diff --git a/go.mod b/go.mod index bf8f3f5e..e68b17a1 100644 --- a/go.mod +++ b/go.mod @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ require ( github.com/kardianos/service v1.2.2 github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.55 github.com/powerman/check v1.7.0 - github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.36.1 + github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.37.0 golang.org/x/crypto v0.11.0 golang.org/x/net v0.12.0 golang.org/x/sys v0.10.0 @@ -39,8 +39,7 @@ require ( github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 // indirect github.com/powerman/deepequal v0.1.0 // indirect github.com/quic-go/qpack v0.4.0 // indirect - github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19 v0.3.2 // indirect - github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20 v0.2.2 // indirect + github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20 v0.3.0 // indirect github.com/smartystreets/goconvey v1.7.2 // indirect golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20221205204356-47842c84f3db // indirect golang.org/x/mod v0.10.0 // indirect diff --git a/go.sum b/go.sum index 4fbfa347..88dc8208 100644 --- a/go.sum +++ b/go.sum @@ -70,12 +70,10 @@ github.com/powerman/deepequal v0.1.0 h1:sVwtyTsBuYIvdbLR1O2wzRY63YgPqdGZmk/o80l+ github.com/powerman/deepequal v0.1.0/go.mod h1:3k7aG/slufBhUANdN67o/UPg8i5YaiJ6FmibWX0cn04= github.com/quic-go/qpack v0.4.0 h1:Cr9BXA1sQS2SmDUWjSofMPNKmvF6IiIfDRmgU0w1ZCo= github.com/quic-go/qpack v0.4.0/go.mod h1:UZVnYIfi5GRk+zI9UMaCPsmZ2xKJP7XBUvVyT1Knj9A= -github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19 v0.3.2 h1:tFxjCFcTQzK+oMxG6Zcvp4Dq8dx4yD3dDiIiyc86Z5U= -github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19 v0.3.2/go.mod h1:ySOI96ew8lnoKPtSqx2BlI5wCpUVPT05RMAlajtnyOI= -github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20 v0.2.2 h1:WLOPx6OY/hxtTxKV1Zrq20FtXtDEkeY00CGQm8GEa3E= -github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20 v0.2.2/go.mod h1:JKtK6mjbAVcUTN/9jZpvLbGxvdWIKS8uT7EiStoU1SM= -github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.36.1 h1:WsG73nVtnDy1TiACxFxhQ3TqaW+DipmqzLEtNlAwZyY= -github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.36.1/go.mod h1:zPetvwDlILVxt15n3hr3Gf/I3mDf7LpLKPhR4Ez0AZQ= +github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20 v0.3.0 h1:NrCXmDl8BddZwO67vlvEpBTwT89bJfKYygxv4HQvuDk= +github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20 v0.3.0/go.mod h1:X9Nh97ZL80Z+bX/gUXMbipO6OxdiDi58b/fMC9mAL+k= +github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.37.0 h1:wf/Ym2yeWi98oQn4ahiBSqdnaXVxNQGj2oBQFgiVChc= +github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.37.0/go.mod h1:XtCUOCALTTWbPyd0IxFfHf6h0sEMubRFvEYHl3QxKw8= github.com/smartystreets/assertions v1.2.0 h1:42S6lae5dvLc7BrLu/0ugRtcFVjoJNMC/N3yZFZkDFs= github.com/smartystreets/assertions v1.2.0/go.mod h1:tcbTF8ujkAEcZ8TElKY+i30BzYlVhC/LOxJk7iOWnoo= github.com/smartystreets/goconvey v1.7.2 h1:9RBaZCeXEQ3UselpuwUQHltGVXvdwm6cv1hgR6gDIPg= diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/LICENSE b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/LICENSE deleted file mode 100644 index 6a66aea5..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/LICENSE +++ /dev/null @@ -1,27 +0,0 @@ -Copyright (c) 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. - -Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are -met: - - * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above -copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer -in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the -distribution. - * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its -contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from -this software without specific prior written permission. - -THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS -"AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT -LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR -A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT -OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, -SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT -LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE -OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/README.md b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index bf41f1c5..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ -# qtls - -[![Go Reference](https://pkg.go.dev/badge/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19.svg)](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19) -[![.github/workflows/go-test.yml](https://github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/actions/workflows/go-test.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/actions/workflows/go-test.yml) - -This repository contains a modified version of the standard library's TLS implementation, modified for the QUIC protocol. It is used by [quic-go](https://github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go). diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/alert.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/alert.go deleted file mode 100644 index 3feac79b..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/alert.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,102 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package qtls - -import "strconv" - -type alert uint8 - -// Alert is a TLS alert -type Alert = alert - -const ( - // alert level - alertLevelWarning = 1 - alertLevelError = 2 -) - -const ( - alertCloseNotify alert = 0 - alertUnexpectedMessage alert = 10 - alertBadRecordMAC alert = 20 - alertDecryptionFailed alert = 21 - alertRecordOverflow alert = 22 - alertDecompressionFailure alert = 30 - alertHandshakeFailure alert = 40 - alertBadCertificate alert = 42 - alertUnsupportedCertificate alert = 43 - alertCertificateRevoked alert = 44 - alertCertificateExpired alert = 45 - alertCertificateUnknown alert = 46 - alertIllegalParameter alert = 47 - alertUnknownCA alert = 48 - alertAccessDenied alert = 49 - alertDecodeError alert = 50 - alertDecryptError alert = 51 - alertExportRestriction alert = 60 - alertProtocolVersion alert = 70 - alertInsufficientSecurity alert = 71 - alertInternalError alert = 80 - alertInappropriateFallback alert = 86 - alertUserCanceled alert = 90 - alertNoRenegotiation alert = 100 - alertMissingExtension alert = 109 - alertUnsupportedExtension alert = 110 - alertCertificateUnobtainable alert = 111 - alertUnrecognizedName alert = 112 - alertBadCertificateStatusResponse alert = 113 - alertBadCertificateHashValue alert = 114 - alertUnknownPSKIdentity alert = 115 - alertCertificateRequired alert = 116 - alertNoApplicationProtocol alert = 120 -) - -var alertText = map[alert]string{ - alertCloseNotify: "close notify", - alertUnexpectedMessage: "unexpected message", - alertBadRecordMAC: "bad record MAC", - alertDecryptionFailed: "decryption failed", - alertRecordOverflow: "record overflow", - alertDecompressionFailure: "decompression failure", - alertHandshakeFailure: "handshake failure", - alertBadCertificate: "bad certificate", - alertUnsupportedCertificate: "unsupported certificate", - alertCertificateRevoked: "revoked certificate", - alertCertificateExpired: "expired certificate", - alertCertificateUnknown: "unknown certificate", - alertIllegalParameter: "illegal parameter", - alertUnknownCA: "unknown certificate authority", - alertAccessDenied: "access denied", - alertDecodeError: "error decoding message", - alertDecryptError: "error decrypting message", - alertExportRestriction: "export restriction", - alertProtocolVersion: "protocol version not supported", - alertInsufficientSecurity: "insufficient security level", - alertInternalError: "internal error", - alertInappropriateFallback: "inappropriate fallback", - alertUserCanceled: "user canceled", - alertNoRenegotiation: "no renegotiation", - alertMissingExtension: "missing extension", - alertUnsupportedExtension: "unsupported extension", - alertCertificateUnobtainable: "certificate unobtainable", - alertUnrecognizedName: "unrecognized name", - alertBadCertificateStatusResponse: "bad certificate status response", - alertBadCertificateHashValue: "bad certificate hash value", - alertUnknownPSKIdentity: "unknown PSK identity", - alertCertificateRequired: "certificate required", - alertNoApplicationProtocol: "no application protocol", -} - -func (e alert) String() string { - s, ok := alertText[e] - if ok { - return "tls: " + s - } - return "tls: alert(" + strconv.Itoa(int(e)) + ")" -} - -func (e alert) Error() string { - return e.String() -} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/auth.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/auth.go deleted file mode 100644 index effc9ace..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/auth.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,293 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package qtls - -import ( - "bytes" - "crypto" - "crypto/ecdsa" - "crypto/ed25519" - "crypto/elliptic" - "crypto/rsa" - "errors" - "fmt" - "hash" - "io" -) - -// verifyHandshakeSignature verifies a signature against pre-hashed -// (if required) handshake contents. -func verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType uint8, pubkey crypto.PublicKey, hashFunc crypto.Hash, signed, sig []byte) error { - switch sigType { - case signatureECDSA: - pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey) - if !ok { - return fmt.Errorf("expected an ECDSA public key, got %T", pubkey) - } - if !ecdsa.VerifyASN1(pubKey, signed, sig) { - return errors.New("ECDSA verification failure") - } - case signatureEd25519: - pubKey, ok := pubkey.(ed25519.PublicKey) - if !ok { - return fmt.Errorf("expected an Ed25519 public key, got %T", pubkey) - } - if !ed25519.Verify(pubKey, signed, sig) { - return errors.New("Ed25519 verification failure") - } - case signaturePKCS1v15: - pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*rsa.PublicKey) - if !ok { - return fmt.Errorf("expected an RSA public key, got %T", pubkey) - } - if err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pubKey, hashFunc, signed, sig); err != nil { - return err - } - case signatureRSAPSS: - pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*rsa.PublicKey) - if !ok { - return fmt.Errorf("expected an RSA public key, got %T", pubkey) - } - signOpts := &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash} - if err := rsa.VerifyPSS(pubKey, hashFunc, signed, sig, signOpts); err != nil { - return err - } - default: - return errors.New("internal error: unknown signature type") - } - return nil -} - -const ( - serverSignatureContext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify\x00" - clientSignatureContext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify\x00" -) - -var signaturePadding = []byte{ - 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, - 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, - 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, - 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, - 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, - 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, - 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, - 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, -} - -// signedMessage returns the pre-hashed (if necessary) message to be signed by -// certificate keys in TLS 1.3. See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3. -func signedMessage(sigHash crypto.Hash, context string, transcript hash.Hash) []byte { - if sigHash == directSigning { - b := &bytes.Buffer{} - b.Write(signaturePadding) - io.WriteString(b, context) - b.Write(transcript.Sum(nil)) - return b.Bytes() - } - h := sigHash.New() - h.Write(signaturePadding) - io.WriteString(h, context) - h.Write(transcript.Sum(nil)) - return h.Sum(nil) -} - -// typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme returns the corresponding signature type and -// crypto.Hash for a given TLS SignatureScheme. -func typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme) (sigType uint8, hash crypto.Hash, err error) { - switch signatureAlgorithm { - case PKCS1WithSHA1, PKCS1WithSHA256, PKCS1WithSHA384, PKCS1WithSHA512: - sigType = signaturePKCS1v15 - case PSSWithSHA256, PSSWithSHA384, PSSWithSHA512: - sigType = signatureRSAPSS - case ECDSAWithSHA1, ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512: - sigType = signatureECDSA - case Ed25519: - sigType = signatureEd25519 - default: - return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("unsupported signature algorithm: %v", signatureAlgorithm) - } - switch signatureAlgorithm { - case PKCS1WithSHA1, ECDSAWithSHA1: - hash = crypto.SHA1 - case PKCS1WithSHA256, PSSWithSHA256, ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256: - hash = crypto.SHA256 - case PKCS1WithSHA384, PSSWithSHA384, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384: - hash = crypto.SHA384 - case PKCS1WithSHA512, PSSWithSHA512, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512: - hash = crypto.SHA512 - case Ed25519: - hash = directSigning - default: - return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("unsupported signature algorithm: %v", signatureAlgorithm) - } - return sigType, hash, nil -} - -// legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey returns the fixed signature type and crypto.Hash for -// a given public key used with TLS 1.0 and 1.1, before the introduction of -// signature algorithm negotiation. -func legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(pub crypto.PublicKey) (sigType uint8, hash crypto.Hash, err error) { - switch pub.(type) { - case *rsa.PublicKey: - return signaturePKCS1v15, crypto.MD5SHA1, nil - case *ecdsa.PublicKey: - return signatureECDSA, crypto.SHA1, nil - case ed25519.PublicKey: - // RFC 8422 specifies support for Ed25519 in TLS 1.0 and 1.1, - // but it requires holding on to a handshake transcript to do a - // full signature, and not even OpenSSL bothers with the - // complexity, so we can't even test it properly. - return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("tls: Ed25519 public keys are not supported before TLS 1.2") - default: - return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported public key: %T", pub) - } -} - -var rsaSignatureSchemes = []struct { - scheme SignatureScheme - minModulusBytes int - maxVersion uint16 -}{ - // RSA-PSS is used with PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, and requires - // emLen >= hLen + sLen + 2 - {PSSWithSHA256, crypto.SHA256.Size()*2 + 2, VersionTLS13}, - {PSSWithSHA384, crypto.SHA384.Size()*2 + 2, VersionTLS13}, - {PSSWithSHA512, crypto.SHA512.Size()*2 + 2, VersionTLS13}, - // PKCS #1 v1.5 uses prefixes from hashPrefixes in crypto/rsa, and requires - // emLen >= len(prefix) + hLen + 11 - // TLS 1.3 dropped support for PKCS #1 v1.5 in favor of RSA-PSS. - {PKCS1WithSHA256, 19 + crypto.SHA256.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12}, - {PKCS1WithSHA384, 19 + crypto.SHA384.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12}, - {PKCS1WithSHA512, 19 + crypto.SHA512.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12}, - {PKCS1WithSHA1, 15 + crypto.SHA1.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12}, -} - -// signatureSchemesForCertificate returns the list of supported SignatureSchemes -// for a given certificate, based on the public key and the protocol version, -// and optionally filtered by its explicit SupportedSignatureAlgorithms. -// -// This function must be kept in sync with supportedSignatureAlgorithms. -// FIPS filtering is applied in the caller, selectSignatureScheme. -func signatureSchemesForCertificate(version uint16, cert *Certificate) []SignatureScheme { - priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer) - if !ok { - return nil - } - - var sigAlgs []SignatureScheme - switch pub := priv.Public().(type) { - case *ecdsa.PublicKey: - if version != VersionTLS13 { - // In TLS 1.2 and earlier, ECDSA algorithms are not - // constrained to a single curve. - sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{ - ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, - ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, - ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512, - ECDSAWithSHA1, - } - break - } - switch pub.Curve { - case elliptic.P256(): - sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256} - case elliptic.P384(): - sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384} - case elliptic.P521(): - sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512} - default: - return nil - } - case *rsa.PublicKey: - size := pub.Size() - sigAlgs = make([]SignatureScheme, 0, len(rsaSignatureSchemes)) - for _, candidate := range rsaSignatureSchemes { - if size >= candidate.minModulusBytes && version <= candidate.maxVersion { - sigAlgs = append(sigAlgs, candidate.scheme) - } - } - case ed25519.PublicKey: - sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{Ed25519} - default: - return nil - } - - if cert.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms != nil { - var filteredSigAlgs []SignatureScheme - for _, sigAlg := range sigAlgs { - if isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(sigAlg, cert.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms) { - filteredSigAlgs = append(filteredSigAlgs, sigAlg) - } - } - return filteredSigAlgs - } - return sigAlgs -} - -// selectSignatureScheme picks a SignatureScheme from the peer's preference list -// that works with the selected certificate. It's only called for protocol -// versions that support signature algorithms, so TLS 1.2 and 1.3. -func selectSignatureScheme(vers uint16, c *Certificate, peerAlgs []SignatureScheme) (SignatureScheme, error) { - supportedAlgs := signatureSchemesForCertificate(vers, c) - if len(supportedAlgs) == 0 { - return 0, unsupportedCertificateError(c) - } - if len(peerAlgs) == 0 && vers == VersionTLS12 { - // For TLS 1.2, if the client didn't send signature_algorithms then we - // can assume that it supports SHA1. See RFC 5246, Section 7.4.1.4.1. - peerAlgs = []SignatureScheme{PKCS1WithSHA1, ECDSAWithSHA1} - } - // Pick signature scheme in the peer's preference order, as our - // preference order is not configurable. - for _, preferredAlg := range peerAlgs { - if needFIPS() && !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(preferredAlg, fipsSupportedSignatureAlgorithms) { - continue - } - if isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(preferredAlg, supportedAlgs) { - return preferredAlg, nil - } - } - return 0, errors.New("tls: peer doesn't support any of the certificate's signature algorithms") -} - -// unsupportedCertificateError returns a helpful error for certificates with -// an unsupported private key. -func unsupportedCertificateError(cert *Certificate) error { - switch cert.PrivateKey.(type) { - case rsa.PrivateKey, ecdsa.PrivateKey: - return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate: private key is %T, expected *%T", - cert.PrivateKey, cert.PrivateKey) - case *ed25519.PrivateKey: - return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate: private key is *ed25519.PrivateKey, expected ed25519.PrivateKey") - } - - signer, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer) - if !ok { - return fmt.Errorf("tls: certificate private key (%T) does not implement crypto.Signer", - cert.PrivateKey) - } - - switch pub := signer.Public().(type) { - case *ecdsa.PublicKey: - switch pub.Curve { - case elliptic.P256(): - case elliptic.P384(): - case elliptic.P521(): - default: - return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate curve (%s)", pub.Curve.Params().Name) - } - case *rsa.PublicKey: - return fmt.Errorf("tls: certificate RSA key size too small for supported signature algorithms") - case ed25519.PublicKey: - default: - return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate key (%T)", pub) - } - - if cert.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("tls: peer doesn't support the certificate custom signature algorithms") - } - - return fmt.Errorf("tls: internal error: unsupported key (%T)", cert.PrivateKey) -} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/cipher_suites.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/cipher_suites.go deleted file mode 100644 index 56dd4543..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/cipher_suites.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,693 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package qtls - -import ( - "crypto" - "crypto/aes" - "crypto/cipher" - "crypto/des" - "crypto/hmac" - "crypto/rc4" - "crypto/sha1" - "crypto/sha256" - "fmt" - "hash" - - "golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305" -) - -// CipherSuite is a TLS cipher suite. Note that most functions in this package -// accept and expose cipher suite IDs instead of this type. -type CipherSuite struct { - ID uint16 - Name string - - // Supported versions is the list of TLS protocol versions that can - // negotiate this cipher suite. - SupportedVersions []uint16 - - // Insecure is true if the cipher suite has known security issues - // due to its primitives, design, or implementation. - Insecure bool -} - -var ( - supportedUpToTLS12 = []uint16{VersionTLS10, VersionTLS11, VersionTLS12} - supportedOnlyTLS12 = []uint16{VersionTLS12} - supportedOnlyTLS13 = []uint16{VersionTLS13} -) - -// CipherSuites returns a list of cipher suites currently implemented by this -// package, excluding those with security issues, which are returned by -// InsecureCipherSuites. -// -// The list is sorted by ID. Note that the default cipher suites selected by -// this package might depend on logic that can't be captured by a static list, -// and might not match those returned by this function. -func CipherSuites() []*CipherSuite { - return []*CipherSuite{ - {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false}, - - {TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS13, false}, - {TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS13, false}, - {TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS13, false}, - - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, false}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", supportedOnlyTLS12, false}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, false}, - } -} - -// InsecureCipherSuites returns a list of cipher suites currently implemented by -// this package and which have security issues. -// -// Most applications should not use the cipher suites in this list, and should -// only use those returned by CipherSuites. -func InsecureCipherSuites() []*CipherSuite { - // This list includes RC4, CBC_SHA256, and 3DES cipher suites. See - // cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder for details. - return []*CipherSuite{ - {TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA", supportedUpToTLS12, true}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256", supportedOnlyTLS12, true}, - } -} - -// CipherSuiteName returns the standard name for the passed cipher suite ID -// (e.g. "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"), or a fallback representation -// of the ID value if the cipher suite is not implemented by this package. -func CipherSuiteName(id uint16) string { - for _, c := range CipherSuites() { - if c.ID == id { - return c.Name - } - } - for _, c := range InsecureCipherSuites() { - if c.ID == id { - return c.Name - } - } - return fmt.Sprintf("0x%04X", id) -} - -const ( - // suiteECDHE indicates that the cipher suite involves elliptic curve - // Diffie-Hellman. This means that it should only be selected when the - // client indicates that it supports ECC with a curve and point format - // that we're happy with. - suiteECDHE = 1 << iota - // suiteECSign indicates that the cipher suite involves an ECDSA or - // EdDSA signature and therefore may only be selected when the server's - // certificate is ECDSA or EdDSA. If this is not set then the cipher suite - // is RSA based. - suiteECSign - // suiteTLS12 indicates that the cipher suite should only be advertised - // and accepted when using TLS 1.2. - suiteTLS12 - // suiteSHA384 indicates that the cipher suite uses SHA384 as the - // handshake hash. - suiteSHA384 -) - -// A cipherSuite is a TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suite, and defines the key exchange -// mechanism, as well as the cipher+MAC pair or the AEAD. -type cipherSuite struct { - id uint16 - // the lengths, in bytes, of the key material needed for each component. - keyLen int - macLen int - ivLen int - ka func(version uint16) keyAgreement - // flags is a bitmask of the suite* values, above. - flags int - cipher func(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any - mac func(key []byte) hash.Hash - aead func(key, fixedNonce []byte) aead -} - -var cipherSuites = []*cipherSuite{ // TODO: replace with a map, since the order doesn't matter. - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, rsaKA, suiteTLS12, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, rsaKA, 0, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil}, - {TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, rsaKA, 0, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil}, - {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil}, - {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil}, -} - -// selectCipherSuite returns the first TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suite from ids which -// is also in supportedIDs and passes the ok filter. -func selectCipherSuite(ids, supportedIDs []uint16, ok func(*cipherSuite) bool) *cipherSuite { - for _, id := range ids { - candidate := cipherSuiteByID(id) - if candidate == nil || !ok(candidate) { - continue - } - - for _, suppID := range supportedIDs { - if id == suppID { - return candidate - } - } - } - return nil -} - -// A cipherSuiteTLS13 defines only the pair of the AEAD algorithm and hash -// algorithm to be used with HKDF. See RFC 8446, Appendix B.4. -type cipherSuiteTLS13 struct { - id uint16 - keyLen int - aead func(key, fixedNonce []byte) aead - hash crypto.Hash -} - -type CipherSuiteTLS13 struct { - ID uint16 - KeyLen int - Hash crypto.Hash - AEAD func(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD -} - -func (c *CipherSuiteTLS13) IVLen() int { - return aeadNonceLength -} - -var cipherSuitesTLS13 = []*cipherSuiteTLS13{ // TODO: replace with a map. - {TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, aeadAESGCMTLS13, crypto.SHA256}, - {TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, 32, aeadChaCha20Poly1305, crypto.SHA256}, - {TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, aeadAESGCMTLS13, crypto.SHA384}, -} - -// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder is the order in which we'll select (on the -// server) or advertise (on the client) TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suites. -// -// Cipher suites are filtered but not reordered based on the application and -// peer's preferences, meaning we'll never select a suite lower in this list if -// any higher one is available. This makes it more defensible to keep weaker -// cipher suites enabled, especially on the server side where we get the last -// word, since there are no known downgrade attacks on cipher suites selection. -// -// The list is sorted by applying the following priority rules, stopping at the -// first (most important) applicable one: -// -// - Anything else comes before RC4 -// -// RC4 has practically exploitable biases. See https://www.rc4nomore.com. -// -// - Anything else comes before CBC_SHA256 -// -// SHA-256 variants of the CBC ciphersuites don't implement any Lucky13 -// countermeasures. See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/Lucky13.html and -// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html. -// -// - Anything else comes before 3DES -// -// 3DES has 64-bit blocks, which makes it fundamentally susceptible to -// birthday attacks. See https://sweet32.info. -// -// - ECDHE comes before anything else -// -// Once we got the broken stuff out of the way, the most important -// property a cipher suite can have is forward secrecy. We don't -// implement FFDHE, so that means ECDHE. -// -// - AEADs come before CBC ciphers -// -// Even with Lucky13 countermeasures, MAC-then-Encrypt CBC cipher suites -// are fundamentally fragile, and suffered from an endless sequence of -// padding oracle attacks. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1129, -// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/12/08/poodleagain.html, and -// https://blog.cloudflare.com/yet-another-padding-oracle-in-openssl-cbc-ciphersuites/. -// -// - AES comes before ChaCha20 -// -// When AES hardware is available, AES-128-GCM and AES-256-GCM are faster -// than ChaCha20Poly1305. -// -// When AES hardware is not available, AES-128-GCM is one or more of: much -// slower, way more complex, and less safe (because not constant time) -// than ChaCha20Poly1305. -// -// We use this list if we think both peers have AES hardware, and -// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES otherwise. -// -// - AES-128 comes before AES-256 -// -// The only potential advantages of AES-256 are better multi-target -// margins, and hypothetical post-quantum properties. Neither apply to -// TLS, and AES-256 is slower due to its four extra rounds (which don't -// contribute to the advantages above). -// -// - ECDSA comes before RSA -// -// The relative order of ECDSA and RSA cipher suites doesn't matter, -// as they depend on the certificate. Pick one to get a stable order. -var cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder = []uint16{ - // AEADs w/ ECDHE - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, - - // CBC w/ ECDHE - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, - - // AEADs w/o ECDHE - TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, - TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, - - // CBC w/o ECDHE - TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, - TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, - - // 3DES - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - - // CBC_SHA256 - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, - TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, - - // RC4 - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, -} - -var cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES = []uint16{ - // ChaCha20Poly1305 - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, - - // AES-GCM w/ ECDHE - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, - - // The rest of cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder. - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, - TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, - TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, - TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, - TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, - TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, -} - -// disabledCipherSuites are not used unless explicitly listed in -// Config.CipherSuites. They MUST be at the end of cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder. -var disabledCipherSuites = []uint16{ - // CBC_SHA256 - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, - TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, - - // RC4 - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, -} - -var ( - defaultCipherSuitesLen = len(cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder) - len(disabledCipherSuites) - defaultCipherSuites = cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder[:defaultCipherSuitesLen] -) - -// defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 is also the preference order, since there are no -// disabled by default TLS 1.3 cipher suites. The same AES vs ChaCha20 logic as -// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder applies. -var defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 = []uint16{ - TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, - TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, - TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, -} - -var defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES = []uint16{ - TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, - TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, - TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, -} - -var aesgcmCiphers = map[uint16]bool{ - // TLS 1.2 - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true, - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true, - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true, - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true, - // TLS 1.3 - TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true, - TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: true, -} - -var nonAESGCMAEADCiphers = map[uint16]bool{ - // TLS 1.2 - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305: true, - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305: true, - // TLS 1.3 - TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: true, -} - -// aesgcmPreferred returns whether the first known cipher in the preference list -// is an AES-GCM cipher, implying the peer has hardware support for it. -func aesgcmPreferred(ciphers []uint16) bool { - for _, cID := range ciphers { - if c := cipherSuiteByID(cID); c != nil { - return aesgcmCiphers[cID] - } - if c := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(cID); c != nil { - return aesgcmCiphers[cID] - } - } - return false -} - -func cipherRC4(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any { - cipher, _ := rc4.NewCipher(key) - return cipher -} - -func cipher3DES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any { - block, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(key) - if isRead { - return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv) - } - return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv) -} - -func cipherAES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any { - block, _ := aes.NewCipher(key) - if isRead { - return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv) - } - return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv) -} - -// macSHA1 returns a SHA-1 based constant time MAC. -func macSHA1(key []byte) hash.Hash { - h := sha1.New - h = newConstantTimeHash(h) - return hmac.New(h, key) -} - -// macSHA256 returns a SHA-256 based MAC. This is only supported in TLS 1.2 and -// is currently only used in disabled-by-default cipher suites. -func macSHA256(key []byte) hash.Hash { - return hmac.New(sha256.New, key) -} - -type aead interface { - cipher.AEAD - - // explicitNonceLen returns the number of bytes of explicit nonce - // included in each record. This is eight for older AEADs and - // zero for modern ones. - explicitNonceLen() int -} - -const ( - aeadNonceLength = 12 - noncePrefixLength = 4 -) - -// prefixNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD and prefixes a fixed portion of the nonce to -// each call. -type prefixNonceAEAD struct { - // nonce contains the fixed part of the nonce in the first four bytes. - nonce [aeadNonceLength]byte - aead cipher.AEAD -} - -func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int { return aeadNonceLength - noncePrefixLength } -func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Overhead() int { return f.aead.Overhead() } -func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return f.NonceSize() } - -func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte { - copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce) - return f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonce[:], plaintext, additionalData) -} - -func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) { - copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce) - return f.aead.Open(out, f.nonce[:], ciphertext, additionalData) -} - -// xoredNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD by XORing in a fixed pattern to the nonce -// before each call. -type xorNonceAEAD struct { - nonceMask [aeadNonceLength]byte - aead cipher.AEAD -} - -func (f *xorNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int { return 8 } // 64-bit sequence number -func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Overhead() int { return f.aead.Overhead() } -func (f *xorNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return 0 } - -func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte { - for i, b := range nonce { - f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b - } - result := f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonceMask[:], plaintext, additionalData) - for i, b := range nonce { - f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b - } - - return result -} - -func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) { - for i, b := range nonce { - f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b - } - result, err := f.aead.Open(out, f.nonceMask[:], ciphertext, additionalData) - for i, b := range nonce { - f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b - } - - return result, err -} - -func aeadAESGCM(key, noncePrefix []byte) aead { - if len(noncePrefix) != noncePrefixLength { - panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length") - } - aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key) - if err != nil { - panic(err) - } - var aead cipher.AEAD - aead, err = cipher.NewGCM(aes) - if err != nil { - panic(err) - } - - ret := &prefixNonceAEAD{aead: aead} - copy(ret.nonce[:], noncePrefix) - return ret -} - -// AEADAESGCMTLS13 creates a new AES-GCM AEAD for TLS 1.3 -func AEADAESGCMTLS13(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD { - return aeadAESGCMTLS13(key, fixedNonce) -} - -func aeadAESGCMTLS13(key, nonceMask []byte) aead { - if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength { - panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length") - } - aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key) - if err != nil { - panic(err) - } - aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(aes) - if err != nil { - panic(err) - } - - ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead} - copy(ret.nonceMask[:], nonceMask) - return ret -} - -func aeadChaCha20Poly1305(key, nonceMask []byte) aead { - if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength { - panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length") - } - aead, err := chacha20poly1305.New(key) - if err != nil { - panic(err) - } - - ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead} - copy(ret.nonceMask[:], nonceMask) - return ret -} - -type constantTimeHash interface { - hash.Hash - ConstantTimeSum(b []byte) []byte -} - -// cthWrapper wraps any hash.Hash that implements ConstantTimeSum, and replaces -// with that all calls to Sum. It's used to obtain a ConstantTimeSum-based HMAC. -type cthWrapper struct { - h constantTimeHash -} - -func (c *cthWrapper) Size() int { return c.h.Size() } -func (c *cthWrapper) BlockSize() int { return c.h.BlockSize() } -func (c *cthWrapper) Reset() { c.h.Reset() } -func (c *cthWrapper) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return c.h.Write(p) } -func (c *cthWrapper) Sum(b []byte) []byte { return c.h.ConstantTimeSum(b) } - -func newConstantTimeHash(h func() hash.Hash) func() hash.Hash { - return func() hash.Hash { - return &cthWrapper{h().(constantTimeHash)} - } -} - -// tls10MAC implements the TLS 1.0 MAC function. RFC 2246, Section 6.2.3. -func tls10MAC(h hash.Hash, out, seq, header, data, extra []byte) []byte { - h.Reset() - h.Write(seq) - h.Write(header) - h.Write(data) - res := h.Sum(out) - if extra != nil { - h.Write(extra) - } - return res -} - -func rsaKA(version uint16) keyAgreement { - return rsaKeyAgreement{} -} - -func ecdheECDSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement { - return &ecdheKeyAgreement{ - isRSA: false, - version: version, - } -} - -func ecdheRSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement { - return &ecdheKeyAgreement{ - isRSA: true, - version: version, - } -} - -// mutualCipherSuite returns a cipherSuite given a list of supported -// ciphersuites and the id requested by the peer. -func mutualCipherSuite(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuite { - for _, id := range have { - if id == want { - return cipherSuiteByID(id) - } - } - return nil -} - -func cipherSuiteByID(id uint16) *cipherSuite { - for _, cipherSuite := range cipherSuites { - if cipherSuite.id == id { - return cipherSuite - } - } - return nil -} - -func mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 { - for _, id := range have { - if id == want { - return cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id) - } - } - return nil -} - -func cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 { - for _, cipherSuite := range cipherSuitesTLS13 { - if cipherSuite.id == id { - return cipherSuite - } - } - return nil -} - -// A list of cipher suite IDs that are, or have been, implemented by this -// package. -// -// See https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml -const ( - // TLS 1.0 - 1.2 cipher suites. - TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0x0005 - TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x000a - TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x002f - TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0035 - TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x003c - TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x009c - TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x009d - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xc007 - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc009 - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc00a - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xc011 - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc012 - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc013 - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc014 - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc023 - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc027 - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc02f - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc02b - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xc030 - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xc02c - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xcca8 - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xcca9 - - // TLS 1.3 cipher suites. - TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x1301 - TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x1302 - TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0x1303 - - // TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV isn't a standard cipher suite but an indicator - // that the client is doing version fallback. See RFC 7507. - TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV uint16 = 0x5600 - - // Legacy names for the corresponding cipher suites with the correct _SHA256 - // suffix, retained for backward compatibility. - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 = TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 = TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -) diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/common.