabel(sessionState.resumptionSecret, "resumption",
+			nil, hs.suite.hash.Size())
+		hs.earlySecret = hs.suite.extract(psk, nil)
+		binderKey := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.earlySecret, resumptionBinderLabel, nil)
+		// Clone the transcript in case a HelloRetryRequest was recorded.
+		transcript := cloneHash(hs.transcript, hs.suite.hash)
+		if transcript == nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+			return errors.New("tls: internal error: failed to clone hash")
+		}
+		transcript.Write(hs.clientHello.marshalWithoutBinders())
+		pskBinder := hs.suite.finishedHash(binderKey, transcript)
+		if !hmac.Equal(hs.clientHello.pskBinders[i], pskBinder) {
+			c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
+			return errors.New("tls: invalid PSK binder")
+		}
+
+		c.didResume = true
+		if err := c.processCertsFromClient(sessionState.certificate); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+
+		h := cloneHash(hs.transcript, hs.suite.hash)
+		h.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
+		if hs.encryptedExtensions.earlyData {
+			clientEarlySecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.earlySecret, "c e traffic", h)
+			c.in.exportKey(Encryption0RTT, hs.suite, clientEarlySecret)
+			if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelEarlyTraffic, hs.clientHello.random, clientEarlySecret); err != nil {
+				c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+
+		hs.hello.selectedIdentityPresent = true
+		hs.hello.selectedIdentity = uint16(i)
+		hs.usingPSK = true
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// cloneHash uses the encoding.BinaryMarshaler and encoding.BinaryUnmarshaler
+// interfaces implemented by standard library hashes to clone the state of in
+// to a new instance of h. It returns nil if the operation fails.
+func cloneHash(in hash.Hash, h crypto.Hash) hash.Hash {
+	// Recreate the interface to avoid importing encoding.
+	type binaryMarshaler interface {
+		MarshalBinary() (data []byte, err error)
+		UnmarshalBinary(data []byte) error
+	}
+	marshaler, ok := in.(binaryMarshaler)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil
+	}
+	state, err := marshaler.MarshalBinary()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	out := h.New()
+	unmarshaler, ok := out.(binaryMarshaler)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if err := unmarshaler.UnmarshalBinary(state); err != nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) pickCertificate() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	// Only one of PSK and certificates are used at a time.
+	if hs.usingPSK {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// signature_algorithms is required in TLS 1.3. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.3.
+	if len(hs.clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) == 0 {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertMissingExtension)
+	}
+
+	certificate, err := c.config.getCertificate(newClientHelloInfo(hs.ctx, c, hs.clientHello))
+	if err != nil {
+		if err == errNoCertificates {
+			c.sendAlert(alertUnrecognizedName)
+		} else {
+			c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		}
+		return err
+	}
+	hs.sigAlg, err = selectSignatureScheme(c.vers, certificate, hs.clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms)
+	if err != nil {
+		// getCertificate returned a certificate that is unsupported or
+		// incompatible with the client's signature algorithms.
+		c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		return err
+	}
+	hs.cert = certificate
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// sendDummyChangeCipherSpec sends a ChangeCipherSpec record for compatibility
+// with middleboxes that didn't implement TLS correctly. See RFC 8446, Appendix D.4.
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendDummyChangeCipherSpec() error {
+	if hs.sentDummyCCS {
+		return nil
+	}
+	hs.sentDummyCCS = true
+
+	_, err := hs.c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
+	return err
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) doHelloRetryRequest(selectedGroup CurveID) error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	// The first ClientHello gets double-hashed into the transcript upon a
+	// HelloRetryRequest. See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.1.
+	hs.transcript.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
+	chHash := hs.transcript.Sum(nil)
+	hs.transcript.Reset()
+	hs.transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
+	hs.transcript.Write(chHash)
+
+	helloRetryRequest := &serverHelloMsg{
+		vers:              hs.hello.vers,
+		random:            helloRetryRequestRandom,
+		sessionId:         hs.hello.sessionId,
+		cipherSuite:       hs.hello.cipherSuite,
+		compressionMethod: hs.hello.compressionMethod,
+		supportedVersion:  hs.hello.supportedVersion,
+		selectedGroup:     selectedGroup,
+	}
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(helloRetryRequest.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloRetryRequest.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	clientHello, ok := msg.(*clientHelloMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return unexpectedMessageError(clientHello, msg)
+	}
+
+	if len(clientHello.keyShares) != 1 || clientHello.keyShares[0].group != selectedGroup {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: client sent invalid key share in second ClientHello")
+	}
+
+	if clientHello.earlyData {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: client indicated early data in second ClientHello")
+	}
+
+	if illegalClientHelloChange(clientHello, hs.clientHello) {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: client illegally modified second ClientHello")
+	}
+
+	if clientHello.earlyData {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: client offered 0-RTT data in second ClientHello")
+	}
+
+	hs.clientHello = clientHello
+	return nil
+}
+
+// illegalClientHelloChange reports whether the two ClientHello messages are
+// different, with the exception of the changes allowed before and after a
+// HelloRetryRequest. See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.2.
+func illegalClientHelloChange(ch, ch1 *clientHelloMsg) bool {
+	if len(ch.supportedVersions) != len(ch1.supportedVersions) ||
+		len(ch.cipherSuites) != len(ch1.cipherSuites) ||
+		len(ch.supportedCurves) != len(ch1.supportedCurves) ||
+		len(ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) != len(ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) ||
+		len(ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert) != len(ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert) ||
+		len(ch.alpnProtocols) != len(ch1.alpnProtocols) {
+		return true
+	}
+	for i := range ch.supportedVersions {
+		if ch.supportedVersions[i] != ch1.supportedVersions[i] {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	for i := range ch.cipherSuites {
+		if ch.cipherSuites[i] != ch1.cipherSuites[i] {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	for i := range ch.supportedCurves {
+		if ch.supportedCurves[i] != ch1.supportedCurves[i] {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	for i := range ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithms {
+		if ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithms[i] != ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithms[i] {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	for i := range ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert {
+		if ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert[i] != ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert[i] {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	for i := range ch.alpnProtocols {
+		if ch.alpnProtocols[i] != ch1.alpnProtocols[i] {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return ch.vers != ch1.vers ||
+		!bytes.Equal(ch.random, ch1.random) ||
+		!bytes.Equal(ch.sessionId, ch1.sessionId) ||
+		!bytes.Equal(ch.compressionMethods, ch1.compressionMethods) ||
+		ch.serverName != ch1.serverName ||
+		ch.ocspStapling != ch1.ocspStapling ||
+		!bytes.Equal(ch.supportedPoints, ch1.supportedPoints) ||
+		ch.ticketSupported != ch1.ticketSupported ||
+		!bytes.Equal(ch.sessionTicket, ch1.sessionTicket) ||
+		ch.secureRenegotiationSupported != ch1.secureRenegotiationSupported ||
+		!bytes.Equal(ch.secureRenegotiation, ch1.secureRenegotiation) ||
+		ch.scts != ch1.scts ||
+		!bytes.Equal(ch.cookie, ch1.cookie) ||
+		!bytes.Equal(ch.pskModes, ch1.pskModes)
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerParameters() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
+	hs.transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	earlySecret := hs.earlySecret
+	if earlySecret == nil {
+		earlySecret = hs.suite.extract(nil, nil)
+	}
+	hs.handshakeSecret = hs.suite.extract(hs.sharedKey,
+		hs.suite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, "derived", nil))
+
+	clientSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.handshakeSecret,
+		clientHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
+	c.in.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, clientSecret)
+	c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, clientSecret)
+	serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.handshakeSecret,