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/common.go deleted file mode 100644 index 63e391bf..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/common.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1513 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package qtls - -import ( - "bytes" - "container/list" - "context" - "crypto" - "crypto/ecdsa" - "crypto/ed25519" - "crypto/elliptic" - "crypto/rand" - "crypto/rsa" - "crypto/sha512" - "crypto/tls" - "crypto/x509" - "errors" - "fmt" - "io" - "net" - "strings" - "sync" - "time" -) - -const ( - VersionTLS10 = 0x0301 - VersionTLS11 = 0x0302 - VersionTLS12 = 0x0303 - VersionTLS13 = 0x0304 - - // Deprecated: SSLv3 is cryptographically broken, and is no longer - // supported by this package. See golang.org/issue/32716. - VersionSSL30 = 0x0300 -) - -const ( - maxPlaintext = 16384 // maximum plaintext payload length - maxCiphertext = 16384 + 2048 // maximum ciphertext payload length - maxCiphertextTLS13 = 16384 + 256 // maximum ciphertext length in TLS 1.3 - recordHeaderLen = 5 // record header length - maxHandshake = 65536 // maximum handshake we support (protocol max is 16 MB) - maxUselessRecords = 16 // maximum number of consecutive non-advancing records -) - -// TLS record types. -type recordType uint8 - -const ( - recordTypeChangeCipherSpec recordType = 20 - recordTypeAlert recordType = 21 - recordTypeHandshake recordType = 22 - recordTypeApplicationData recordType = 23 -) - -// TLS handshake message types. -const ( - typeHelloRequest uint8 = 0 - typeClientHello uint8 = 1 - typeServerHello uint8 = 2 - typeNewSessionTicket uint8 = 4 - typeEndOfEarlyData uint8 = 5 - typeEncryptedExtensions uint8 = 8 - typeCertificate uint8 = 11 - typeServerKeyExchange uint8 = 12 - typeCertificateRequest uint8 = 13 - typeServerHelloDone uint8 = 14 - typeCertificateVerify uint8 = 15 - typeClientKeyExchange uint8 = 16 - typeFinished uint8 = 20 - typeCertificateStatus uint8 = 22 - typeKeyUpdate uint8 = 24 - typeNextProtocol uint8 = 67 // Not IANA assigned - typeMessageHash uint8 = 254 // synthetic message -) - -// TLS compression types. -const ( - compressionNone uint8 = 0 -) - -type Extension struct { - Type uint16 - Data []byte -} - -// TLS extension numbers -const ( - extensionServerName uint16 = 0 - extensionStatusRequest uint16 = 5 - extensionSupportedCurves uint16 = 10 // supported_groups in TLS 1.3, see RFC 8446, Section 4.2.7 - extensionSupportedPoints uint16 = 11 - extensionSignatureAlgorithms uint16 = 13 - extensionALPN uint16 = 16 - extensionSCT uint16 = 18 - extensionSessionTicket uint16 = 35 - extensionPreSharedKey uint16 = 41 - extensionEarlyData uint16 = 42 - extensionSupportedVersions uint16 = 43 - extensionCookie uint16 = 44 - extensionPSKModes uint16 = 45 - extensionCertificateAuthorities uint16 = 47 - extensionSignatureAlgorithmsCert uint16 = 50 - extensionKeyShare uint16 = 51 - extensionRenegotiationInfo uint16 = 0xff01 -) - -// TLS signaling cipher suite values -const ( - scsvRenegotiation uint16 = 0x00ff -) - -type EncryptionLevel uint8 - -const ( - EncryptionHandshake EncryptionLevel = iota - Encryption0RTT - EncryptionApplication -) - -// CurveID is a tls.CurveID -type CurveID = tls.CurveID - -const ( - CurveP256 CurveID = 23 - CurveP384 CurveID = 24 - CurveP521 CurveID = 25 - X25519 CurveID = 29 -) - -// TLS 1.3 Key Share. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.8. -type keyShare struct { - group CurveID - data []byte -} - -// TLS 1.3 PSK Key Exchange Modes. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.9. -const ( - pskModePlain uint8 = 0 - pskModeDHE uint8 = 1 -) - -// TLS 1.3 PSK Identity. Can be a Session Ticket, or a reference to a saved -// session. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.11. -type pskIdentity struct { - label []byte - obfuscatedTicketAge uint32 -} - -// TLS Elliptic Curve Point Formats -// https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-parameters-9 -const ( - pointFormatUncompressed uint8 = 0 -) - -// TLS CertificateStatusType (RFC 3546) -const ( - statusTypeOCSP uint8 = 1 -) - -// Certificate types (for certificateRequestMsg) -const ( - certTypeRSASign = 1 - certTypeECDSASign = 64 // ECDSA or EdDSA keys, see RFC 8422, Section 3. -) - -// Signature algorithms (for internal signaling use). Starting at 225 to avoid overlap with -// TLS 1.2 codepoints (RFC 5246, Appendix A.4.1), with which these have nothing to do. -const ( - signaturePKCS1v15 uint8 = iota + 225 - signatureRSAPSS - signatureECDSA - signatureEd25519 -) - -// directSigning is a standard Hash value that signals that no pre-hashing -// should be performed, and that the input should be signed directly. It is the -// hash function associated with the Ed25519 signature scheme. -var directSigning crypto.Hash = 0 - -// defaultSupportedSignatureAlgorithms contains the signature and hash algorithms that -// the code advertises as supported in a TLS 1.2+ ClientHello and in a TLS 1.2+ -// CertificateRequest. The two fields are merged to match with TLS 1.3. -// Note that in TLS 1.2, the ECDSA algorithms are not constrained to P-256, etc. -var defaultSupportedSignatureAlgorithms = []SignatureScheme{ - PSSWithSHA256, - ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, - Ed25519, - PSSWithSHA384, - PSSWithSHA512, - PKCS1WithSHA256, - PKCS1WithSHA384, - PKCS1WithSHA512, - ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, - ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512, - PKCS1WithSHA1, - ECDSAWithSHA1, -} - -// helloRetryRequestRandom is set as the Random value of a ServerHello -// to signal that the message is actually a HelloRetryRequest. -var helloRetryRequestRandom = []byte{ // See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.3. - 0xCF, 0x21, 0xAD, 0x74, 0xE5, 0x9A, 0x61, 0x11, - 0xBE, 0x1D, 0x8C, 0x02, 0x1E, 0x65, 0xB8, 0x91, - 0xC2, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7A, 0xBB, 0x8C, 0x5E, - 0x07, 0x9E, 0x09, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x9C, -} - -const ( - // downgradeCanaryTLS12 or downgradeCanaryTLS11 is embedded in the server - // random as a downgrade protection if the server would be capable of - // negotiating a higher version. See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.3. - downgradeCanaryTLS12 = "DOWNGRD\x01" - downgradeCanaryTLS11 = "DOWNGRD\x00" -) - -// testingOnlyForceDowngradeCanary is set in tests to force the server side to -// include downgrade canaries even if it's using its highers supported version. -var testingOnlyForceDowngradeCanary bool - -type ConnectionState = tls.ConnectionState - -// ConnectionState records basic TLS details about the connection. -type connectionState struct { - // Version is the TLS version used by the connection (e.g. VersionTLS12). - Version uint16 - - // HandshakeComplete is true if the handshake has concluded. - HandshakeComplete bool - - // DidResume is true if this connection was successfully resumed from a - // previous session with a session ticket or similar mechanism. - DidResume bool - - // CipherSuite is the cipher suite negotiated for the connection (e.g. - // TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256). - CipherSuite uint16 - - // NegotiatedProtocol is the application protocol negotiated with ALPN. - NegotiatedProtocol string - - // NegotiatedProtocolIsMutual used to indicate a mutual NPN negotiation. - // - // Deprecated: this value is always true. - NegotiatedProtocolIsMutual bool - - // ServerName is the value of the Server Name Indication extension sent by - // the client. It's available both on the server and on the client side. - ServerName string - - // PeerCertificates are the parsed certificates sent by the peer, in the - // order in which they were sent. The first element is the leaf certificate - // that the connection is verified against. - // - // On the client side, it can't be empty. On the server side, it can be - // empty if Config.ClientAuth is not RequireAnyClientCert or - // RequireAndVerifyClientCert. - PeerCertificates []*x509.Certificate - - // VerifiedChains is a list of one or more chains where the first element is - // PeerCertificates[0] and the last element is from Config.RootCAs (on the - // client side) or Config.ClientCAs (on the server side). - // - // On the client side, it's set if Config.InsecureSkipVerify is false. On - // the server side, it's set if Config.ClientAuth is VerifyClientCertIfGiven - // (and the peer provided a certificate) or RequireAndVerifyClientCert. - VerifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate - - // SignedCertificateTimestamps is a list of SCTs provided by the peer - // through the TLS handshake for the leaf certificate, if any. - SignedCertificateTimestamps [][]byte - - // OCSPResponse is a stapled Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) - // response provided by the peer for the leaf certificate, if any. - OCSPResponse []byte - - // TLSUnique contains the "tls-unique" channel binding value (see RFC 5929, - // Section 3). This value will be nil for TLS 1.3 connections and for all - // resumed connections. - // - // Deprecated: there are conditions in which this value might not be unique - // to a connection. See the Security Considerations sections of RFC 5705 and - // RFC 7627, and https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE#channelbindings. - TLSUnique []byte - - // ekm is a closure exposed via ExportKeyingMaterial. - ekm func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) -} - -type ConnectionStateWith0RTT struct { - ConnectionState - - Used0RTT bool // true if 0-RTT was both offered and accepted -} - -// ClientAuthType is tls.ClientAuthType -type ClientAuthType = tls.ClientAuthType - -const ( - NoClientCert = tls.NoClientCert - RequestClientCert = tls.RequestClientCert - RequireAnyClientCert = tls.RequireAnyClientCert - VerifyClientCertIfGiven = tls.VerifyClientCertIfGiven - RequireAndVerifyClientCert = tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert -) - -// requiresClientCert reports whether the ClientAuthType requires a client -// certificate to be provided. -func requiresClientCert(c ClientAuthType) bool { - switch c { - case RequireAnyClientCert, RequireAndVerifyClientCert: - return true - default: - return false - } -} - -// ClientSessionState contains the state needed by clients to resume TLS -// sessions. -type ClientSessionState = tls.ClientSessionState - -type clientSessionState struct { - sessionTicket []uint8 // Encrypted ticket used for session resumption with server - vers uint16 // TLS version negotiated for the session - cipherSuite uint16 // Ciphersuite negotiated for the session - masterSecret []byte // Full handshake MasterSecret, or TLS 1.3 resumption_master_secret - serverCertificates []*x509.Certificate // Certificate chain presented by the server - verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate // Certificate chains we built for verification - receivedAt time.Time // When the session ticket was received from the server - ocspResponse []byte // Stapled OCSP response presented by the server - scts [][]byte // SCTs presented by the server - - // TLS 1.3 fields. - nonce []byte // Ticket nonce sent by the server, to derive PSK - useBy time.Time // Expiration of the ticket lifetime as set by the server - ageAdd uint32 // Random obfuscation factor for sending the ticket age -} - -// ClientSessionCache is a cache of ClientSessionState objects that can be used -// by a client to resume a TLS session with a given server. ClientSessionCache -// implementations should expect to be called concurrently from different -// goroutines. Up to TLS 1.2, only ticket-based resumption is supported, not -// SessionID-based resumption. In TLS 1.3 they were merged into PSK modes, which -// are supported via this interface. -// -//go:generate sh -c "mockgen -package qtls -destination mock_client_session_cache_test.go github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19 ClientSessionCache" -type ClientSessionCache = tls.ClientSessionCache - -// SignatureScheme is a tls.SignatureScheme -type SignatureScheme = tls.SignatureScheme - -const ( - // RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms. - PKCS1WithSHA256 SignatureScheme = 0x0401 - PKCS1WithSHA384 SignatureScheme = 0x0501 - PKCS1WithSHA512 SignatureScheme = 0x0601 - - // RSASSA-PSS algorithms with public key OID rsaEncryption. - PSSWithSHA256 SignatureScheme = 0x0804 - PSSWithSHA384 SignatureScheme = 0x0805 - PSSWithSHA512 SignatureScheme = 0x0806 - - // ECDSA algorithms. Only constrained to a specific curve in TLS 1.3. - ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256 SignatureScheme = 0x0403 - ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384 SignatureScheme = 0x0503 - ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512 SignatureScheme = 0x0603 - - // EdDSA algorithms. - Ed25519 SignatureScheme = 0x0807 - - // Legacy signature and hash algorithms for TLS 1.2. - PKCS1WithSHA1 SignatureScheme = 0x0201 - ECDSAWithSHA1 SignatureScheme = 0x0203 -) - -// ClientHelloInfo contains information from a ClientHello message in order to -// guide application logic in the GetCertificate and GetConfigForClient callbacks. -type ClientHelloInfo = tls.ClientHelloInfo - -type clientHelloInfo struct { - // CipherSuites lists the CipherSuites supported by the client (e.g. - // TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256). - CipherSuites []uint16 - - // ServerName indicates the name of the server requested by the client - // in order to support virtual hosting. ServerName is only set if the - // client is using SNI (see RFC 4366, Section 3.1). - ServerName string - - // SupportedCurves lists the elliptic curves supported by the client. - // SupportedCurves is set only if the Supported Elliptic Curves - // Extension is being used (see RFC 4492, Section 5.1.1). - SupportedCurves []CurveID - - // SupportedPoints lists the point formats supported by the client. - // SupportedPoints is set only if the Supported Point Formats Extension - // is being used (see RFC 4492, Section 5.1.2). - SupportedPoints []uint8 - - // SignatureSchemes lists the signature and hash schemes that the client - // is willing to verify. SignatureSchemes is set only if the Signature - // Algorithms Extension is being used (see RFC 5246, Section 7.4.1.4.1). - SignatureSchemes []SignatureScheme - - // SupportedProtos lists the application protocols supported by the client. - // SupportedProtos is set only if the Application-Layer Protocol - // Negotiation Extension is being used (see RFC 7301, Section 3.1). - // - // Servers can select a protocol by setting Config.NextProtos in a - // GetConfigForClient return value. - SupportedProtos []string - - // SupportedVersions lists the TLS versions supported by the client. - // For TLS versions less than 1.3, this is extrapolated from the max - // version advertised by the client, so values other than the greatest - // might be rejected if used. - SupportedVersions []uint16 - - // Conn is the underlying net.Conn for the connection. Do not read - // from, or write to, this connection; that will cause the TLS - // connection to fail. - Conn net.Conn - - // config is embedded by the GetCertificate or GetConfigForClient caller, - // for use with SupportsCertificate. - config *Config - - // ctx is the context of the handshake that is in progress. - ctx context.Context -} - -// Context returns the context of the handshake that is in progress. -// This context is a child of the context passed to HandshakeContext, -// if any, and is canceled when the handshake concludes. -func (c *clientHelloInfo) Context() context.Context { - return c.ctx -} - -// CertificateRequestInfo contains information from a server's -// CertificateRequest message, which is used to demand a certificate and proof -// of control from a client. -type CertificateRequestInfo = tls.CertificateRequestInfo - -type certificateRequestInfo struct { - // AcceptableCAs contains zero or more, DER-encoded, X.501 - // Distinguished Names. These are the names of root or intermediate CAs - // that the server wishes the returned certificate to be signed by. An - // empty slice indicates that the server has no preference. - AcceptableCAs [][]byte - - // SignatureSchemes lists the signature schemes that the server is - // willing to verify. - SignatureSchemes []SignatureScheme - - // Version is the TLS version that was negotiated for this connection. - Version uint16 - - // ctx is the context of the handshake that is in progress. - ctx context.Context -} - -// Context returns the context of the handshake that is in progress. -// This context is a child of the context passed to HandshakeContext, -// if any, and is canceled when the handshake concludes. -func (c *certificateRequestInfo) Context() context.Context { - return c.ctx -} - -// RenegotiationSupport enumerates the different levels of support for TLS -// renegotiation. TLS renegotiation is the act of performing subsequent -// handshakes on a connection after the first. This significantly complicates -// the state machine and has been the source of numerous, subtle security -// issues. Initiating a renegotiation is not supported, but support for -// accepting renegotiation requests may be enabled. -// -// Even when enabled, the server may not change its identity between handshakes -// (i.e. the leaf certificate must be the same). Additionally, concurrent -// handshake and application data flow is not permitted so renegotiation can -// only be used with protocols that synchronise with the renegotiation, such as -// HTTPS. -// -// Renegotiation is not defined in TLS 1.3. -type RenegotiationSupport = tls.RenegotiationSupport - -const ( - // RenegotiateNever disables renegotiation. - RenegotiateNever = tls.RenegotiateNever - - // RenegotiateOnceAsClient allows a remote server to request - // renegotiation once per connection. - RenegotiateOnceAsClient = tls.RenegotiateOnceAsClient - - // RenegotiateFreelyAsClient allows a remote server to repeatedly - // request renegotiation. - RenegotiateFreelyAsClient = tls.RenegotiateFreelyAsClient -) - -// A Config structure is used to configure a TLS client or server. -// After one has been passed to a TLS function it must not be -// modified. A Config may be reused; the tls package will also not -// modify it. -type Config = tls.Config - -type config struct { - // Rand provides the source of entropy for nonces and RSA blinding. - // If Rand is nil, TLS uses the cryptographic random reader in package - // crypto/rand. - // The Reader must be safe for use by multiple goroutines. - Rand io.Reader - - // Time returns the current time as the number of seconds since the epoch. - // If Time is nil, TLS uses time.Now. - Time func() time.Time - - // Certificates contains one or more certificate chains to present to the - // other side of the connection. The first certificate compatible with the - // peer's requirements is selected automatically. - // - // Server configurations must set one of Certificates, GetCertificate or - // GetConfigForClient. Clients doing client-authentication may set either - // Certificates or GetClientCertificate. - // - // Note: if there are multiple Certificates, and they don't have the - // optional field Leaf set, certificate selection will incur a significant - // per-handshake performance cost. - Certificates []Certificate - - // NameToCertificate maps from a certificate name to an element of - // Certificates. Note that a certificate name can be of the form - // '*.example.com' and so doesn't have to be a domain name as such. - // - // Deprecated: NameToCertificate only allows associating a single - // certificate with a given name. Leave this field nil to let the library - // select the first compatible chain from Certificates. - NameToCertificate map[string]*Certificate - - // GetCertificate returns a Certificate based on the given - // ClientHelloInfo. It will only be called if the client supplies SNI - // information or if Certificates is empty. - // - // If GetCertificate is nil or returns nil, then the certificate is - // retrieved from NameToCertificate. If NameToCertificate is nil, the - // best element of Certificates will be used. - GetCertificate func(*ClientHelloInfo) (*Certificate, error) - - // GetClientCertificate, if not nil, is called when a server requests a - // certificate from a client. If set, the contents of Certificates will - // be ignored. - // - // If GetClientCertificate returns an error, the handshake will be - // aborted and that error will be returned. Otherwise - // GetClientCertificate must return a non-nil Certificate. If - // Certificate.Certificate is empty then no certificate will be sent to - // the server. If this is unacceptable to the server then it may abort - // the handshake. - // - // GetClientCertificate may be called multiple times for the same - // connection if renegotiation occurs or if TLS 1.3 is in use. - GetClientCertificate func(*CertificateRequestInfo) (*Certificate, error) - - // GetConfigForClient, if not nil, is called after a ClientHello is - // received from a client. It may return a non-nil Config in order to - // change the Config that will be used to handle this connection. If - // the returned Config is nil, the original Config will be used. The - // Config returned by this callback may not be subsequently modified. - // - // If GetConfigForClient is nil, the Config passed to Server() will be - // used for all connections. - // - // If SessionTicketKey was explicitly set on the returned Config, or if - // SetSessionTicketKeys was called on the returned Config, those keys will - // be used. Otherwise, the original Config keys will be used (and possibly - // rotated if they are automatically managed). - GetConfigForClient func(*ClientHelloInfo) (*Config, error) - - // VerifyPeerCertificate, if not nil, is called after normal - // certificate verification by either a TLS client or server. It - // receives the raw ASN.1 certificates provided by the peer and also - // any verified chains that normal processing found. If it returns a - // non-nil error, the handshake is aborted and that error results. - // - // If normal verification fails then the handshake will abort before - // considering this callback. If normal verification is disabled by - // setting InsecureSkipVerify, or (for a server) when ClientAuth is - // RequestClientCert or RequireAnyClientCert, then this callback will - // be considered but the verifiedChains argument will always be nil. - VerifyPeerCertificate func(rawCerts [][]byte, verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate) error - - // VerifyConnection, if not nil, is called after normal certificate - // verification and after VerifyPeerCertificate by either a TLS client - // or server. If it returns a non-nil error, the handshake is aborted - // and that error results. - // - // If normal verification fails then the handshake will abort before - // considering this callback. This callback will run for all connections - // regardless of InsecureSkipVerify or ClientAuth settings. - VerifyConnection func(ConnectionState) error - - // RootCAs defines the set of root certificate authorities - // that clients use when verifying server certificates. - // If RootCAs is nil, TLS uses the host's root CA set. - RootCAs *x509.CertPool - - // NextProtos is a list of supported application level protocols, in - // order of preference. If both peers support ALPN, the selected - // protocol will be one from this list, and the connection will fail - // if there is no mutually supported protocol. If NextProtos is empty - // or the peer doesn't support ALPN, the connection will succeed and - // ConnectionState.NegotiatedProtocol will be empty. - NextProtos []string - - // ServerName is used to verify the hostname on the returned - // certificates unless InsecureSkipVerify is given. It is also included - // in the client's handshake to support virtual hosting unless it is - // an IP address. - ServerName string - - // ClientAuth determines the server's policy for - // TLS Client Authentication. The default is NoClientCert. - ClientAuth ClientAuthType - - // ClientCAs defines the set of root certificate authorities - // that servers use if required to verify a client certificate - // by the policy in ClientAuth. - ClientCAs *x509.CertPool - - // InsecureSkipVerify controls whether a client verifies the server's - // certificate chain and host name. If InsecureSkipVerify is true, crypto/tls - // accepts any certificate presented by the server and any host name in that - // certificate. In this mode, TLS is susceptible to machine-in-the-middle - // attacks unless custom verification is used. This should be used only for - // testing or in combination with VerifyConnection or VerifyPeerCertificate. - InsecureSkipVerify bool - - // CipherSuites is a list of enabled TLS 1.0–1.2 cipher suites. The order of - // the list is ignored. Note that TLS 1.3 ciphersuites are not configurable. - // - // If CipherSuites is nil, a safe default list is used. The default cipher - // suites might change over time. - CipherSuites []uint16 - - // PreferServerCipherSuites is a legacy field and has no effect. - // - // It used to control whether the server would follow the client's or the - // server's preference. Servers now select the best mutually supported - // cipher suite based on logic that takes into account inferred client - // hardware, server hardware, and security. - // - // Deprecated: PreferServerCipherSuites is ignored. - PreferServerCipherSuites bool - - // SessionTicketsDisabled may be set to true to disable session ticket and - // PSK (resumption) support. Note that on clients, session ticket support is - // also disabled if ClientSessionCache is nil. - SessionTicketsDisabled bool - - // SessionTicketKey is used by TLS servers to provide session resumption. - // See RFC 5077 and the PSK mode of RFC 8446. If zero, it will be filled - // with random data before the first server handshake. - // - // Deprecated: if this field is left at zero, session ticket keys will be - // automatically rotated every day and dropped after seven days. For - // customizing the rotation schedule or synchronizing servers that are - // terminating connections for the same host, use SetSessionTicketKeys. - SessionTicketKey [32]byte - - // ClientSessionCache is a cache of ClientSessionState entries for TLS - // session resumption. It is only used by clients. - ClientSessionCache ClientSessionCache - - // MinVersion contains the minimum TLS version that is acceptable. - // - // By default, TLS 1.2 is currently used as the minimum when acting as a - // client, and TLS 1.0 when acting as a server. TLS 1.0 is the minimum - // supported by this package, both as a client and as a server. - // - // The client-side default can temporarily be reverted to TLS 1.0 by - // including the value "x509sha1=1" in the GODEBUG environment variable. - // Note that this option will be removed in Go 1.19 (but it will still be - // possible to set this field to VersionTLS10 explicitly). - MinVersion uint16 - - // MaxVersion contains the maximum TLS version that is acceptable. - // - // By default, the maximum version supported by this package is used, - // which is currently TLS 1.3. - MaxVersion uint16 - - // CurvePreferences contains the elliptic curves that will be used in - // an ECDHE handshake, in preference order. If empty, the default will - // be used. The client will use the first preference as the type for - // its key share in TLS 1.3. This may change in the future. - CurvePreferences []CurveID - - // DynamicRecordSizingDisabled disables adaptive sizing of TLS records. - // When true, the largest possible TLS record size is always used. When - // false, the size of TLS records may be adjusted in an attempt to - // improve latency. - DynamicRecordSizingDisabled bool - - // Renegotiation controls what types of renegotiation are supported. - // The default, none, is correct for the vast majority of applications. - Renegotiation RenegotiationSupport - - // KeyLogWriter optionally specifies a destination for TLS master secrets - // in NSS key log format that can be used to allow external programs - // such as Wireshark to decrypt TLS connections. - // See https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/Key_Log_Format. - // Use of KeyLogWriter compromises security and should only be - // used for debugging. - KeyLogWriter io.Writer - - // mutex protects sessionTicketKeys and autoSessionTicketKeys. - mutex sync.RWMutex - // sessionTicketKeys contains zero or more ticket keys. If set, it means the - // the keys were set with SessionTicketKey or SetSessionTicketKeys. The - // first key is used for new tickets and any subsequent keys can be used to - // decrypt old tickets. The slice contents are not protected by the mutex - // and are immutable. - sessionTicketKeys []ticketKey - // autoSessionTicketKeys is like sessionTicketKeys but is owned by the - // auto-rotation logic. See Config.ticketKeys. - autoSessionTicketKeys []ticketKey -} - -// A RecordLayer handles encrypting and decrypting of TLS messages. -type RecordLayer interface { - SetReadKey(encLevel EncryptionLevel, suite *CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte) - SetWriteKey(encLevel EncryptionLevel, suite *CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte) - ReadHandshakeMessage() ([]byte, error) - WriteRecord([]byte) (int, error) - SendAlert(uint8) -} - -type ExtraConfig struct { - // GetExtensions, if not nil, is called before a message that allows - // sending of extensions is sent. - // Currently only implemented for the ClientHello message (for the client) - // and for the EncryptedExtensions message (for the server). - // Only valid for TLS 1.3. - GetExtensions func(handshakeMessageType uint8) []Extension - - // ReceivedExtensions, if not nil, is called when a message that allows the - // inclusion of extensions is received. - // It is called with an empty slice of extensions, if the message didn't - // contain any extensions. - // Currently only implemented for the ClientHello message (sent by the - // client) and for the EncryptedExtensions message (sent by the server). - // Only valid for TLS 1.3. - ReceivedExtensions func(handshakeMessageType uint8, exts []Extension) - - // AlternativeRecordLayer is used by QUIC - AlternativeRecordLayer RecordLayer - - // Enforce the selection of a supported application protocol. - // Only works for TLS 1.3. - // If enabled, client and server have to agree on an application protocol. - // Otherwise, connection establishment fails. - EnforceNextProtoSelection bool - - // If MaxEarlyData is greater than 0, the client will be allowed to send early - // data when resuming a session. - // Requires the AlternativeRecordLayer to be set. - // - // It has no meaning on the client. - MaxEarlyData uint32 - - // The Accept0RTT callback is called when the client offers 0-RTT. - // The server then has to decide if it wants to accept or reject 0-RTT. - // It is only used for servers. - Accept0RTT func(appData []byte) bool - - // 0RTTRejected is called when the server rejectes 0-RTT. - // It is only used for clients. - Rejected0RTT func() - - // If set, the client will export the 0-RTT key when resuming a session that - // allows sending of early data. - // Requires the AlternativeRecordLayer to be set. - // - // It has no meaning to the server. - Enable0RTT bool - - // Is called when the client saves a session ticket to the session ticket. - // This gives the application the opportunity to save some data along with the ticket, - // which can be restored when the session ticket is used. - GetAppDataForSessionState func() []byte - - // Is called when the client uses a session ticket. - // Restores the application data that was saved earlier on GetAppDataForSessionTicket. - SetAppDataFromSessionState func([]byte) -} - -// Clone clones. -func (c *ExtraConfig) Clone() *ExtraConfig { - return &ExtraConfig{ - GetExtensions: c.GetExtensions, - ReceivedExtensions: c.ReceivedExtensions, - AlternativeRecordLayer: c.AlternativeRecordLayer, - EnforceNextProtoSelection: c.EnforceNextProtoSelection, - MaxEarlyData: c.MaxEarlyData, - Enable0RTT: c.Enable0RTT, - Accept0RTT: c.Accept0RTT, - Rejected0RTT: c.Rejected0RTT, - GetAppDataForSessionState: c.GetAppDataForSessionState, - SetAppDataFromSessionState: c.SetAppDataFromSessionState, - } -} - -func (c *ExtraConfig) usesAlternativeRecordLayer() bool { - return c != nil && c.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil -} - -const ( - // ticketKeyNameLen is the number of bytes of identifier that is prepended to - // an encrypted session ticket in order to identify the key used to encrypt it. - ticketKeyNameLen = 16 - - // ticketKeyLifetime is how long a ticket key remains valid and can be used to - // resume a client connection. - ticketKeyLifetime = 7 * 24 * time.Hour // 7 days - - // ticketKeyRotation is how often the server should rotate the session ticket key - // that is used for new tickets. - ticketKeyRotation = 24 * time.Hour -) - -// ticketKey is the internal representation of a session ticket key. -type ticketKey struct { - // keyName is an opaque byte string that serves to identify the session - // ticket key. It's exposed as plaintext in every session ticket. - keyName [ticketKeyNameLen]byte - aesKey [16]byte - hmacKey [16]byte - // created is the time at which this ticket key was created. See Config.ticketKeys. - created time.Time -} - -// ticketKeyFromBytes converts from the external representation of a session -// ticket key to a ticketKey. Externally, session ticket keys are 32 random -// bytes and this function expands that into sufficient name and key material. -func (c *config) ticketKeyFromBytes(b [32]byte) (key ticketKey) { - hashed := sha512.Sum512(b[:]) - copy(key.keyName[:], hashed[:ticketKeyNameLen]) - copy(key.aesKey[:], hashed[ticketKeyNameLen:ticketKeyNameLen+16]) - copy(key.hmacKey[:], hashed[ticketKeyNameLen+16:ticketKeyNameLen+32]) - key.created = c.time() - return key -} - -// maxSessionTicketLifetime is the maximum allowed lifetime of a TLS 1.3 session -// ticket, and the lifetime we set for tickets we send. -const maxSessionTicketLifetime = 7 * 24 * time.Hour - -// Clone returns a shallow clone of c or nil if c is nil. It is safe to clone a Config that is -// being used concurrently by a TLS client or server. -func (c *config) Clone() *config { - if c == nil { - return nil - } - c.mutex.RLock() - defer c.mutex.RUnlock() - return &config{ - Rand: c.Rand, - Time: c.Time, - Certificates: c.Certificates, - NameToCertificate: c.NameToCertificate, - GetCertificate: c.GetCertificate, - GetClientCertificate: c.GetClientCertificate, - GetConfigForClient: c.GetConfigForClient, - VerifyPeerCertificate: c.VerifyPeerCertificate, - VerifyConnection: c.VerifyConnection, - RootCAs: c.RootCAs, - NextProtos: c.NextProtos, - ServerName: c.ServerName, - ClientAuth: c.ClientAuth, - ClientCAs: c.ClientCAs, - InsecureSkipVerify: c.InsecureSkipVerify, - CipherSuites: c.CipherSuites, - PreferServerCipherSuites: c.PreferServerCipherSuites, - SessionTicketsDisabled: c.SessionTicketsDisabled, - SessionTicketKey: c.SessionTicketKey, - ClientSessionCache: c.ClientSessionCache, - MinVersion: c.MinVersion, - MaxVersion: c.MaxVersion, - CurvePreferences: c.CurvePreferences, - DynamicRecordSizingDisabled: c.DynamicRecordSizingDisabled, - Renegotiation: c.Renegotiation, - KeyLogWriter: c.KeyLogWriter, - sessionTicketKeys: c.sessionTicketKeys, - autoSessionTicketKeys: c.autoSessionTicketKeys, - } -} - -// deprecatedSessionTicketKey is set as the prefix of SessionTicketKey if it was -// randomized for backwards compatibility but is not in use. -var deprecatedSessionTicketKey = []byte("DEPRECATED") - -// initLegacySessionTicketKeyRLocked ensures the legacy SessionTicketKey field is -// randomized if empty, and that sessionTicketKeys is populated from it otherwise. -func (c *config) initLegacySessionTicketKeyRLocked() { - // Don't write if SessionTicketKey is already defined as our deprecated string, - // or if it is defined by the user but sessionTicketKeys is already set. - if c.SessionTicketKey != [32]byte{} && - (bytes.HasPrefix(c.SessionTicketKey[:], deprecatedSessionTicketKey) || len(c.sessionTicketKeys) > 0) { - return - } - - // We need to write some data, so get an exclusive lock and re-check any conditions. - c.mutex.RUnlock() - defer c.mutex.RLock() - c.mutex.Lock() - defer c.mutex.Unlock() - if c.SessionTicketKey == [32]byte{} { - if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.rand(), c.SessionTicketKey[:]); err != nil { - panic(fmt.Sprintf("tls: unable to generate random session ticket key: %v", err)) - } - // Write the deprecated prefix at the beginning so we know we created - // it. This key with the DEPRECATED prefix isn't used as an actual - // session ticket key, and is only randomized in case the application - // reuses it for some reason. - copy(c.SessionTicketKey[:], deprecatedSessionTicketKey) - } else if !bytes.HasPrefix(c.SessionTicketKey[:], deprecatedSessionTicketKey) && len(c.sessionTicketKeys) == 0 { - c.sessionTicketKeys = []ticketKey{c.ticketKeyFromBytes(c.SessionTicketKey)} - } - -} - -// ticketKeys returns the ticketKeys for this connection. -// If configForClient has explicitly set keys, those will -// be returned. Otherwise, the keys on c will be used and -// may be rotated if auto-managed. -// During rotation, any expired session ticket keys are deleted from -// c.sessionTicketKeys. If the session ticket key that is currently -// encrypting tickets (ie. the first ticketKey in c.sessionTicketKeys) -// is not fresh, then a new session ticket key will be -// created and prepended to c.sessionTicketKeys. -func (c *config) ticketKeys(configForClient *config) []ticketKey { - // If the ConfigForClient callback returned a Config with explicitly set - // keys, use those, otherwise just use the original Config. - if configForClient != nil { - configForClient.mutex.RLock() - if configForClient.SessionTicketsDisabled { - return nil - } - configForClient.initLegacySessionTicketKeyRLocked() - if len(configForClient.sessionTicketKeys) != 0 { - ret := configForClient.sessionTicketKeys - configForClient.mutex.RUnlock() - return ret - } - configForClient.mutex.RUnlock() - } - - c.mutex.RLock() - defer c.mutex.RUnlock() - if c.SessionTicketsDisabled { - return nil - } - c.initLegacySessionTicketKeyRLocked() - if len(c.sessionTicketKeys) != 0 { - return c.sessionTicketKeys - } - // Fast path for the common case where the key is fresh enough. - if len(c.autoSessionTicketKeys) > 0 && c.time().Sub(c.autoSessionTicketKeys[0].created) < ticketKeyRotation { - return c.autoSessionTicketKeys - } - - // autoSessionTicketKeys are managed by auto-rotation. - c.mutex.RUnlock() - defer c.mutex.RLock() - c.mutex.Lock() - defer c.mutex.Unlock() - // Re-check the condition in case it changed since obtaining the new lock. - if len(c.autoSessionTicketKeys) == 0 || c.time().Sub(c.autoSessionTicketKeys[0].created) >= ticketKeyRotation { - var newKey [32]byte - if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.rand(), newKey[:]); err != nil { - panic(fmt.Sprintf("unable to generate random session ticket key: %v", err)) - } - valid := make([]ticketKey, 0, len(c.autoSessionTicketKeys)+1) - valid = append(valid, c.ticketKeyFromBytes(newKey)) - for _, k := range c.autoSessionTicketKeys { - // While rotating the current key, also remove any expired ones. - if c.time().Sub(k.created) < ticketKeyLifetime { - valid = append(valid, k) - } - } - c.autoSessionTicketKeys = valid - } - return c.autoSessionTicketKeys -} - -// SetSessionTicketKeys updates the session ticket keys for a server. -// -// The first key will be used when creating new tickets, while all keys can be -// used for decrypting tickets. It is safe to call this function while the -// server is running in order to rotate the session ticket keys. The function -// will panic if keys is empty. -// -// Calling this function will turn off automatic session ticket key rotation. -// -// If multiple servers are terminating connections for the same host they should -// all have the same session ticket keys. If the session ticket keys leaks, -// previously recorded and future TLS connections using those keys might be -// compromised. -func (c *config) SetSessionTicketKeys(keys [][32]byte) { - if len(keys) == 0 { - panic("tls: keys must have at least one key") - } - - newKeys := make([]ticketKey, len(keys)) - for i, bytes := range keys { - newKeys[i] = c.ticketKeyFromBytes(bytes) - } - - c.mutex.Lock() - c.sessionTicketKeys = newKeys - c.mutex.Unlock() -} - -func (c *config) rand() io.Reader { - r := c.Rand - if r == nil { - return rand.Reader - } - return r -} - -func (c *config) time() time.Time { - t := c.Time - if t == nil { - t = time.Now - } - return t() -} - -func (c *config) cipherSuites() []uint16 { - if needFIPS() { - return fipsCipherSuites(c) - } - if c.CipherSuites != nil { - return c.CipherSuites - } - return defaultCipherSuites -} - -var supportedVersions = []uint16{ - VersionTLS13, - VersionTLS12, - VersionTLS11, - VersionTLS10, -} - -// roleClient and roleServer are meant to call supportedVersions and parents -// with more readability at the callsite. -const roleClient = true -const roleServer = false - -func (c *config) supportedVersions(isClient bool) []uint16 { - versions := make([]uint16, 0, len(supportedVersions)) - for _, v := range supportedVersions { - if needFIPS() && (v < fipsMinVersion(c) || v > fipsMaxVersion(c)) { - continue - } - if (c == nil || c.MinVersion == 0) && - isClient && v < VersionTLS12 { - continue - } - if c != nil && c.MinVersion != 0 && v < c.MinVersion { - continue - } - if c != nil && c.MaxVersion != 0 && v > c.MaxVersion { - continue - } - versions = append(versions, v) - } - return versions -} - -func (c *config) maxSupportedVersion(isClient bool) uint16 { - supportedVersions := c.supportedVersions(isClient) - if len(supportedVersions) == 0 { - return 0 - } - return supportedVersions[0] -} - -// supportedVersionsFromMax returns a list of supported versions derived from a -// legacy maximum version value. Note that only versions supported by this -// library are returned. Any newer peer will use supportedVersions anyway. -func supportedVersionsFromMax(maxVersion uint16) []uint16 { - versions := make([]uint16, 0, len(supportedVersions)) - for _, v := range supportedVersions { - if v > maxVersion { - continue - } - versions = append(versions, v) - } - return versions -} - -var defaultCurvePreferences = []CurveID{X25519, CurveP256, CurveP384, CurveP521} - -func (c *config) curvePreferences() []CurveID { - if needFIPS() { - return fipsCurvePreferences(c) - } - if c == nil || len(c.CurvePreferences) == 0 { - return defaultCurvePreferences - } - return c.CurvePreferences -} - -func (c *config) supportsCurve(curve CurveID) bool { - for _, cc := range c.curvePreferences() { - if cc == curve { - return true - } - } - return false -} - -// mutualVersion returns the protocol version to use given the advertised -// versions of the peer. Priority is given to the peer preference order. -func (c *config) mutualVersion(isClient bool, peerVersions []uint16) (uint16, bool) { - supportedVersions := c.supportedVersions(isClient) - for _, peerVersion := range peerVersions { - for _, v := range supportedVersions { - if v == peerVersion { - return v, true - } - } - } - return 0, false -} - -var errNoCertificates = errors.New("tls: no certificates configured") - -// getCertificate returns the best certificate for the given ClientHelloInfo, -// defaulting to the first element of c.Certificates. -func (c *config) getCertificate(clientHello *ClientHelloInfo) (*Certificate, error) { - if c.GetCertificate != nil && - (len(c.Certificates) == 0 || len(clientHello.ServerName) > 0) { - cert, err := c.GetCertificate(clientHello) - if cert != nil || err != nil { - return cert, err - } - } - - if len(c.Certificates) == 0 { - return nil, errNoCertificates - } - - if len(c.Certificates) == 1 { - // There's only one choice, so no point doing any work. - return &c.Certificates[0], nil - } - - if c.NameToCertificate != nil { - name := strings.ToLower(clientHello.ServerName) - if cert, ok := c.NameToCertificate[name]; ok { - return cert, nil - } - if len(name) > 0 { - labels := strings.Split(name, ".") - labels[0] = "*" - wildcardName := strings.Join(labels, ".") - if cert, ok := c.NameToCertificate[wildcardName]; ok { - return cert, nil - } - } - } - - for _, cert := range c.Certificates { - if err := clientHello.SupportsCertificate(&cert); err == nil { - return &cert, nil - } - } - - // If nothing matches, return the first certificate. - return &c.Certificates[0], nil -} - -// SupportsCertificate returns nil if the provided certificate is supported by -// the client that sent the ClientHello. Otherwise, it returns an error -// describing the reason for the incompatibility. -// -// If this ClientHelloInfo was passed to a GetConfigForClient or GetCertificate -// callback, this method will take into account the associated Config. Note that -// if GetConfigForClient returns a different Config, the change can't be -// accounted for by this method. -// -// This function will call x509.ParseCertificate unless c.Leaf is set, which can -// incur a significant performance cost. -func (chi *clientHelloInfo) SupportsCertificate(c *Certificate) error { - // Note we don't currently support certificate_authorities nor - // signature_algorithms_cert, and don't check the algorithms of the - // signatures on the chain (which anyway are a SHOULD, see RFC 8446, - // Section 4.4.2.2). - - config := chi.config - if config == nil { - config = &Config{} - } - conf := fromConfig(config) - vers, ok := conf.mutualVersion(roleServer, chi.SupportedVersions) - if !ok { - return errors.New("no mutually supported protocol versions") - } - - // If the client specified the name they are trying to connect to, the - // certificate needs to be valid for it. - if chi.ServerName != "" { - x509Cert, err := leafCertificate(c) - if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse certificate: %w", err) - } - if err := x509Cert.VerifyHostname(chi.ServerName); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("certificate is not valid for requested server name: %w", err) - } - } - - // supportsRSAFallback returns nil if the certificate and connection support - // the static RSA key exchange, and unsupported otherwise. The logic for - // supporting static RSA is completely disjoint from the logic for - // supporting signed key exchanges, so we just check it as a fallback. - supportsRSAFallback := func(unsupported error) error { - // TLS 1.3 dropped support for the static RSA key exchange. - if vers == VersionTLS13 { - return unsupported - } - // The static RSA key exchange works by decrypting a challenge with the - // RSA private key, not by signing, so check the PrivateKey implements - // crypto.Decrypter, like *rsa.PrivateKey does. - if priv, ok := c.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter); ok { - if _, ok := priv.Public().(*rsa.PublicKey); !ok { - return unsupported - } - } else { - return unsupported - } - // Finally, there needs to be a mutual cipher suite that uses the static - // RSA key exchange instead of ECDHE. - rsaCipherSuite := selectCipherSuite(chi.CipherSuites, conf.cipherSuites(), func(c *cipherSuite) bool { - if c.flags&suiteECDHE != 0 { - return false - } - if vers < VersionTLS12 && c.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 { - return false - } - return true - }) - if rsaCipherSuite == nil { - return unsupported - } - return nil - } - - // If the client sent the signature_algorithms extension, ensure it supports - // schemes we can use with this certificate and TLS version. - if len(chi.SignatureSchemes) > 0 { - if _, err := selectSignatureScheme(vers, c, chi.SignatureSchemes); err != nil { - return supportsRSAFallback(err) - } - } - - // In TLS 1.3 we are done because supported_groups is only relevant to the - // ECDHE computation, point format negotiation is removed, cipher suites are - // only relevant to the AEAD choice, and static RSA does not exist. - if vers == VersionTLS13 { - return nil - } - - // The only signed key exchange we support is ECDHE. - if !supportsECDHE(conf, chi.SupportedCurves, chi.SupportedPoints) { - return supportsRSAFallback(errors.New("client doesn't support ECDHE, can only use legacy RSA key exchange")) - } - - var ecdsaCipherSuite bool - if priv, ok := c.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer); ok { - switch pub := priv.Public().(type) { - case *ecdsa.PublicKey: - var curve CurveID - switch pub.Curve { - case elliptic.P256(): - curve = CurveP256 - case elliptic.P384(): - curve = CurveP384 - case elliptic.P521(): - curve = CurveP521 - default: - return supportsRSAFallback(unsupportedCertificateError(c)) - } - var curveOk bool - for _, c := range chi.SupportedCurves { - if c == curve && conf.supportsCurve(c) { - curveOk = true - break - } - } - if !curveOk { - return errors.New("client doesn't support certificate curve") - } - ecdsaCipherSuite = true - case ed25519.PublicKey: - if vers < VersionTLS12 || len(chi.SignatureSchemes) == 0 { - return errors.New("connection doesn't support Ed25519") - } - ecdsaCipherSuite = true - case *rsa.PublicKey: - default: - return supportsRSAFallback(unsupportedCertificateError(c)) - } - } else { - return supportsRSAFallback(unsupportedCertificateError(c)) - } - - // Make sure that there is a mutually supported cipher suite that works with - // this certificate. Cipher suite selection will then apply the logic in - // reverse to pick it. See also serverHandshakeState.cipherSuiteOk. - cipherSuite := selectCipherSuite(chi.CipherSuites, conf.cipherSuites(), func(c *cipherSuite) bool { - if c.flags&suiteECDHE == 0 { - return false - } - if c.flags&suiteECSign != 0 { - if !ecdsaCipherSuite { - return false - } - } else { - if ecdsaCipherSuite { - return false - } - } - if vers < VersionTLS12 && c.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 { - return false - } - return true - }) - if cipherSuite == nil { - return supportsRSAFallback(errors.New("client doesn't support any cipher suites compatible with the certificate")) - } - - return nil -} - -// BuildNameToCertificate parses c.Certificates and builds c.NameToCertificate -// from the CommonName and SubjectAlternateName fields of each of the leaf -// certificates. -// -// Deprecated: NameToCertificate only allows associating a single certificate -// with a given name. Leave that field nil to let the library select the first -// compatible chain from Certificates. -func (c *config) BuildNameToCertificate() { - c.NameToCertificate = make(map[string]*Certificate) - for i := range c.Certificates { - cert := &c.Certificates[i] - x509Cert, err := leafCertificate(cert) - if err != nil { - continue - } - // If SANs are *not* present, some clients will consider the certificate - // valid for the name in the Common Name. - if x509Cert.Subject.CommonName != "" && len(x509Cert.DNSNames) == 0 { - c.NameToCertificate[x509Cert.Subject.CommonName] = cert - } - for _, san := range x509Cert.DNSNames { - c.NameToCertificate[san] = cert - } - } -} - -const ( - keyLogLabelTLS12 = "CLIENT_RANDOM" - keyLogLabelEarlyTraffic = "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET" - keyLogLabelClientHandshake = "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET" - keyLogLabelServerHandshake = "SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET" - keyLogLabelClientTraffic = "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0" - keyLogLabelServerTraffic = "SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0" -) - -func (c *config) writeKeyLog(label string, clientRandom, secret []byte) error { - if c.KeyLogWriter == nil { - return nil - } - - logLine := []byte(fmt.Sprintf("%s %x %x\n", label, clientRandom, secret)) - - writerMutex.Lock() - _, err := c.KeyLogWriter.Write(logLine) - writerMutex.Unlock() - - return err -} - -// writerMutex protects all KeyLogWriters globally. It is rarely enabled, -// and is only for debugging, so a global mutex saves space. -var writerMutex sync.Mutex - -// A Certificate is a chain of one or more certificates, leaf first. -type Certificate = tls.Certificate - -// leaf returns the parsed leaf certificate, either from c.Leaf or by parsing -// the corresponding c.Certificate[0]. -func leafCertificate(c *Certificate) (*x509.Certificate, error) { - if c.Leaf != nil { - return c.Leaf, nil - } - return x509.ParseCertificate(c.Certificate[0]) -} - -type handshakeMessage interface { - marshal() ([]byte, error) - unmarshal([]byte) bool -} - -// lruSessionCache is a ClientSessionCache implementation that uses an LRU -// caching strategy. -type lruSessionCache struct { - sync.Mutex - - m map[string]*list.Element - q *list.List - capacity int -} - -type lruSessionCacheEntry struct { - sessionKey string - state *ClientSessionState -} - -// NewLRUClientSessionCache returns a ClientSessionCache with the given -// capacity that uses an LRU strategy. If capacity is < 1, a default capacity -// is used instead. -func NewLRUClientSessionCache(capacity int) ClientSessionCache { - const defaultSessionCacheCapacity = 64 - - if capacity < 1 { - capacity = defaultSessionCacheCapacity - } - return &lruSessionCache{ - m: make(map[string]*list.Element), - q: list.New(), - capacity: capacity, - } -} - -// Put adds the provided (sessionKey, cs) pair to the cache. If cs is nil, the entry -// corresponding to sessionKey is removed from the cache instead. -func (c *lruSessionCache) Put(sessionKey string, cs *ClientSessionState) { - c.Lock() - defer c.Unlock() - - if elem, ok := c.m[sessionKey]; ok { - if cs == nil { - c.q.Remove(elem) - delete(c.m, sessionKey) - } else { - entry := elem.Value.(*lruSessionCacheEntry) - entry.state = cs - c.q.MoveToFront(elem) - } - return - } - - if c.q.Len() < c.capacity { - entry := &lruSessionCacheEntry{sessionKey, cs} - c.m[sessionKey] = c.q.PushFront(entry) - return - } - - elem := c.q.Back() - entry := elem.Value.(*lruSessionCacheEntry) - delete(c.m, entry.sessionKey) - entry.sessionKey = sessionKey - entry.state = cs - c.q.MoveToFront(elem) - c.m[sessionKey] = elem -} - -// Get returns the ClientSessionState value associated with a given key. It -// returns (nil, false) if no value is found. -func (c *lruSessionCache) Get(sessionKey string) (*ClientSessionState, bool) { - c.Lock() - defer c.Unlock() - - if elem, ok := c.m[sessionKey]; ok { - c.q.MoveToFront(elem) - return elem.Value.(*lruSessionCacheEntry).state, true - } - return nil, false -} - -var emptyConfig Config - -func defaultConfig() *Config { - return &emptyConfig -} - -func unexpectedMessageError(wanted, got any) error { - return fmt.Errorf("tls: received unexpected handshake message of type %T when waiting for %T", got, wanted) -} - -func isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(sigAlg SignatureScheme, supportedSignatureAlgorithms []SignatureScheme) bool { - for _, s := range supportedSignatureAlgorithms { - if s == sigAlg { - return true - } - } - return false -} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/conn.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/conn.go deleted file mode 100644 index 19f24e95..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/conn.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1649 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -// TLS low level connection and record layer - -package qtls - -import ( - "bytes" - "context" - "crypto/cipher" - "crypto/subtle" - "crypto/x509" - "errors" - "fmt" - "hash" - "io" - "net" - "sync" - "sync/atomic" - "time" -) - -// A Conn represents a secured connection. -// It implements the net.Conn interface. -type Conn struct { - // constant - conn net.Conn - isClient bool - handshakeFn func(context.Context) error // (*Conn).clientHandshake or serverHandshake - - // handshakeStatus is 1 if the connection is currently transferring - // application data (i.e. is not currently processing a handshake). - // handshakeStatus == 1 implies handshakeErr == nil. - // This field is only to be accessed with sync/atomic. - handshakeStatus uint32 - // constant after handshake; protected by handshakeMutex - handshakeMutex sync.Mutex - handshakeErr error // error resulting from handshake - vers uint16 // TLS version - haveVers bool // version has been negotiated - config *config // configuration passed to constructor - // handshakes counts the number of handshakes performed on the - // connection so far. If renegotiation is disabled then this is either - // zero or one. - extraConfig *ExtraConfig - - handshakes int - didResume bool // whether this connection was a session resumption - cipherSuite uint16 - ocspResponse []byte // stapled OCSP response - scts [][]byte // signed certificate timestamps from server - peerCertificates []*x509.Certificate - // verifiedChains contains the certificate chains that we built, as - // opposed to the ones presented by the server. - verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate - // serverName contains the server name indicated by the client, if any. - serverName string - // secureRenegotiation is true if the server echoed the secure - // renegotiation extension. (This is meaningless as a server because - // renegotiation is not supported in that case.) - secureRenegotiation bool - // ekm is a closure for exporting keying material. - ekm func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) - // For the client: - // resumptionSecret is the resumption_master_secret for handling - // NewSessionTicket messages. nil if config.SessionTicketsDisabled. - // For the server: - // resumptionSecret is the resumption_master_secret for generating - // NewSessionTicket messages. Only used when the alternative record - // layer is set. nil if config.SessionTicketsDisabled. - resumptionSecret []byte - - // ticketKeys is the set of active session ticket keys for this - // connection. The first one is used to encrypt new tickets and - // all are tried to decrypt tickets. - ticketKeys []ticketKey - - // clientFinishedIsFirst is true if the client sent the first Finished - // message during the most recent handshake. This is recorded because - // the first transmitted Finished message is the tls-unique - // channel-binding value. - clientFinishedIsFirst bool - - // closeNotifyErr is any error from sending the alertCloseNotify record. - closeNotifyErr error - // closeNotifySent is true if the Conn attempted to send an - // alertCloseNotify record. - closeNotifySent bool - - // clientFinished and serverFinished contain the Finished message sent - // by the client or server in the most recent handshake. This is - // retained to support the renegotiation extension and tls-unique - // channel-binding. - clientFinished [12]byte - serverFinished [12]byte - - // clientProtocol is the negotiated ALPN protocol. - clientProtocol string - - // input/output - in, out halfConn - rawInput bytes.Buffer // raw input, starting with a record header - input bytes.Reader // application data waiting to be read, from rawInput.Next - hand bytes.Buffer // handshake data waiting to be read - buffering bool // whether records are buffered in sendBuf - sendBuf []byte // a buffer of records waiting to be sent - - // bytesSent counts the bytes of application data sent. - // packetsSent counts packets. - bytesSent int64 - packetsSent int64 - - // retryCount counts the number of consecutive non-advancing records - // received by Conn.readRecord. That is, records that neither advance the - // handshake, nor deliver application data. Protected by in.Mutex. - retryCount int - - // activeCall is an atomic int32; the low bit is whether Close has - // been called. the rest of the bits are the number of goroutines - // in Conn.Write. - activeCall int32 - - used0RTT bool - - tmp [16]byte - - connStateMutex sync.Mutex - connState ConnectionStateWith0RTT -} - -// Access to net.Conn methods. -// Cannot just embed net.Conn because that would -// export the struct field too. - -// LocalAddr returns the local network address. -func (c *Conn) LocalAddr() net.Addr { - return c.conn.LocalAddr() -} - -// RemoteAddr returns the remote network address. -func (c *Conn) RemoteAddr() net.Addr { - return c.conn.RemoteAddr() -} - -// SetDeadline sets the read and write deadlines associated with the connection. -// A zero value for t means Read and Write will not time out. -// After a Write has timed out, the TLS state is corrupt and all future writes will return the same error. -func (c *Conn) SetDeadline(t time.Time) error { - return c.conn.SetDeadline(t) -} - -// SetReadDeadline sets the read deadline on the underlying connection. -// A zero value for t means Read will not time out. -func (c *Conn) SetReadDeadline(t time.Time) error { - return c.conn.SetReadDeadline(t) -} - -// SetWriteDeadline sets the write deadline on the underlying connection. -// A zero value for t means Write will not time out. -// After a Write has timed out, the TLS state is corrupt and all future writes will return the same error. -func (c *Conn) SetWriteDeadline(t time.Time) error { - return c.conn.SetWriteDeadline(t) -} - -// NetConn returns the underlying connection that is wrapped by c. -// Note that writing to or reading from this connection directly will corrupt the -// TLS session. -func (c *Conn) NetConn() net.Conn { - return c.conn -} - -// A halfConn represents one direction of the record layer -// connection, either sending or receiving. -type halfConn struct { - sync.Mutex - - err error // first permanent error - version uint16 // protocol version - cipher any // cipher algorithm - mac hash.Hash - seq [8]byte // 64-bit sequence number - - scratchBuf [13]byte // to avoid allocs; interface method args escape - - nextCipher any // next encryption state - nextMac hash.Hash // next MAC algorithm - - trafficSecret []byte // current TLS 1.3 traffic secret - - setKeyCallback func(encLevel EncryptionLevel, suite *CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte) -} - -type permanentError struct { - err net.Error -} - -func (e *permanentError) Error() string { return e.err.Error() } -func (e *permanentError) Unwrap() error { return e.err } -func (e *permanentError) Timeout() bool { return e.err.Timeout() } -func (e *permanentError) Temporary() bool { return false } - -func (hc *halfConn) setErrorLocked(err error) error { - if e, ok := err.(net.Error); ok { - hc.err = &permanentError{err: e} - } else { - hc.err = err - } - return hc.err -} - -// prepareCipherSpec sets the encryption and MAC states -// that a subsequent changeCipherSpec will use. -func (hc *halfConn) prepareCipherSpec(version uint16, cipher any, mac hash.Hash) { - hc.version = version - hc.nextCipher = cipher - hc.nextMac = mac -} - -// changeCipherSpec changes the encryption and MAC states -// to the ones previously passed to prepareCipherSpec. -func (hc *halfConn) changeCipherSpec() error { - if hc.nextCipher == nil || hc.version == VersionTLS13 { - return alertInternalError - } - hc.cipher = hc.nextCipher - hc.mac = hc.nextMac - hc.nextCipher = nil - hc.nextMac = nil - for i := range hc.seq { - hc.seq[i] = 0 - } - return nil -} - -func (hc *halfConn) exportKey(encLevel EncryptionLevel, suite *cipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte) { - if hc.setKeyCallback != nil { - s := &CipherSuiteTLS13{ - ID: suite.id, - KeyLen: suite.keyLen, - Hash: suite.hash, - AEAD: func(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD { return suite.aead(key, fixedNonce) }, - } - hc.setKeyCallback(encLevel, s, trafficSecret) - } -} - -func (hc *halfConn) setTrafficSecret(suite *cipherSuiteTLS13, secret []byte) { - hc.trafficSecret = secret - key, iv := suite.trafficKey(secret) - hc.cipher = suite.aead(key, iv) - for i := range hc.seq { - hc.seq[i] = 0 - } -} - -// incSeq increments the sequence number. -func (hc *halfConn) incSeq() { - for i := 7; i >= 0; i-- { - hc.seq[i]++ - if hc.seq[i] != 0 { - return - } - } - - // Not allowed to let sequence number wrap. - // Instead, must renegotiate before it does. - // Not likely enough to bother. - panic("TLS: sequence number wraparound") -} - -// explicitNonceLen returns the number of bytes of explicit nonce or IV included -// in each record. Explicit nonces are present only in CBC modes after TLS 1.0 -// and in certain AEAD modes in TLS 1.2. -func (hc *halfConn) explicitNonceLen() int { - if hc.cipher == nil { - return 0 - } - - switch c := hc.cipher.(type) { - case cipher.Stream: - return 0 - case aead: - return c.explicitNonceLen() - case cbcMode: - // TLS 1.1 introduced a per-record explicit IV to fix the BEAST attack. - if hc.version >= VersionTLS11 { - return c.BlockSize() - } - return 0 - default: - panic("unknown cipher type") - } -} - -// extractPadding returns, in constant time, the length of the padding to remove -// from the end of payload. It also returns a byte which is equal to 255 if the -// padding was valid and 0 otherwise. See RFC 2246, Section 6.2.3.2. -func extractPadding(payload []byte) (toRemove int, good byte) { - if len(payload) < 1 { - return 0, 0 - } - - paddingLen := payload[len(payload)-1] - t := uint(len(payload)-1) - uint(paddingLen) - // if len(payload) >= (paddingLen - 1) then the MSB of t is zero - good = byte(int32(^t) >> 31) - - // The maximum possible padding length plus the actual length field - toCheck := 256 - // The length of the padded data is public, so we can use an if here - if toCheck > len(payload) { - toCheck = len(payload) - } - - for i := 0; i < toCheck; i++ { - t := uint(paddingLen) - uint(i) - // if i <= paddingLen then the MSB of t is zero - mask := byte(int32(^t) >> 31) - b := payload[len(payload)-1-i] - good &^= mask&paddingLen ^ mask&b - } - - // We AND together the bits of good and replicate the result across - // all the bits. - good &= good << 4 - good &= good << 2 - good &= good << 1 - good = uint8(int8(good) >> 7) - - // Zero the padding length on error. This ensures any unchecked bytes - // are included in the MAC. Otherwise, an attacker that could - // distinguish MAC failures from padding failures could mount an attack - // similar to POODLE in SSL 3.0: given a good ciphertext that uses a - // full block's worth of padding, replace the final block with another - // block. If the MAC check passed but the padding check failed, the - // last byte of that block decrypted to the block size. - // - // See also macAndPaddingGood logic below. - paddingLen &= good - - toRemove = int(paddingLen) + 1 - return -} - -func roundUp(a, b int) int { - return a + (b-a%b)%b -} - -// cbcMode is an interface for block ciphers using cipher block chaining. -type cbcMode interface { - cipher.BlockMode - SetIV([]byte) -} - -// decrypt authenticates and decrypts the record if protection is active at -// this stage. The returned plaintext might overlap with the input. -func (hc *halfConn) decrypt(record []byte) ([]byte, recordType, error) { - var plaintext []byte - typ := recordType(record[0]) - payload := record[recordHeaderLen:] - - // In TLS 1.3, change_cipher_spec messages are to be ignored without being - // decrypted. See RFC 8446, Appendix D.4. - if hc.version == VersionTLS13 && typ == recordTypeChangeCipherSpec { - return payload, typ, nil - } - - paddingGood := byte(255) - paddingLen := 0 - - explicitNonceLen := hc.explicitNonceLen() - - if hc.cipher != nil { - switch c := hc.cipher.(type) { - case cipher.Stream: - c.XORKeyStream(payload, payload) - case aead: - if len(payload) < explicitNonceLen { - return nil, 0, alertBadRecordMAC - } - nonce := payload[:explicitNonceLen] - if len(nonce) == 0 { - nonce = hc.seq[:] - } - payload = payload[explicitNonceLen:] - - var additionalData []byte - if hc.version == VersionTLS13 { - additionalData = record[:recordHeaderLen] - } else { - additionalData = append(hc.scratchBuf[:0], hc.seq[:]...) - additionalData = append(additionalData, record[:3]...) - n := len(payload) - c.Overhead() - additionalData = append(additionalData, byte(n>>8), byte(n)) - } - - var err error - plaintext, err = c.Open(payload[:0], nonce, payload, additionalData) - if err != nil { - return nil, 0, alertBadRecordMAC - } - case cbcMode: - blockSize := c.BlockSize() - minPayload := explicitNonceLen + roundUp(hc.mac.Size()+1, blockSize) - if len(payload)%blockSize != 0 || len(payload) < minPayload { - return nil, 0, alertBadRecordMAC - } - - if explicitNonceLen > 0 { - c.SetIV(payload[:explicitNonceLen]) - payload = payload[explicitNonceLen:] - } - c.CryptBlocks(payload, payload) - - // In a limited attempt to protect against CBC padding oracles like - // Lucky13, the data past paddingLen (which is secret) is passed to - // the MAC function as extra data, to be fed into the HMAC after - // computing the digest. This makes the MAC roughly constant time as - // long as the digest computation is constant time and does not - // affect the subsequent write, modulo cache effects. - paddingLen, paddingGood = extractPadding(payload) - default: - panic("unknown cipher type") - } - - if hc.version == VersionTLS13 { - if typ != recordTypeApplicationData { - return nil, 0, alertUnexpectedMessage - } - if len(plaintext) > maxPlaintext+1 { - return nil, 0, alertRecordOverflow - } - // Remove padding and find the ContentType scanning from the end. - for i := len(plaintext) - 1; i >= 0; i-- { - if plaintext[i] != 0 { - typ = recordType(plaintext[i]) - plaintext = plaintext[:i] - break - } - if i == 0 { - return nil, 0, alertUnexpectedMessage - } - } - } - } else { - plaintext = payload - } - - if hc.mac != nil { - macSize := hc.mac.Size() - if len(payload) < macSize { - return nil, 0, alertBadRecordMAC - } - - n := len(payload) - macSize - paddingLen - n = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(int(uint32(n)>>31), 0, n) // if n < 0 { n = 0 } - record[3] = byte(n >> 8) - record[4] = byte(n) - remoteMAC := payload[n : n+macSize] - localMAC := tls10MAC(hc.mac, hc.scratchBuf[:0], hc.seq[:], record[:recordHeaderLen], payload[:n], payload[n+macSize:]) - - // This is equivalent to checking the MACs and paddingGood - // separately, but in constant-time to prevent distinguishing - // padding failures from MAC failures. Depending on what value - // of paddingLen was returned on bad padding, distinguishing - // bad MAC from bad padding can lead to an attack. - // - // See also the logic at the end of extractPadding. - macAndPaddingGood := subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(localMAC, remoteMAC) & int(paddingGood) - if macAndPaddingGood != 1 { - return nil, 0, alertBadRecordMAC - } - - plaintext = payload[:n] - } - - hc.incSeq() - return plaintext, typ, nil -} - -func (c *Conn) setAlternativeRecordLayer() { - if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil { - c.in.setKeyCallback = c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer.SetReadKey - c.out.setKeyCallback = c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer.SetWriteKey - } -} - -// sliceForAppend extends the input slice by n bytes. head is the full extended -// slice, while tail is the appended part. If the original slice has sufficient -// capacity no allocation is performed. -func sliceForAppend(in []byte, n int) (head, tail []byte) { - if total := len(in) + n; cap(in) >= total { - head = in[:total] - } else { - head = make([]byte, total) - copy(head, in) - } - tail = head[len(in):] - return -} - -// encrypt encrypts payload, adding the appropriate nonce and/or MAC, and -// appends it to record, which must already contain the record header. -func (hc *halfConn) encrypt(record, payload []byte, rand io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { - if hc.cipher == nil { - return append(record, payload...), nil - } - - var explicitNonce []byte - if explicitNonceLen := hc.explicitNonceLen(); explicitNonceLen > 0 { - record, explicitNonce = sliceForAppend(record, explicitNonceLen) - if _, isCBC := hc.cipher.(cbcMode); !isCBC && explicitNonceLen < 16 { - // The AES-GCM construction in TLS has an explicit nonce so that the - // nonce can be random. However, the nonce is only 8 bytes which is - // too small for a secure, random nonce. Therefore we use the - // sequence number as the nonce. The 3DES-CBC construction also has - // an 8 bytes nonce but its nonces must be unpredictable (see RFC - // 5246, Appendix F.3), forcing us to use randomness. That's not - // 3DES' biggest problem anyway because the birthday bound on block - // collision is reached first due to its similarly small block size - // (see the Sweet32 attack). - copy(explicitNonce, hc.seq[:]) - } else { - if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, explicitNonce); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - } - } - - var dst []byte - switch c := hc.cipher.(type) { - case cipher.Stream: - mac := tls10MAC(hc.mac, hc.scratchBuf[:0], hc.seq[:], record[:recordHeaderLen], payload, nil) - record, dst = sliceForAppend(record, len(payload)+len(mac)) - c.XORKeyStream(dst[:len(payload)], payload) - c.XORKeyStream(dst[len(payload):], mac) - case aead: - nonce := explicitNonce - if len(nonce) == 0 { - nonce = hc.seq[:] - } - - if hc.version == VersionTLS13 { - record = append(record, payload...) - - // Encrypt the actual ContentType and replace the plaintext one. - record = append(record, record[0]) - record[0] = byte(recordTypeApplicationData) - - n := len(payload) + 1 + c.Overhead() - record[3] = byte(n >> 8) - record[4] = byte(n) - - record = c.Seal(record[:recordHeaderLen], - nonce, record[recordHeaderLen:], record[:recordHeaderLen]) - } else { - additionalData := append(hc.scratchBuf[:0], hc.seq[:]...) - additionalData = append(additionalData, record[:recordHeaderLen]...) - record = c.Seal(record, nonce, payload, additionalData) - } - case cbcMode: - mac := tls10MAC(hc.mac, hc.scratchBuf[:0], hc.seq[:], record[:recordHeaderLen], payload, nil) - blockSize := c.BlockSize() - plaintextLen := len(payload) + len(mac) - paddingLen := blockSize - plaintextLen%blockSize - record, dst = sliceForAppend(record, plaintextLen+paddingLen) - copy(dst, payload) - copy(dst[len(payload):], mac) - for i := plaintextLen; i < len(dst); i++ { - dst[i] = byte(paddingLen - 1) - } - if len(explicitNonce) > 0 { - c.SetIV(explicitNonce) - } - c.CryptBlocks(dst, dst) - default: - panic("unknown cipher type") - } - - // Update length to include nonce, MAC and any block padding needed. - n := len(record) - recordHeaderLen - record[3] = byte(n >> 8) - record[4] = byte(n) - hc.incSeq() - - return record, nil -} - -// RecordHeaderError is returned when a TLS record header is invalid. -type RecordHeaderError struct { - // Msg contains a human readable string that describes the error. - Msg string - // RecordHeader contains the five bytes of TLS record header that - // triggered the error. - RecordHeader [5]byte - // Conn provides the underlying net.Conn in the case that a client - // sent an initial handshake that didn't look like TLS. - // It is nil if there's already been a handshake or a TLS alert has - // been written to the connection. - Conn net.Conn -} - -func (e RecordHeaderError) Error() string { return "tls: " + e.Msg } - -func (c *Conn) newRecordHeaderError(conn net.Conn, msg string) (err RecordHeaderError) { - err.Msg = msg - err.Conn = conn - copy(err.RecordHeader[:], c.rawInput.Bytes()) - return err -} - -func (c *Conn) readRecord() error { - return c.readRecordOrCCS(false) -} - -func (c *Conn) readChangeCipherSpec() error { - return c.readRecordOrCCS(true) -} - -// readRecordOrCCS reads one or more TLS records from the connection and -// updates the record layer state. Some invariants: -// - c.in must be locked -// - c.input must be empty -// -// During the handshake one and only one of the following will happen: -// - c.hand grows -// - c.in.changeCipherSpec is called -// - an error is returned -// -// After the handshake one and only one of the following will happen: -// - c.hand grows -// - c.input is set -// - an error is returned -func (c *Conn) readRecordOrCCS(expectChangeCipherSpec bool) error { - if c.in.err != nil { - return c.in.err - } - handshakeComplete := c.handshakeComplete() - - // This function modifies c.rawInput, which owns the c.input memory. - if c.input.Len() != 0 { - return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: internal error: attempted to read record with pending application data")) - } - c.input.Reset(nil) - - // Read header, payload. - if err := c.readFromUntil(c.conn, recordHeaderLen); err != nil { - // RFC 8446, Section 6.1 suggests that EOF without an alertCloseNotify - // is an error, but popular web sites seem to do this, so we accept it - // if and only if at the record boundary. - if err == io.ErrUnexpectedEOF && c.rawInput.Len() == 0 { - err = io.EOF - } - if e, ok := err.(net.Error); !ok || !e.Temporary() { - c.in.setErrorLocked(err) - } - return err - } - hdr := c.rawInput.Bytes()[:recordHeaderLen] - typ := recordType(hdr[0]) - - // No valid TLS record has a type of 0x80, however SSLv2 handshakes - // start with a uint16 length where the MSB is set and the first record - // is always < 256 bytes long. Therefore typ == 0x80 strongly suggests - // an SSLv2 client. - if !handshakeComplete && typ == 0x80 { - c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) - return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.newRecordHeaderError(nil, "unsupported SSLv2 handshake received")) - } - - vers := uint16(hdr[1])<<8 | uint16(hdr[2]) - n := int(hdr[3])<<8 | int(hdr[4]) - if c.haveVers && c.vers != VersionTLS13 && vers != c.vers { - c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) - msg := fmt.Sprintf("received record with version %x when expecting version %x", vers, c.vers) - return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.newRecordHeaderError(nil, msg)) - } - if !c.haveVers { - // First message, be extra suspicious: this might not be a TLS - // client. Bail out before reading a full 'body', if possible. - // The current max version is 3.3 so if the version is >= 16.0, - // it's probably not real. - if (typ != recordTypeAlert && typ != recordTypeHandshake) || vers >= 0x1000 { - return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.newRecordHeaderError(c.conn, "first record does not look like a TLS handshake")) - } - } - if c.vers == VersionTLS13 && n > maxCiphertextTLS13 || n > maxCiphertext { - c.sendAlert(alertRecordOverflow) - msg := fmt.Sprintf("oversized record received with length %d", n) - return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.newRecordHeaderError(nil, msg)) - } - if err := c.readFromUntil(c.conn, recordHeaderLen+n); err != nil { - if e, ok := err.(net.Error); !ok || !e.Temporary() { - c.in.setErrorLocked(err) - } - return err - } - - // Process message. - record := c.rawInput.Next(recordHeaderLen + n) - data, typ, err := c.in.decrypt(record) - if err != nil { - return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(err.(alert))) - } - if len(data) > maxPlaintext { - return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertRecordOverflow)) - } - - // Application Data messages are always protected. - if c.in.cipher == nil && typ == recordTypeApplicationData { - return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) - } - - if typ != recordTypeAlert && typ != recordTypeChangeCipherSpec && len(data) > 0 { - // This is a state-advancing message: reset the retry count. - c.retryCount = 0 - } - - // Handshake messages MUST NOT be interleaved with other record types in TLS 1.3. - if c.vers == VersionTLS13 && typ != recordTypeHandshake && c.hand.Len() > 0 { - return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) - } - - switch typ { - default: - return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) - - case recordTypeAlert: - if len(data) != 2 { - return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) - } - if alert(data[1]) == alertCloseNotify { - return c.in.setErrorLocked(io.EOF) - } - if c.vers == VersionTLS13 { - return c.in.setErrorLocked(&net.OpError{Op: "remote error", Err: alert(data[1])}) - } - switch data[0] { - case alertLevelWarning: - // Drop the record on the floor and retry. - return c.retryReadRecord(expectChangeCipherSpec) - case alertLevelError: - return c.in.setErrorLocked(&net.OpError{Op: "remote error", Err: alert(data[1])}) - default: - return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) - } - - case recordTypeChangeCipherSpec: - if len(data) != 1 || data[0] != 1 { - return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)) - } - // Handshake messages are not allowed to fragment across the CCS. - if c.hand.Len() > 0 { - return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) - } - // In TLS 1.3, change_cipher_spec records are ignored until the - // Finished. See RFC 8446, Appendix D.4. Note that according to Section - // 5, a server can send a ChangeCipherSpec before its ServerHello, when - // c.vers is still unset. That's not useful though and suspicious if the - // server then selects a lower protocol version, so don't allow that. - if c.vers == VersionTLS13 { - return c.retryReadRecord(expectChangeCipherSpec) - } - if !expectChangeCipherSpec { - return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) - } - if err := c.in.changeCipherSpec(); err != nil { - return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(err.