+		serverHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
+	c.out.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, serverSecret)
+	c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret)
+
+	err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientHandshake, hs.clientHello.random, clientSecret)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+	err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerHandshake, hs.clientHello.random, serverSecret)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if hs.alpnNegotiationErr != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol)
+		return hs.alpnNegotiationErr
+	}
+	if hs.c.extraConfig != nil && hs.c.extraConfig.GetExtensions != nil {
+		hs.encryptedExtensions.additionalExtensions = hs.c.extraConfig.GetExtensions(typeEncryptedExtensions)
+	}
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(hs.encryptedExtensions.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.encryptedExtensions.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) requestClientCert() bool {
+	return hs.c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert && !hs.usingPSK
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerCertificate() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	// Only one of PSK and certificates are used at a time.
+	if hs.usingPSK {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	if hs.requestClientCert() {
+		// Request a client certificate
+		certReq := new(certificateRequestMsgTLS13)
+		certReq.ocspStapling = true
+		certReq.scts = true
+		certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms()
+		if c.config.ClientCAs != nil {
+			certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects()
+		}
+
+		hs.transcript.Write(certReq.marshal())
+		if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal()); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	certMsg := new(certificateMsgTLS13)
+
+	certMsg.certificate = *hs.cert
+	certMsg.scts = hs.clientHello.scts && len(hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps) > 0
+	certMsg.ocspStapling = hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	certVerifyMsg := new(certificateVerifyMsg)
+	certVerifyMsg.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true
+	certVerifyMsg.signatureAlgorithm = hs.sigAlg
+
+	sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(hs.sigAlg)
+	if err != nil {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+	}
+
+	signed := signedMessage(sigHash, serverSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
+	signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash)
+	if sigType == signatureRSAPSS {
+		signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash}
+	}
+	sig, err := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Sign(c.config.rand(), signed, signOpts)
+	if err != nil {
+		public := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Public()
+		if rsaKey, ok := public.(*rsa.PublicKey); ok && sigType == signatureRSAPSS &&
+			rsaKey.N.BitLen()/8 < sigHash.Size()*2+2 { // key too small for RSA-PSS
+			c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+		} else {
+			c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		}
+		return errors.New("tls: failed to sign handshake: " + err.Error())
+	}
+	certVerifyMsg.signature = sig
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(certVerifyMsg.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerifyMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerFinished() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	finished := &finishedMsg{
+		verifyData: hs.suite.finishedHash(c.out.trafficSecret, hs.transcript),
+	}
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(finished.marshal())
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Derive secrets that take context through the server Finished.
+
+	hs.masterSecret = hs.suite.extract(nil,
+		hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.handshakeSecret, "derived", nil))
+
+	hs.trafficSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
+		clientApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
+	serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
+		serverApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript)
+	c.out.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, serverSecret)
+	c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret)
+
+	err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientTraffic, hs.clientHello.random, hs.trafficSecret)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+	err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerTraffic, hs.clientHello.random, serverSecret)
+	if err != nil {
+		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		return err
+	}
+
+	c.ekm = hs.suite.exportKeyingMaterial(hs.masterSecret, hs.transcript)
+
+	// If we did not request client certificates, at this point we can
+	// precompute the client finished and roll the transcript forward to send
+	// session tickets in our first flight.
+	if !hs.requestClientCert() {
+		if err := hs.sendSessionTickets(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) shouldSendSessionTickets() bool {
+	if hs.c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	// Don't send tickets the client wouldn't use. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.9.
+	for _, pskMode := range hs.clientHello.pskModes {
+		if pskMode == pskModeDHE {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendSessionTickets() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	hs.clientFinished = hs.suite.finishedHash(c.in.trafficSecret, hs.transcript)
+	finishedMsg := &finishedMsg{
+		verifyData: hs.clientFinished,
+	}
+	hs.transcript.Write(finishedMsg.marshal())
+
+	if !hs.shouldSendSessionTickets() {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	c.resumptionSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
+		resumptionLabel, hs.transcript)
+
+	// Don't send session tickets when the alternative record layer is set.
+	// Instead, save the resumption secret on the Conn.
+	// Session tickets can then be generated by calling Conn.GetSessionTicket().
+	if hs.c.extraConfig != nil && hs.c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	m, err := hs.c.getSessionTicketMsg(nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientCertificate() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	if !hs.requestClientCert() {
+		// Make sure the connection is still being verified whether or not
+		// the server requested a client certificate.
+		if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
+			if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
+				c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a
+	// certificate message. If it's empty, no CertificateVerify is sent.
+
+	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsgTLS13)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
+	}
+	hs.transcript.Write(certMsg.marshal())
+
+	if err := c.processCertsFromClient(certMsg.certificate); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil {
+		if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	if len(certMsg.certificate.Certificate) != 0 {
+		msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+
+		certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
+		if !ok {
+			c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+			return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
+		}
+
+		// See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3.
+		if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, supportedSignatureAlgorithms()) {
+			c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+			return errors.New("tls: client certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
+		}
+		sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm)
+		if err != nil {
+			return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		}
+		if sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigHash == crypto.SHA1 {
+			c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+			return errors.New("tls: client certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
+		}
+		signed := signedMessage(sigHash, clientSignatureContext, hs.transcript)
+		if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey,
+			sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil {
+			c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
+			return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the client certificate: " + err.Error())
+		}
+
+		hs.transcript.Write(certVerify.marshal())
+	}
+
+	// If we waited until the client certificates to send session tickets, we
+	// are ready to do it now.
+	if err := hs.sendSessionTickets(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientFinished() error {
+	c := hs.c
+
+	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	finished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
+	if !ok {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return unexpectedMessageError(finished, msg)
+	}
+
+	if !hmac.Equal(hs.clientFinished, finished.verifyData) {
+		c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
+		return errors.New("tls: invalid client finished hash")
+	}
+
+	c.in.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret)
+	c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret)
+
+	return nil
+}