(alert))) - } - - case recordTypeApplicationData: - if !handshakeComplete || expectChangeCipherSpec { - return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) - } - // Some OpenSSL servers send empty records in order to randomize the - // CBC IV. Ignore a limited number of empty records. - if len(data) == 0 { - return c.retryReadRecord(expectChangeCipherSpec) - } - // Note that data is owned by c.rawInput, following the Next call above, - // to avoid copying the plaintext. This is safe because c.rawInput is - // not read from or written to until c.input is drained. - c.input.Reset(data) - - case recordTypeHandshake: - if len(data) == 0 || expectChangeCipherSpec { - return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) - } - c.hand.Write(data) - } - - return nil -} - -// retryReadRecord recurs into readRecordOrCCS to drop a non-advancing record, like -// a warning alert, empty application_data, or a change_cipher_spec in TLS 1.3. -func (c *Conn) retryReadRecord(expectChangeCipherSpec bool) error { - c.retryCount++ - if c.retryCount > maxUselessRecords { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: too many ignored records")) - } - return c.readRecordOrCCS(expectChangeCipherSpec) -} - -// atLeastReader reads from R, stopping with EOF once at least N bytes have been -// read. It is different from an io.LimitedReader in that it doesn't cut short -// the last Read call, and in that it considers an early EOF an error. -type atLeastReader struct { - R io.Reader - N int64 -} - -func (r *atLeastReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { - if r.N <= 0 { - return 0, io.EOF - } - n, err := r.R.Read(p) - r.N -= int64(n) // won't underflow unless len(p) >= n > 9223372036854775809 - if r.N > 0 && err == io.EOF { - return n, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF - } - if r.N <= 0 && err == nil { - return n, io.EOF - } - return n, err -} - -// readFromUntil reads from r into c.rawInput until c.rawInput contains -// at least n bytes or else returns an error. -func (c *Conn) readFromUntil(r io.Reader, n int) error { - if c.rawInput.Len() >= n { - return nil - } - needs := n - c.rawInput.Len() - // There might be extra input waiting on the wire. Make a best effort - // attempt to fetch it so that it can be used in (*Conn).Read to - // "predict" closeNotify alerts. - c.rawInput.Grow(needs + bytes.MinRead) - _, err := c.rawInput.ReadFrom(&atLeastReader{r, int64(needs)}) - return err -} - -// sendAlert sends a TLS alert message. -func (c *Conn) sendAlertLocked(err alert) error { - switch err { - case alertNoRenegotiation, alertCloseNotify: - c.tmp[0] = alertLevelWarning - default: - c.tmp[0] = alertLevelError - } - c.tmp[1] = byte(err) - - _, writeErr := c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeAlert, c.tmp[0:2]) - if err == alertCloseNotify { - // closeNotify is a special case in that it isn't an error. - return writeErr - } - - return c.out.setErrorLocked(&net.OpError{Op: "local error", Err: err}) -} - -// sendAlert sends a TLS alert message. -func (c *Conn) sendAlert(err alert) error { - if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil { - c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer.SendAlert(uint8(err)) - return &net.OpError{Op: "local error", Err: err} - } - - c.out.Lock() - defer c.out.Unlock() - return c.sendAlertLocked(err) -} - -const ( - // tcpMSSEstimate is a conservative estimate of the TCP maximum segment - // size (MSS). A constant is used, rather than querying the kernel for - // the actual MSS, to avoid complexity. The value here is the IPv6 - // minimum MTU (1280 bytes) minus the overhead of an IPv6 header (40 - // bytes) and a TCP header with timestamps (32 bytes). - tcpMSSEstimate = 1208 - - // recordSizeBoostThreshold is the number of bytes of application data - // sent after which the TLS record size will be increased to the - // maximum. - recordSizeBoostThreshold = 128 * 1024 -) - -// maxPayloadSizeForWrite returns the maximum TLS payload size to use for the -// next application data record. There is the following trade-off: -// -// - For latency-sensitive applications, such as web browsing, each TLS -// record should fit in one TCP segment. -// - For throughput-sensitive applications, such as large file transfers, -// larger TLS records better amortize framing and encryption overheads. -// -// A simple heuristic that works well in practice is to use small records for -// the first 1MB of data, then use larger records for subsequent data, and -// reset back to smaller records after the connection becomes idle. See "High -// Performance Web Networking", Chapter 4, or: -// https://www.igvita.com/2013/10/24/optimizing-tls-record-size-and-buffering-latency/ -// -// In the interests of simplicity and determinism, this code does not attempt -// to reset the record size once the connection is idle, however. -func (c *Conn) maxPayloadSizeForWrite(typ recordType) int { - if c.config.DynamicRecordSizingDisabled || typ != recordTypeApplicationData { - return maxPlaintext - } - - if c.bytesSent >= recordSizeBoostThreshold { - return maxPlaintext - } - - // Subtract TLS overheads to get the maximum payload size. - payloadBytes := tcpMSSEstimate - recordHeaderLen - c.out.explicitNonceLen() - if c.out.cipher != nil { - switch ciph := c.out.cipher.(type) { - case cipher.Stream: - payloadBytes -= c.out.mac.Size() - case cipher.AEAD: - payloadBytes -= ciph.Overhead() - case cbcMode: - blockSize := ciph.BlockSize() - // The payload must fit in a multiple of blockSize, with - // room for at least one padding byte. - payloadBytes = (payloadBytes & ^(blockSize - 1)) - 1 - // The MAC is appended before padding so affects the - // payload size directly. - payloadBytes -= c.out.mac.Size() - default: - panic("unknown cipher type") - } - } - if c.vers == VersionTLS13 { - payloadBytes-- // encrypted ContentType - } - - // Allow packet growth in arithmetic progression up to max. - pkt := c.packetsSent - c.packetsSent++ - if pkt > 1000 { - return maxPlaintext // avoid overflow in multiply below - } - - n := payloadBytes * int(pkt+1) - if n > maxPlaintext { - n = maxPlaintext - } - return n -} - -func (c *Conn) write(data []byte) (int, error) { - if c.buffering { - c.sendBuf = append(c.sendBuf, data...) - return len(data), nil - } - - n, err := c.conn.Write(data) - c.bytesSent += int64(n) - return n, err -} - -func (c *Conn) flush() (int, error) { - if len(c.sendBuf) == 0 { - return 0, nil - } - - n, err := c.conn.Write(c.sendBuf) - c.bytesSent += int64(n) - c.sendBuf = nil - c.buffering = false - return n, err -} - -// outBufPool pools the record-sized scratch buffers used by writeRecordLocked. -var outBufPool = sync.Pool{ - New: func() any { - return new([]byte) - }, -} - -// writeRecordLocked writes a TLS record with the given type and payload to the -// connection and updates the record layer state. -func (c *Conn) writeRecordLocked(typ recordType, data []byte) (int, error) { - outBufPtr := outBufPool.Get().(*[]byte) - outBuf := *outBufPtr - defer func() { - // You might be tempted to simplify this by just passing &outBuf to Put, - // but that would make the local copy of the outBuf slice header escape - // to the heap, causing an allocation. Instead, we keep around the - // pointer to the slice header returned by Get, which is already on the - // heap, and overwrite and return that. - *outBufPtr = outBuf - outBufPool.Put(outBufPtr) - }() - - var n int - for len(data) > 0 { - m := len(data) - if maxPayload := c.maxPayloadSizeForWrite(typ); m > maxPayload { - m = maxPayload - } - - _, outBuf = sliceForAppend(outBuf[:0], recordHeaderLen) - outBuf[0] = byte(typ) - vers := c.vers - if vers == 0 { - // Some TLS servers fail if the record version is - // greater than TLS 1.0 for the initial ClientHello. - vers = VersionTLS10 - } else if vers == VersionTLS13 { - // TLS 1.3 froze the record layer version to 1.2. - // See RFC 8446, Section 5.1. - vers = VersionTLS12 - } - outBuf[1] = byte(vers >> 8) - outBuf[2] = byte(vers) - outBuf[3] = byte(m >> 8) - outBuf[4] = byte(m) - - var err error - outBuf, err = c.out.encrypt(outBuf, data[:m], c.config.rand()) - if err != nil { - return n, err - } - if _, err := c.write(outBuf); err != nil { - return n, err - } - n += m - data = data[m:] - } - - if typ == recordTypeChangeCipherSpec && c.vers != VersionTLS13 { - if err := c.out.changeCipherSpec(); err != nil { - return n, c.sendAlertLocked(err.(alert)) - } - } - - return n, nil -} - -// writeHandshakeRecord writes a handshake message to the connection and updates -// the record layer state. If transcript is non-nil the marshalled message is -// written to it. -func (c *Conn) writeHandshakeRecord(msg handshakeMessage, transcript transcriptHash) (int, error) { - data, err := msg.marshal() - if err != nil { - return 0, err - } - - c.out.Lock() - defer c.out.Unlock() - - if transcript != nil { - transcript.Write(data) - } - - if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil { - return c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer.WriteRecord(data) - } - - return c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeHandshake, data) -} - -// writeChangeCipherRecord writes a ChangeCipherSpec message to the connection and -// updates the record layer state. -func (c *Conn) writeChangeCipherRecord() error { - if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil { - return nil - } - - c.out.Lock() - defer c.out.Unlock() - _, err := c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}) - return err -} - -// readHandshake reads the next handshake message from -// the record layer. If transcript is non-nil, the message -// is written to the passed transcriptHash. -func (c *Conn) readHandshake(transcript transcriptHash) (any, error) { - var data []byte - if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil { - var err error - data, err = c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer.ReadHandshakeMessage() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - } else { - for c.hand.Len() < 4 { - if err := c.readRecord(); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - } - - data = c.hand.Bytes() - n := int(data[1])<<16 | int(data[2])<<8 | int(data[3]) - if n > maxHandshake { - c.sendAlertLocked(alertInternalError) - return nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("tls: handshake message of length %d bytes exceeds maximum of %d bytes", n, maxHandshake)) - } - for c.hand.Len() < 4+n { - if err := c.readRecord(); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - } - data = c.hand.Next(4 + n) - } - var m handshakeMessage - switch data[0] { - case typeHelloRequest: - m = new(helloRequestMsg) - case typeClientHello: - m = new(clientHelloMsg) - case typeServerHello: - m = new(serverHelloMsg) - case typeNewSessionTicket: - if c.vers == VersionTLS13 { - m = new(newSessionTicketMsgTLS13) - } else { - m = new(newSessionTicketMsg) - } - case typeCertificate: - if c.vers == VersionTLS13 { - m = new(certificateMsgTLS13) - } else { - m = new(certificateMsg) - } - case typeCertificateRequest: - if c.vers == VersionTLS13 { - m = new(certificateRequestMsgTLS13) - } else { - m = &certificateRequestMsg{ - hasSignatureAlgorithm: c.vers >= VersionTLS12, - } - } - case typeCertificateStatus: - m = new(certificateStatusMsg) - case typeServerKeyExchange: - m = new(serverKeyExchangeMsg) - case typeServerHelloDone: - m = new(serverHelloDoneMsg) - case typeClientKeyExchange: - m = new(clientKeyExchangeMsg) - case typeCertificateVerify: - m = &certificateVerifyMsg{ - hasSignatureAlgorithm: c.vers >= VersionTLS12, - } - case typeFinished: - m = new(finishedMsg) - case typeEncryptedExtensions: - m = new(encryptedExtensionsMsg) - case typeEndOfEarlyData: - m = new(endOfEarlyDataMsg) - case typeKeyUpdate: - m = new(keyUpdateMsg) - default: - return nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) - } - - // The handshake message unmarshalers - // expect to be able to keep references to data, - // so pass in a fresh copy that won't be overwritten. - data = append([]byte(nil), data...) - - if !m.unmarshal(data) { - return nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) - } - - if transcript != nil { - transcript.Write(data) - } - - return m, nil -} - -var ( - errShutdown = errors.New("tls: protocol is shutdown") -) - -// Write writes data to the connection. -// -// As Write calls Handshake, in order to prevent indefinite blocking a deadline -// must be set for both Read and Write before Write is called when the handshake -// has not yet completed. See SetDeadline, SetReadDeadline, and -// SetWriteDeadline. -func (c *Conn) Write(b []byte) (int, error) { - // interlock with Close below - for { - x := atomic.LoadInt32(&c.activeCall) - if x&1 != 0 { - return 0, net.ErrClosed - } - if atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&c.activeCall, x, x+2) { - break - } - } - defer atomic.AddInt32(&c.activeCall, -2) - - if err := c.Handshake(); err != nil { - return 0, err - } - - c.out.Lock() - defer c.out.Unlock() - - if err := c.out.err; err != nil { - return 0, err - } - - if !c.handshakeComplete() { - return 0, alertInternalError - } - - if c.closeNotifySent { - return 0, errShutdown - } - - // TLS 1.0 is susceptible to a chosen-plaintext - // attack when using block mode ciphers due to predictable IVs. - // This can be prevented by splitting each Application Data - // record into two records, effectively randomizing the IV. - // - // https://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt - // https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=665814 - // https://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/01/15/beastfollowup.html - - var m int - if len(b) > 1 && c.vers == VersionTLS10 { - if _, ok := c.out.cipher.(cipher.BlockMode); ok { - n, err := c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeApplicationData, b[:1]) - if err != nil { - return n, c.out.setErrorLocked(err) - } - m, b = 1, b[1:] - } - } - - n, err := c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeApplicationData, b) - return n + m, c.out.setErrorLocked(err) -} - -// handleRenegotiation processes a HelloRequest handshake message. -func (c *Conn) handleRenegotiation() error { - if c.vers == VersionTLS13 { - return errors.New("tls: internal error: unexpected renegotiation") - } - - msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - helloReq, ok := msg.(*helloRequestMsg) - if !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return unexpectedMessageError(helloReq, msg) - } - - if !c.isClient { - return c.sendAlert(alertNoRenegotiation) - } - - switch c.config.Renegotiation { - case RenegotiateNever: - return c.sendAlert(alertNoRenegotiation) - case RenegotiateOnceAsClient: - if c.handshakes > 1 { - return c.sendAlert(alertNoRenegotiation) - } - case RenegotiateFreelyAsClient: - // Ok. - default: - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return errors.New("tls: unknown Renegotiation value") - } - - c.handshakeMutex.Lock() - defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock() - - atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 0) - if c.handshakeErr = c.clientHandshake(context.Background()); c.handshakeErr == nil { - c.handshakes++ - } - return c.handshakeErr -} - -func (c *Conn) HandlePostHandshakeMessage() error { - return c.handlePostHandshakeMessage() -} - -// handlePostHandshakeMessage processes a handshake message arrived after the -// handshake is complete. Up to TLS 1.2, it indicates the start of a renegotiation. -func (c *Conn) handlePostHandshakeMessage() error { - if c.vers != VersionTLS13 { - return c.handleRenegotiation() - } - - msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - c.retryCount++ - if c.retryCount > maxUselessRecords { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: too many non-advancing records")) - } - - switch msg := msg.(type) { - case *newSessionTicketMsgTLS13: - return c.handleNewSessionTicket(msg) - case *keyUpdateMsg: - return c.handleKeyUpdate(msg) - default: - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return fmt.Errorf("tls: received unexpected handshake message of type %T", msg) - } -} - -func (c *Conn) handleKeyUpdate(keyUpdate *keyUpdateMsg) error { - cipherSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(c.cipherSuite) - if cipherSuite == nil { - return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)) - } - - newSecret := cipherSuite.nextTrafficSecret(c.in.trafficSecret) - c.in.setTrafficSecret(cipherSuite, newSecret) - - if keyUpdate.updateRequested { - c.out.Lock() - defer c.out.Unlock() - - msg := &keyUpdateMsg{} - msgBytes, err := msg.marshal() - if err != nil { - return err - } - _, err = c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeHandshake, msgBytes) - if err != nil { - // Surface the error at the next write. - c.out.setErrorLocked(err) - return nil - } - - newSecret := cipherSuite.nextTrafficSecret(c.out.trafficSecret) - c.out.setTrafficSecret(cipherSuite, newSecret) - } - - return nil -} - -// Read reads data from the connection. -// -// As Read calls Handshake, in order to prevent indefinite blocking a deadline -// must be set for both Read and Write before Read is called when the handshake -// has not yet completed. See SetDeadline, SetReadDeadline, and -// SetWriteDeadline. -func (c *Conn) Read(b []byte) (int, error) { - if err := c.Handshake(); err != nil { - return 0, err - } - if len(b) == 0 { - // Put this after Handshake, in case people were calling - // Read(nil) for the side effect of the Handshake. - return 0, nil - } - - c.in.Lock() - defer c.in.Unlock() - - for c.input.Len() == 0 { - if err := c.readRecord(); err != nil { - return 0, err - } - for c.hand.Len() > 0 { - if err := c.handlePostHandshakeMessage(); err != nil { - return 0, err - } - } - } - - n, _ := c.input.Read(b) - - // If a close-notify alert is waiting, read it so that we can return (n, - // EOF) instead of (n, nil), to signal to the HTTP response reading - // goroutine that the connection is now closed. This eliminates a race - // where the HTTP response reading goroutine would otherwise not observe - // the EOF until its next read, by which time a client goroutine might - // have already tried to reuse the HTTP connection for a new request. - // See https://golang.org/cl/76400046 and https://golang.org/issue/3514 - if n != 0 && c.input.Len() == 0 && c.rawInput.Len() > 0 && - recordType(c.rawInput.Bytes()[0]) == recordTypeAlert { - if err := c.readRecord(); err != nil { - return n, err // will be io.EOF on closeNotify - } - } - - return n, nil -} - -// Close closes the connection. -func (c *Conn) Close() error { - // Interlock with Conn.Write above. - var x int32 - for { - x = atomic.LoadInt32(&c.activeCall) - if x&1 != 0 { - return net.ErrClosed - } - if atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&c.activeCall, x, x|1) { - break - } - } - if x != 0 { - // io.Writer and io.Closer should not be used concurrently. - // If Close is called while a Write is currently in-flight, - // interpret that as a sign that this Close is really just - // being used to break the Write and/or clean up resources and - // avoid sending the alertCloseNotify, which may block - // waiting on handshakeMutex or the c.out mutex. - return c.conn.Close() - } - - var alertErr error - if c.handshakeComplete() { - if err := c.closeNotify(); err != nil { - alertErr = fmt.Errorf("tls: failed to send closeNotify alert (but connection was closed anyway): %w", err) - } - } - - if err := c.conn.Close(); err != nil { - return err - } - return alertErr -} - -var errEarlyCloseWrite = errors.New("tls: CloseWrite called before handshake complete") - -// CloseWrite shuts down the writing side of the connection. It should only be -// called once the handshake has completed and does not call CloseWrite on the -// underlying connection. Most callers should just use Close. -func (c *Conn) CloseWrite() error { - if !c.handshakeComplete() { - return errEarlyCloseWrite - } - - return c.closeNotify() -} - -func (c *Conn) closeNotify() error { - c.out.Lock() - defer c.out.Unlock() - - if !c.closeNotifySent { - // Set a Write Deadline to prevent possibly blocking forever. - c.SetWriteDeadline(time.Now().Add(time.Second * 5)) - c.closeNotifyErr = c.sendAlertLocked(alertCloseNotify) - c.closeNotifySent = true - // Any subsequent writes will fail. - c.SetWriteDeadline(time.Now()) - } - return c.closeNotifyErr -} - -// Handshake runs the client or server handshake -// protocol if it has not yet been run. -// -// Most uses of this package need not call Handshake explicitly: the -// first Read or Write will call it automatically. -// -// For control over canceling or setting a timeout on a handshake, use -// HandshakeContext or the Dialer's DialContext method instead. -func (c *Conn) Handshake() error { - return c.HandshakeContext(context.Background()) -} - -// HandshakeContext runs the client or server handshake -// protocol if it has not yet been run. -// -// The provided Context must be non-nil. If the context is canceled before -// the handshake is complete, the handshake is interrupted and an error is returned. -// Once the handshake has completed, cancellation of the context will not affect the -// connection. -// -// Most uses of this package need not call HandshakeContext explicitly: the -// first Read or Write will call it automatically. -func (c *Conn) HandshakeContext(ctx context.Context) error { - // Delegate to unexported method for named return - // without confusing documented signature. - return c.handshakeContext(ctx) -} - -func (c *Conn) handshakeContext(ctx context.Context) (ret error) { - // Fast sync/atomic-based exit if there is no handshake in flight and the - // last one succeeded without an error. Avoids the expensive context setup - // and mutex for most Read and Write calls. - if c.handshakeComplete() { - return nil - } - - handshakeCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx) - // Note: defer this before starting the "interrupter" goroutine - // so that we can tell the difference between the input being canceled and - // this cancellation. In the former case, we need to close the connection. - defer cancel() - - // Start the "interrupter" goroutine, if this context might be canceled. - // (The background context cannot). - // - // The interrupter goroutine waits for the input context to be done and - // closes the connection if this happens before the function returns. - if ctx.Done() != nil { - done := make(chan struct{}) - interruptRes := make(chan error, 1) - defer func() { - close(done) - if ctxErr := <-interruptRes; ctxErr != nil { - // Return context error to user. - ret = ctxErr - } - }() - go func() { - select { - case <-handshakeCtx.Done(): - // Close the connection, discarding the error - _ = c.conn.Close() - interruptRes <- handshakeCtx.Err() - case <-done: - interruptRes <- nil - } - }() - } - - c.handshakeMutex.Lock() - defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock() - - if err := c.handshakeErr; err != nil { - return err - } - if c.handshakeComplete() { - return nil - } - - c.in.Lock() - defer c.in.Unlock() - - c.handshakeErr = c.handshakeFn(handshakeCtx) - if c.handshakeErr == nil { - c.handshakes++ - } else { - // If an error occurred during the handshake try to flush the - // alert that might be left in the buffer. - c.flush() - } - - if c.handshakeErr == nil && !c.handshakeComplete() { - c.handshakeErr = errors.New("tls: internal error: handshake should have had a result") - } - if c.handshakeErr != nil && c.handshakeComplete() { - panic("tls: internal error: handshake returned an error but is marked successful") - } - - return c.handshakeErr -} - -// ConnectionState returns basic TLS details about the connection. -func (c *Conn) ConnectionState() ConnectionState { - c.connStateMutex.Lock() - defer c.connStateMutex.Unlock() - return c.connState.ConnectionState -} - -// ConnectionStateWith0RTT returns basic TLS details (incl. 0-RTT status) about the connection. -func (c *Conn) ConnectionStateWith0RTT() ConnectionStateWith0RTT { - c.connStateMutex.Lock() - defer c.connStateMutex.Unlock() - return c.connState -} - -func (c *Conn) connectionStateLocked() ConnectionState { - var state connectionState - state.HandshakeComplete = c.handshakeComplete() - state.Version = c.vers - state.NegotiatedProtocol = c.clientProtocol - state.DidResume = c.didResume - state.NegotiatedProtocolIsMutual = true - state.ServerName = c.serverName - state.CipherSuite = c.cipherSuite - state.PeerCertificates = c.peerCertificates - state.VerifiedChains = c.verifiedChains - state.SignedCertificateTimestamps = c.scts - state.OCSPResponse = c.ocspResponse - if !c.didResume && c.vers != VersionTLS13 { - if c.clientFinishedIsFirst { - state.TLSUnique = c.clientFinished[:] - } else { - state.TLSUnique = c.serverFinished[:] - } - } - if c.config.Renegotiation != RenegotiateNever { - state.ekm = noExportedKeyingMaterial - } else { - state.ekm = c.ekm - } - return toConnectionState(state) -} - -func (c *Conn) updateConnectionState() { - c.connStateMutex.Lock() - defer c.connStateMutex.Unlock() - c.connState = ConnectionStateWith0RTT{ - Used0RTT: c.used0RTT, - ConnectionState: c.connectionStateLocked(), - } -} - -// OCSPResponse returns the stapled OCSP response from the TLS server, if -// any. (Only valid for client connections.) -func (c *Conn) OCSPResponse() []byte { - c.handshakeMutex.Lock() - defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock() - - return c.ocspResponse -} - -// VerifyHostname checks that the peer certificate chain is valid for -// connecting to host. If so, it returns nil; if not, it returns an error -// describing the problem. -func (c *Conn) VerifyHostname(host string) error { - c.handshakeMutex.Lock() - defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock() - if !c.isClient { - return errors.New("tls: VerifyHostname called on TLS server connection") - } - if !c.handshakeComplete() { - return errors.New("tls: handshake has not yet been performed") - } - if len(c.verifiedChains) == 0 { - return errors.New("tls: handshake did not verify certificate chain") - } - return c.peerCertificates[0].VerifyHostname(host) -} - -func (c *Conn) handshakeComplete() bool { - return atomic.LoadUint32(&c.handshakeStatus) == 1 -} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/cpu.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/cpu.go deleted file mode 100644 index 12194508..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/cpu.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,22 +0,0 @@ -//go:build !js -// +build !js - -package qtls - -import ( - "runtime" - - "golang.org/x/sys/cpu" -) - -var ( - hasGCMAsmAMD64 = cpu.X86.HasAES && cpu.X86.HasPCLMULQDQ - hasGCMAsmARM64 = cpu.ARM64.HasAES && cpu.ARM64.HasPMULL - // Keep in sync with crypto/aes/cipher_s390x.go. - hasGCMAsmS390X = cpu.S390X.HasAES && cpu.S390X.HasAESCBC && cpu.S390X.HasAESCTR && - (cpu.S390X.HasGHASH || cpu.S390X.HasAESGCM) - - hasAESGCMHardwareSupport = runtime.GOARCH == "amd64" && hasGCMAsmAMD64 || - runtime.GOARCH == "arm64" && hasGCMAsmARM64 || - runtime.GOARCH == "s390x" && hasGCMAsmS390X -) diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/cpu_other.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/cpu_other.go deleted file mode 100644 index 33f7d219..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/cpu_other.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12 +0,0 @@ -//go:build js -// +build js - -package qtls - -var ( - hasGCMAsmAMD64 = false - hasGCMAsmARM64 = false - hasGCMAsmS390X = false - - hasAESGCMHardwareSupport = false -) diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_client.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_client.go deleted file mode 100644 index ec7dcb56..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_client.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1123 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package qtls - -import ( - "bytes" - "context" - "crypto" - "crypto/ecdsa" - "crypto/ed25519" - "crypto/rsa" - "crypto/subtle" - "crypto/x509" - "errors" - "fmt" - "hash" - "io" - "net" - "strings" - "sync/atomic" - "time" - - "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte" -) - -const clientSessionStateVersion = 1 - -type clientHandshakeState struct { - c *Conn - ctx context.Context - serverHello *serverHelloMsg - hello *clientHelloMsg - suite *cipherSuite - finishedHash finishedHash - masterSecret []byte - session *clientSessionState -} - -var testingOnlyForceClientHelloSignatureAlgorithms []SignatureScheme - -func (c *Conn) makeClientHello() (*clientHelloMsg, ecdheParameters, error) { - config := c.config - if len(config.ServerName) == 0 && !config.InsecureSkipVerify { - return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: either ServerName or InsecureSkipVerify must be specified in the tls.Config") - } - - nextProtosLength := 0 - for _, proto := range config.NextProtos { - if l := len(proto); l == 0 || l > 255 { - return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: invalid NextProtos value") - } else { - nextProtosLength += 1 + l - } - } - if nextProtosLength > 0xffff { - return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: NextProtos values too large") - } - - var supportedVersions []uint16 - var clientHelloVersion uint16 - if c.extraConfig.usesAlternativeRecordLayer() { - if config.maxSupportedVersion(roleClient) < VersionTLS13 { - return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: MaxVersion prevents QUIC from using TLS 1.3") - } - // Only offer TLS 1.3 when QUIC is used. - supportedVersions = []uint16{VersionTLS13} - clientHelloVersion = VersionTLS13 - } else { - supportedVersions = config.supportedVersions(roleClient) - if len(supportedVersions) == 0 { - return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: no supported versions satisfy MinVersion and MaxVersion") - } - clientHelloVersion = config.maxSupportedVersion(roleClient) - } - - // The version at the beginning of the ClientHello was capped at TLS 1.2 - // for compatibility reasons. The supported_versions extension is used - // to negotiate versions now. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.1. - if clientHelloVersion > VersionTLS12 { - clientHelloVersion = VersionTLS12 - } - - hello := &clientHelloMsg{ - vers: clientHelloVersion, - compressionMethods: []uint8{compressionNone}, - random: make([]byte, 32), - ocspStapling: true, - scts: true, - serverName: hostnameInSNI(config.ServerName), - supportedCurves: config.curvePreferences(), - supportedPoints: []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed}, - secureRenegotiationSupported: true, - alpnProtocols: config.NextProtos, - supportedVersions: supportedVersions, - } - - if c.handshakes > 0 { - hello.secureRenegotiation = c.clientFinished[:] - } - - preferenceOrder := cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder - if !hasAESGCMHardwareSupport { - preferenceOrder = cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES - } - configCipherSuites := config.cipherSuites() - hello.cipherSuites = make([]uint16, 0, len(configCipherSuites)) - - for _, suiteId := range preferenceOrder { - suite := mutualCipherSuite(configCipherSuites, suiteId) - if suite == nil { - continue - } - // Don't advertise TLS 1.2-only cipher suites unless - // we're attempting TLS 1.2. - if hello.vers < VersionTLS12 && suite.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 { - continue - } - hello.cipherSuites = append(hello.cipherSuites, suiteId) - } - - _, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), hello.random) - if err != nil { - return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error()) - } - - // A random session ID is used to detect when the server accepted a ticket - // and is resuming a session (see RFC 5077). In TLS 1.3, it's always set as - // a compatibility measure (see RFC 8446, Section 4.1.2). - if c.extraConfig == nil || c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer == nil { - hello.sessionId = make([]byte, 32) - if _, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), hello.sessionId); err != nil { - return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error()) - } - } - - if hello.vers >= VersionTLS12 { - hello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms() - } - if testingOnlyForceClientHelloSignatureAlgorithms != nil { - hello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = testingOnlyForceClientHelloSignatureAlgorithms - } - - var params ecdheParameters - if hello.supportedVersions[0] == VersionTLS13 { - if len(hello.supportedVersions) == 1 { - hello.cipherSuites = hello.cipherSuites[:0] - } - if hasAESGCMHardwareSupport { - hello.cipherSuites = append(hello.cipherSuites, defaultCipherSuitesTLS13...) - } else { - hello.cipherSuites = append(hello.cipherSuites, defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES...) - } - - curveID := config.curvePreferences()[0] - if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); curveID != X25519 && !ok { - return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve") - } - params, err = generateECDHEParameters(config.rand(), curveID) - if err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - hello.keyShares = []keyShare{{group: curveID, data: params.PublicKey()}} - } - - if hello.supportedVersions[0] == VersionTLS13 && c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.GetExtensions != nil { - hello.additionalExtensions = c.extraConfig.GetExtensions(typeClientHello) - } - - return hello, params, nil -} - -func (c *Conn) clientHandshake(ctx context.Context) (err error) { - if c.config == nil { - c.config = fromConfig(defaultConfig()) - } - c.setAlternativeRecordLayer() - - // This may be a renegotiation handshake, in which case some fields - // need to be reset. - c.didResume = false - - hello, ecdheParams, err := c.makeClientHello() - if err != nil { - return err - } - c.serverName = hello.serverName - - cacheKey, session, earlySecret, binderKey, err := c.loadSession(hello) - if err != nil { - return err - } - if cacheKey != "" && session != nil { - var deletedTicket bool - if session.vers == VersionTLS13 && hello.earlyData && c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.Enable0RTT { - // don't reuse a session ticket that enabled 0-RTT - c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, nil) - deletedTicket = true - - if suite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(session.cipherSuite); suite != nil { - h := suite.hash.New() - helloBytes, err := hello.marshal() - if err != nil { - return err - } - h.Write(helloBytes) - clientEarlySecret := suite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, "c e traffic", h) - c.out.exportKey(Encryption0RTT, suite, clientEarlySecret) - if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelEarlyTraffic, hello.random, clientEarlySecret); err != nil { - return err - } - } - } - if !deletedTicket { - defer func() { - // If we got a handshake failure when resuming a session, throw away - // the session ticket. See RFC 5077, Section 3.2. - // - // RFC 8446 makes no mention of dropping tickets on failure, but it - // does require servers to abort on invalid binders, so we need to - // delete tickets to recover from a corrupted PSK. - if err != nil { - c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, nil) - } - }() - } - } - - if _, err := c.writeHandshakeRecord(hello, nil); err != nil { - return err - } - - // serverHelloMsg is not included in the transcript - msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - serverHello, ok := msg.(*serverHelloMsg) - if !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return unexpectedMessageError(serverHello, msg) - } - - if err := c.pickTLSVersion(serverHello); err != nil { - return err - } - - // If we are negotiating a protocol version that's lower than what we - // support, check for the server downgrade canaries. - // See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.3. - maxVers := c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleClient) - tls12Downgrade := string(serverHello.random[24:]) == downgradeCanaryTLS12 - tls11Downgrade := string(serverHello.random[24:]) == downgradeCanaryTLS11 - if maxVers == VersionTLS13 && c.vers <= VersionTLS12 && (tls12Downgrade || tls11Downgrade) || - maxVers == VersionTLS12 && c.vers <= VersionTLS11 && tls11Downgrade { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: downgrade attempt detected, possibly due to a MitM attack or a broken middlebox") - } - - if c.vers == VersionTLS13 { - hs := &clientHandshakeStateTLS13{ - c: c, - ctx: ctx, - serverHello: serverHello, - hello: hello, - ecdheParams: ecdheParams, - session: session, - earlySecret: earlySecret, - binderKey: binderKey, - } - - // In TLS 1.3, session tickets are delivered after the handshake. - return hs.handshake() - } - - hs := &clientHandshakeState{ - c: c, - ctx: ctx, - serverHello: serverHello, - hello: hello, - session: session, - } - - if err := hs.handshake(); err != nil { - return err - } - - // If we had a successful handshake and hs.session is different from - // the one already cached - cache a new one. - if cacheKey != "" && hs.session != nil && session != hs.session { - c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, toClientSessionState(hs.session)) - } - - c.updateConnectionState() - return nil -} - -// extract the app data saved in the session.nonce, -// and set the session.nonce to the actual nonce value -func (c *Conn) decodeSessionState(session *clientSessionState) (uint32 /* max early data */, []byte /* app data */, bool /* ok */) { - s := cryptobyte.String(session.nonce) - var version uint16 - if !s.ReadUint16(&version) { - return 0, nil, false - } - if version != clientSessionStateVersion { - return 0, nil, false - } - var maxEarlyData uint32 - if !s.ReadUint32(&maxEarlyData) { - return 0, nil, false - } - var appData []byte - if !readUint16LengthPrefixed(&s, &appData) { - return 0, nil, false - } - var nonce []byte - if !readUint16LengthPrefixed(&s, &nonce) { - return 0, nil, false - } - session.nonce = nonce - return maxEarlyData, appData, true -} - -func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string, - session *clientSessionState, earlySecret, binderKey []byte, err error) { - if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled || c.config.ClientSessionCache == nil { - return "", nil, nil, nil, nil - } - - hello.ticketSupported = true - - if hello.supportedVersions[0] == VersionTLS13 { - // Require DHE on resumption as it guarantees forward secrecy against - // compromise of the session ticket key. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.9. - hello.pskModes = []uint8{pskModeDHE} - } - - // Session resumption is not allowed if renegotiating because - // renegotiation is primarily used to allow a client to send a client - // certificate, which would be skipped if session resumption occurred. - if c.handshakes != 0 { - return "", nil, nil, nil, nil - } - - // Try to resume a previously negotiated TLS session, if available. - cacheKey = clientSessionCacheKey(c.conn.RemoteAddr(), c.config) - sess, ok := c.config.ClientSessionCache.Get(cacheKey) - if !ok || sess == nil { - return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil - } - session = fromClientSessionState(sess) - - var appData []byte - var maxEarlyData uint32 - if session.vers == VersionTLS13 { - var ok bool - maxEarlyData, appData, ok = c.decodeSessionState(session) - if !ok { // delete it, if parsing failed - c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, nil) - return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil - } - } - - // Check that version used for the previous session is still valid. - versOk := false - for _, v := range hello.supportedVersions { - if v == session.vers { - versOk = true - break - } - } - if !versOk { - return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil - } - - // Check that the cached server certificate is not expired, and that it's - // valid for the ServerName. This should be ensured by the cache key, but - // protect the application from a faulty ClientSessionCache implementation. - if !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify { - if len(session.verifiedChains) == 0 { - // The original connection had InsecureSkipVerify, while this doesn't. - return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil - } - serverCert := session.serverCertificates[0] - if c.config.time().After(serverCert.NotAfter) { - // Expired certificate, delete the entry. - c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, nil) - return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil - } - if err := serverCert.VerifyHostname(c.config.ServerName); err != nil { - return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil - } - } - - if session.vers != VersionTLS13 { - // In TLS 1.2 the cipher suite must match the resumed session. Ensure we - // are still offering it. - if mutualCipherSuite(hello.cipherSuites, session.cipherSuite) == nil { - return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil - } - - hello.sessionTicket = session.sessionTicket - return - } - - // Check that the session ticket is not expired. - if c.config.time().After(session.useBy) { - c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, nil) - return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil - } - - // In TLS 1.3 the KDF hash must match the resumed session. Ensure we - // offer at least one cipher suite with that hash. - cipherSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(session.cipherSuite) - if cipherSuite == nil { - return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil - } - cipherSuiteOk := false - for _, offeredID := range hello.cipherSuites { - offeredSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(offeredID) - if offeredSuite != nil && offeredSuite.hash == cipherSuite.hash { - cipherSuiteOk = true - break - } - } - if !cipherSuiteOk { - return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil - } - - // Set the pre_shared_key extension. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.11.1. - ticketAge := uint32(c.config.time().Sub(session.receivedAt) / time.Millisecond) - identity := pskIdentity{ - label: session.sessionTicket, - obfuscatedTicketAge: ticketAge + session.ageAdd, - } - hello.pskIdentities = []pskIdentity{identity} - hello.pskBinders = [][]byte{make([]byte, cipherSuite.hash.Size())} - - // Compute the PSK binders. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.11.2. - psk := cipherSuite.expandLabel(session.masterSecret, "resumption", - session.nonce, cipherSuite.hash.Size()) - earlySecret = cipherSuite.extract(psk, nil) - binderKey = cipherSuite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, resumptionBinderLabel, nil) - if c.extraConfig != nil { - hello.earlyData = c.extraConfig.Enable0RTT && maxEarlyData > 0 - } - transcript := cipherSuite.hash.New() - helloBytes, err := hello.marshalWithoutBinders() - if err != nil { - return "", nil, nil, nil, err - } - transcript.Write(helloBytes) - pskBinders := [][]byte{cipherSuite.finishedHash(binderKey, transcript)} - if err := hello.updateBinders(pskBinders); err != nil { - return "", nil, nil, nil, err - } - - if session.vers == VersionTLS13 && c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.SetAppDataFromSessionState != nil { - c.extraConfig.SetAppDataFromSessionState(appData) - } - return -} - -func (c *Conn) pickTLSVersion(serverHello *serverHelloMsg) error { - peerVersion := serverHello.vers - if serverHello.supportedVersion != 0 { - peerVersion = serverHello.supportedVersion - } - - vers, ok := c.config.mutualVersion(roleClient, []uint16{peerVersion}) - if !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) - return fmt.Errorf("tls: server selected unsupported protocol version %x", peerVersion) - } - - c.vers = vers - c.haveVers = true - c.in.version = vers - c.out.version = vers - - return nil -} - -// Does the handshake, either a full one or resumes old session. Requires hs.c, -// hs.hello, hs.serverHello, and, optionally, hs.session to be set. -func (hs *clientHandshakeState) handshake() error { - c := hs.c - - isResume, err := hs.processServerHello() - if err != nil { - return err - } - - hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite) - - // No signatures of the handshake are needed in a resumption. - // Otherwise, in a full handshake, if we don't have any certificates - // configured then we will never send a CertificateVerify message and - // thus no signatures are needed in that case either. - if isResume || (len(c.config.Certificates) == 0 && c.config.GetClientCertificate == nil) { - hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() - } - - if err := transcriptMsg(hs.hello, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := transcriptMsg(hs.serverHello, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil { - return err - } - - c.buffering = true - c.didResume = isResume - if isResume { - if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := hs.readFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil { - return err - } - c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false - // Make sure the connection is still being verified whether or not this - // is a resumption. Resumptions currently don't reverify certificates so - // they don't call verifyServerCertificate. See Issue 31641. - if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil { - if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) - return err - } - } - if err := hs.sendFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil { - return err - } - if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { - return err - } - } else { - if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := hs.sendFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil { - return err - } - if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { - return err - } - c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true - if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := hs.readFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil { - return err - } - } - - c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random) - atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1) - - return nil -} - -func (hs *clientHandshakeState) pickCipherSuite() error { - if hs.suite = mutualCipherSuite(hs.hello.cipherSuites, hs.serverHello.cipherSuite); hs.suite == nil { - hs.c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) - return errors.New("tls: server chose an unconfigured cipher suite") - } - - hs.c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id - return nil -} - -func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error { - c := hs.c - - msg, err := c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash) - if err != nil { - return err - } - certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg) - if !ok || len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg) - } - - msg, err = c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - cs, ok := msg.(*certificateStatusMsg) - if ok { - // RFC4366 on Certificate Status Request: - // The server MAY return a "certificate_status" message. - - if !hs.serverHello.ocspStapling { - // If a server returns a "CertificateStatus" message, then the - // server MUST have included an extension of type "status_request" - // with empty "extension_data" in the extended server hello. - - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return errors.New("tls: received unexpected CertificateStatus message") - } - - c.ocspResponse = cs.response - - msg, err = c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash) - if err != nil { - return err - } - } - - if c.handshakes == 0 { - // If this is the first handshake on a connection, process and - // (optionally) verify the server's certificates. - if err := c.verifyServerCertificate(certMsg.certificates); err != nil { - return err - } - } else { - // This is a renegotiation handshake. We require that the - // server's identity (i.e. leaf certificate) is unchanged and - // thus any previous trust decision is still valid. - // - // See https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE for the - // motivation behind this requirement. - if !bytes.Equal(c.peerCertificates[0].Raw, certMsg.certificates[0]) { - c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) - return errors.New("tls: server's identity changed during renegotiation") - } - } - - keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers) - - skx, ok := msg.(*serverKeyExchangeMsg) - if ok { - err = keyAgreement.processServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, c.peerCertificates[0], skx) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return err - } - - msg, err = c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash) - if err != nil { - return err - } - } - - var chainToSend *Certificate - var certRequested bool - certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsg) - if ok { - certRequested = true - - cri := certificateRequestInfoFromMsg(hs.ctx, c.vers, certReq) - if chainToSend, err = c.getClientCertificate(cri); err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return err - } - - msg, err = c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash) - if err != nil { - return err - } - } - - shd, ok := msg.(*serverHelloDoneMsg) - if !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return unexpectedMessageError(shd, msg) - } - - // If the server requested a certificate then we have to send a - // Certificate message, even if it's empty because we don't have a - // certificate to send. - if certRequested { - certMsg = new(certificateMsg) - certMsg.certificates = chainToSend.Certificate - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certMsg, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil { - return err - } - } - - preMasterSecret, ckx, err := keyAgreement.generateClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, c.peerCertificates[0]) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return err - } - if ckx != nil { - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(ckx, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil { - return err - } - } - - if chainToSend != nil && len(chainToSend.Certificate) > 0 { - certVerify := &certificateVerifyMsg{} - - key, ok := chainToSend.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer) - if !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return fmt.Errorf("tls: client certificate private key of type %T does not implement crypto.Signer", chainToSend.PrivateKey) - } - - var sigType uint8 - var sigHash crypto.Hash - if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 { - signatureAlgorithm, err := selectSignatureScheme(c.vers, chainToSend, certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return err - } - sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm) - if err != nil { - return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - } - certVerify.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true - certVerify.signatureAlgorithm = signatureAlgorithm - } else { - sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(key.Public()) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return err - } - } - - signed := hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(sigType, sigHash, hs.masterSecret) - signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash) - if sigType == signatureRSAPSS { - signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash} - } - certVerify.signature, err = key.Sign(c.config.rand(), signed, signOpts) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return err - } - - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certVerify, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil { - return err - } - } - - hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random) - if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelTLS12, hs.hello.random, hs.masterSecret); err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return errors.New("tls: failed to write to key log: " + err.Error()) - } - - hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() - - return nil -} - -func (hs *clientHandshakeState) establishKeys() error { - c := hs.c - - clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV := - keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen) - var clientCipher, serverCipher any - var clientHash, serverHash hash.Hash - if hs.suite.cipher != nil { - clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, false /* not for reading */) - clientHash = hs.suite.mac(clientMAC) - serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, true /* for reading */) - serverHash = hs.suite.mac(serverMAC) - } else { - clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV) - serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV) - } - - c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash) - c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash) - return nil -} - -func (hs *clientHandshakeState) serverResumedSession() bool { - // If the server responded with the same sessionId then it means the - // sessionTicket is being used to resume a TLS session. - return hs.session != nil && hs.hello.sessionId != nil && - bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.sessionId, hs.hello.sessionId) -} - -func (hs *clientHandshakeState) processServerHello() (bool, error) { - c := hs.c - - if err := hs.pickCipherSuite(); err != nil { - return false, err - } - - if hs.serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return false, errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported compression format") - } - - if c.handshakes == 0 && hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiationSupported { - c.secureRenegotiation = true - if len(hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 { - c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) - return false, errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension") - } - } - - if c.handshakes > 0 && c.secureRenegotiation { - var expectedSecureRenegotiation [24]byte - copy(expectedSecureRenegotiation[:], c.clientFinished[:]) - copy(expectedSecureRenegotiation[12:], c.serverFinished[:]) - if !bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiation, expectedSecureRenegotiation[:]) { - c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) - return false, errors.New("tls: incorrect renegotiation extension contents") - } - } - - if err := checkALPN(hs.hello.alpnProtocols, hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol); err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension) - return false, err - } - c.clientProtocol = hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol - - c.scts = hs.serverHello.scts - - if !hs.serverResumedSession() { - return false, nil - } - - if hs.session.vers != c.vers { - c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) - return false, errors.New("tls: server resumed a session with a different version") - } - - if hs.session.cipherSuite != hs.suite.id { - c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) - return false, errors.New("tls: server resumed a session with a different cipher suite") - } - - // Restore masterSecret, peerCerts, and ocspResponse from previous state - hs.masterSecret = hs.session.masterSecret - c.peerCertificates = hs.session.serverCertificates - c.verifiedChains = hs.session.verifiedChains - c.ocspResponse = hs.session.ocspResponse - // Let the ServerHello SCTs override the session SCTs from the original - // connection, if any are provided - if len(c.scts) == 0 && len(hs.session.scts) != 0 { - c.scts = hs.session.scts - } - - return true, nil -} - -// checkALPN ensure that the server's choice of ALPN protocol is compatible with -// the protocols that we advertised in the Client Hello. -func checkALPN(clientProtos []string, serverProto string) error { - if serverProto == "" { - return nil - } - if len(clientProtos) == 0 { - return errors.New("tls: server advertised unrequested ALPN extension") - } - for _, proto := range clientProtos { - if proto == serverProto { - return nil - } - } - return errors.New("tls: server selected unadvertised ALPN protocol") -} - -func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error { - c := hs.c - - if err := c.readChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil { - return err - } - - // finishedMsg is included in the transcript, but not until after we - // check the client version, since the state before this message was - // sent is used during verification. - msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil) - if err != nil { - return err - } - serverFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg) - if !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return unexpectedMessageError(serverFinished, msg) - } - - verify := hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret) - if len(verify) != len(serverFinished.verifyData) || - subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, serverFinished.verifyData) != 1 { - c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) - return errors.New("tls: server's Finished message was incorrect") - } - - if err := transcriptMsg(serverFinished, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil { - return err - } - - copy(out, verify) - return nil -} - -func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readSessionTicket() error { - if !hs.serverHello.ticketSupported { - return nil - } - - c := hs.c - msg, err := c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash) - if err != nil { - return err - } - sessionTicketMsg, ok := msg.(*newSessionTicketMsg) - if !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return unexpectedMessageError(sessionTicketMsg, msg) - } - - hs.session = &clientSessionState{ - sessionTicket: sessionTicketMsg.ticket, - vers: c.vers, - cipherSuite: hs.suite.id, - masterSecret: hs.masterSecret, - serverCertificates: c.peerCertificates, - verifiedChains: c.verifiedChains, - receivedAt: c.config.time(), - ocspResponse: c.ocspResponse, - scts: c.scts, - } - - return nil -} - -func (hs *clientHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error { - c := hs.c - - if err := c.writeChangeCipherRecord(); err != nil { - return err - } - - finished := new(finishedMsg) - finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret) - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(finished, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil { - return err - } - copy(out, finished.verifyData) - return nil -} - -// verifyServerCertificate parses and verifies the provided chain, setting -// c.verifiedChains and c.peerCertificates or sending the appropriate alert. -func (c *Conn) verifyServerCertificate(certificates [][]byte) error { - certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certificates)) - for i, asn1Data := range certificates { - cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) - return errors.New("tls: failed to parse certificate from server: " + err.Error()) - } - certs[i] = cert - } - - if !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify { - opts := x509.VerifyOptions{ - Roots: c.config.RootCAs, - CurrentTime: c.config.time(), - DNSName: c.config.ServerName, - Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(), - } - - for _, cert := range certs[1:] { - opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert) - } - var err error - c.verifiedChains, err = certs[0].Verify(opts) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) - return err - } - } - - switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) { - case *rsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey, ed25519.PublicKey: - break - default: - c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate) - return fmt.Errorf("tls: server's certificate contains an unsupported type of public key: %T", certs[0].PublicKey) - } - - c.peerCertificates = certs - - if c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil { - if err := c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate(certificates, c.verifiedChains); err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) - return err - } - } - - if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil { - if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) - return err - } - } - - return nil -} - -// certificateRequestInfoFromMsg generates a CertificateRequestInfo from a TLS -// <= 1.2 CertificateRequest, making an effort to fill in missing information. -func certificateRequestInfoFromMsg(ctx context.Context, vers uint16, certReq *certificateRequestMsg) *CertificateRequestInfo { - cri := &certificateRequestInfo{ - AcceptableCAs: certReq.certificateAuthorities, - Version: vers, - ctx: ctx, - } - - var rsaAvail, ecAvail bool - for _, certType := range certReq.certificateTypes { - switch certType { - case certTypeRSASign: - rsaAvail = true - case certTypeECDSASign: - ecAvail = true - } - } - - if !certReq.hasSignatureAlgorithm { - // Prior to TLS 1.2, signature schemes did not exist. In this case we - // make up a list based on the acceptable certificate types, to help - // GetClientCertificate and SupportsCertificate select the right certificate. - // The hash part of the SignatureScheme is a lie here, because - // TLS 1.0 and 1.1 always use MD5+SHA1 for RSA and SHA1 for ECDSA. - switch { - case rsaAvail && ecAvail: - cri.SignatureSchemes = []SignatureScheme{ - ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512, - PKCS1WithSHA256, PKCS1WithSHA384, PKCS1WithSHA512, PKCS1WithSHA1, - } - case rsaAvail: - cri.SignatureSchemes = []SignatureScheme{ - PKCS1WithSHA256, PKCS1WithSHA384, PKCS1WithSHA512, PKCS1WithSHA1, - } - case ecAvail: - cri.SignatureSchemes = []SignatureScheme{ - ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512, - } - } - return toCertificateRequestInfo(cri) - } - - // Filter the signature schemes based on the certificate types. - // See RFC 5246, Section 7.4.4 (where it calls this "somewhat complicated"). - cri.SignatureSchemes = make([]SignatureScheme, 0, len(certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms)) - for _, sigScheme := range certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms { - sigType, _, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(sigScheme) - if err != nil { - continue - } - switch sigType { - case signatureECDSA, signatureEd25519: - if ecAvail { - cri.SignatureSchemes = append(cri.SignatureSchemes, sigScheme) - } - case signatureRSAPSS, signaturePKCS1v15: - if rsaAvail { - cri.SignatureSchemes = append(cri.SignatureSchemes, sigScheme) - } - } - } - - return toCertificateRequestInfo(cri) -} - -func (c *Conn) getClientCertificate(cri *CertificateRequestInfo) (*Certificate, error) { - if c.config.GetClientCertificate != nil { - return c.config.GetClientCertificate(cri) - } - - for _, chain := range c.config.Certificates { - if err := cri.SupportsCertificate(&chain); err != nil { - continue - } - return &chain, nil - } - - // No acceptable certificate found. Don't send a certificate. - return new(Certificate), nil -} - -const clientSessionCacheKeyPrefix = "qtls-" - -// clientSessionCacheKey returns a key used to cache sessionTickets that could -// be used to resume previously negotiated TLS sessions with a server. -func clientSessionCacheKey(serverAddr net.Addr, config *config) string { - if len(config.ServerName) > 0 { - return clientSessionCacheKeyPrefix + config.ServerName - } - return clientSessionCacheKeyPrefix + serverAddr.String() -} - -// hostnameInSNI converts name into an appropriate hostname for SNI. -// Literal IP addresses and absolute FQDNs are not permitted as SNI values. -// See RFC 6066, Section 3. -func hostnameInSNI(name string) string { - host := name - if len(host) > 0 && host[0] == '[' && host[len(host)-1] == ']' { - host = host[1 : len(host)-1] - } - if i := strings.LastIndex(host, "%"); i > 0 { - host = host[:i] - } - if net.ParseIP(host) != nil { - return "" - } - for len(name) > 0 && name[len(name)-1] == '.' { - name = name[:len(name)-1] - } - return name -} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_client_tls13.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_client_tls13.go deleted file mode 100644 index 05ca1333..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_client_tls13.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,755 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package qtls - -import ( - "bytes" - "context" - "crypto" - "crypto/hmac" - "crypto/rsa" - "encoding/binary" - "errors" - "hash" - "sync/atomic" - "time" - - "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte" -) - -type clientHandshakeStateTLS13 struct { - c *Conn - ctx context.Context - serverHello *serverHelloMsg - hello *clientHelloMsg - ecdheParams ecdheParameters - - session *clientSessionState - earlySecret []byte - binderKey []byte - - certReq *certificateRequestMsgTLS13 - usingPSK bool - sentDummyCCS bool - suite *cipherSuiteTLS13 - transcript hash.Hash - masterSecret []byte - trafficSecret []byte // client_application_traffic_secret_0 -} - -// handshake requires hs.c, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, hs.ecdheParams, and, -// optionally, hs.session, hs.earlySecret and hs.binderKey to be set. -func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error { - c := hs.c - - if needFIPS() { - return errors.New("tls: internal error: TLS 1.3 reached in FIPS mode") - } - - // The server must not select TLS 1.3 in a renegotiation. See RFC 8446, - // sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3. - if c.handshakes > 0 { - c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) - return errors.New("tls: server selected TLS 1.3 in a renegotiation") - } - - // Consistency check on the presence of a keyShare and its parameters. - if hs.ecdheParams == nil || len(hs.hello.keyShares) != 1 { - return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - } - - if err := hs.checkServerHelloOrHRR(); err != nil { - return err - } - - hs.transcript = hs.suite.hash.New() - - if err := transcriptMsg(hs.hello, hs.transcript); err != nil { - return err - } - - if bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.random, helloRetryRequestRandom) { - if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := hs.processHelloRetryRequest(); err != nil { - return err - } - } - - if err := transcriptMsg(hs.serverHello, hs.transcript); err != nil { - return err - } - - c.buffering = true - if err := hs.processServerHello(); err != nil { - return err - } - c.updateConnectionState() - if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := hs.establishHandshakeKeys(); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := hs.readServerParameters(); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := hs.readServerCertificate(); err != nil { - return err - } - c.updateConnectionState() - if err := hs.readServerFinished(); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := hs.sendClientCertificate(); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := hs.sendClientFinished(); err != nil { - return err - } - if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { - return err - } - - atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1) - c.updateConnectionState() - return nil -} - -// checkServerHelloOrHRR does validity checks that apply to both ServerHello and -// HelloRetryRequest messages. It sets hs.suite. -func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) checkServerHelloOrHRR() error { - c := hs.c - - if hs.serverHello.supportedVersion == 0 { - c.sendAlert(alertMissingExtension) - return errors.New("tls: server selected TLS 1.3 using the legacy version field") - } - - if hs.serverHello.supportedVersion != VersionTLS13 { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid version after a HelloRetryRequest") - } - - if hs.serverHello.vers != VersionTLS12 { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: server sent an incorrect legacy version") - } - - if hs.serverHello.ocspStapling || - hs.serverHello.ticketSupported || - hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiationSupported || - len(hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 || - len(hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol) != 0 || - len(hs.serverHello.scts) != 0 { - c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension) - return errors.New("tls: server sent a ServerHello extension forbidden in TLS 1.3") - } - - if !bytes.Equal(hs.hello.sessionId, hs.serverHello.sessionId) { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: server did not echo the legacy session ID") - } - - if hs.serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported compression format") - } - - selectedSuite := mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(hs.hello.cipherSuites, hs.serverHello.cipherSuite) - if hs.suite != nil && selectedSuite != hs.suite { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: server changed cipher suite after a HelloRetryRequest") - } - if selectedSuite == nil { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: server chose an unconfigured cipher suite") - } - hs.suite = selectedSuite - c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id - - return nil -} - -// sendDummyChangeCipherSpec sends a ChangeCipherSpec record for compatibility -// with middleboxes that didn't implement TLS correctly. See RFC 8446, Appendix D.4. -func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendDummyChangeCipherSpec() error { - if hs.sentDummyCCS { - return nil - } - hs.sentDummyCCS = true - - return hs.c.writeChangeCipherRecord() -} - -// processHelloRetryRequest handles the HRR in hs.serverHello, modifies and -// resends hs.hello, and reads the new ServerHello into hs.serverHello. -func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processHelloRetryRequest() error { - c := hs.c - - // The first ClientHello gets double-hashed into the transcript upon a - // HelloRetryRequest. (The idea is that the server might offload transcript - // storage to the client in the cookie.) See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.1. - chHash := hs.transcript.Sum(nil) - hs.transcript.Reset() - hs.transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))}) - hs.transcript.Write(chHash) - if err := transcriptMsg(hs.serverHello, hs.transcript); err != nil { - return err - } - - // The only HelloRetryRequest extensions we support are key_share and - // cookie, and clients must abort the handshake if the HRR would not result - // in any change in the ClientHello. - if hs.serverHello.selectedGroup == 0 && hs.serverHello.cookie == nil { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: server sent an unnecessary HelloRetryRequest message") - } - - if hs.serverHello.cookie != nil { - hs.hello.cookie = hs.serverHello.cookie - } - - if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group != 0 { - c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError) - return errors.New("tls: received malformed key_share extension") - } - - // If the server sent a key_share extension selecting a group, ensure it's - // a group we advertised but did not send a key share for, and send a key - // share for it this time. - if curveID := hs.serverHello.selectedGroup; curveID != 0 { - curveOK := false - for _, id := range hs.hello.supportedCurves { - if id == curveID { - curveOK = true - break - } - } - if !curveOK { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported group") - } - if hs.ecdheParams.CurveID() == curveID { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: server sent an unnecessary HelloRetryRequest key_share") - } - if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); curveID != X25519 && !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve") - } - params, err := generateECDHEParameters(c.config.rand(), curveID) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return err - } - hs.ecdheParams = params - hs.hello.keyShares = []keyShare{{group: curveID, data: params.PublicKey()}} - } - - hs.hello.raw = nil - if len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) > 0 { - pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(hs.session.cipherSuite) - if pskSuite == nil { - return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - } - if pskSuite.hash == hs.suite.hash { - // Update binders and obfuscated_ticket_age. - ticketAge := uint32(c.config.time().Sub(hs.session.receivedAt) / time.Millisecond) - hs.hello.pskIdentities[0].obfuscatedTicketAge = ticketAge + hs.session.ageAdd - - transcript := hs.suite.hash.New() - transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))}) - transcript.Write(chHash) - if err := transcriptMsg(hs.serverHello, hs.transcript); err != nil { - return err - } - helloBytes, err := hs.hello.marshalWithoutBinders() - if err != nil { - return err - } - transcript.Write(helloBytes) - pskBinders := [][]byte{hs.suite.finishedHash(hs.binderKey, transcript)} - if err := hs.hello.updateBinders(pskBinders); err != nil { - return err - } - } else { - // Server selected a cipher suite incompatible with the PSK. - hs.hello.pskIdentities = nil - hs.hello.pskBinders = nil - } - } - - if hs.hello.earlyData && c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT != nil { - c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT() - } - hs.hello.earlyData = false // disable 0-RTT - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(hs.hello, hs.transcript); err != nil { - return err - } - - // serverHelloMsg is not included in the transcript - msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - serverHello, ok := msg.(*serverHelloMsg) - if !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return unexpectedMessageError(serverHello, msg) - } - hs.serverHello = serverHello - - if err := hs.checkServerHelloOrHRR(); err != nil { - return err - } - - return nil -} - -func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processServerHello() error { - c := hs.c - - if bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.random, helloRetryRequestRandom) { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return errors.New("tls: server sent two HelloRetryRequest messages") - } - - if len(hs.serverHello.cookie) != 0 { - c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension) - return errors.New("tls: server sent a cookie in a normal ServerHello") - } - - if hs.serverHello.selectedGroup != 0 { - c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError) - return errors.New("tls: malformed key_share extension") - } - - if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group == 0 { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: server did not send a key share") - } - if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group != hs.ecdheParams.CurveID() { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported group") - } - - if !hs.serverHello.selectedIdentityPresent { - return nil - } - - if int(hs.serverHello.selectedIdentity) >= len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid PSK") - } - - if len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) != 1 || hs.session == nil { - return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - } - pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(hs.session.cipherSuite) - if pskSuite == nil { - return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - } - if pskSuite.hash != hs.suite.hash { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid PSK and cipher suite pair") - } - - hs.usingPSK = true - c.didResume = true - c.peerCertificates = hs.session.serverCertificates - c.verifiedChains = hs.session.verifiedChains - c.ocspResponse = hs.session.ocspResponse - c.scts = hs.session.scts - return nil -} - -func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) establishHandshakeKeys() error { - c := hs.c - - sharedKey := hs.ecdheParams.SharedKey(hs.serverHello.serverShare.data) - if sharedKey == nil { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: invalid server key share") - } - - earlySecret := hs.earlySecret - if !hs.usingPSK { - earlySecret = hs.suite.extract(nil, nil) - } - - handshakeSecret := hs.suite.extract(sharedKey, - hs.suite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, "derived", nil)) - - clientSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(handshakeSecret, - clientHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript) - c.out.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, clientSecret) - c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, clientSecret) - serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(handshakeSecret, - serverHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript) - c.in.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, serverSecret) - c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret) - - err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientHandshake, hs.hello.random, clientSecret) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return err - } - err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerHandshake, hs.hello.random, serverSecret) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return err - } - - hs.masterSecret = hs.suite.extract(nil, - hs.suite.deriveSecret(handshakeSecret, "derived", nil)) - - return nil -} - -func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerParameters() error { - c := hs.c - - msg, err := c.readHandshake(hs.transcript) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - encryptedExtensions, ok := msg.(*encryptedExtensionsMsg) - if !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return unexpectedMessageError(encryptedExtensions, msg) - } - // Notify the caller if 0-RTT was rejected. - if !encryptedExtensions.earlyData && hs.hello.earlyData && c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT != nil { - c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT() - } - c.used0RTT = encryptedExtensions.earlyData - if hs.c.extraConfig != nil && hs.c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions != nil { - hs.c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions(typeEncryptedExtensions, encryptedExtensions.additionalExtensions) - } - - if err := checkALPN(hs.hello.alpnProtocols, encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol); err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension) - return err - } - c.clientProtocol = encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol - - if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.EnforceNextProtoSelection { - if len(encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol) == 0 { - // the server didn't select an ALPN - c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol) - return errors.New("ALPN negotiation failed. Server didn't offer any protocols") - } - } - return nil -} - -func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerCertificate() error { - c := hs.c - - // Either a PSK or a certificate is always used, but not both. - // See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.1. - if hs.usingPSK { - // Make sure the connection is still being verified whether or not this - // is a resumption. Resumptions currently don't reverify certificates so - // they don't call verifyServerCertificate. See Issue 31641. - if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil { - if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) - return err - } - } - return nil - } - - msg, err := c.readHandshake(hs.transcript) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsgTLS13) - if ok { - hs.certReq = certReq - - msg, err = c.readHandshake(hs.transcript) - if err != nil { - return err - } - } - - certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsgTLS13) - if !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg) - } - if len(certMsg.certificate.Certificate) == 0 { - c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError) - return errors.New("tls: received empty certificates message") - } - - c.scts = certMsg.certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps - c.ocspResponse = certMsg.certificate.OCSPStaple - - if err := c.verifyServerCertificate(certMsg.certificate.Certificate); err != nil { - return err - } - - // certificateVerifyMsg is included in the transcript, but not until - // after we verify the handshake signature, since the state before - // this message was sent is used. - msg, err = c.readHandshake(nil) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg) - if !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg) - } - - // See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3. - if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, supportedSignatureAlgorithms()) { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithm") - } - sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm) - if err != nil { - return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - } - if sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigHash == crypto.SHA1 { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithm") - } - signed := signedMessage(sigHash, serverSignatureContext, hs.transcript) - if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey, - sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError) - return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the server certificate: " + err.Error()) - } - - if err := transcriptMsg(certVerify, hs.transcript); err != nil { - return err - } - - return nil -} - -func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerFinished() error { - c := hs.c - - // finishedMsg is included in the transcript, but not until after we - // check the client version, since the state before this message was - // sent is used during verification. - msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - finished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg) - if !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return unexpectedMessageError(finished, msg) - } - - expectedMAC := hs.suite.finishedHash(c.in.trafficSecret, hs.transcript) - if !hmac.Equal(expectedMAC, finished.verifyData) { - c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError) - return errors.New("tls: invalid server finished hash") - } - - if err := transcriptMsg(finished, hs.transcript); err != nil { - return err - } - - // Derive secrets that take context through the server Finished. - - hs.trafficSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret, - clientApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript) - serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret, - serverApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript) - c.in.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, serverSecret) - c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret) - - err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientTraffic, hs.hello.random, hs.trafficSecret) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return err - } - err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerTraffic, hs.hello.random, serverSecret) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return err - } - - c.ekm = hs.suite.exportKeyingMaterial(hs.masterSecret, hs.transcript) - - return nil -} - -func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientCertificate() error { - c := hs.c - - if hs.certReq == nil { - return nil - } - - cert, err := c.getClientCertificate(toCertificateRequestInfo(&certificateRequestInfo{ - AcceptableCAs: hs.certReq.certificateAuthorities, - SignatureSchemes: hs.certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms, - Version: c.vers, - ctx: hs.ctx, - })) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - certMsg := new(certificateMsgTLS13) - - certMsg.certificate = *cert - certMsg.scts = hs.certReq.scts && len(cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps) > 0 - certMsg.ocspStapling = hs.certReq.ocspStapling && len(cert.OCSPStaple) > 0 - - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certMsg, hs.transcript); err != nil { - return err - } - - // If we sent an empty certificate message, skip the CertificateVerify. - if len(cert.Certificate) == 0 { - return nil - } - - certVerifyMsg := new(certificateVerifyMsg) - certVerifyMsg.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true - - certVerifyMsg.signatureAlgorithm, err = selectSignatureScheme(c.vers, cert, hs.certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) - if err != nil { - // getClientCertificate returned a certificate incompatible with the - // CertificateRequestInfo supported signature algorithms. - c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) - return err - } - - sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerifyMsg.signatureAlgorithm) - if err != nil { - return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - } - - signed := signedMessage(sigHash, clientSignatureContext, hs.transcript) - signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash) - if sigType == signatureRSAPSS { - signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash} - } - sig, err := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Sign(c.config.rand(), signed, signOpts) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return errors.New("tls: failed to sign handshake: " + err.Error()) - } - certVerifyMsg.signature = sig - - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certVerifyMsg, hs.transcript); err != nil { - return err - } - - return nil -} - -func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientFinished() error { - c := hs.c - - finished := &finishedMsg{ - verifyData: hs.suite.finishedHash(c.out.trafficSecret, hs.transcript), - } - - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(finished, hs.transcript); err != nil { - return err - } - - c.out.