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/key_agreement.go

@@ -0,0 +1,366 @@
+// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package qtls
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/ecdh"
+	"crypto/md5"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/sha1"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+)
+
+// a keyAgreement implements the client and server side of a TLS key agreement
+// protocol by generating and processing key exchange messages.
+type keyAgreement interface {
+	// On the server side, the first two methods are called in order.
+
+	// In the case that the key agreement protocol doesn't use a
+	// ServerKeyExchange message, generateServerKeyExchange can return nil,
+	// nil.
+	generateServerKeyExchange(*config, *Certificate, *clientHelloMsg, *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error)
+	processClientKeyExchange(*config, *Certificate, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, uint16) ([]byte, error)
+
+	// On the client side, the next two methods are called in order.
+
+	// This method may not be called if the server doesn't send a
+	// ServerKeyExchange message.
+	processServerKeyExchange(*config, *clientHelloMsg, *serverHelloMsg, *x509.Certificate, *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error
+	generateClientKeyExchange(*config, *clientHelloMsg, *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error)
+}
+
+var errClientKeyExchange = errors.New("tls: invalid ClientKeyExchange message")
+var errServerKeyExchange = errors.New("tls: invalid ServerKeyExchange message")
+
+// rsaKeyAgreement implements the standard TLS key agreement where the client
+// encrypts the pre-master secret to the server's public key.
+type rsaKeyAgreement struct{}
+
+func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) generateServerKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, hello *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error) {
+	return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) processClientKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg, version uint16) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(ckx.ciphertext) < 2 {
+		return nil, errClientKeyExchange
+	}
+	ciphertextLen := int(ckx.ciphertext[0])<<8 | int(ckx.ciphertext[1])
+	if ciphertextLen != len(ckx.ciphertext)-2 {
+		return nil, errClientKeyExchange
+	}
+	ciphertext := ckx.ciphertext[2:]
+
+	priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, errors.New("tls: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Decrypter")
+	}
+	// Perform constant time RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 decryption
+	preMasterSecret, err := priv.Decrypt(config.rand(), ciphertext, &rsa.PKCS1v15DecryptOptions{SessionKeyLen: 48})
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	// We don't check the version number in the premaster secret. For one,
+	// by checking it, we would leak information about the validity of the
+	// encrypted pre-master secret. Secondly, it provides only a small
+	// benefit against a downgrade attack and some implementations send the
+	// wrong version anyway. See the discussion at the end of section
+	// 7.4.7.1 of RFC 4346.
+	return preMasterSecret, nil
+}
+
+func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) processServerKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, serverHello *serverHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate, skx *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error {
+	return errors.New("tls: unexpected ServerKeyExchange")
+}
+
+func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) generateClientKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error) {
+	preMasterSecret := make([]byte, 48)
+	preMasterSecret[0] = byte(clientHello.vers >> 8)
+	preMasterSecret[1] = byte(clientHello.vers)
+	_, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), preMasterSecret[2:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, err
+	}
+
+	rsaKey, ok := cert.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: server certificate contains incorrect key type for selected ciphersuite")
+	}
+	encrypted, err := rsa.EncryptPKCS1v15(config.rand(), rsaKey, preMasterSecret)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, err
+	}
+	ckx := new(clientKeyExchangeMsg)
+	ckx.ciphertext = make([]byte, len(encrypted)+2)
+	ckx.ciphertext[0] = byte(len(encrypted) >> 8)
+	ckx.ciphertext[1] = byte(len(encrypted))
+	copy(ckx.ciphertext[2:], encrypted)
+	return preMasterSecret, ckx, nil
+}
+
+// sha1Hash calculates a SHA1 hash over the given byte slices.
+func sha1Hash(slices [][]byte) []byte {
+	hsha1 := sha1.New()
+	for _, slice := range slices {
+		hsha1.Write(slice)
+	}
+	return hsha1.Sum(nil)
+}
+
+// md5SHA1Hash implements TLS 1.0's hybrid hash function which consists of the
+// concatenation of an MD5 and SHA1 hash.
+func md5SHA1Hash(slices [][]byte) []byte {
+	md5sha1 := make([]byte, md5.Size+sha1.Size)
+	hmd5 := md5.New()
+	for _, slice := range slices {
+		hmd5.Write(slice)
+	}
+	copy(md5sha1, hmd5.Sum(nil))
+	copy(md5sha1[md5.Size:], sha1Hash(slices))
+	return md5sha1
+}
+
+// hashForServerKeyExchange hashes the given slices and returns their digest
+// using the given hash function (for >= TLS 1.2) or using a default based on
+// the sigType (for earlier TLS versions). For Ed25519 signatures, which don't
+// do pre-hashing, it returns the concatenation of the slices.
+func hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType uint8, hashFunc crypto.Hash, version uint16, slices ...[]byte) []byte {
+	if sigType == signatureEd25519 {
+		var signed []byte
+		for _, slice := range slices {
+			signed = append(signed, slice...)
+		}
+		return signed
+	}
+	if version >= VersionTLS12 {
+		h := hashFunc.New()
+		for _, slice := range slices {
+			h.Write(slice)
+		}
+		digest := h.Sum(nil)
+		return digest
+	}
+	if sigType == signatureECDSA {
+		return sha1Hash(slices)
+	}
+	return md5SHA1Hash(slices)
+}
+
+// ecdheKeyAgreement implements a TLS key agreement where the server
+// generates an ephemeral EC public/private key pair and signs it. The
+// pre-master secret is then calculated using ECDH. The signature may
+// be ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA.
+type ecdheKeyAgreement struct {
+	version uint16
+	isRSA   bool
+	key     *ecdh.PrivateKey
+
+	// ckx and preMasterSecret are generated in processServerKeyExchange
+	// and returned in generateClientKeyExchange.
+	ckx             *clientKeyExchangeMsg
+	preMasterSecret []byte
+}
+
+func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) generateServerKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, hello *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error) {
+	var curveID CurveID
+	for _, c := range clientHello.supportedCurves {
+		if config.supportsCurve(c) {
+			curveID = c
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	if curveID == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("tls: no supported elliptic curves offered")
+	}
+	if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); !ok {
+		return nil, errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve")
+	}
+
+	key, err := generateECDHEKey(config.rand(), curveID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	ka.key = key
+
+	// See RFC 4492, Section 5.4.
+	ecdhePublic := key.PublicKey().Bytes()
+	serverECDHEParams := make([]byte, 1+2+1+len(ecdhePublic))
+	serverECDHEParams[0] = 3 // named curve
+	serverECDHEParams[1] = byte(curveID >> 8)
+	serverECDHEParams[2] = byte(curveID)
+	serverECDHEParams[3] = byte(len(ecdhePublic))
+	copy(serverECDHEParams[4:], ecdhePublic)
+
+	priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: certificate private key of type %T does not implement crypto.Signer", cert.PrivateKey)
+	}
+
+	var signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme
+	var sigType uint8
+	var sigHash crypto.Hash
+	if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 {
+		signatureAlgorithm, err = selectSignatureScheme(ka.version, cert, clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	} else {
+		sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(priv.Public())
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	if (sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigType == signatureRSAPSS) != ka.isRSA {
+		return nil, errors.New("tls: certificate cannot be used with the selected cipher suite")
+	}
+
+	signed := hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType, sigHash, ka.version, clientHello.random, hello.random, serverECDHEParams)
+
+	signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash)
+	if sigType == signatureRSAPSS {
+		signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash}
+	}
+	sig, err := priv.Sign(config.rand(), signed, signOpts)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to sign ECDHE parameters: " + err.Error())
+	}
+
+	skx := new(serverKeyExchangeMsg)
+	sigAndHashLen := 0
+	if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 {
+		sigAndHashLen = 2
+	}
+	skx.key = make([]byte, len(serverECDHEParams)+sigAndHashLen+2+len(sig))
+	copy(skx.key, serverECDHEParams)
+	k := skx.key[len(serverECDHEParams):]
+	if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 {
+		k[0] = byte(signatureAlgorithm >> 8)
+		k[1] = byte(signatureAlgorithm)
+		k = k[2:]
+	}
+	k[0] = byte(len(sig) >> 8)
+	k[1] = byte(len(sig))
+	copy(k[2:], sig)
+
+	return skx, nil
+}
+
+func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) processClientKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg, version uint16) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(ckx.ciphertext) == 0 || int(ckx.ciphertext[0]) != len(ckx.ciphertext)-1 {
+		return nil, errClientKeyExchange
+	}
+
+	peerKey, err := ka.key.Curve().NewPublicKey(ckx.ciphertext[1:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errClientKeyExchange
+	}
+	preMasterSecret, err := ka.key.ECDH(peerKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errClientKeyExchange
+	}
+
+	return preMasterSecret, nil
+}
+
+func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) processServerKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, serverHello *serverHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate, skx *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error {
+	if len(skx.key) < 4 {
+		return errServerKeyExchange
+	}
+	if skx.key[0] != 3 { // named curve
+		return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported curve")
+	}
+	curveID := CurveID(skx.key[1])<<8 | CurveID(skx.key[2])
+
+	publicLen := int(skx.key[3])
+	if publicLen+4 > len(skx.key) {
+		return errServerKeyExchange
+	}
+	serverECDHEParams := skx.key[:4+publicLen]
+	publicKey := serverECDHEParams[4:]
+
+	sig := skx.key[4+publicLen:]
+	if len(sig) < 2 {
+		return errServerKeyExchange
+	}
+
+	if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); !ok {
+		return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported curve")
+	}
+
+	key, err := generateECDHEKey(config.rand(), curveID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	ka.key = key
+
+	peerKey, err := key.Curve().NewPublicKey(publicKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return errServerKeyExchange
+	}
+	ka.preMasterSecret, err = key.ECDH(peerKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return errServerKeyExchange
+	}
+
+	ourPublicKey := key.PublicKey().Bytes()
+	ka.ckx = new(clientKeyExchangeMsg)
+	ka.ckx.ciphertext = make([]byte, 1+len(ourPublicKey))
+	ka.ckx.ciphertext[0] = byte(len(ourPublicKey))
+	copy(ka.ckx.ciphertext[1:], ourPublicKey)
+
+	var sigType uint8
+	var sigHash crypto.Hash
+	if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 {
+		signatureAlgorithm := SignatureScheme(sig[0])<<8 | SignatureScheme(sig[1])
+		sig = sig[2:]
+		if len(sig) < 2 {
+			return errServerKeyExchange
+		}
+
+		if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(signatureAlgorithm, clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
+			return errors.New("tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
+		}
+		sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	} else {
+		sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(cert.PublicKey)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	if (sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigType == signatureRSAPSS) != ka.isRSA {
+		return errServerKeyExchange
+	}
+
+	sigLen := int(sig[0])<<8 | int(sig[1])
+	if sigLen+2 != len(sig) {
+		return errServerKeyExchange
+	}
+	sig = sig[2:]
+
+	signed := hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType, sigHash, ka.version, clientHello.random, serverHello.random, serverECDHEParams)
+	if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, cert.PublicKey, sigHash, signed, sig); err != nil {
+		return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the server certificate: " + err.Error())
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) generateClientKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error) {
+	if ka.ckx == nil {
+		return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: missing ServerKeyExchange message")
+	}
+
+	return ka.preMasterSecret, ka.ckx, nil
+}