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret) - c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret) - - if !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled && c.config.ClientSessionCache != nil { - c.resumptionSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret, - resumptionLabel, hs.transcript) - } - - return nil -} - -func (c *Conn) handleNewSessionTicket(msg *newSessionTicketMsgTLS13) error { - if !c.isClient { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return errors.New("tls: received new session ticket from a client") - } - - if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled || c.config.ClientSessionCache == nil { - return nil - } - - // See RFC 8446, Section 4.6.1. - if msg.lifetime == 0 { - return nil - } - lifetime := time.Duration(msg.lifetime) * time.Second - if lifetime > maxSessionTicketLifetime { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: received a session ticket with invalid lifetime") - } - - cipherSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(c.cipherSuite) - if cipherSuite == nil || c.resumptionSecret == nil { - return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - } - - // We need to save the max_early_data_size that the server sent us, in order - // to decide if we're going to try 0-RTT with this ticket. - // However, at the same time, the qtls.ClientSessionTicket needs to be equal to - // the tls.ClientSessionTicket, so we can't just add a new field to the struct. - // We therefore abuse the nonce field (which is a byte slice) - nonceWithEarlyData := make([]byte, len(msg.nonce)+4) - binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(nonceWithEarlyData, msg.maxEarlyData) - copy(nonceWithEarlyData[4:], msg.nonce) - - var appData []byte - if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.GetAppDataForSessionState != nil { - appData = c.extraConfig.GetAppDataForSessionState() - } - var b cryptobyte.Builder - b.AddUint16(clientSessionStateVersion) // revision - b.AddUint32(msg.maxEarlyData) - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(appData) - }) - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(msg.nonce) - }) - - // Save the resumption_master_secret and nonce instead of deriving the PSK - // to do the least amount of work on NewSessionTicket messages before we - // know if the ticket will be used. Forward secrecy of resumed connections - // is guaranteed by the requirement for pskModeDHE. - session := &clientSessionState{ - sessionTicket: msg.label, - vers: c.vers, - cipherSuite: c.cipherSuite, - masterSecret: c.resumptionSecret, - serverCertificates: c.peerCertificates, - verifiedChains: c.verifiedChains, - receivedAt: c.config.time(), - nonce: b.BytesOrPanic(), - useBy: c.config.time().Add(lifetime), - ageAdd: msg.ageAdd, - ocspResponse: c.ocspResponse, - scts: c.scts, - } - - cacheKey := clientSessionCacheKey(c.conn.RemoteAddr(), c.config) - c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, toClientSessionState(session)) - - return nil -} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_messages.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_messages.go deleted file mode 100644 index c69fcefd..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_messages.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1875 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package qtls - -import ( - "errors" - "fmt" - "strings" - - "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte" -) - -// The marshalingFunction type is an adapter to allow the use of ordinary -// functions as cryptobyte.MarshalingValue. -type marshalingFunction func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) error - -func (f marshalingFunction) Marshal(b *cryptobyte.Builder) error { - return f(b) -} - -// addBytesWithLength appends a sequence of bytes to the cryptobyte.Builder. If -// the length of the sequence is not the value specified, it produces an error. -func addBytesWithLength(b *cryptobyte.Builder, v []byte, n int) { - b.AddValue(marshalingFunction(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) error { - if len(v) != n { - return fmt.Errorf("invalid value length: expected %d, got %d", n, len(v)) - } - b.AddBytes(v) - return nil - })) -} - -// addUint64 appends a big-endian, 64-bit value to the cryptobyte.Builder. -func addUint64(b *cryptobyte.Builder, v uint64) { - b.AddUint32(uint32(v >> 32)) - b.AddUint32(uint32(v)) -} - -// readUint64 decodes a big-endian, 64-bit value into out and advances over it. -// It reports whether the read was successful. -func readUint64(s *cryptobyte.String, out *uint64) bool { - var hi, lo uint32 - if !s.ReadUint32(&hi) || !s.ReadUint32(&lo) { - return false - } - *out = uint64(hi)<<32 | uint64(lo) - return true -} - -// readUint8LengthPrefixed acts like s.ReadUint8LengthPrefixed, but targets a -// []byte instead of a cryptobyte.String. -func readUint8LengthPrefixed(s *cryptobyte.String, out *[]byte) bool { - return s.ReadUint8LengthPrefixed((*cryptobyte.String)(out)) -} - -// readUint16LengthPrefixed acts like s.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed, but targets a -// []byte instead of a cryptobyte.String. -func readUint16LengthPrefixed(s *cryptobyte.String, out *[]byte) bool { - return s.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed((*cryptobyte.String)(out)) -} - -// readUint24LengthPrefixed acts like s.ReadUint24LengthPrefixed, but targets a -// []byte instead of a cryptobyte.String. -func readUint24LengthPrefixed(s *cryptobyte.String, out *[]byte) bool { - return s.ReadUint24LengthPrefixed((*cryptobyte.String)(out)) -} - -type clientHelloMsg struct { - raw []byte - vers uint16 - random []byte - sessionId []byte - cipherSuites []uint16 - compressionMethods []uint8 - serverName string - ocspStapling bool - supportedCurves []CurveID - supportedPoints []uint8 - ticketSupported bool - sessionTicket []uint8 - supportedSignatureAlgorithms []SignatureScheme - supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert []SignatureScheme - secureRenegotiationSupported bool - secureRenegotiation []byte - alpnProtocols []string - scts bool - supportedVersions []uint16 - cookie []byte - keyShares []keyShare - earlyData bool - pskModes []uint8 - pskIdentities []pskIdentity - pskBinders [][]byte - additionalExtensions []Extension -} - -func (m *clientHelloMsg) marshal() ([]byte, error) { - if m.raw != nil { - return m.raw, nil - } - - var exts cryptobyte.Builder - if len(m.serverName) > 0 { - // RFC 6066, Section 3 - exts.AddUint16(extensionServerName) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint8(0) // name_type = host_name - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddBytes([]byte(m.serverName)) - }) - }) - }) - } - if m.ocspStapling { - // RFC 4366, Section 3.6 - exts.AddUint16(extensionStatusRequest) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint8(1) // status_type = ocsp - exts.AddUint16(0) // empty responder_id_list - exts.AddUint16(0) // empty request_extensions - }) - } - if len(m.supportedCurves) > 0 { - // RFC 4492, sections 5.1.1 and RFC 8446, Section 4.2.7 - exts.AddUint16(extensionSupportedCurves) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - for _, curve := range m.supportedCurves { - exts.AddUint16(uint16(curve)) - } - }) - }) - } - if len(m.supportedPoints) > 0 { - // RFC 4492, Section 5.1.2 - exts.AddUint16(extensionSupportedPoints) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddBytes(m.supportedPoints) - }) - }) - } - if m.ticketSupported { - // RFC 5077, Section 3.2 - exts.AddUint16(extensionSessionTicket) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddBytes(m.sessionTicket) - }) - } - if len(m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) > 0 { - // RFC 5246, Section 7.4.1.4.1 - exts.AddUint16(extensionSignatureAlgorithms) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - for _, sigAlgo := range m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms { - exts.AddUint16(uint16(sigAlgo)) - } - }) - }) - } - if len(m.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert) > 0 { - // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.3 - exts.AddUint16(extensionSignatureAlgorithmsCert) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - for _, sigAlgo := range m.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert { - exts.AddUint16(uint16(sigAlgo)) - } - }) - }) - } - if m.secureRenegotiationSupported { - // RFC 5746, Section 3.2 - exts.AddUint16(extensionRenegotiationInfo) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddBytes(m.secureRenegotiation) - }) - }) - } - if len(m.alpnProtocols) > 0 { - // RFC 7301, Section 3.1 - exts.AddUint16(extensionALPN) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - for _, proto := range m.alpnProtocols { - exts.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddBytes([]byte(proto)) - }) - } - }) - }) - } - if m.scts { - // RFC 6962, Section 3.3.1 - exts.AddUint16(extensionSCT) - exts.AddUint16(0) // empty extension_data - } - if len(m.supportedVersions) > 0 { - // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.1 - exts.AddUint16(extensionSupportedVersions) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - for _, vers := range m.supportedVersions { - exts.AddUint16(vers) - } - }) - }) - } - if len(m.cookie) > 0 { - // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.2 - exts.AddUint16(extensionCookie) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddBytes(m.cookie) - }) - }) - } - if len(m.keyShares) > 0 { - // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.8 - exts.AddUint16(extensionKeyShare) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - for _, ks := range m.keyShares { - exts.AddUint16(uint16(ks.group)) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddBytes(ks.data) - }) - } - }) - }) - } - if m.earlyData { - // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.10 - exts.AddUint16(extensionEarlyData) - exts.AddUint16(0) // empty extension_data - } - if len(m.pskModes) > 0 { - // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.9 - exts.AddUint16(extensionPSKModes) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddBytes(m.pskModes) - }) - }) - } - for _, ext := range m.additionalExtensions { - exts.AddUint16(ext.Type) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddBytes(ext.Data) - }) - } - if len(m.pskIdentities) > 0 { // pre_shared_key must be the last extension - // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.11 - exts.AddUint16(extensionPreSharedKey) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - for _, psk := range m.pskIdentities { - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddBytes(psk.label) - }) - exts.AddUint32(psk.obfuscatedTicketAge) - } - }) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - for _, binder := range m.pskBinders { - exts.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddBytes(binder) - }) - } - }) - }) - } - extBytes, err := exts.Bytes() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - var b cryptobyte.Builder - b.AddUint8(typeClientHello) - b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddUint16(m.vers) - addBytesWithLength(b, m.random, 32) - b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(m.sessionId) - }) - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - for _, suite := range m.cipherSuites { - b.AddUint16(suite) - } - }) - b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(m.compressionMethods) - }) - - if len(extBytes) > 0 { - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(extBytes) - }) - } - }) - - m.raw, err = b.Bytes() - return m.raw, err -} - -// marshalWithoutBinders returns the ClientHello through the -// PreSharedKeyExtension.identities field, according to RFC 8446, Section -// 4.2.11.2. Note that m.pskBinders must be set to slices of the correct length. -func (m *clientHelloMsg) marshalWithoutBinders() ([]byte, error) { - bindersLen := 2 // uint16 length prefix - for _, binder := range m.pskBinders { - bindersLen += 1 // uint8 length prefix - bindersLen += len(binder) - } - - fullMessage, err := m.marshal() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - return fullMessage[:len(fullMessage)-bindersLen], nil -} - -// updateBinders updates the m.pskBinders field, if necessary updating the -// cached marshaled representation. The supplied binders must have the same -// length as the current m.pskBinders. -func (m *clientHelloMsg) updateBinders(pskBinders [][]byte) error { - if len(pskBinders) != len(m.pskBinders) { - return errors.New("tls: internal error: pskBinders length mismatch") - } - for i := range m.pskBinders { - if len(pskBinders[i]) != len(m.pskBinders[i]) { - return errors.New("tls: internal error: pskBinders length mismatch") - } - } - m.pskBinders = pskBinders - if m.raw != nil { - helloBytes, err := m.marshalWithoutBinders() - if err != nil { - return err - } - lenWithoutBinders := len(helloBytes) - b := cryptobyte.NewFixedBuilder(m.raw[:lenWithoutBinders]) - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - for _, binder := range m.pskBinders { - b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(binder) - }) - } - }) - if out, err := b.Bytes(); err != nil || len(out) != len(m.raw) { - return errors.New("tls: internal error: failed to update binders") - } - } - - return nil -} - -func (m *clientHelloMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { - *m = clientHelloMsg{raw: data} - s := cryptobyte.String(data) - - if !s.Skip(4) || // message type and uint24 length field - !s.ReadUint16(&m.vers) || !s.ReadBytes(&m.random, 32) || - !readUint8LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.sessionId) { - return false - } - - var cipherSuites cryptobyte.String - if !s.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&cipherSuites) { - return false - } - m.cipherSuites = []uint16{} - m.secureRenegotiationSupported = false - for !cipherSuites.Empty() { - var suite uint16 - if !cipherSuites.ReadUint16(&suite) { - return false - } - if suite == scsvRenegotiation { - m.secureRenegotiationSupported = true - } - m.cipherSuites = append(m.cipherSuites, suite) - } - - if !readUint8LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.compressionMethods) { - return false - } - - if s.Empty() { - // ClientHello is optionally followed by extension data - return true - } - - var extensions cryptobyte.String - if !s.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extensions) || !s.Empty() { - return false - } - - seenExts := make(map[uint16]bool) - for !extensions.Empty() { - var extension uint16 - var extData cryptobyte.String - if !extensions.ReadUint16(&extension) || - !extensions.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extData) { - return false - } - - if seenExts[extension] { - return false - } - seenExts[extension] = true - - switch extension { - case extensionServerName: - // RFC 6066, Section 3 - var nameList cryptobyte.String - if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&nameList) || nameList.Empty() { - return false - } - for !nameList.Empty() { - var nameType uint8 - var serverName cryptobyte.String - if !nameList.ReadUint8(&nameType) || - !nameList.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&serverName) || - serverName.Empty() { - return false - } - if nameType != 0 { - continue - } - if len(m.serverName) != 0 { - // Multiple names of the same name_type are prohibited. - return false - } - m.serverName = string(serverName) - // An SNI value may not include a trailing dot. - if strings.HasSuffix(m.serverName, ".") { - return false - } - } - case extensionStatusRequest: - // RFC 4366, Section 3.6 - var statusType uint8 - var ignored cryptobyte.String - if !extData.ReadUint8(&statusType) || - !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&ignored) || - !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&ignored) { - return false - } - m.ocspStapling = statusType == statusTypeOCSP - case extensionSupportedCurves: - // RFC 4492, sections 5.1.1 and RFC 8446, Section 4.2.7 - var curves cryptobyte.String - if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&curves) || curves.Empty() { - return false - } - for !curves.Empty() { - var curve uint16 - if !curves.ReadUint16(&curve) { - return false - } - m.supportedCurves = append(m.supportedCurves, CurveID(curve)) - } - case extensionSupportedPoints: - // RFC 4492, Section 5.1.2 - if !readUint8LengthPrefixed(&extData, &m.supportedPoints) || - len(m.supportedPoints) == 0 { - return false - } - case extensionSessionTicket: - // RFC 5077, Section 3.2 - m.ticketSupported = true - extData.ReadBytes(&m.sessionTicket, len(extData)) - case extensionSignatureAlgorithms: - // RFC 5246, Section 7.4.1.4.1 - var sigAndAlgs cryptobyte.String - if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&sigAndAlgs) || sigAndAlgs.Empty() { - return false - } - for !sigAndAlgs.Empty() { - var sigAndAlg uint16 - if !sigAndAlgs.ReadUint16(&sigAndAlg) { - return false - } - m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = append( - m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms, SignatureScheme(sigAndAlg)) - } - case extensionSignatureAlgorithmsCert: - // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.3 - var sigAndAlgs cryptobyte.String - if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&sigAndAlgs) || sigAndAlgs.Empty() { - return false - } - for !sigAndAlgs.Empty() { - var sigAndAlg uint16 - if !sigAndAlgs.ReadUint16(&sigAndAlg) { - return false - } - m.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert = append( - m.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert, SignatureScheme(sigAndAlg)) - } - case extensionRenegotiationInfo: - // RFC 5746, Section 3.2 - if !readUint8LengthPrefixed(&extData, &m.secureRenegotiation) { - return false - } - m.secureRenegotiationSupported = true - case extensionALPN: - // RFC 7301, Section 3.1 - var protoList cryptobyte.String - if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&protoList) || protoList.Empty() { - return false - } - for !protoList.Empty() { - var proto cryptobyte.String - if !protoList.ReadUint8LengthPrefixed(&proto) || proto.Empty() { - return false - } - m.alpnProtocols = append(m.alpnProtocols, string(proto)) - } - case extensionSCT: - // RFC 6962, Section 3.3.1 - m.scts = true - case extensionSupportedVersions: - // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.1 - var versList cryptobyte.String - if !extData.ReadUint8LengthPrefixed(&versList) || versList.Empty() { - return false - } - for !versList.Empty() { - var vers uint16 - if !versList.ReadUint16(&vers) { - return false - } - m.supportedVersions = append(m.supportedVersions, vers) - } - case extensionCookie: - // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.2 - if !readUint16LengthPrefixed(&extData, &m.cookie) || - len(m.cookie) == 0 { - return false - } - case extensionKeyShare: - // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.8 - var clientShares cryptobyte.String - if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&clientShares) { - return false - } - for !clientShares.Empty() { - var ks keyShare - if !clientShares.ReadUint16((*uint16)(&ks.group)) || - !readUint16LengthPrefixed(&clientShares, &ks.data) || - len(ks.data) == 0 { - return false - } - m.keyShares = append(m.keyShares, ks) - } - case extensionEarlyData: - // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.10 - m.earlyData = true - case extensionPSKModes: - // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.9 - if !readUint8LengthPrefixed(&extData, &m.pskModes) { - return false - } - case extensionPreSharedKey: - // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.11 - if !extensions.Empty() { - return false // pre_shared_key must be the last extension - } - var identities cryptobyte.String - if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&identities) || identities.Empty() { - return false - } - for !identities.Empty() { - var psk pskIdentity - if !readUint16LengthPrefixed(&identities, &psk.label) || - !identities.ReadUint32(&psk.obfuscatedTicketAge) || - len(psk.label) == 0 { - return false - } - m.pskIdentities = append(m.pskIdentities, psk) - } - var binders cryptobyte.String - if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&binders) || binders.Empty() { - return false - } - for !binders.Empty() { - var binder []byte - if !readUint8LengthPrefixed(&binders, &binder) || - len(binder) == 0 { - return false - } - m.pskBinders = append(m.pskBinders, binder) - } - default: - m.additionalExtensions = append(m.additionalExtensions, Extension{Type: extension, Data: extData}) - continue - } - - if !extData.Empty() { - return false - } - } - - return true -} - -type serverHelloMsg struct { - raw []byte - vers uint16 - random []byte - sessionId []byte - cipherSuite uint16 - compressionMethod uint8 - ocspStapling bool - ticketSupported bool - secureRenegotiationSupported bool - secureRenegotiation []byte - alpnProtocol string - scts [][]byte - supportedVersion uint16 - serverShare keyShare - selectedIdentityPresent bool - selectedIdentity uint16 - supportedPoints []uint8 - - // HelloRetryRequest extensions - cookie []byte - selectedGroup CurveID -} - -func (m *serverHelloMsg) marshal() ([]byte, error) { - if m.raw != nil { - return m.raw, nil - } - - var exts cryptobyte.Builder - if m.ocspStapling { - exts.AddUint16(extensionStatusRequest) - exts.AddUint16(0) // empty extension_data - } - if m.ticketSupported { - exts.AddUint16(extensionSessionTicket) - exts.AddUint16(0) // empty extension_data - } - if m.secureRenegotiationSupported { - exts.AddUint16(extensionRenegotiationInfo) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddBytes(m.secureRenegotiation) - }) - }) - } - if len(m.alpnProtocol) > 0 { - exts.AddUint16(extensionALPN) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddBytes([]byte(m.alpnProtocol)) - }) - }) - }) - } - if len(m.scts) > 0 { - exts.AddUint16(extensionSCT) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - for _, sct := range m.scts { - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddBytes(sct) - }) - } - }) - }) - } - if m.supportedVersion != 0 { - exts.AddUint16(extensionSupportedVersions) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint16(m.supportedVersion) - }) - } - if m.serverShare.group != 0 { - exts.AddUint16(extensionKeyShare) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint16(uint16(m.serverShare.group)) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddBytes(m.serverShare.data) - }) - }) - } - if m.selectedIdentityPresent { - exts.AddUint16(extensionPreSharedKey) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint16(m.selectedIdentity) - }) - } - - if len(m.cookie) > 0 { - exts.AddUint16(extensionCookie) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddBytes(m.cookie) - }) - }) - } - if m.selectedGroup != 0 { - exts.AddUint16(extensionKeyShare) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint16(uint16(m.selectedGroup)) - }) - } - if len(m.supportedPoints) > 0 { - exts.AddUint16(extensionSupportedPoints) - exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddBytes(m.supportedPoints) - }) - }) - } - - extBytes, err := exts.Bytes() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - var b cryptobyte.Builder - b.AddUint8(typeServerHello) - b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddUint16(m.vers) - addBytesWithLength(b, m.random, 32) - b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(m.sessionId) - }) - b.AddUint16(m.cipherSuite) - b.AddUint8(m.compressionMethod) - - if len(extBytes) > 0 { - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(extBytes) - }) - } - }) - - m.raw, err = b.Bytes() - return m.raw, err -} - -func (m *serverHelloMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { - *m = serverHelloMsg{raw: data} - s := cryptobyte.String(data) - - if !s.Skip(4) || // message type and uint24 length field - !s.ReadUint16(&m.vers) || !s.ReadBytes(&m.random, 32) || - !readUint8LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.sessionId) || - !s.ReadUint16(&m.cipherSuite) || - !s.ReadUint8(&m.compressionMethod) { - return false - } - - if s.Empty() { - // ServerHello is optionally followed by extension data - return true - } - - var extensions cryptobyte.String - if !s.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extensions) || !s.Empty() { - return false - } - - seenExts := make(map[uint16]bool) - for !extensions.Empty() { - var extension uint16 - var extData cryptobyte.String - if !extensions.ReadUint16(&extension) || - !extensions.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extData) { - return false - } - - if seenExts[extension] { - return false - } - seenExts[extension] = true - - switch extension { - case extensionStatusRequest: - m.ocspStapling = true - case extensionSessionTicket: - m.ticketSupported = true - case extensionRenegotiationInfo: - if !readUint8LengthPrefixed(&extData, &m.secureRenegotiation) { - return false - } - m.secureRenegotiationSupported = true - case extensionALPN: - var protoList cryptobyte.String - if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&protoList) || protoList.Empty() { - return false - } - var proto cryptobyte.String - if !protoList.ReadUint8LengthPrefixed(&proto) || - proto.Empty() || !protoList.Empty() { - return false - } - m.alpnProtocol = string(proto) - case extensionSCT: - var sctList cryptobyte.String - if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&sctList) || sctList.Empty() { - return false - } - for !sctList.Empty() { - var sct []byte - if !readUint16LengthPrefixed(&sctList, &sct) || - len(sct) == 0 { - return false - } - m.scts = append(m.scts, sct) - } - case extensionSupportedVersions: - if !extData.ReadUint16(&m.supportedVersion) { - return false - } - case extensionCookie: - if !readUint16LengthPrefixed(&extData, &m.cookie) || - len(m.cookie) == 0 { - return false - } - case extensionKeyShare: - // This extension has different formats in SH and HRR, accept either - // and let the handshake logic decide. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.8. - if len(extData) == 2 { - if !extData.ReadUint16((*uint16)(&m.selectedGroup)) { - return false - } - } else { - if !extData.ReadUint16((*uint16)(&m.serverShare.group)) || - !readUint16LengthPrefixed(&extData, &m.serverShare.data) { - return false - } - } - case extensionPreSharedKey: - m.selectedIdentityPresent = true - if !extData.ReadUint16(&m.selectedIdentity) { - return false - } - case extensionSupportedPoints: - // RFC 4492, Section 5.1.2 - if !readUint8LengthPrefixed(&extData, &m.supportedPoints) || - len(m.supportedPoints) == 0 { - return false - } - default: - // Ignore unknown extensions. - continue - } - - if !extData.Empty() { - return false - } - } - - return true -} - -type encryptedExtensionsMsg struct { - raw []byte - alpnProtocol string - earlyData bool - - additionalExtensions []Extension -} - -func (m *encryptedExtensionsMsg) marshal() ([]byte, error) { - if m.raw != nil { - return m.raw, nil - } - - var b cryptobyte.Builder - b.AddUint8(typeEncryptedExtensions) - b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - if len(m.alpnProtocol) > 0 { - b.AddUint16(extensionALPN) - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes([]byte(m.alpnProtocol)) - }) - }) - }) - } - if m.earlyData { - // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.10 - b.AddUint16(extensionEarlyData) - b.AddUint16(0) // empty extension_data - } - for _, ext := range m.additionalExtensions { - b.AddUint16(ext.Type) - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(ext.Data) - }) - } - }) - }) - - var err error - m.raw, err = b.Bytes() - return m.raw, err -} - -func (m *encryptedExtensionsMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { - *m = encryptedExtensionsMsg{raw: data} - s := cryptobyte.String(data) - - var extensions cryptobyte.String - if !s.Skip(4) || // message type and uint24 length field - !s.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extensions) || !s.Empty() { - return false - } - - for !extensions.Empty() { - var ext uint16 - var extData cryptobyte.String - if !extensions.ReadUint16(&ext) || - !extensions.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extData) { - return false - } - - switch ext { - case extensionALPN: - var protoList cryptobyte.String - if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&protoList) || protoList.Empty() { - return false - } - var proto cryptobyte.String - if !protoList.ReadUint8LengthPrefixed(&proto) || - proto.Empty() || !protoList.Empty() { - return false - } - m.alpnProtocol = string(proto) - case extensionEarlyData: - m.earlyData = true - default: - m.additionalExtensions = append(m.additionalExtensions, Extension{Type: ext, Data: extData}) - continue - } - - if !extData.Empty() { - return false - } - } - - return true -} - -type endOfEarlyDataMsg struct{} - -func (m *endOfEarlyDataMsg) marshal() ([]byte, error) { - x := make([]byte, 4) - x[0] = typeEndOfEarlyData - return x, nil -} - -func (m *endOfEarlyDataMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { - return len(data) == 4 -} - -type keyUpdateMsg struct { - raw []byte - updateRequested bool -} - -func (m *keyUpdateMsg) marshal() ([]byte, error) { - if m.raw != nil { - return m.raw, nil - } - - var b cryptobyte.Builder - b.AddUint8(typeKeyUpdate) - b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - if m.updateRequested { - b.AddUint8(1) - } else { - b.AddUint8(0) - } - }) - - var err error - m.raw, err = b.Bytes() - return m.raw, err -} - -func (m *keyUpdateMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { - m.raw = data - s := cryptobyte.String(data) - - var updateRequested uint8 - if !s.Skip(4) || // message type and uint24 length field - !s.ReadUint8(&updateRequested) || !s.Empty() { - return false - } - switch updateRequested { - case 0: - m.updateRequested = false - case 1: - m.updateRequested = true - default: - return false - } - return true -} - -type newSessionTicketMsgTLS13 struct { - raw []byte - lifetime uint32 - ageAdd uint32 - nonce []byte - label []byte - maxEarlyData uint32 -} - -func (m *newSessionTicketMsgTLS13) marshal() ([]byte, error) { - if m.raw != nil { - return m.raw, nil - } - - var b cryptobyte.Builder - b.AddUint8(typeNewSessionTicket) - b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddUint32(m.lifetime) - b.AddUint32(m.ageAdd) - b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(m.nonce) - }) - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(m.label) - }) - - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - if m.maxEarlyData > 0 { - b.AddUint16(extensionEarlyData) - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddUint32(m.maxEarlyData) - }) - } - }) - }) - - var err error - m.raw, err = b.Bytes() - return m.raw, err -} - -func (m *newSessionTicketMsgTLS13) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { - *m = newSessionTicketMsgTLS13{raw: data} - s := cryptobyte.String(data) - - var extensions cryptobyte.String - if !s.Skip(4) || // message type and uint24 length field - !s.ReadUint32(&m.lifetime) || - !s.ReadUint32(&m.ageAdd) || - !readUint8LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.nonce) || - !readUint16LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.label) || - !s.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extensions) || - !s.Empty() { - return false - } - - for !extensions.Empty() { - var extension uint16 - var extData cryptobyte.String - if !extensions.ReadUint16(&extension) || - !extensions.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extData) { - return false - } - - switch extension { - case extensionEarlyData: - if !extData.ReadUint32(&m.maxEarlyData) { - return false - } - default: - // Ignore unknown extensions. - continue - } - - if !extData.Empty() { - return false - } - } - - return true -} - -type certificateRequestMsgTLS13 struct { - raw []byte - ocspStapling bool - scts bool - supportedSignatureAlgorithms []SignatureScheme - supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert []SignatureScheme - certificateAuthorities [][]byte -} - -func (m *certificateRequestMsgTLS13) marshal() ([]byte, error) { - if m.raw != nil { - return m.raw, nil - } - - var b cryptobyte.Builder - b.AddUint8(typeCertificateRequest) - b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - // certificate_request_context (SHALL be zero length unless used for - // post-handshake authentication) - b.AddUint8(0) - - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - if m.ocspStapling { - b.AddUint16(extensionStatusRequest) - b.AddUint16(0) // empty extension_data - } - if m.scts { - // RFC 8446, Section 4.4.2.1 makes no mention of - // signed_certificate_timestamp in CertificateRequest, but - // "Extensions in the Certificate message from the client MUST - // correspond to extensions in the CertificateRequest message - // from the server." and it appears in the table in Section 4.2. - b.AddUint16(extensionSCT) - b.AddUint16(0) // empty extension_data - } - if len(m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) > 0 { - b.AddUint16(extensionSignatureAlgorithms) - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - for _, sigAlgo := range m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms { - b.AddUint16(uint16(sigAlgo)) - } - }) - }) - } - if len(m.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert) > 0 { - b.AddUint16(extensionSignatureAlgorithmsCert) - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - for _, sigAlgo := range m.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert { - b.AddUint16(uint16(sigAlgo)) - } - }) - }) - } - if len(m.certificateAuthorities) > 0 { - b.AddUint16(extensionCertificateAuthorities) - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - for _, ca := range m.certificateAuthorities { - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(ca) - }) - } - }) - }) - } - }) - }) - - var err error - m.raw, err = b.Bytes() - return m.raw, err -} - -func (m *certificateRequestMsgTLS13) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { - *m = certificateRequestMsgTLS13{raw: data} - s := cryptobyte.String(data) - - var context, extensions cryptobyte.String - if !s.Skip(4) || // message type and uint24 length field - !s.ReadUint8LengthPrefixed(&context) || !context.Empty() || - !s.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extensions) || - !s.Empty() { - return false - } - - for !extensions.Empty() { - var extension uint16 - var extData cryptobyte.String - if !extensions.ReadUint16(&extension) || - !extensions.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extData) { - return false - } - - switch extension { - case extensionStatusRequest: - m.ocspStapling = true - case extensionSCT: - m.scts = true - case extensionSignatureAlgorithms: - var sigAndAlgs cryptobyte.String - if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&sigAndAlgs) || sigAndAlgs.Empty() { - return false - } - for !sigAndAlgs.Empty() { - var sigAndAlg uint16 - if !sigAndAlgs.ReadUint16(&sigAndAlg) { - return false - } - m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = append( - m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms, SignatureScheme(sigAndAlg)) - } - case extensionSignatureAlgorithmsCert: - var sigAndAlgs cryptobyte.String - if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&sigAndAlgs) || sigAndAlgs.Empty() { - return false - } - for !sigAndAlgs.Empty() { - var sigAndAlg uint16 - if !sigAndAlgs.ReadUint16(&sigAndAlg) { - return false - } - m.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert = append( - m.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert, SignatureScheme(sigAndAlg)) - } - case extensionCertificateAuthorities: - var auths cryptobyte.String - if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&auths) || auths.Empty() { - return false - } - for !auths.Empty() { - var ca []byte - if !readUint16LengthPrefixed(&auths, &ca) || len(ca) == 0 { - return false - } - m.certificateAuthorities = append(m.certificateAuthorities, ca) - } - default: - // Ignore unknown extensions. - continue - } - - if !extData.Empty() { - return false - } - } - - return true -} - -type certificateMsg struct { - raw []byte - certificates [][]byte -} - -func (m *certificateMsg) marshal() ([]byte, error) { - if m.raw != nil { - return m.raw, nil - } - - var i int - for _, slice := range m.certificates { - i += len(slice) - } - - length := 3 + 3*len(m.certificates) + i - x := make([]byte, 4+length) - x[0] = typeCertificate - x[1] = uint8(length >> 16) - x[2] = uint8(length >> 8) - x[3] = uint8(length) - - certificateOctets := length - 3 - x[4] = uint8(certificateOctets >> 16) - x[5] = uint8(certificateOctets >> 8) - x[6] = uint8(certificateOctets) - - y := x[7:] - for _, slice := range m.certificates { - y[0] = uint8(len(slice) >> 16) - y[1] = uint8(len(slice) >> 8) - y[2] = uint8(len(slice)) - copy(y[3:], slice) - y = y[3+len(slice):] - } - - m.raw = x - return m.raw, nil -} - -func (m *certificateMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { - if len(data) < 7 { - return false - } - - m.raw = data - certsLen := uint32(data[4])<<16 | uint32(data[5])<<8 | uint32(data[6]) - if uint32(len(data)) != certsLen+7 { - return false - } - - numCerts := 0 - d := data[7:] - for certsLen > 0 { - if len(d) < 4 { - return false - } - certLen := uint32(d[0])<<16 | uint32(d[1])<<8 | uint32(d[2]) - if uint32(len(d)) < 3+certLen { - return false - } - d = d[3+certLen:] - certsLen -= 3 + certLen - numCerts++ - } - - m.certificates = make([][]byte, numCerts) - d = data[7:] - for i := 0; i < numCerts; i++ { - certLen := uint32(d[0])<<16 | uint32(d[1])<<8 | uint32(d[2]) - m.certificates[i] = d[3 : 3+certLen] - d = d[3+certLen:] - } - - return true -} - -type certificateMsgTLS13 struct { - raw []byte - certificate Certificate - ocspStapling bool - scts bool -} - -func (m *certificateMsgTLS13) marshal() ([]byte, error) { - if m.raw != nil { - return m.raw, nil - } - - var b cryptobyte.Builder - b.AddUint8(typeCertificate) - b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddUint8(0) // certificate_request_context - - certificate := m.certificate - if !m.ocspStapling { - certificate.OCSPStaple = nil - } - if !m.scts { - certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps = nil - } - marshalCertificate(b, certificate) - }) - - var err error - m.raw, err = b.Bytes() - return m.raw, err -} - -func marshalCertificate(b *cryptobyte.Builder, certificate Certificate) { - b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - for i, cert := range certificate.Certificate { - b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(cert) - }) - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - if i > 0 { - // This library only supports OCSP and SCT for leaf certificates. - return - } - if certificate.OCSPStaple != nil { - b.AddUint16(extensionStatusRequest) - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddUint8(statusTypeOCSP) - b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(certificate.OCSPStaple) - }) - }) - } - if certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps != nil { - b.AddUint16(extensionSCT) - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - for _, sct := range certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps { - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(sct) - }) - } - }) - }) - } - }) - } - }) -} - -func (m *certificateMsgTLS13) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { - *m = certificateMsgTLS13{raw: data} - s := cryptobyte.String(data) - - var context cryptobyte.String - if !s.Skip(4) || // message type and uint24 length field - !s.ReadUint8LengthPrefixed(&context) || !context.Empty() || - !unmarshalCertificate(&s, &m.certificate) || - !s.Empty() { - return false - } - - m.scts = m.certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps != nil - m.ocspStapling = m.certificate.OCSPStaple != nil - - return true -} - -func unmarshalCertificate(s *cryptobyte.String, certificate *Certificate) bool { - var certList cryptobyte.String - if !s.ReadUint24LengthPrefixed(&certList) { - return false - } - for !certList.Empty() { - var cert []byte - var extensions cryptobyte.String - if !readUint24LengthPrefixed(&certList, &cert) || - !certList.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extensions) { - return false - } - certificate.Certificate = append(certificate.Certificate, cert) - for !extensions.Empty() { - var extension uint16 - var extData cryptobyte.String - if !extensions.ReadUint16(&extension) || - !extensions.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extData) { - return false - } - if len(certificate.Certificate) > 1 { - // This library only supports OCSP and SCT for leaf certificates. - continue - } - - switch extension { - case extensionStatusRequest: - var statusType uint8 - if !extData.ReadUint8(&statusType) || statusType != statusTypeOCSP || - !readUint24LengthPrefixed(&extData, &certificate.OCSPStaple) || - len(certificate.OCSPStaple) == 0 { - return false - } - case extensionSCT: - var sctList cryptobyte.String - if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&sctList) || sctList.Empty() { - return false - } - for !sctList.Empty() { - var sct []byte - if !readUint16LengthPrefixed(&sctList, &sct) || - len(sct) == 0 { - return false - } - certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps = append( - certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps, sct) - } - default: - // Ignore unknown extensions. - continue - } - - if !extData.Empty() { - return false - } - } - } - return true -} - -type serverKeyExchangeMsg struct { - raw []byte - key []byte -} - -func (m *serverKeyExchangeMsg) marshal() ([]byte, error) { - if m.raw != nil { - return m.raw, nil - } - length := len(m.key) - x := make([]byte, length+4) - x[0] = typeServerKeyExchange - x[1] = uint8(length >> 16) - x[2] = uint8(length >> 8) - x[3] = uint8(length) - copy(x[4:], m.key) - - m.raw = x - return x, nil -} - -func (m *serverKeyExchangeMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { - m.raw = data - if len(data) < 4 { - return false - } - m.key = data[4:] - return true -} - -type certificateStatusMsg struct { - raw []byte - response []byte -} - -func (m *certificateStatusMsg) marshal() ([]byte, error) { - if m.raw != nil { - return m.raw, nil - } - - var b cryptobyte.Builder - b.AddUint8(typeCertificateStatus) - b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddUint8(statusTypeOCSP) - b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(m.response) - }) - }) - - var err error - m.raw, err = b.Bytes() - return m.raw, err -} - -func (m *certificateStatusMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { - m.raw = data - s := cryptobyte.String(data) - - var statusType uint8 - if !s.Skip(4) || // message type and uint24 length field - !s.ReadUint8(&statusType) || statusType != statusTypeOCSP || - !readUint24LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.response) || - len(m.response) == 0 || !s.Empty() { - return false - } - return true -} - -type serverHelloDoneMsg struct{} - -func (m *serverHelloDoneMsg) marshal() ([]byte, error) { - x := make([]byte, 4) - x[0] = typeServerHelloDone - return x, nil -} - -func (m *serverHelloDoneMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { - return len(data) == 4 -} - -type clientKeyExchangeMsg struct { - raw []byte - ciphertext []byte -} - -func (m *clientKeyExchangeMsg) marshal() ([]byte, error) { - if m.raw != nil { - return m.raw, nil - } - length := len(m.ciphertext) - x := make([]byte, length+4) - x[0] = typeClientKeyExchange - x[1] = uint8(length >> 16) - x[2] = uint8(length >> 8) - x[3] = uint8(length) - copy(x[4:], m.ciphertext) - - m.raw = x - return x, nil -} - -func (m *clientKeyExchangeMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { - m.raw = data - if len(data) < 4 { - return false - } - l := int(data[1])<<16 | int(data[2])<<8 | int(data[3]) - if l != len(data)-4 { - return false - } - m.ciphertext = data[4:] - return true -} - -type finishedMsg struct { - raw []byte - verifyData []byte -} - -func (m *finishedMsg) marshal() ([]byte, error) { - if m.raw != nil { - return m.raw, nil - } - - var b cryptobyte.Builder - b.AddUint8(typeFinished) - b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(m.verifyData) - }) - - var err error - m.raw, err = b.Bytes() - return m.raw, err -} - -func (m *finishedMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { - m.raw = data - s := cryptobyte.String(data) - return s.Skip(1) && - readUint24LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.verifyData) && - s.Empty() -} - -type certificateRequestMsg struct { - raw []byte - // hasSignatureAlgorithm indicates whether this message includes a list of - // supported signature algorithms. This change was introduced with TLS 1.2. - hasSignatureAlgorithm bool - - certificateTypes []byte - supportedSignatureAlgorithms []SignatureScheme - certificateAuthorities [][]byte -} - -func (m *certificateRequestMsg) marshal() ([]byte, error) { - if m.raw != nil { - return m.raw, nil - } - - // See RFC 4346, Section 7.4.4. - length := 1 + len(m.certificateTypes) + 2 - casLength := 0 - for _, ca := range m.certificateAuthorities { - casLength += 2 + len(ca) - } - length += casLength - - if m.hasSignatureAlgorithm { - length += 2 + 2*len(m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) - } - - x := make([]byte, 4+length) - x[0] = typeCertificateRequest - x[1] = uint8(length >> 16) - x[2] = uint8(length >> 8) - x[3] = uint8(length) - - x[4] = uint8(len(m.certificateTypes)) - - copy(x[5:], m.certificateTypes) - y := x[5+len(m.certificateTypes):] - - if m.hasSignatureAlgorithm { - n := len(m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) * 2 - y[0] = uint8(n >> 8) - y[1] = uint8(n) - y = y[2:] - for _, sigAlgo := range m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms { - y[0] = uint8(sigAlgo >> 8) - y[1] = uint8(sigAlgo) - y = y[2:] - } - } - - y[0] = uint8(casLength >> 8) - y[1] = uint8(casLength) - y = y[2:] - for _, ca := range m.certificateAuthorities { - y[0] = uint8(len(ca) >> 8) - y[1] = uint8(len(ca)) - y = y[2:] - copy(y, ca) - y = y[len(ca):] - } - - m.raw = x - return m.raw, nil -} - -func (m *certificateRequestMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { - m.raw = data - - if len(data) < 5 { - return false - } - - length := uint32(data[1])<<16 | uint32(data[2])<<8 | uint32(data[3]) - if uint32(len(data))-4 != length { - return false - } - - numCertTypes := int(data[4]) - data = data[5:] - if numCertTypes == 0 || len(data) <= numCertTypes { - return false - } - - m.certificateTypes = make([]byte, numCertTypes) - if copy(m.certificateTypes, data) != numCertTypes { - return false - } - - data = data[numCertTypes:] - - if m.hasSignatureAlgorithm { - if len(data) < 2 { - return false - } - sigAndHashLen := uint16(data[0])<<8 | uint16(data[1]) - data = data[2:] - if sigAndHashLen&1 != 0 { - return false - } - if len(data) < int(sigAndHashLen) { - return false - } - numSigAlgos := sigAndHashLen / 2 - m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = make([]SignatureScheme, numSigAlgos) - for i := range m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms { - m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms[i] = SignatureScheme(data[0])<<8 | SignatureScheme(data[1]) - data = data[2:] - } - } - - if len(data) < 2 { - return false - } - casLength := uint16(data[0])<<8 | uint16(data[1]) - data = data[2:] - if len(data) < int(casLength) { - return false - } - cas := make([]byte, casLength) - copy(cas, data) - data = data[casLength:] - - m.certificateAuthorities = nil - for len(cas) > 0 { - if len(cas) < 2 { - return false - } - caLen := uint16(cas[0])<<8 | uint16(cas[1]) - cas = cas[2:] - - if len(cas) < int(caLen) { - return false - } - - m.certificateAuthorities = append(m.certificateAuthorities, cas[:caLen]) - cas = cas[caLen:] - } - - return len(data) == 0 -} - -type certificateVerifyMsg struct { - raw []byte - hasSignatureAlgorithm bool // format change introduced in TLS 1.2 - signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme - signature []byte -} - -func (m *certificateVerifyMsg) marshal() ([]byte, error) { - if m.raw != nil { - return m.raw, nil - } - - var b cryptobyte.Builder - b.AddUint8(typeCertificateVerify) - b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - if m.hasSignatureAlgorithm { - b.AddUint16(uint16(m.signatureAlgorithm)) - } - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(m.signature) - }) - }) - - var err error - m.raw, err = b.Bytes() - return m.raw, err -} - -func (m *certificateVerifyMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { - m.raw = data - s := cryptobyte.String(data) - - if !s.Skip(4) { // message type and uint24 length field - return false - } - if m.hasSignatureAlgorithm { - if !s.ReadUint16((*uint16)(&m.signatureAlgorithm)) { - return false - } - } - return readUint16LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.signature) && s.Empty() -} - -type newSessionTicketMsg struct { - raw []byte - ticket []byte -} - -func (m *newSessionTicketMsg) marshal() ([]byte, error) { - if m.raw != nil { - return m.raw, nil - } - - // See RFC 5077, Section 3.3. - ticketLen := len(m.ticket) - length := 2 + 4 + ticketLen - x := make([]byte, 4+length) - x[0] = typeNewSessionTicket - x[1] = uint8(length >> 16) - x[2] = uint8(length >> 8) - x[3] = uint8(length) - x[8] = uint8(ticketLen >> 8) - x[9] = uint8(ticketLen) - copy(x[10:], m.ticket) - - m.raw = x - - return m.raw, nil -} - -func (m *newSessionTicketMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { - m.raw = data - - if len(data) < 10 { - return false - } - - length := uint32(data[1])<<16 | uint32(data[2])<<8 | uint32(data[3]) - if uint32(len(data))-4 != length { - return false - } - - ticketLen := int(data[8])<<8 + int(data[9]) - if len(data)-10 != ticketLen { - return false - } - - m.ticket = data[10:] - - return true -} - -type helloRequestMsg struct { -} - -func (*helloRequestMsg) marshal() ([]byte, error) { - return []byte{typeHelloRequest, 0, 0, 0}, nil -} - -func (*helloRequestMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { - return len(data) == 4 -} - -type transcriptHash interface { - Write([]byte) (int, error) -} - -// transcriptMsg is a helper used to marshal and hash messages which typically -// are not written to the wire, and as such aren't hashed during Conn.writeRecord. -func transcriptMsg(msg handshakeMessage, h transcriptHash) error { - data, err := msg.marshal() - if err != nil { - return err - } - h.Write(data) - return nil -} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_server.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_server.go deleted file mode 100644 index f0c0aa01..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_server.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,922 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package qtls - -import ( - "context" - "crypto" - "crypto/ecdsa" - "crypto/ed25519" - "crypto/rsa" - "crypto/subtle" - "crypto/x509" - "errors" - "fmt" - "hash" - "io" - "sync/atomic" - "time" -) - -// serverHandshakeState contains details of a server handshake in progress. -// It's discarded once the handshake has completed. -type serverHandshakeState struct { - c *Conn - ctx context.Context - clientHello *clientHelloMsg - hello *serverHelloMsg - suite *cipherSuite - ecdheOk bool - ecSignOk bool - rsaDecryptOk bool - rsaSignOk bool - sessionState *sessionState - finishedHash finishedHash - masterSecret []byte - cert *Certificate -} - -// serverHandshake performs a TLS handshake as a server. -func (c *Conn) serverHandshake(ctx context.Context) error { - c.setAlternativeRecordLayer() - - clientHello, err := c.readClientHello(ctx) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - if c.vers == VersionTLS13 { - hs := serverHandshakeStateTLS13{ - c: c, - ctx: ctx, - clientHello: clientHello, - } - return hs.handshake() - } else if c.extraConfig.usesAlternativeRecordLayer() { - // This should already have been caught by the check that the ClientHello doesn't - // offer any (supported) versions older than TLS 1.3. - // Check again to make sure we can't be tricked into using an older version. - c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) - return errors.New("tls: negotiated TLS < 1.3 when using QUIC") - } - - hs := serverHandshakeState{ - c: c, - ctx: ctx, - clientHello: clientHello, - } - return hs.handshake() -} - -func (hs *serverHandshakeState) handshake() error { - c := hs.c - - if err := hs.processClientHello(); err != nil { - return err - } - - // For an overview of TLS handshaking, see RFC 5246, Section 7.3. - c.buffering = true - if hs.checkForResumption() { - // The client has included a session ticket and so we do an abbreviated handshake. - c.didResume = true - if err := hs.doResumeHandshake(); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := hs.sendFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil { - return err - } - if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { - return err - } - c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false - if err := hs.readFinished(nil); err != nil { - return err - } - } else { - // The client didn't include a session ticket, or it wasn't - // valid so we do a full handshake. - if err := hs.pickCipherSuite(); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := hs.readFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil { - return err - } - c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true - c.buffering = true - if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := hs.sendFinished(nil); err != nil { - return err - } - if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { - return err - } - } - - c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random) - atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1) - - c.updateConnectionState() - return nil -} - -// readClientHello reads a ClientHello message and selects the protocol version. -func (c *Conn) readClientHello(ctx context.Context) (*clientHelloMsg, error) { - // clientHelloMsg is included in the transcript, but we haven't initialized - // it yet. The respective handshake functions will record it themselves. - msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - clientHello, ok := msg.(*clientHelloMsg) - if !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return nil, unexpectedMessageError(clientHello, msg) - } - - var configForClient *config - originalConfig := c.config - if c.config.GetConfigForClient != nil { - chi := newClientHelloInfo(ctx, c, clientHello) - if cfc, err := c.config.GetConfigForClient(chi); err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return nil, err - } else if cfc != nil { - configForClient = fromConfig(cfc) - c.config = configForClient - } - } - c.ticketKeys = originalConfig.ticketKeys(configForClient) - - clientVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions - if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 { - clientVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers) - } - if c.extraConfig.usesAlternativeRecordLayer() { - // In QUIC, the client MUST NOT offer any old TLS versions. - // Here, we can only check that none of the other supported versions of this library - // (TLS 1.0 - TLS 1.2) is offered. We don't check for any SSL versions here. - for _, ver := range clientVersions { - if ver == VersionTLS13 { - continue - } - for _, v := range supportedVersions { - if ver == v { - c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) - return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered old TLS version %#x", ver) - } - } - } - // Make the config we're using allows us to use TLS 1.3. - if c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer) < VersionTLS13 { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return nil, errors.New("tls: MaxVersion prevents QUIC from using TLS 1.3") - } - } - c.vers, ok = c.config.mutualVersion(roleServer, clientVersions) - if !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) - return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered only unsupported versions: %x", clientVersions) - } - c.haveVers = true - c.in.version = c.vers - c.out.version = c.vers - - return clientHello, nil -} - -func (hs *serverHandshakeState) processClientHello() error { - c := hs.c - - hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg) - hs.hello.vers = c.vers - - foundCompression := false - // We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it. - for _, compression := range hs.clientHello.compressionMethods { - if compression == compressionNone { - foundCompression = true - break - } - } - - if !foundCompression { - c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) - return errors.New("tls: client does not support uncompressed connections") - } - - hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32) - serverRandom := hs.hello.random - // Downgrade protection canaries. See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.3. - maxVers := c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer) - if maxVers >= VersionTLS12 && c.vers < maxVers || testingOnlyForceDowngradeCanary { - if c.vers == VersionTLS12 { - copy(serverRandom[24:], downgradeCanaryTLS12) - } else { - copy(serverRandom[24:], downgradeCanaryTLS11) - } - serverRandom = serverRandom[:24] - } - _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), serverRandom) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return err - } - - if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 { - c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) - return errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension") - } - - hs.hello.secureRenegotiationSupported = hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiationSupported - hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone - if len(hs.clientHello.serverName) > 0 { - c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName - } - - selectedProto, err := negotiateALPN(c.config.NextProtos, hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol) - return err - } - hs.hello.alpnProtocol = selectedProto - c.clientProtocol = selectedProto - - hs.cert, err = c.config.getCertificate(newClientHelloInfo(hs.ctx, c, hs.clientHello)) - if err != nil { - if err == errNoCertificates { - c.sendAlert(alertUnrecognizedName) - } else { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - } - return err - } - if hs.clientHello.scts { - hs.hello.scts = hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps - } - - hs.ecdheOk = supportsECDHE(c.config, hs.clientHello.supportedCurves, hs.clientHello.supportedPoints) - - if hs.ecdheOk && len(hs.clientHello.supportedPoints) > 0 { - // Although omitting the ec_point_formats extension is permitted, some - // old OpenSSL version will refuse to handshake if not present. - // - // Per RFC 4492, section 5.1.2, implementations MUST support the - // uncompressed point format. See golang.org/issue/31943. - hs.hello.supportedPoints = []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed} - } - - if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer); ok { - switch priv.Public().(type) { - case *ecdsa.PublicKey: - hs.ecSignOk = true - case ed25519.PublicKey: - hs.ecSignOk = true - case *rsa.PublicKey: - hs.rsaSignOk = true - default: - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported signing key type (%T)", priv.Public()) - } - } - if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter); ok { - switch priv.Public().(type) { - case *rsa.PublicKey: - hs.rsaDecryptOk = true - default: - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported decryption key type (%T)", priv.Public()) - } - } - - return nil -} - -// negotiateALPN picks a shared ALPN protocol that both sides support in server -// preference order. If ALPN is not configured or the peer doesn't support it, -// it returns "" and no error. -func negotiateALPN(serverProtos, clientProtos []string) (string, error) { - if len(serverProtos) == 0 || len(clientProtos) == 0 { - return "", nil - } - var http11fallback bool - for _, s := range serverProtos { - for _, c := range clientProtos { - if s == c { - return s, nil - } - if s == "h2" && c == "http/1.1" { - http11fallback = true - } - } - } - // As a special case, let http/1.1 clients connect to h2 servers as if they - // didn't support ALPN. We used not to enforce protocol overlap, so over - // time a number of HTTP servers were configured with only "h2", but - // expected to accept connections from "http/1.1" clients. See Issue 46310. - if http11fallback { - return "", nil - } - return "", fmt.Errorf("tls: client requested unsupported application protocols (%s)", clientProtos) -} - -// supportsECDHE returns whether ECDHE key exchanges can be used with this -// pre-TLS 1.3 client. -func supportsECDHE(c *config, supportedCurves []CurveID, supportedPoints []uint8) bool { - supportsCurve := false - for _, curve := range supportedCurves { - if c.supportsCurve(curve) { - supportsCurve = true - break - } - } - - supportsPointFormat := false - for _, pointFormat := range supportedPoints { - if pointFormat == pointFormatUncompressed { - supportsPointFormat = true - break - } - } - // Per RFC 8422, Section 5.1.2, if the Supported Point Formats extension is - // missing, uncompressed points are supported. If supportedPoints is empty, - // the extension must be missing, as an empty extension body is rejected by - // the parser. See https://go.dev/issue/49126. - if len(supportedPoints) == 0 { - supportsPointFormat = true - } - - return supportsCurve && supportsPointFormat -} - -func (hs *serverHandshakeState) pickCipherSuite() error { - c := hs.c - - preferenceOrder := cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder - if !hasAESGCMHardwareSupport || !aesgcmPreferred(hs.clientHello.cipherSuites) { - preferenceOrder = cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES - } - - configCipherSuites := c.config.cipherSuites() - preferenceList := make([]uint16, 0, len(configCipherSuites)) - for _, suiteID := range preferenceOrder { - for _, id := range configCipherSuites { - if id == suiteID { - preferenceList = append(preferenceList, id) - break - } - } - } - - hs.suite = selectCipherSuite(preferenceList, hs.clientHello.cipherSuites, hs.cipherSuiteOk) - if hs.suite == nil { - c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) - return errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server") - } - c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id - - for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites { - if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV { - // The client is doing a fallback connection. See RFC 7507. - if hs.clientHello.vers < c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer) { - c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback) - return errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback") - } - break - } - } - - return nil -} - -func (hs *serverHandshakeState) cipherSuiteOk(c *cipherSuite) bool { - if c.flags&suiteECDHE != 0 { - if !hs.ecdheOk { - return false - } - if c.flags&suiteECSign != 0 { - if !hs.ecSignOk { - return false - } - } else if !hs.rsaSignOk { - return false - } - } else if !hs.rsaDecryptOk { - return false - } - if hs.c.vers < VersionTLS12 && c.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 { - return false - } - return true -} - -// checkForResumption reports whether we should perform resumption on this connection. -func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkForResumption() bool { - c := hs.c - - if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled { - return false - } - - plaintext, usedOldKey := c.decryptTicket(hs.clientHello.sessionTicket) - if plaintext == nil { - return false - } - hs.sessionState = &sessionState{usedOldKey: usedOldKey} - ok := hs.sessionState.unmarshal(plaintext) - if !ok { - return false - } - - createdAt := time.Unix(int64(hs.sessionState.createdAt), 0) - if c.config.time().Sub(createdAt) > maxSessionTicketLifetime { - return false - } - - // Never resume a session for a different TLS version. - if c.vers != hs.sessionState.vers { - return false - } - - cipherSuiteOk := false - // Check that the client is still offering the ciphersuite in the session. - for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites { - if id == hs.sessionState.cipherSuite { - cipherSuiteOk = true - break - } - } - if !cipherSuiteOk { - return false - } - - // Check that we also support the ciphersuite from the session. - hs.suite = selectCipherSuite([]uint16{hs.sessionState.cipherSuite}, - c.config.cipherSuites(), hs.cipherSuiteOk) - if hs.suite == nil { - return false - } - - sessionHasClientCerts := len(hs.sessionState.certificates) != 0 - needClientCerts := requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth) - if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts { - return false - } - if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert { - return false - } - - return true -} - -func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doResumeHandshake() error { - c := hs.c - - hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id - c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id - // We echo the client's session ID in the ServerHello to let it know - // that we're doing a resumption. - hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId - hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.sessionState.usedOldKey - hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite) - hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() - if err := transcriptMsg(hs.clientHello, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil { - return err - } - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(hs.hello, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil { - return err - } - - if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{ - Certificate: hs.sessionState.certificates, - }); err != nil { - return err - } - - if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil { - if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) - return err - } - } - - hs.masterSecret = hs.sessionState.masterSecret - - return nil -} - -func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error { - c := hs.c - - if hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0 { - hs.hello.ocspStapling = true - } - - hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.clientHello.ticketSupported && !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled - hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id - - hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(hs.c.vers, hs.suite) - if c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert { - // No need to keep a full record of the handshake if client - // certificates won't be used. - hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() - } - if err := transcriptMsg(hs.clientHello, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil { - return err - } - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(hs.hello, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil { - return err - } - - certMsg := new(certificateMsg) - certMsg.certificates = hs.cert.Certificate - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certMsg, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil { - return err - } - - if hs.hello.ocspStapling { - certStatus := new(certificateStatusMsg) - certStatus.response = hs.cert.OCSPStaple - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certStatus, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil { - return err - } - } - - keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers) - skx, err := keyAgreement.generateServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, hs.clientHello, hs.hello) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) - return err - } - if skx != nil { - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(skx, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil { - return err - } - } - - var certReq *certificateRequestMsg - if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert { - // Request a client certificate - certReq = new(certificateRequestMsg) - certReq.certificateTypes = []byte{ - byte(certTypeRSASign), - byte(certTypeECDSASign), - } - if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 { - certReq.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true - certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms() - } - - // An empty list of certificateAuthorities signals to - // the client that it may send any certificate in response - // to our request. When we know the CAs we trust, then - // we can send them down, so that the client can choose - // an appropriate certificate to give to us. - if c.config.ClientCAs != nil { - certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects() - } - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certReq, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil { - return err - } - } - - helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg) - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(helloDone, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil { - return err - } - - if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { - return err - } - - var pub crypto.PublicKey // public key for client auth, if any - - msg, err := c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - // If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a - // certificate message, even if it's empty. - if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert { - certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg) - if !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg) - } - - if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{ - Certificate: certMsg.certificates, - }); err != nil { - return err - } - if len(certMsg.certificates) != 0 { - pub = c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey - } - - msg, err = c.readHandshake(&hs.finishedHash) - if err != nil { - return err - } - } - if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil { - if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) - return err - } - } - - // Get client key exchange - ckx, ok := msg.(*clientKeyExchangeMsg) - if !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return unexpectedMessageError(ckx, msg) - } - - preMasterSecret, err := keyAgreement.processClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, ckx, c.vers) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) - return err - } - hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random) - if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelTLS12, hs.clientHello.random, hs.masterSecret); err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return err - } - - // If we received a client cert in response to our certificate request message, - // the client will send us a certificateVerifyMsg immediately after the - // clientKeyExchangeMsg. This message is a digest of all preceding - // handshake-layer messages that is signed using the private key corresponding - // to the client's certificate. This allows us to verify that the client is in - // possession of the private key of the certificate. - if len(c.peerCertificates) > 0 { - // certificateVerifyMsg is included in the transcript, but not until - // after we verify the handshake signature, since the state before - // this message was sent is used. - msg, err = c.readHandshake(nil) - if err != nil { - return err - } - certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg) - if !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg) - } - - var sigType uint8 - var sigHash crypto.Hash - if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 { - if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: client certificate used with invalid signature algorithm") - } - sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm) - if err != nil { - return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - } - } else { - sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(pub) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return err - } - } - - signed := hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(sigType, sigHash, hs.masterSecret) - if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, pub, sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError) - return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the client certificate: " + err.Error()) - } - - if err := transcriptMsg(certVerify, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil { - return err - } - } - - hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() - - return nil -} - -func (hs *serverHandshakeState) establishKeys() error { - c := hs.c - - clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV := - keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen) - - var clientCipher, serverCipher any - var clientHash, serverHash hash.Hash - - if hs.suite.aead == nil { - clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, true /* for reading */) - clientHash = hs.suite.mac(clientMAC) - serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, false /* not for reading */) - serverHash = hs.suite.mac(serverMAC) - } else { - clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV) - serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV) - } - - c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash) - c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash) - - return nil -} - -func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error { - c := hs.c - - if err := c.readChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil { - return err - } - - // finishedMsg is included in the transcript, but not until after we - // check the client version, since the state before this message was - // sent is used during verification. - msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil) - if err != nil { - return err - } - clientFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg) - if !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return unexpectedMessageError(clientFinished, msg) - } - - verify := hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret) - if len(verify) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) || - subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 { - c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) - return errors.New("tls: client's Finished message is incorrect") - } - - if err := transcriptMsg(clientFinished, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil { - return err - } - - copy(out, verify) - return nil -} - -func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendSessionTicket() error { - // ticketSupported is set in a resumption handshake if the - // ticket from the client was encrypted with an old session - // ticket key and thus a refreshed ticket should be sent. - if !hs.hello.ticketSupported { - return nil - } - - c := hs.c - m := new(newSessionTicketMsg) - - createdAt := uint64(c.config.time().Unix()) - if hs.sessionState != nil { - // If this is re-wrapping an old key, then keep - // the original time it was created. - createdAt = hs.sessionState.createdAt - } - - var certsFromClient [][]byte - for _, cert := range c.peerCertificates { - certsFromClient = append(certsFromClient, cert.Raw) - } - state := sessionState{ - vers: c.vers, - cipherSuite: hs.suite.id, - createdAt: createdAt, - masterSecret: hs.masterSecret, - certificates: certsFromClient, - } - stateBytes, err := state.marshal() - if err != nil { - return err - } - m.ticket, err = c.encryptTicket(stateBytes) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(m, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil { - return err - } - - return nil -} - -func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error { - c := hs.c - - if err := c.writeChangeCipherRecord(); err != nil { - return err - } - - finished := new(finishedMsg) - finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret) - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(finished, &hs.finishedHash); err != nil { - return err - } - - copy(out, finished.verifyData) - - return nil -} - -// processCertsFromClient takes a chain of client certificates either from a -// Certificates message or from a sessionState and verifies them. It returns -// the public key of the leaf certificate. -func (c *Conn) processCertsFromClient(certificate Certificate) error { - certificates := certificate.Certificate - certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certificates)) - var err error - for i, asn1Data := range certificates { - if certs[i], err = x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data); err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) - return errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate: " + err.Error()) - } - } - - if len(certs) == 0 && requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth) { - c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) - return errors.New("tls: client didn't provide a certificate") - } - - if c.config.ClientAuth >= VerifyClientCertIfGiven && len(certs) > 0 { - opts := x509.VerifyOptions{ - Roots: c.config.ClientCAs, - CurrentTime: c.config.time(), - Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(), - KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth}, - } - - for _, cert := range certs[1:] { - opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert) - } - - chains, err := certs[0].Verify(opts) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) - return errors.New("tls: failed to verify client certificate: " + err.Error()) - } - - c.verifiedChains = chains - } - - c.peerCertificates = certs - c.ocspResponse = certificate.OCSPStaple - c.scts = certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps - - if len(certs) > 0 { - switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) { - case *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey, ed25519.PublicKey: - default: - c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate) - return fmt.Errorf("tls: client certificate contains an unsupported public key of type %T", certs[0].PublicKey) - } - } - - if c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil { - if err := c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate(certificates, c.verifiedChains); err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) - return err - } - } - - return nil -} - -func newClientHelloInfo(ctx context.Context, c *Conn, clientHello *clientHelloMsg) *ClientHelloInfo { - supportedVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions - if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 { - supportedVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers) - } - - return toClientHelloInfo(&clientHelloInfo{ - CipherSuites: clientHello.cipherSuites, - ServerName: clientHello.serverName, - SupportedCurves: clientHello.supportedCurves, - SupportedPoints: clientHello.supportedPoints, - SignatureSchemes: clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms, - SupportedProtos: clientHello.alpnProtocols, - SupportedVersions: supportedVersions, - Conn: c.conn, - config: toConfig(c.config), - ctx: ctx, - }) -} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_server_tls13.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_server_tls13.go deleted file mode 100644 index c4706c44..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/handshake_server_tls13.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,903 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package qtls - -import ( - "bytes" - "context" - "crypto" - "crypto/hmac" - "crypto/rsa" - "errors" - "hash" - "io" - "sync/atomic" - "time" -) - -// maxClientPSKIdentities is the number of client PSK identities the server will -// attempt to validate. It will ignore the rest not to let cheap ClientHello -// messages cause too much work in session ticket decryption attempts. -const maxClientPSKIdentities = 5 - -type serverHandshakeStateTLS13 struct { - c *Conn - ctx context.Context - clientHello *clientHelloMsg - hello *serverHelloMsg - alpnNegotiationErr error - encryptedExtensions *encryptedExtensionsMsg - sentDummyCCS bool - usingPSK bool - suite *cipherSuiteTLS13 - cert *Certificate - sigAlg SignatureScheme - earlySecret []byte - sharedKey []byte - handshakeSecret []byte - masterSecret []byte - trafficSecret []byte // client_application_traffic_secret_0 - transcript hash.Hash - clientFinished []byte -} - -func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error { - c := hs.c - - if needFIPS() { - return errors.New("tls: internal error: TLS 1.3 reached in FIPS mode") - } - - // For an overview of the TLS 1.3 handshake, see RFC 8446, Section 2. - if err := hs.processClientHello(); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := hs.checkForResumption(); err != nil { - return err - } - c.updateConnectionState() - if err := hs.pickCertificate(); err != nil { - return err - } - c.buffering = true - if err := hs.sendServerParameters(); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := hs.sendServerCertificate(); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := hs.sendServerFinished(); err != nil { - return err - } - // Note that at this point we could start sending application data without - // waiting for the client's second flight, but the application might not - // expect the lack of replay protection of the ClientHello parameters. - if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := hs.readClientCertificate(); err != nil { - return err - } - c.updateConnectionState() - if err := hs.readClientFinished(); err != nil { - return err - } - - atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1) - c.updateConnectionState() - return nil -} - -func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) processClientHello() error { - c := hs.c - - hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg) - hs.encryptedExtensions = new(encryptedExtensionsMsg) - - // TLS 1.3 froze the ServerHello.legacy_version field, and uses - // supported_versions instead. See RFC 8446, sections 4.1.3 and 4.2.1. - hs.hello.vers = VersionTLS12 - hs.hello.supportedVersion = c.vers - - if len(hs.clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: client used the legacy version field to negotiate TLS 1.3") - } - - // Abort if the client is doing a fallback and landing lower than what we - // support. See RFC 7507, which however does not specify the interaction - // with supported_versions. The only difference is that with - // supported_versions a client has a chance to attempt a [TLS 1.2, TLS 1.4] - // handshake in case TLS 1.3 is broken but 1.2 is not. Alas, in that case, - // it will have to drop the TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV protection if it falls back to - // TLS 1.2, because a TLS 1.3 server would abort here. The situation before - // supported_versions was not better because there was just no way to do a - // TLS 1.4 handshake without risking the server selecting TLS 1.3. - for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites { - if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV { - // Use c.vers instead of max(supported_versions) because an attacker - // could defeat this by adding an arbitrary high version otherwise. - if c.vers < c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer) { - c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback) - return errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback") - } - break - } - } - - if len(hs.clientHello.compressionMethods) != 1 || - hs.clientHello.compressionMethods[0] != compressionNone { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: TLS 1.3 client supports illegal compression methods") - } - - hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32) - if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hs.hello.random); err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return err - } - - if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 { - c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) - return errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension") - } - - hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId - hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone - - preferenceList := defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 - if !hasAESGCMHardwareSupport || !aesgcmPreferred(hs.clientHello.cipherSuites) { - preferenceList = defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES - } - for _, suiteID := range preferenceList { - hs.suite = mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(hs.clientHello.cipherSuites, suiteID) - if hs.suite != nil { - break - } - } - if hs.suite == nil { - c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) - return errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server") - } - c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id - hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id - hs.transcript = hs.suite.hash.New() - - // Pick the ECDHE group in server preference order, but give priority to - // groups with a key share, to avoid a HelloRetryRequest round-trip. - var selectedGroup CurveID - var clientKeyShare *keyShare -GroupSelection: - for _, preferredGroup := range c.config.curvePreferences() { - for _, ks := range hs.clientHello.keyShares { - if ks.group == preferredGroup { - selectedGroup = ks.group - clientKeyShare = &ks - break GroupSelection - } - } - if selectedGroup != 0 { - continue - } - for _, group := range hs.clientHello.supportedCurves { - if group == preferredGroup { - selectedGroup = group - break - } - } - } - if selectedGroup == 0 { - c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) - return errors.New("tls: no ECDHE curve supported by both client and server") - } - if clientKeyShare == nil { - if err := hs.doHelloRetryRequest(selectedGroup); err != nil { - return err - } - clientKeyShare = &hs.clientHello.keyShares[0] - } - - if _, ok := curveForCurveID(selectedGroup); selectedGroup != X25519 && !