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/key_schedule.go

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package qtls
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ecdh"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"errors"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf"
+)
+
+// This file contains the functions necessary to compute the TLS 1.3 key
+// schedule. See RFC 8446, Section 7.
+
+const (
+	resumptionBinderLabel         = "res binder"
+	clientHandshakeTrafficLabel   = "c hs traffic"
+	serverHandshakeTrafficLabel   = "s hs traffic"
+	clientApplicationTrafficLabel = "c ap traffic"
+	serverApplicationTrafficLabel = "s ap traffic"
+	exporterLabel                 = "exp master"
+	resumptionLabel               = "res master"
+	trafficUpdateLabel            = "traffic upd"
+)
+
+// expandLabel implements HKDF-Expand-Label from RFC 8446, Section 7.1.
+func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) expandLabel(secret []byte, label string, context []byte, length int) []byte {
+	var hkdfLabel cryptobyte.Builder
+	hkdfLabel.AddUint16(uint16(length))
+	hkdfLabel.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		b.AddBytes([]byte("tls13 "))
+		b.AddBytes([]byte(label))
+	})
+	hkdfLabel.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		b.AddBytes(context)
+	})
+	out := make([]byte, length)
+	n, err := hkdf.Expand(c.hash.New, secret, hkdfLabel.BytesOrPanic()).Read(out)
+	if err != nil || n != length {
+		panic("tls: HKDF-Expand-Label invocation failed unexpectedly")
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// deriveSecret implements Derive-Secret from RFC 8446, Section 7.1.
+func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) deriveSecret(secret []byte, label string, transcript hash.Hash) []byte {
+	if transcript == nil {
+		transcript = c.hash.New()
+	}
+	return c.expandLabel(secret, label, transcript.Sum(nil), c.hash.Size())
+}
+
+// extract implements HKDF-Extract with the cipher suite hash.
+func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) extract(newSecret, currentSecret []byte) []byte {
+	if newSecret == nil {
+		newSecret = make([]byte, c.hash.Size())
+	}
+	return hkdf.Extract(c.hash.New, newSecret, currentSecret)
+}
+
+// nextTrafficSecret generates the next traffic secret, given the current one,
+// according to RFC 8446, Section 7.2.
+func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) nextTrafficSecret(trafficSecret []byte) []byte {
+	return c.expandLabel(trafficSecret, trafficUpdateLabel, nil, c.hash.Size())
+}
+
+// trafficKey generates traffic keys according to RFC 8446, Section 7.3.
+func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) trafficKey(trafficSecret []byte) (key, iv []byte) {
+	key = c.expandLabel(trafficSecret, "key", nil, c.keyLen)
+	iv = c.expandLabel(trafficSecret, "iv", nil, aeadNonceLength)
+	return
+}
+
+// finishedHash generates the Finished verify_data or PskBinderEntry according
+// to RFC 8446, Section 4.4.4. See sections 4.4 and 4.2.11.2 for the baseKey
+// selection.
+func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) finishedHash(baseKey []byte, transcript hash.Hash) []byte {
+	finishedKey := c.expandLabel(baseKey, "finished", nil, c.hash.Size())
+	verifyData := hmac.New(c.hash.New, finishedKey)
+	verifyData.Write(transcript.Sum(nil))
+	return verifyData.Sum(nil)
+}
+
+// exportKeyingMaterial implements RFC5705 exporters for TLS 1.3 according to
+// RFC 8446, Section 7.5.
+func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) exportKeyingMaterial(masterSecret []byte, transcript hash.Hash) func(string, []byte, int) ([]byte, error) {
+	expMasterSecret := c.deriveSecret(masterSecret, exporterLabel, transcript)
+	return func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) {
+		secret := c.deriveSecret(expMasterSecret, label, nil)
+		h := c.hash.New()
+		h.Write(context)
+		return c.expandLabel(secret, "exporter", h.Sum(nil), length), nil
+	}
+}
+
+// generateECDHEKey returns a PrivateKey that implements Diffie-Hellman
+// according to RFC 8446, Section 4.2.8.2.
+func generateECDHEKey(rand io.Reader, curveID CurveID) (*ecdh.PrivateKey, error) {
+	curve, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, errors.New("tls: internal error: unsupported curve")
+	}
+
+	return curve.GenerateKey(rand)
+}
+
+func curveForCurveID(id CurveID) (ecdh.Curve, bool) {
+	switch id {
+	case X25519:
+		return ecdh.X25519(), true
+	case CurveP256:
+		return ecdh.P256(), true
+	case CurveP384:
+		return ecdh.P384(), true
+	case CurveP521:
+		return ecdh.P521(), true
+	default:
+		return nil, false
+	}
+}
+
+func curveIDForCurve(curve ecdh.Curve) (CurveID, bool) {
+	switch curve {
+	case ecdh.X25519():
+		return X25519, true
+	case ecdh.P256():
+		return CurveP256, true
+	case ecdh.P384():
+		return CurveP384, true
+	case ecdh.P521():
+		return CurveP521, true
+	default:
+		return 0, false
+	}
+}

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/notboring.go

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package qtls
+
+func needFIPS() bool { return false }
+
+func supportedSignatureAlgorithms() []SignatureScheme {
+	return defaultSupportedSignatureAlgorithms
+}
+
+func fipsMinVersion(c *config) uint16          { panic("fipsMinVersion") }
+func fipsMaxVersion(c *config) uint16          { panic("fipsMaxVersion") }
+func fipsCurvePreferences(c *config) []CurveID { panic("fipsCurvePreferences") }
+func fipsCipherSuites(c *config) []uint16      { panic("fipsCipherSuites") }
+
+var fipsSupportedSignatureAlgorithms []SignatureScheme

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/prf.go

@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package qtls
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/md5"
+	"crypto/sha1"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/sha512"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"hash"
+)
+
+// Split a premaster secret in two as specified in RFC 4346, Section 5.
+func splitPreMasterSecret(secret []byte) (s1, s2 []byte) {
+	s1 = secret[0 : (len(secret)+1)/2]
+	s2 = secret[len(secret)/2:]
+	return
+}
+
+// pHash implements the P_hash function, as defined in RFC 4346, Section 5.
+func pHash(result, secret, seed []byte, hash func() hash.Hash) {
+	h := hmac.New(hash, secret)
+	h.Write(seed)
+	a := h.Sum(nil)
+
+	j := 0
+	for j < len(result) {
+		h.Reset()
+		h.Write(a)
+		h.Write(seed)
+		b := h.Sum(nil)
+		copy(result[j:], b)
+		j += len(b)
+
+		h.Reset()
+		h.Write(a)
+		a = h.Sum(nil)
+	}
+}
+
+// prf10 implements the TLS 1.0 pseudo-random function, as defined in RFC 2246, Section 5.
+func prf10(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
+	hashSHA1 := sha1.New
+	hashMD5 := md5.New
+
+	labelAndSeed := make([]byte, len(label)+len(seed))
+	copy(labelAndSeed, label)
+	copy(labelAndSeed[len(label):], seed)
+
+	s1, s2 := splitPreMasterSecret(secret)
+	pHash(result, s1, labelAndSeed, hashMD5)
+	result2 := make([]byte, len(result))
+	pHash(result2, s2, labelAndSeed, hashSHA1)
+
+	for i, b := range result2 {
+		result[i] ^= b
+	}
+}
+
+// prf12 implements the TLS 1.2 pseudo-random function, as defined in RFC 5246, Section 5.
+func prf12(hashFunc func() hash.Hash) func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
+	return func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
+		labelAndSeed := make([]byte, len(label)+len(seed))
+		copy(labelAndSeed, label)
+		copy(labelAndSeed[len(label):], seed)
+
+		pHash(result, secret, labelAndSeed, hashFunc)
+	}
+}
+
+const (
+	masterSecretLength   = 48 // Length of a master secret in TLS 1.1.
+	finishedVerifyLength = 12 // Length of verify_data in a Finished message.
+)
+
+var masterSecretLabel = []byte("master secret")
+var keyExpansionLabel = []byte("key expansion")
+var clientFinishedLabel = []byte("client finished")
+var serverFinishedLabel = []byte("server finished")
+
+func prfAndHashForVersion(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite) (func(result, secret, label, seed []byte), crypto.Hash) {
+	switch version {
+	case VersionTLS10, VersionTLS11:
+		return prf10, crypto.Hash(0)
+	case VersionTLS12:
+		if suite.flags&suiteSHA384 != 0 {
+			return prf12(sha512.New384), crypto.SHA384
+		}
+		return prf12(sha256.New), crypto.SHA256
+	default:
+		panic("unknown version")
+	}
+}
+
+func prfForVersion(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite) func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
+	prf, _ := prfAndHashForVersion(version, suite)
+	return prf
+}
+
+// masterFromPreMasterSecret generates the master secret from the pre-master
+// secret. See RFC 5246, Section 8.1.
+func masterFromPreMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, preMasterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte) []byte {
+	seed := make([]byte, 0, len(clientRandom)+len(serverRandom))
+	seed = append(seed, clientRandom...)
+	seed = append(seed, serverRandom...)
+
+	masterSecret := make([]byte, masterSecretLength)
+	prfForVersion(version, suite)(masterSecret, preMasterSecret, masterSecretLabel, seed)
+	return masterSecret
+}
+
+// keysFromMasterSecret generates the connection keys from the master
+// secret, given the lengths of the MAC key, cipher key and IV, as defined in
+// RFC 2246, Section 6.3.
+func keysFromMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte, macLen, keyLen, ivLen int) (clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV []byte) {
+	seed := make([]byte, 0, len(serverRandom)+len(clientRandom))
+	seed = append(seed, serverRandom...)
+	seed = append(seed, clientRandom...)
+
+	n := 2*macLen + 2*keyLen + 2*ivLen
+	keyMaterial := make([]byte, n)
+	prfForVersion(version, suite)(keyMaterial, masterSecret, keyExpansionLabel, seed)
+	clientMAC = keyMaterial[:macLen]
+	keyMaterial = keyMaterial[macLen:]
+	serverMAC = keyMaterial[:macLen]
+	keyMaterial = keyMaterial[macLen:]
+	clientKey = keyMaterial[:keyLen]
+	keyMaterial = keyMaterial[keyLen:]
+	serverKey = keyMaterial[:keyLen]
+	keyMaterial = keyMaterial[keyLen:]
+	clientIV = keyMaterial[:ivLen]
+	keyMaterial = keyMaterial[ivLen:]
+	serverIV = keyMaterial[:ivLen]
+	return
+}
+
+func newFinishedHash(version uint16, cipherSuite *cipherSuite) finishedHash {
+	var buffer []byte
+	if version >= VersionTLS12 {
+		buffer = []byte{}
+	}
+
+	prf, hash := prfAndHashForVersion(version, cipherSuite)
+	if hash != 0 {
+		return finishedHash{hash.New(), hash.New(), nil, nil, buffer, version, prf}
+	}
+
+	return finishedHash{sha1.New(), sha1.New(), md5.New(), md5.New(), buffer, version, prf}
+}
+
+// A finishedHash calculates the hash of a set of handshake messages suitable
+// for including in a Finished message.
+type finishedHash struct {
+	client hash.Hash
+	server hash.Hash
+
+	// Prior to TLS 1.2, an additional MD5 hash is required.
+	clientMD5 hash.Hash
+	serverMD5 hash.Hash
+
+	// In TLS 1.2, a full buffer is sadly required.
+	buffer []byte
+
+	version uint16
+	prf     func(result, secret, label, seed []byte)
+}
+
+func (h *finishedHash) Write(msg []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	h.client.Write(msg)
+	h.server.Write(msg)
+
+	if h.version < VersionTLS12 {
+		h.clientMD5.Write(msg)
+		h.serverMD5.Write(msg)
+	}
+
+	if h.buffer != nil {
+		h.buffer = append(h.buffer, msg...)
+	}
+
+	return len(msg), nil
+}
+
+func (h finishedHash) Sum() []byte {
+	if h.version >= VersionTLS12 {
+		return h.client.Sum(nil)
+	}
+
+	out := make([]byte, 0, md5.Size+sha1.Size)
+	out = h.clientMD5.Sum(out)
+	return h.client.Sum(out)
+}
+
+// clientSum returns the contents of the verify_data member of a client's
+// Finished message.
+func (h finishedHash) clientSum(masterSecret []byte) []byte {
+	out := make([]byte, finishedVerifyLength)
+	h.prf(out, masterSecret, clientFinishedLabel, h.Sum())
+	return out
+}
+
+// serverSum returns the contents of the verify_data member of a server's
+// Finished message.
+func (h finishedHash) serverSum(masterSecret []byte) []byte {
+	out := make([]byte, finishedVerifyLength)
+	h.prf(out, masterSecret, serverFinishedLabel, h.Sum())
+	return out
+}
+
+// hashForClientCertificate returns the handshake messages so far, pre-hashed if
+// necessary, suitable for signing by a TLS client certificate.
+func (h finishedHash) hashForClientCertificate(sigType uint8, hashAlg crypto.Hash) []byte {
+	if (h.version >= VersionTLS12 || sigType == signatureEd25519) && h.buffer == nil {
+		panic("tls: handshake hash for a client certificate requested after discarding the handshake buffer")
+	}
+
+	if sigType == signatureEd25519 {
+		return h.buffer
+	}
+
+	if h.version >= VersionTLS12 {
+		hash := hashAlg.New()
+		hash.Write(h.buffer)
+		return hash.Sum(nil)
+	}
+
+	if sigType == signatureECDSA {
+		return h.server.Sum(nil)
+	}
+
+	return h.Sum()
+}
+
+// discardHandshakeBuffer is called when there is no more need to
+// buffer the entirety of the handshake messages.
+func (h *finishedHash) discardHandshakeBuffer() {
+	h.buffer = nil
+}
+
+// noExportedKeyingMaterial is used as a value of
+// ConnectionState.ekm when renegotiation is enabled and thus
+// we wish to fail all key-material export requests.
+func noExportedKeyingMaterial(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) {
+	return nil, errors.New("crypto/tls: ExportKeyingMaterial is unavailable when renegotiation is enabled")
+}
+
+// ekmFromMasterSecret generates exported keying material as defined in RFC 5705.
+func ekmFromMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte) func(string, []byte, int) ([]byte, error) {
+	return func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) {
+		switch label {
+		case "client finished", "server finished", "master secret", "key expansion":
+			// These values are reserved and may not be used.
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("crypto/tls: reserved ExportKeyingMaterial label: %s", label)
+		}
+
+		seedLen := len(serverRandom) + len(clientRandom)
+		if context != nil {
+			seedLen += 2 + len(context)
+		}
+		seed := make([]byte, 0, seedLen)
+
+		seed = append(seed, clientRandom...)
+		seed = append(seed, serverRandom...)
+
+		if context != nil {
+			if len(context) >= 1<<16 {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("crypto/tls: ExportKeyingMaterial context too long")
+			}
+			seed = append(seed, byte(len(context)>>8), byte(len(context)))
+			seed = append(seed, context...)
+		}
+
+		keyMaterial := make([]byte, length)
+		prfForVersion(version, suite)(keyMaterial, masterSecret, []byte(label), seed)
+		return keyMaterial, nil
+	}
+}

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/ticket.go

@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package qtls
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"time"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
+)
+
+// sessionState contains the information that is serialized into a session
+// ticket in order to later resume a connection.
+type sessionState struct {
+	vers         uint16
+	cipherSuite  uint16
+	createdAt    uint64
+	masterSecret []byte // opaque master_secret<1..2^16-1>;
+	// struct { opaque certificate<1..2^24-1> } Certificate;
+	certificates [][]byte // Certificate certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
+
+	// usedOldKey is true if the ticket from which this session came from
+	// was encrypted with an older key and thus should be refreshed.
+	usedOldKey bool
+}
+
+func (m *sessionState) marshal() []byte {
+	var b cryptobyte.Builder
+	b.AddUint16(m.vers)
+	b.AddUint16(m.cipherSuite)
+	addUint64(&b, m.createdAt)
+	b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		b.AddBytes(m.masterSecret)
+	})
+	b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		for _, cert := range m.certificates {
+			b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+				b.AddBytes(cert)
+			})
+		}
+	})
+	return b.BytesOrPanic()
+}
+
+func (m *sessionState) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
+	*m = sessionState{usedOldKey: m.usedOldKey}
+	s := cryptobyte.String(data)
+	if ok := s.ReadUint16(&m.vers) &&
+		s.ReadUint16(&m.cipherSuite) &&
+		readUint64(&s, &m.createdAt) &&
+		readUint16LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.masterSecret) &&
+		len(m.masterSecret) != 0; !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	var certList cryptobyte.String
+	if !s.ReadUint24LengthPrefixed(&certList) {
+		return false
+	}
+	for !certList.Empty() {
+		var cert []byte
+		if !readUint24LengthPrefixed(&certList, &cert) {
+			return false
+		}
+		m.certificates = append(m.certificates, cert)
+	}
+	return s.Empty()
+}
+
+// sessionStateTLS13 is the content of a TLS 1.3 session ticket. Its first
+// version (revision = 0) doesn't carry any of the information needed for 0-RTT
+// validation and the nonce is always empty.
+// version (revision = 1) carries the max_early_data_size sent in the ticket.
+// version (revision = 2) carries the ALPN sent in the ticket.
+type sessionStateTLS13 struct {
+	// uint8 version  = 0x0304;
+	// uint8 revision = 2;
+	cipherSuite      uint16
+	createdAt        uint64
+	resumptionSecret []byte      // opaque resumption_master_secret<1..2^8-1>;
+	certificate      Certificate // CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
+	maxEarlyData     uint32
+	alpn             string
+
+	appData []byte
+}
+
+func (m *sessionStateTLS13) marshal() []byte {
+	var b cryptobyte.Builder
+	b.AddUint16(VersionTLS13)
+	b.AddUint8(2) // revision
+	b.AddUint16(m.cipherSuite)
+	addUint64(&b, m.createdAt)
+	b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		b.AddBytes(m.resumptionSecret)
+	})
+	marshalCertificate(&b, m.certificate)
+	b.AddUint32(m.maxEarlyData)
+	b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		b.AddBytes([]byte(m.alpn))
+	})
+	b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		b.AddBytes(m.appData)
+	})
+	return b.BytesOrPanic()
+}
+
+func (m *sessionStateTLS13) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
+	*m = sessionStateTLS13{}
+	s := cryptobyte.String(data)
+	var version uint16
+	var revision uint8
+	var alpn []byte
+	ret := s.ReadUint16(&version) &&
+		version == VersionTLS13 &&
+		s.ReadUint8(&revision) &&
+		revision == 2 &&
+		s.ReadUint16(&m.cipherSuite) &&
+		readUint64(&s, &m.createdAt) &&
+		readUint8LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.resumptionSecret) &&
+		len(m.resumptionSecret) != 0 &&
+		unmarshalCertificate(&s, &m.certificate) &&
+		s.ReadUint32(&m.maxEarlyData) &&
+		readUint8LengthPrefixed(&s, &alpn) &&
+		readUint16LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.appData) &&
+		s.Empty()
+	m.alpn = string(alpn)
+	return ret
+}
+
+func (c *Conn) encryptTicket(state []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(c.ticketKeys) == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("tls: internal error: session ticket keys unavailable")
+	}
+
+	encrypted := make([]byte, ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize+len(state)+sha256.Size)
+	keyName := encrypted[:ticketKeyNameLen]
+	iv := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen : ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize]
+	macBytes := encrypted[len(encrypted)-sha256.Size:]
+
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), iv); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	key := c.ticketKeys[0]
+	copy(keyName, key.keyName[:])
+	block, err := aes.NewCipher(key.aesKey[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to create cipher while encrypting ticket: " + err.Error())
+	}
+	cipher.NewCTR(block, iv).XORKeyStream(encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize:], state)
+
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key.hmacKey[:])
+	mac.Write(encrypted[:len(encrypted)-sha256.Size])
+	mac.Sum(macBytes[:0])
+
+	return encrypted, nil
+}
+
+func (c *Conn) decryptTicket(encrypted []byte) (plaintext []byte, usedOldKey bool) {
+	if len(encrypted) < ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize+sha256.Size {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+
+	keyName := encrypted[:ticketKeyNameLen]
+	iv := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen : ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize]
+	macBytes := encrypted[len(encrypted)-sha256.Size:]
+	ciphertext := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize : len(encrypted)-sha256.Size]
+
+	keyIndex := -1
+	for i, candidateKey := range c.ticketKeys {
+		if bytes.Equal(keyName, candidateKey.keyName[:]) {
+			keyIndex = i
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if keyIndex == -1 {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	key := &c.ticketKeys[keyIndex]
+
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key.hmacKey[:])
+	mac.Write(encrypted[:len(encrypted)-sha256.Size])
+	expected := mac.Sum(nil)
+
+	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(macBytes, expected) != 1 {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+
+	block, err := aes.NewCipher(key.aesKey[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	plaintext = make([]byte, len(ciphertext))
+	cipher.NewCTR(block, iv).XORKeyStream(plaintext, ciphertext)
+
+	return plaintext, keyIndex > 0
+}
+
+func (c *Conn) getSessionTicketMsg(appData []byte) (*newSessionTicketMsgTLS13, error) {
+	m := new(newSessionTicketMsgTLS13)
+
+	var certsFromClient [][]byte
+	for _, cert := range c.peerCertificates {
+		certsFromClient = append(certsFromClient, cert.Raw)
+	}
+	state := sessionStateTLS13{
+		cipherSuite:      c.cipherSuite,
+		createdAt:        uint64(c.config.time().Unix()),
+		resumptionSecret: c.resumptionSecret,
+		certificate: Certificate{
+			Certificate:                 certsFromClient,
+			OCSPStaple:                  c.ocspResponse,
+			SignedCertificateTimestamps: c.scts,
+		},
+		appData: appData,
+		alpn:    c.clientProtocol,
+	}
+	if c.extraConfig != nil {
+		state.maxEarlyData = c.extraConfig.MaxEarlyData
+	}
+	var err error
+	m.label, err = c.encryptTicket(state.marshal())
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	m.lifetime = uint32(maxSessionTicketLifetime / time.Second)
+
+	// ticket_age_add is a random 32-bit value. See RFC 8446, section 4.6.1
+	// The value is not stored anywhere; we never need to check the ticket age
+	// because 0-RTT is not supported.
+	ageAdd := make([]byte, 4)
+	_, err = c.config.rand().Read(ageAdd)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	m.ageAdd = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(ageAdd)
+
+	// ticket_nonce, which must be unique per connection, is always left at
+	// zero because we only ever send one ticket per connection.
+
+	if c.extraConfig != nil {
+		m.maxEarlyData = c.extraConfig.MaxEarlyData
+	}
+	return m, nil
+}
+
+// GetSessionTicket generates a new session ticket.
+// It should only be called after the handshake completes.
+// It can only be used for servers, and only if the alternative record layer is set.
+// The ticket may be nil if config.SessionTicketsDisabled is set,
+// or if the client isn't able to receive session tickets.
+func (c *Conn) GetSessionTicket(appData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if c.isClient || !c.isHandshakeComplete.Load() || c.extraConfig == nil || c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer == nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("GetSessionTicket is only valid for servers after completion of the handshake, and if an alternative record layer is set.")
+	}
+	if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+
+	m, err := c.getSessionTicketMsg(appData)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return m.marshal(), nil
+}

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/tls.go

@@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// package qtls partially implements TLS 1.2, as specified in RFC 5246,
+// and TLS 1.3, as specified in RFC 8446.
+package qtls
+
+// BUG(agl): The crypto/tls package only implements some countermeasures
+// against Lucky13 attacks on CBC-mode encryption, and only on SHA1
+// variants. See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/TLStiming.pdf and
+// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html.
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/pem"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// Server returns a new TLS server side connection
+// using conn as the underlying transport.
+// The configuration config must be non-nil and must include
+// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate.
+func Server(conn net.Conn, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *Conn {
+	c := &Conn{
+		conn:        conn,
+		config:      fromConfig(config),
+		extraConfig: extraConfig,
+	}
+	c.handshakeFn = c.serverHandshake
+	return c
+}
+
+// Client returns a new TLS client side connection
+// using conn as the underlying transport.
+// The config cannot be nil: users must set either ServerName or
+// InsecureSkipVerify in the config.
+func Client(conn net.Conn, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *Conn {
+	c := &Conn{
+		conn:        conn,
+		config:      fromConfig(config),
+		extraConfig: extraConfig,
+		isClient:    true,
+	}
+	c.handshakeFn = c.clientHandshake
+	return c
+}
+
+// A listener implements a network listener (net.Listener) for TLS connections.
+type listener struct {
+	net.Listener
+	config      *Config
+	extraConfig *ExtraConfig
+}
+
+// Accept waits for and returns the next incoming TLS connection.
+// The returned connection is of type *Conn.
+func (l *listener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) {
+	c, err := l.Listener.Accept()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return Server(c, l.config, l.extraConfig), nil
+}
+
+// NewListener creates a Listener which accepts connections from an inner
+// Listener and wraps each connection with Server.
+// The configuration config must be non-nil and must include
+// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate.
+func NewListener(inner net.Listener, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) net.Listener {
+	l := new(listener)
+	l.Listener = inner
+	l.config = config
+	l.extraConfig = extraConfig
+	return l
+}
+
+// Listen creates a TLS listener accepting connections on the
+// given network address using net.Listen.
+// The configuration config must be non-nil and must include
+// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate.
+func Listen(network, laddr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (net.Listener, error) {
+	if config == nil || len(config.Certificates) == 0 &&
+		config.GetCertificate == nil && config.GetConfigForClient == nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("tls: neither Certificates, GetCertificate, nor GetConfigForClient set in Config")
+	}
+	l, err := net.Listen(network, laddr)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return NewListener(l, config, extraConfig), nil
+}
+
+type timeoutError struct{}
+
+func (timeoutError) Error() string   { return "tls: DialWithDialer timed out" }
+func (timeoutError) Timeout() bool   { return true }
+func (timeoutError) Temporary() bool { return true }
+
+// DialWithDialer connects to the given network address using dialer.Dial and
+// then initiates a TLS handshake, returning the resulting TLS connection. Any
+// timeout or deadline given in the dialer apply to connection and TLS
+// handshake as a whole.
+//
+// DialWithDialer interprets a nil configuration as equivalent to the zero
+// configuration; see the documentation of Config for the defaults.
+//
+// DialWithDialer uses context.Background internally; to specify the context,
+// use Dialer.DialContext with NetDialer set to the desired dialer.
+func DialWithDialer(dialer *net.Dialer, network, addr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (*Conn, error) {
+	return dial(context.Background(), dialer, network, addr, config, extraConfig)
+}
+
+func dial(ctx context.Context, netDialer *net.Dialer, network, addr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (*Conn, error) {
+	if netDialer.Timeout != 0 {
+		var cancel context.CancelFunc
+		ctx, cancel = context.WithTimeout(ctx, netDialer.Timeout)
+		defer cancel()
+	}
+
+	if !netDialer.Deadline.IsZero() {
+		var cancel context.CancelFunc
+		ctx, cancel = context.WithDeadline(ctx, netDialer.Deadline)
+		defer cancel()
+	}
+
+	rawConn, err := netDialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	colonPos := strings.LastIndex(addr, ":")
+	if colonPos == -1 {
+		colonPos = len(addr)
+	}
+	hostname := addr[:colonPos]
+
+	if config == nil {
+		config = defaultConfig()
+	}
+	// If no ServerName is set, infer the ServerName
+	// from the hostname we're connecting to.
+	if config.ServerName == "" {
+		// Make a copy to avoid polluting argument or default.
+		c := config.Clone()
+		c.ServerName = hostname
+		config = c
+	}
+
+	conn := Client(rawConn, config, extraConfig)
+	if err := conn.HandshakeContext(ctx); err != nil {
+		rawConn.Close()
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return conn, nil
+}
+
+// Dial connects to the given network address using net.Dial
+// and then initiates a TLS handshake, returning the resulting
+// TLS connection.
+// Dial interprets a nil configuration as equivalent to
+// the zero configuration; see the documentation of Config
+// for the defaults.
+func Dial(network, addr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (*Conn, error) {
+	return DialWithDialer(new(net.Dialer), network, addr, config, extraConfig)
+}
+
+// Dialer dials TLS connections given a configuration and a Dialer for the
+// underlying connection.
+type Dialer struct {
+	// NetDialer is the optional dialer to use for the TLS connections'
+	// underlying TCP connections.
+	// A nil NetDialer is equivalent to the net.Dialer zero value.
+	NetDialer *net.Dialer
+
+	// Config is the TLS configuration to use for new connections.
+	// A nil configuration is equivalent to the zero
+	// configuration; see the documentation of Config for the
+	// defaults.
+	Config *Config
+
+	ExtraConfig *ExtraConfig
+}
+
+// Dial connects to the given network address and initiates a TLS
+// handshake, returning the resulting TLS connection.
+//
+// The returned Conn, if any, will always be of type *Conn.
+//
+// Dial uses context.Background internally; to specify the context,
+// use DialContext.
+func (d *Dialer) Dial(network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
+	return d.DialContext(context.Background(), network, addr)
+}
+
+func (d *Dialer) netDialer() *net.Dialer {
+	if d.NetDialer != nil {
+		return d.NetDialer
+	}
+	return new(net.Dialer)
+}
+
+// DialContext connects to the given network address and initiates a TLS
+// handshake, returning the resulting TLS connection.
+//
+// The provided Context must be non-nil. If the context expires before
+// the connection is complete, an error is returned. Once successfully
+// connected, any expiration of the context will not affect the
+// connection.
+//
+// The returned Conn, if any, will always be of type *Conn.
+func (d *Dialer) DialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
+	c, err := dial(ctx, d.netDialer(), network, addr, d.Config, d.ExtraConfig)
+	if err != nil {
+		// Don't return c (a typed nil) in an interface.
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return c, nil
+}
+
+// LoadX509KeyPair reads and parses a public/private key pair from a pair
+// of files. The files must contain PEM encoded data. The certificate file
+// may contain intermediate certificates following the leaf certificate to
+// form a certificate chain. On successful return, Certificate.Leaf will
+// be nil because the parsed form of the certificate is not retained.
+func LoadX509KeyPair(certFile, keyFile string) (Certificate, error) {
+	certPEMBlock, err := os.ReadFile(certFile)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Certificate{}, err
+	}
+	keyPEMBlock, err := os.ReadFile(keyFile)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Certificate{}, err
+	}
+	return X509KeyPair(certPEMBlock, keyPEMBlock)
+}
+
+// X509KeyPair parses a public/private key pair from a pair of
+// PEM encoded data. On successful return, Certificate.Leaf will be nil because
+// the parsed form of the certificate is not retained.
+func X509KeyPair(certPEMBlock, keyPEMBlock []byte) (Certificate, error) {
+	fail := func(err error) (Certificate, error) { return Certificate{}, err }
+
+	var cert Certificate
+	var skippedBlockTypes []string
+	for {
+		var certDERBlock *pem.Block
+		certDERBlock, certPEMBlock = pem.Decode(certPEMBlock)
+		if certDERBlock == nil {
+			break
+		}
+		if certDERBlock.Type == "CERTIFICATE" {
+			cert.Certificate = append(cert.Certificate, certDERBlock.Bytes)
+		} else {
+			skippedBlockTypes = append(skippedBlockTypes, certDERBlock.Type)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if len(cert.Certificate) == 0 {
+		if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 0 {
+			return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find any PEM data in certificate input"))
+		}
+		if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 1 && strings.HasSuffix(skippedBlockTypes[0], "PRIVATE KEY") {
+			return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find certificate PEM data in certificate input, but did find a private key; PEM inputs may have been switched"))
+		}
+		return fail(fmt.Errorf("tls: failed to find \"CERTIFICATE\" PEM block in certificate input after skipping PEM blocks of the following types: %v", skippedBlockTypes))
+	}
+
+	skippedBlockTypes = skippedBlockTypes[:0]
+	var keyDERBlock *pem.Block
+	for {
+		keyDERBlock, keyPEMBlock = pem.Decode(keyPEMBlock)
+		if keyDERBlock == nil {
+			if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 0 {
+				return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find any PEM data in key input"))
+			}
+			if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 1 && skippedBlockTypes[0] == "CERTIFICATE" {
+				return fail(errors.New("tls: found a certificate rather than a key in the PEM for the private key"))
+			}
+			return fail(fmt.Errorf("tls: failed to find PEM block with type ending in \"PRIVATE KEY\" in key input after skipping PEM blocks of the following types: %v", skippedBlockTypes))
+		}
+		if keyDERBlock.Type == "PRIVATE KEY" || strings.HasSuffix(keyDERBlock.Type, " PRIVATE KEY") {
+			break
+		}
+		skippedBlockTypes = append(skippedBlockTypes, keyDERBlock.Type)
+	}
+
+	// We don't need to parse the public key for TLS, but we so do anyway
+	// to check that it looks sane and matches the private key.
+	x509Cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(cert.Certificate[0])
+	if err != nil {
+		return fail(err)
+	}
+
+	cert.PrivateKey, err = parsePrivateKey(keyDERBlock.Bytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fail(err)
+	}
+
+	switch pub := x509Cert.PublicKey.(type) {
+	case *rsa.PublicKey:
+		priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
+		if !ok {
+			return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type"))
+		}
+		if pub.N.Cmp(priv.N) != 0 {
+			return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key"))
+		}
+	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
+		priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey)
+		if !ok {
+			return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type"))
+		}
+		if pub.X.Cmp(priv.X) != 0 || pub.Y.Cmp(priv.Y) != 0 {
+			return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key"))
+		}
+	case ed25519.PublicKey:
+		priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(ed25519.PrivateKey)
+		if !ok {
+			return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type"))
+		}
+		if !bytes.Equal(priv.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey), pub) {
+			return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key"))
+		}
+	default:
+		return fail(errors.New("tls: unknown public key algorithm"))
+	}
+
+	return cert, nil
+}
+
+// Attempt to parse the given private key DER block. OpenSSL 0.9.8 generates
+// PKCS #1 private keys by default, while OpenSSL 1.0.0 generates PKCS #8 keys.
+// OpenSSL ecparam generates SEC1 EC private keys for ECDSA. We try all three.
+func parsePrivateKey(der []byte) (crypto.PrivateKey, error) {
+	if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(der); err == nil {
+		return key, nil
+	}
+	if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(der); err == nil {
+		switch key := key.(type) {
+		case *rsa.PrivateKey, *ecdsa.PrivateKey, ed25519.PrivateKey:
+			return key, nil
+		default:
+			return nil, errors.New("tls: found unknown private key type in PKCS#8 wrapping")
+		}
+	}
+	if key, err := x509.ParseECPrivateKey(der); err == nil {
+		return key, nil
+	}
+
+	return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to parse private key")
+}

vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/unsafe.go

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+package qtls
+
+import (
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"reflect"
+	"unsafe"
+)
+
+func init() {
+	if !structsEqual(&tls.ConnectionState{}, &connectionState{}) {
+		panic("qtls.ConnectionState doesn't match")
+	}
+	if !structsEqual(&tls.ClientSessionState{}, &clientSessionState{}) {
+		panic("qtls.ClientSessionState doesn't match")
+	}
+	if !structsEqual(&tls.CertificateRequestInfo{}, &certificateRequestInfo{}) {
+		panic("qtls.CertificateRequestInfo doesn't match")
+	}
+	if !structsEqual(&tls.Config{}, &config{}) {
+		panic("qtls.Config doesn't match")
+	}
+	if !structsEqual(&tls.ClientHelloInfo{}, &clientHelloInfo{}) {
+		panic("qtls.ClientHelloInfo doesn't match")
+	}
+}
+
+func toConnectionState(c connectionState) ConnectionState {
+	return *(*ConnectionState)(unsafe.Pointer(&c))
+}
+
+func toClientSessionState(s *clientSessionState) *ClientSessionState {
+	return (*ClientSessionState)(unsafe.Pointer(s))
+}
+
+func fromClientSessionState(s *ClientSessionState) *clientSessionState {
+	return (*clientSessionState)(unsafe.Pointer(s))
+}
+
+func toCertificateRequestInfo(i *certificateRequestInfo) *CertificateRequestInfo {
+	return (*CertificateRequestInfo)(unsafe.Pointer(i))
+}
+
+func toConfig(c *config) *Config {
+	return (*Config)(unsafe.Pointer(c))
+}
+
+func fromConfig(c *Config) *config {
+	return (*config)(unsafe.Pointer(c))
+}
+
+func toClientHelloInfo(chi *clientHelloInfo) *ClientHelloInfo {
+	return (*ClientHelloInfo)(unsafe.Pointer(chi))
+}
+
+func structsEqual(a, b interface{}) bool {
+	return compare(reflect.ValueOf(a), reflect.ValueOf(b))
+}
+
+func compare(a, b reflect.Value) bool {
+	sa := a.Elem()
+	sb := b.Elem()
+	if sa.NumField() != sb.NumField() {
+		return false
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < sa.NumField(); i++ {
+		fa := sa.Type().Field(i)
+		fb := sb.Type().Field(i)
+		if !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Index, fb.Index) || fa.Name != fb.Name || fa.Anonymous != fb.Anonymous || fa.Offset != fb.Offset || !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Type, fb.Type) {
+			if fa.Type.Kind() != fb.Type.Kind() {
+				return false
+			}
+			if fa.Type.Kind() == reflect.Slice {
+				if !compareStruct(fa.Type.Elem(), fb.Type.Elem()) {
+					return false
+				}
+				continue
+			}
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func compareStruct(a, b reflect.Type) bool {
+	if a.NumField() != b.NumField() {
+		return false
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < a.NumField(); i++ {
+		fa := a.Field(i)
+		fb := b.Field(i)
+		if !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Index, fb.Index) || fa.Name != fb.Name || fa.Anonymous != fb.Anonymous || fa.Offset != fb.Offset || !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Type, fb.Type) {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}

vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/Changelog.md

@@ -101,8 +101,8 @@
 - Add a `quic.Config` option to configure keep-alive
 - Rename the STK to Cookie
 - Implement `net.Conn`-style deadlines for streams
-- Remove the `tls.Config` from the `quic.Config`. The `tls.Config` must now be passed to the `Dial` and `Listen` functions as a separate parameter. See the [Godoc](https://godoc.org/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go) for details.
-- Changed the log level environment variable to only accept strings ("DEBUG", "INFO", "ERROR"), see [the wiki](https://github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/wiki/Logging) for more details.
+- Remove the `tls.Config` from the `quic.Config`. The `tls.Config` must now be passed to the `Dial` and `Listen` functions as a separate parameter. See the [Godoc](https://godoc.org/github.com/quic-go/quic-go) for details.
+- Changed the log level environment variable to only accept strings ("DEBUG", "INFO", "ERROR"), see [the wiki](https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/wiki/Logging) for more details.
 - Rename the `h2quic.QuicRoundTripper` to `h2quic.RoundTripper`
 - Changed `h2quic.Server.Serve()` to accept a `net.PacketConn`
 - Drop support for Go 1.7 and 1.8.

vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+# A QUIC implementation in pure Go
+
+<img src="docs/quic.png" width=303 height=124>
+
+[![PkgGoDev](https://pkg.go.dev/badge/github.com/quic-go/quic-go)](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/quic-go/quic-go)
+[![Code Coverage](https://img.shields.io/codecov/c/github/quic-go/quic-go/master.svg?style=flat-square)](https://codecov.io/gh/quic-go/quic-go/)
+
+quic-go is an implementation of the QUIC protocol ([RFC 9000](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000), [RFC 9001](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9001), [RFC 9002](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9002)) in Go, including the Unreliable Datagram Extension ([RFC 9221](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9221)) and Datagram Packetization Layer Path MTU
+   Discovery (DPLPMTUD, [RFC 8899](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8899)). It has support for HTTP/3 ([RFC 9114](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9114)), including QPACK ([RFC 9204](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9204)).
+
+In addition to the RFCs listed above, it currently implements the [IETF QUIC draft-29](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-transport-29). Support for draft-29 will eventually be dropped, as it is phased out of the ecosystem.
+
+## Guides
+
+*We currently support Go 1.18.x and Go 1.19.x.*
+
+Running tests:
+
+    go test ./...
+
+### QUIC without HTTP/3
+
+Take a look at [this echo example](example/echo/echo.go).
+
+## Usage
+
+### As a server
+
+See the [example server](example/main.go). Starting a QUIC server is very similar to the standard lib http in go:
+
+```go
+http.Handle("/", http.FileServer(http.Dir(wwwDir)))
+http3.ListenAndServeQUIC("localhost:4242", "/path/to/cert/chain.pem", "/path/to/privkey.pem", nil)
+```
+
+### As a client
+
+See the [example client](example/client/main.go). Use a `http3.RoundTripper` as a `Transport` in a `http.Client`.
+
+```go
+http.Client{
+  Transport: &http3.RoundTripper{},
+}
+```
+
+## Projects using quic-go
+
+| Project                                                   | Description                                                                                             | Stars |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
+| [AdGuardHome](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome) | Free and open source, powerful network-wide ads & trackers blocking DNS server.                         | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome?style=flat-square) |
+| [algernon](https://github.com/xyproto/algernon)           | Small self-contained pure-Go web server with Lua, Markdown, HTTP/2, QUIC, Redis and PostgreSQL support  | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/xyproto/algernon?style=flat-square) |
+| [caddy](https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/)            | Fast, multi-platform web server with automatic HTTPS                                                    | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/caddyserver/caddy?style=flat-square) |
+| [cloudflared](https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared)  | A tunneling daemon that proxies traffic from the Cloudflare network to your origins                     | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/cloudflare/cloudflared?style=flat-square) |
+| [go-libp2p](https://github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p)          | libp2p implementation in Go, powering [Kubo](https://github.com/ipfs/kubo) (IPFS) and [Lotus](https://github.com/filecoin-project/lotus) (Filecoin), among others                                   | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/libp2p/go-libp2p?style=flat-square) |
+| [OONI Probe](https://github.com/ooni/probe-cli)           | Next generation OONI Probe. Library and CLI tool.                                                       | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/ooni/probe-cli?style=flat-square) |
+| [syncthing](https://github.com/syncthing/syncthing/)      | Open Source Continuous File Synchronization                                                             | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/syncthing/syncthing?style=flat-square) |
+| [traefik](https://github.com/traefik/traefik)             | The Cloud Native Application Proxy                                                                      | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/traefik/traefik?style=flat-square) |
+| [v2ray-core](https://github.com/v2fly/v2ray-core)         | A platform for building proxies to bypass network restrictions                                          | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/v2fly/v2ray-core?style=flat-square) |
+| [YoMo](https://github.com/yomorun/yomo)                   | Streaming Serverless Framework for Geo-distributed System                                               | ![GitHub Repo stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/yomorun/yomo?style=flat-square) |
+
+## Contributing
+
+We are always happy to welcome new contributors! We have a number of self-contained issues that are suitable for first-time contributors, they are tagged with [help wanted](https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aopen+label%3A%22help+wanted%22). If you have any questions, please feel free to reach out by opening an issue or leaving a comment.

vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/buffer_pool.go

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package quic
 import (
 	"sync"
 
-	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/protocol"
+	"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol"
 )
 
 type packetBuffer struct {

vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/client.go

@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 
-	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/protocol"
-	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/utils"
-	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/logging"
+	"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol"
+	"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils"
+	"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/logging"
 )
 
 type client struct {

vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/closed_conn.go

@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ import (
 	"math/bits"
 	"net"
 
-	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/protocol"
-	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/utils"
+	"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol"
+	"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils"
 )
 
 // A closedLocalConn is a connection that we closed locally.

vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/config.go

@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ import (
 	"net"
 	"time"
 
-	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/protocol"
-	"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/utils"
+	"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol"
+	"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils"
 )
 
 // Clone clones a Config
@@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ func populateConfig(config *Config, defaultConnIDLen int) *Config {
 		EnableDatagrams:                  config.EnableDatagrams,
 		DisablePathMTUDiscovery:          config.DisablePathMTUDiscovery,
 		DisableVersionNegotiationPackets: config.DisableVersionNegotiationPackets,
+		Allow0RTT:                        config.Allow0RTT,
 		Tracer:                           config.Tracer,
 	}
 }