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve") - } - params, err := generateECDHEParameters(c.config.rand(), selectedGroup) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return err - } - hs.hello.serverShare = keyShare{group: selectedGroup, data: params.PublicKey()} - hs.sharedKey = params.SharedKey(clientKeyShare.data) - if hs.sharedKey == nil { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: invalid client key share") - } - - c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName - - if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions != nil { - c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions(typeClientHello, hs.clientHello.additionalExtensions) - } - - selectedProto, err := negotiateALPN(c.config.NextProtos, hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols) - if err != nil { - hs.alpnNegotiationErr = err - } - hs.encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol = selectedProto - c.clientProtocol = selectedProto - - return nil -} - -func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) checkForResumption() error { - c := hs.c - - if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled { - return nil - } - - modeOK := false - for _, mode := range hs.clientHello.pskModes { - if mode == pskModeDHE { - modeOK = true - break - } - } - if !modeOK { - return nil - } - - if len(hs.clientHello.pskIdentities) != len(hs.clientHello.pskBinders) { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: invalid or missing PSK binders") - } - if len(hs.clientHello.pskIdentities) == 0 { - return nil - } - - for i, identity := range hs.clientHello.pskIdentities { - if i >= maxClientPSKIdentities { - break - } - - plaintext, _ := c.decryptTicket(identity.label) - if plaintext == nil { - continue - } - sessionState := new(sessionStateTLS13) - if ok := sessionState.unmarshal(plaintext); !ok { - continue - } - - if hs.clientHello.earlyData { - if sessionState.maxEarlyData == 0 { - c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension) - return errors.New("tls: client sent unexpected early data") - } - - if hs.alpnNegotiationErr == nil && sessionState.alpn == c.clientProtocol && - c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.MaxEarlyData > 0 && - c.extraConfig.Accept0RTT != nil && c.extraConfig.Accept0RTT(sessionState.appData) { - hs.encryptedExtensions.earlyData = true - c.used0RTT = true - } - } - - createdAt := time.Unix(int64(sessionState.createdAt), 0) - if c.config.time().Sub(createdAt) > maxSessionTicketLifetime { - continue - } - - // We don't check the obfuscated ticket age because it's affected by - // clock skew and it's only a freshness signal useful for shrinking the - // window for replay attacks, which don't affect us as we don't do 0-RTT. - - pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(sessionState.cipherSuite) - if pskSuite == nil || pskSuite.hash != hs.suite.hash { - continue - } - - // PSK connections don't re-establish client certificates, but carry - // them over in the session ticket. Ensure the presence of client certs - // in the ticket is consistent with the configured requirements. - sessionHasClientCerts := len(sessionState.certificate.Certificate) != 0 - needClientCerts := requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth) - if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts { - continue - } - if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert { - continue - } - - psk := hs.suite.expandLabel(sessionState.resumptionSecret, "resumption", - nil, hs.suite.hash.Size()) - hs.earlySecret = hs.suite.extract(psk, nil) - binderKey := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.earlySecret, resumptionBinderLabel, nil) - // Clone the transcript in case a HelloRetryRequest was recorded. - transcript := cloneHash(hs.transcript, hs.suite.hash) - if transcript == nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return errors.New("tls: internal error: failed to clone hash") - } - clientHelloBytes, err := hs.clientHello.marshalWithoutBinders() - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return err - } - transcript.Write(clientHelloBytes) - pskBinder := hs.suite.finishedHash(binderKey, transcript) - if !hmac.Equal(hs.clientHello.pskBinders[i], pskBinder) { - c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError) - return errors.New("tls: invalid PSK binder") - } - - c.didResume = true - if err := c.processCertsFromClient(sessionState.certificate); err != nil { - return err - } - - h := cloneHash(hs.transcript, hs.suite.hash) - clientHelloWithBindersBytes, err := hs.clientHello.marshal() - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return err - } - h.Write(clientHelloWithBindersBytes) - if hs.encryptedExtensions.earlyData { - clientEarlySecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.earlySecret, "c e traffic", h) - c.in.exportKey(Encryption0RTT, hs.suite, clientEarlySecret) - if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelEarlyTraffic, hs.clientHello.random, clientEarlySecret); err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return err - } - } - - hs.hello.selectedIdentityPresent = true - hs.hello.selectedIdentity = uint16(i) - hs.usingPSK = true - return nil - } - - return nil -} - -// cloneHash uses the encoding.BinaryMarshaler and encoding.BinaryUnmarshaler -// interfaces implemented by standard library hashes to clone the state of in -// to a new instance of h. It returns nil if the operation fails. -func cloneHash(in hash.Hash, h crypto.Hash) hash.Hash { - // Recreate the interface to avoid importing encoding. - type binaryMarshaler interface { - MarshalBinary() (data []byte, err error) - UnmarshalBinary(data []byte) error - } - marshaler, ok := in.(binaryMarshaler) - if !ok { - return nil - } - state, err := marshaler.MarshalBinary() - if err != nil { - return nil - } - out := h.New() - unmarshaler, ok := out.(binaryMarshaler) - if !ok { - return nil - } - if err := unmarshaler.UnmarshalBinary(state); err != nil { - return nil - } - return out -} - -func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) pickCertificate() error { - c := hs.c - - // Only one of PSK and certificates are used at a time. - if hs.usingPSK { - return nil - } - - // signature_algorithms is required in TLS 1.3. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.3. - if len(hs.clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) == 0 { - return c.sendAlert(alertMissingExtension) - } - - certificate, err := c.config.getCertificate(newClientHelloInfo(hs.ctx, c, hs.clientHello)) - if err != nil { - if err == errNoCertificates { - c.sendAlert(alertUnrecognizedName) - } else { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - } - return err - } - hs.sigAlg, err = selectSignatureScheme(c.vers, certificate, hs.clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) - if err != nil { - // getCertificate returned a certificate that is unsupported or - // incompatible with the client's signature algorithms. - c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) - return err - } - hs.cert = certificate - - return nil -} - -// sendDummyChangeCipherSpec sends a ChangeCipherSpec record for compatibility -// with middleboxes that didn't implement TLS correctly. See RFC 8446, Appendix D.4. -func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendDummyChangeCipherSpec() error { - if hs.sentDummyCCS { - return nil - } - hs.sentDummyCCS = true - - return hs.c.writeChangeCipherRecord() -} - -func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) doHelloRetryRequest(selectedGroup CurveID) error { - c := hs.c - - // The first ClientHello gets double-hashed into the transcript upon a - // HelloRetryRequest. See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.1. - if err := transcriptMsg(hs.clientHello, hs.transcript); err != nil { - return err - } - chHash := hs.transcript.Sum(nil) - hs.transcript.Reset() - hs.transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))}) - hs.transcript.Write(chHash) - - helloRetryRequest := &serverHelloMsg{ - vers: hs.hello.vers, - random: helloRetryRequestRandom, - sessionId: hs.hello.sessionId, - cipherSuite: hs.hello.cipherSuite, - compressionMethod: hs.hello.compressionMethod, - supportedVersion: hs.hello.supportedVersion, - selectedGroup: selectedGroup, - } - - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(helloRetryRequest, hs.transcript); err != nil { - return err - } - - if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil { - return err - } - - // clientHelloMsg is not included in the transcript. - msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - clientHello, ok := msg.(*clientHelloMsg) - if !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return unexpectedMessageError(clientHello, msg) - } - - if len(clientHello.keyShares) != 1 || clientHello.keyShares[0].group != selectedGroup { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: client sent invalid key share in second ClientHello") - } - - if clientHello.earlyData { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: client indicated early data in second ClientHello") - } - - if illegalClientHelloChange(clientHello, hs.clientHello) { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: client illegally modified second ClientHello") - } - - if clientHello.earlyData { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: client offered 0-RTT data in second ClientHello") - } - - hs.clientHello = clientHello - return nil -} - -// illegalClientHelloChange reports whether the two ClientHello messages are -// different, with the exception of the changes allowed before and after a -// HelloRetryRequest. See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.2. -func illegalClientHelloChange(ch, ch1 *clientHelloMsg) bool { - if len(ch.supportedVersions) != len(ch1.supportedVersions) || - len(ch.cipherSuites) != len(ch1.cipherSuites) || - len(ch.supportedCurves) != len(ch1.supportedCurves) || - len(ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) != len(ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) || - len(ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert) != len(ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert) || - len(ch.alpnProtocols) != len(ch1.alpnProtocols) { - return true - } - for i := range ch.supportedVersions { - if ch.supportedVersions[i] != ch1.supportedVersions[i] { - return true - } - } - for i := range ch.cipherSuites { - if ch.cipherSuites[i] != ch1.cipherSuites[i] { - return true - } - } - for i := range ch.supportedCurves { - if ch.supportedCurves[i] != ch1.supportedCurves[i] { - return true - } - } - for i := range ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithms { - if ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithms[i] != ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithms[i] { - return true - } - } - for i := range ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert { - if ch.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert[i] != ch1.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert[i] { - return true - } - } - for i := range ch.alpnProtocols { - if ch.alpnProtocols[i] != ch1.alpnProtocols[i] { - return true - } - } - return ch.vers != ch1.vers || - !bytes.Equal(ch.random, ch1.random) || - !bytes.Equal(ch.sessionId, ch1.sessionId) || - !bytes.Equal(ch.compressionMethods, ch1.compressionMethods) || - ch.serverName != ch1.serverName || - ch.ocspStapling != ch1.ocspStapling || - !bytes.Equal(ch.supportedPoints, ch1.supportedPoints) || - ch.ticketSupported != ch1.ticketSupported || - !bytes.Equal(ch.sessionTicket, ch1.sessionTicket) || - ch.secureRenegotiationSupported != ch1.secureRenegotiationSupported || - !bytes.Equal(ch.secureRenegotiation, ch1.secureRenegotiation) || - ch.scts != ch1.scts || - !bytes.Equal(ch.cookie, ch1.cookie) || - !bytes.Equal(ch.pskModes, ch1.pskModes) -} - -func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerParameters() error { - c := hs.c - - if err := transcriptMsg(hs.clientHello, hs.transcript); err != nil { - return err - } - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(hs.hello, hs.transcript); err != nil { - return err - } - - if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil { - return err - } - - earlySecret := hs.earlySecret - if earlySecret == nil { - earlySecret = hs.suite.extract(nil, nil) - } - hs.handshakeSecret = hs.suite.extract(hs.sharedKey, - hs.suite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, "derived", nil)) - - clientSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.handshakeSecret, - clientHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript) - c.in.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, clientSecret) - c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, clientSecret) - serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.handshakeSecret, - serverHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript) - c.out.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, serverSecret) - c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret) - - err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientHandshake, hs.clientHello.random, clientSecret) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return err - } - err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerHandshake, hs.clientHello.random, serverSecret) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return err - } - - if hs.alpnNegotiationErr != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol) - return hs.alpnNegotiationErr - } - if hs.c.extraConfig != nil && hs.c.extraConfig.GetExtensions != nil { - hs.encryptedExtensions.additionalExtensions = hs.c.extraConfig.GetExtensions(typeEncryptedExtensions) - } - - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(hs.encryptedExtensions, hs.transcript); err != nil { - return err - } - - return nil -} - -func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) requestClientCert() bool { - return hs.c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert && !hs.usingPSK -} - -func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerCertificate() error { - c := hs.c - - // Only one of PSK and certificates are used at a time. - if hs.usingPSK { - return nil - } - - if hs.requestClientCert() { - // Request a client certificate - certReq := new(certificateRequestMsgTLS13) - certReq.ocspStapling = true - certReq.scts = true - certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms() - if c.config.ClientCAs != nil { - certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects() - } - - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certReq, hs.transcript); err != nil { - return err - } - } - - certMsg := new(certificateMsgTLS13) - - certMsg.certificate = *hs.cert - certMsg.scts = hs.clientHello.scts && len(hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps) > 0 - certMsg.ocspStapling = hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0 - - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certMsg, hs.transcript); err != nil { - return err - } - - certVerifyMsg := new(certificateVerifyMsg) - certVerifyMsg.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true - certVerifyMsg.signatureAlgorithm = hs.sigAlg - - sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(hs.sigAlg) - if err != nil { - return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - } - - signed := signedMessage(sigHash, serverSignatureContext, hs.transcript) - signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash) - if sigType == signatureRSAPSS { - signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash} - } - sig, err := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Sign(c.config.rand(), signed, signOpts) - if err != nil { - public := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Public() - if rsaKey, ok := public.(*rsa.PublicKey); ok && sigType == signatureRSAPSS && - rsaKey.N.BitLen()/8 < sigHash.Size()*2+2 { // key too small for RSA-PSS - c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) - } else { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - } - return errors.New("tls: failed to sign handshake: " + err.Error()) - } - certVerifyMsg.signature = sig - - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(certVerifyMsg, hs.transcript); err != nil { - return err - } - - return nil -} - -func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerFinished() error { - c := hs.c - - finished := &finishedMsg{ - verifyData: hs.suite.finishedHash(c.out.trafficSecret, hs.transcript), - } - - if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(finished, hs.transcript); err != nil { - return err - } - - // Derive secrets that take context through the server Finished. - - hs.masterSecret = hs.suite.extract(nil, - hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.handshakeSecret, "derived", nil)) - - hs.trafficSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret, - clientApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript) - serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret, - serverApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript) - c.out.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, serverSecret) - c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret) - - err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientTraffic, hs.clientHello.random, hs.trafficSecret) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return err - } - err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelServerTraffic, hs.clientHello.random, serverSecret) - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return err - } - - c.ekm = hs.suite.exportKeyingMaterial(hs.masterSecret, hs.transcript) - - // If we did not request client certificates, at this point we can - // precompute the client finished and roll the transcript forward to send - // session tickets in our first flight. - if !hs.requestClientCert() { - if err := hs.sendSessionTickets(); err != nil { - return err - } - } - - return nil -} - -func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) shouldSendSessionTickets() bool { - if hs.c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled { - return false - } - - // Don't send tickets the client wouldn't use. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.9. - for _, pskMode := range hs.clientHello.pskModes { - if pskMode == pskModeDHE { - return true - } - } - return false -} - -func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendSessionTickets() error { - c := hs.c - - hs.clientFinished = hs.suite.finishedHash(c.in.trafficSecret, hs.transcript) - finishedMsg := &finishedMsg{ - verifyData: hs.clientFinished, - } - if err := transcriptMsg(finishedMsg, hs.transcript); err != nil { - return err - } - - if !hs.shouldSendSessionTickets() { - return nil - } - - c.resumptionSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret, - resumptionLabel, hs.transcript) - - // Don't send session tickets when the alternative record layer is set. - // Instead, save the resumption secret on the Conn. - // Session tickets can then be generated by calling Conn.GetSessionTicket(). - if hs.c.extraConfig != nil && hs.c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil { - return nil - } - - m, err := hs.c.getSessionTicketMsg(nil) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - if _, err := c.writeHandshakeRecord(m, nil); err != nil { - return err - } - - return nil -} - -func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientCertificate() error { - c := hs.c - - if !hs.requestClientCert() { - // Make sure the connection is still being verified whether or not - // the server requested a client certificate. - if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil { - if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) - return err - } - } - return nil - } - - // If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a - // certificate message. If it's empty, no CertificateVerify is sent. - - msg, err := c.readHandshake(hs.transcript) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsgTLS13) - if !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg) - } - - if err := c.processCertsFromClient(certMsg.certificate); err != nil { - return err - } - - if c.config.VerifyConnection != nil { - if err := c.config.VerifyConnection(c.connectionStateLocked()); err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) - return err - } - } - - if len(certMsg.certificate.Certificate) != 0 { - // certificateVerifyMsg is included in the transcript, but not until - // after we verify the handshake signature, since the state before - // this message was sent is used. - msg, err = c.readHandshake(nil) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg) - if !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg) - } - - // See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3. - if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, supportedSignatureAlgorithms()) { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: client certificate used with invalid signature algorithm") - } - sigType, sigHash, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm) - if err != nil { - return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - } - if sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigHash == crypto.SHA1 { - c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: client certificate used with invalid signature algorithm") - } - signed := signedMessage(sigHash, clientSignatureContext, hs.transcript) - if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey, - sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError) - return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the client certificate: " + err.Error()) - } - - if err := transcriptMsg(certVerify, hs.transcript); err != nil { - return err - } - } - - // If we waited until the client certificates to send session tickets, we - // are ready to do it now. - if err := hs.sendSessionTickets(); err != nil { - return err - } - - return nil -} - -func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientFinished() error { - c := hs.c - - // finishedMsg is not included in the transcript. - msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil) - if err != nil { - return err - } - - finished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg) - if !ok { - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return unexpectedMessageError(finished, msg) - } - - if !hmac.Equal(hs.clientFinished, finished.verifyData) { - c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError) - return errors.New("tls: invalid client finished hash") - } - - c.in.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret) - c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret) - - return nil -} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/key_agreement.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/key_agreement.go deleted file mode 100644 index 453a8dcf..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/key_agreement.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,357 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package qtls - -import ( - "crypto" - "crypto/md5" - "crypto/rsa" - "crypto/sha1" - "crypto/x509" - "errors" - "fmt" - "io" -) - -// a keyAgreement implements the client and server side of a TLS key agreement -// protocol by generating and processing key exchange messages. -type keyAgreement interface { - // On the server side, the first two methods are called in order. - - // In the case that the key agreement protocol doesn't use a - // ServerKeyExchange message, generateServerKeyExchange can return nil, - // nil. - generateServerKeyExchange(*config, *Certificate, *clientHelloMsg, *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error) - processClientKeyExchange(*config, *Certificate, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, uint16) ([]byte, error) - - // On the client side, the next two methods are called in order. - - // This method may not be called if the server doesn't send a - // ServerKeyExchange message. - processServerKeyExchange(*config, *clientHelloMsg, *serverHelloMsg, *x509.Certificate, *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error - generateClientKeyExchange(*config, *clientHelloMsg, *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error) -} - -var errClientKeyExchange = errors.New("tls: invalid ClientKeyExchange message") -var errServerKeyExchange = errors.New("tls: invalid ServerKeyExchange message") - -// rsaKeyAgreement implements the standard TLS key agreement where the client -// encrypts the pre-master secret to the server's public key. -type rsaKeyAgreement struct{} - -func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) generateServerKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, hello *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error) { - return nil, nil -} - -func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) processClientKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg, version uint16) ([]byte, error) { - if len(ckx.ciphertext) < 2 { - return nil, errClientKeyExchange - } - ciphertextLen := int(ckx.ciphertext[0])<<8 | int(ckx.ciphertext[1]) - if ciphertextLen != len(ckx.ciphertext)-2 { - return nil, errClientKeyExchange - } - ciphertext := ckx.ciphertext[2:] - - priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter) - if !ok { - return nil, errors.New("tls: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Decrypter") - } - // Perform constant time RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 decryption - preMasterSecret, err := priv.Decrypt(config.rand(), ciphertext, &rsa.PKCS1v15DecryptOptions{SessionKeyLen: 48}) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - // We don't check the version number in the premaster secret. For one, - // by checking it, we would leak information about the validity of the - // encrypted pre-master secret. Secondly, it provides only a small - // benefit against a downgrade attack and some implementations send the - // wrong version anyway. See the discussion at the end of section - // 7.4.7.1 of RFC 4346. - return preMasterSecret, nil -} - -func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) processServerKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, serverHello *serverHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate, skx *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error { - return errors.New("tls: unexpected ServerKeyExchange") -} - -func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) generateClientKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error) { - preMasterSecret := make([]byte, 48) - preMasterSecret[0] = byte(clientHello.vers >> 8) - preMasterSecret[1] = byte(clientHello.vers) - _, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), preMasterSecret[2:]) - if err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - - rsaKey, ok := cert.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey) - if !ok { - return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: server certificate contains incorrect key type for selected ciphersuite") - } - encrypted, err := rsa.EncryptPKCS1v15(config.rand(), rsaKey, preMasterSecret) - if err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - ckx := new(clientKeyExchangeMsg) - ckx.ciphertext = make([]byte, len(encrypted)+2) - ckx.ciphertext[0] = byte(len(encrypted) >> 8) - ckx.ciphertext[1] = byte(len(encrypted)) - copy(ckx.ciphertext[2:], encrypted) - return preMasterSecret, ckx, nil -} - -// sha1Hash calculates a SHA1 hash over the given byte slices. -func sha1Hash(slices [][]byte) []byte { - hsha1 := sha1.New() - for _, slice := range slices { - hsha1.Write(slice) - } - return hsha1.Sum(nil) -} - -// md5SHA1Hash implements TLS 1.0's hybrid hash function which consists of the -// concatenation of an MD5 and SHA1 hash. -func md5SHA1Hash(slices [][]byte) []byte { - md5sha1 := make([]byte, md5.Size+sha1.Size) - hmd5 := md5.New() - for _, slice := range slices { - hmd5.Write(slice) - } - copy(md5sha1, hmd5.Sum(nil)) - copy(md5sha1[md5.Size:], sha1Hash(slices)) - return md5sha1 -} - -// hashForServerKeyExchange hashes the given slices and returns their digest -// using the given hash function (for >= TLS 1.2) or using a default based on -// the sigType (for earlier TLS versions). For Ed25519 signatures, which don't -// do pre-hashing, it returns the concatenation of the slices. -func hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType uint8, hashFunc crypto.Hash, version uint16, slices ...[]byte) []byte { - if sigType == signatureEd25519 { - var signed []byte - for _, slice := range slices { - signed = append(signed, slice...) - } - return signed - } - if version >= VersionTLS12 { - h := hashFunc.New() - for _, slice := range slices { - h.Write(slice) - } - digest := h.Sum(nil) - return digest - } - if sigType == signatureECDSA { - return sha1Hash(slices) - } - return md5SHA1Hash(slices) -} - -// ecdheKeyAgreement implements a TLS key agreement where the server -// generates an ephemeral EC public/private key pair and signs it. The -// pre-master secret is then calculated using ECDH. The signature may -// be ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA. -type ecdheKeyAgreement struct { - version uint16 - isRSA bool - params ecdheParameters - - // ckx and preMasterSecret are generated in processServerKeyExchange - // and returned in generateClientKeyExchange. - ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg - preMasterSecret []byte -} - -func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) generateServerKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, hello *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error) { - var curveID CurveID - for _, c := range clientHello.supportedCurves { - if config.supportsCurve(c) { - curveID = c - break - } - } - - if curveID == 0 { - return nil, errors.New("tls: no supported elliptic curves offered") - } - if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); curveID != X25519 && !ok { - return nil, errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve") - } - - params, err := generateECDHEParameters(config.rand(), curveID) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - ka.params = params - - // See RFC 4492, Section 5.4. - ecdhePublic := params.PublicKey() - serverECDHEParams := make([]byte, 1+2+1+len(ecdhePublic)) - serverECDHEParams[0] = 3 // named curve - serverECDHEParams[1] = byte(curveID >> 8) - serverECDHEParams[2] = byte(curveID) - serverECDHEParams[3] = byte(len(ecdhePublic)) - copy(serverECDHEParams[4:], ecdhePublic) - - priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer) - if !ok { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: certificate private key of type %T does not implement crypto.Signer", cert.PrivateKey) - } - - var signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme - var sigType uint8 - var sigHash crypto.Hash - if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 { - signatureAlgorithm, err = selectSignatureScheme(ka.version, cert, clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - } else { - sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(priv.Public()) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - } - if (sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigType == signatureRSAPSS) != ka.isRSA { - return nil, errors.New("tls: certificate cannot be used with the selected cipher suite") - } - - signed := hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType, sigHash, ka.version, clientHello.random, hello.random, serverECDHEParams) - - signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash) - if sigType == signatureRSAPSS { - signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash} - } - sig, err := priv.Sign(config.rand(), signed, signOpts) - if err != nil { - return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to sign ECDHE parameters: " + err.Error()) - } - - skx := new(serverKeyExchangeMsg) - sigAndHashLen := 0 - if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 { - sigAndHashLen = 2 - } - skx.key = make([]byte, len(serverECDHEParams)+sigAndHashLen+2+len(sig)) - copy(skx.key, serverECDHEParams) - k := skx.key[len(serverECDHEParams):] - if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 { - k[0] = byte(signatureAlgorithm >> 8) - k[1] = byte(signatureAlgorithm) - k = k[2:] - } - k[0] = byte(len(sig) >> 8) - k[1] = byte(len(sig)) - copy(k[2:], sig) - - return skx, nil -} - -func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) processClientKeyExchange(config *config, cert *Certificate, ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg, version uint16) ([]byte, error) { - if len(ckx.ciphertext) == 0 || int(ckx.ciphertext[0]) != len(ckx.ciphertext)-1 { - return nil, errClientKeyExchange - } - - preMasterSecret := ka.params.SharedKey(ckx.ciphertext[1:]) - if preMasterSecret == nil { - return nil, errClientKeyExchange - } - - return preMasterSecret, nil -} - -func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) processServerKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, serverHello *serverHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate, skx *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error { - if len(skx.key) < 4 { - return errServerKeyExchange - } - if skx.key[0] != 3 { // named curve - return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported curve") - } - curveID := CurveID(skx.key[1])<<8 | CurveID(skx.key[2]) - - publicLen := int(skx.key[3]) - if publicLen+4 > len(skx.key) { - return errServerKeyExchange - } - serverECDHEParams := skx.key[:4+publicLen] - publicKey := serverECDHEParams[4:] - - sig := skx.key[4+publicLen:] - if len(sig) < 2 { - return errServerKeyExchange - } - - if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); curveID != X25519 && !ok { - return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported curve") - } - - params, err := generateECDHEParameters(config.rand(), curveID) - if err != nil { - return err - } - ka.params = params - - ka.preMasterSecret = params.SharedKey(publicKey) - if ka.preMasterSecret == nil { - return errServerKeyExchange - } - - ourPublicKey := params.PublicKey() - ka.ckx = new(clientKeyExchangeMsg) - ka.ckx.ciphertext = make([]byte, 1+len(ourPublicKey)) - ka.ckx.ciphertext[0] = byte(len(ourPublicKey)) - copy(ka.ckx.ciphertext[1:], ourPublicKey) - - var sigType uint8 - var sigHash crypto.Hash - if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 { - signatureAlgorithm := SignatureScheme(sig[0])<<8 | SignatureScheme(sig[1]) - sig = sig[2:] - if len(sig) < 2 { - return errServerKeyExchange - } - - if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(signatureAlgorithm, clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) { - return errors.New("tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithm") - } - sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm) - if err != nil { - return err - } - } else { - sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(cert.PublicKey) - if err != nil { - return err - } - } - if (sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigType == signatureRSAPSS) != ka.isRSA { - return errServerKeyExchange - } - - sigLen := int(sig[0])<<8 | int(sig[1]) - if sigLen+2 != len(sig) { - return errServerKeyExchange - } - sig = sig[2:] - - signed := hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType, sigHash, ka.version, clientHello.random, serverHello.random, serverECDHEParams) - if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, cert.PublicKey, sigHash, signed, sig); err != nil { - return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the server certificate: " + err.Error()) - } - return nil -} - -func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) generateClientKeyExchange(config *config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error) { - if ka.ckx == nil { - return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: missing ServerKeyExchange message") - } - - return ka.preMasterSecret, ka.ckx, nil -} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/key_schedule.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/key_schedule.go deleted file mode 100644 index 708bdc7c..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/key_schedule.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,216 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package qtls - -import ( - "crypto/elliptic" - "crypto/hmac" - "errors" - "fmt" - "hash" - "io" - "math/big" - - "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte" - "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519" - "golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf" -) - -// This file contains the functions necessary to compute the TLS 1.3 key -// schedule. See RFC 8446, Section 7. - -const ( - resumptionBinderLabel = "res binder" - clientHandshakeTrafficLabel = "c hs traffic" - serverHandshakeTrafficLabel = "s hs traffic" - clientApplicationTrafficLabel = "c ap traffic" - serverApplicationTrafficLabel = "s ap traffic" - exporterLabel = "exp master" - resumptionLabel = "res master" - trafficUpdateLabel = "traffic upd" -) - -// expandLabel implements HKDF-Expand-Label from RFC 8446, Section 7.1. -func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) expandLabel(secret []byte, label string, context []byte, length int) []byte { - var hkdfLabel cryptobyte.Builder - hkdfLabel.AddUint16(uint16(length)) - hkdfLabel.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes([]byte("tls13 ")) - b.AddBytes([]byte(label)) - }) - hkdfLabel.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(context) - }) - hkdfLabelBytes, err := hkdfLabel.Bytes() - if err != nil { - // Rather than calling BytesOrPanic, we explicitly handle this error, in - // order to provide a reasonable error message. It should be basically - // impossible for this to panic, and routing errors back through the - // tree rooted in this function is quite painful. The labels are fixed - // size, and the context is either a fixed-length computed hash, or - // parsed from a field which has the same length limitation. As such, an - // error here is likely to only be caused during development. - // - // NOTE: another reasonable approach here might be to return a - // randomized slice if we encounter an error, which would break the - // connection, but avoid panicking. This would perhaps be safer but - // significantly more confusing to users. - panic(fmt.Errorf("failed to construct HKDF label: %s", err)) - } - out := make([]byte, length) - n, err := hkdf.Expand(c.hash.New, secret, hkdfLabelBytes).Read(out) - if err != nil || n != length { - panic("tls: HKDF-Expand-Label invocation failed unexpectedly") - } - return out -} - -// deriveSecret implements Derive-Secret from RFC 8446, Section 7.1. -func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) deriveSecret(secret []byte, label string, transcript hash.Hash) []byte { - if transcript == nil { - transcript = c.hash.New() - } - return c.expandLabel(secret, label, transcript.Sum(nil), c.hash.Size()) -} - -// extract implements HKDF-Extract with the cipher suite hash. -func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) extract(newSecret, currentSecret []byte) []byte { - if newSecret == nil { - newSecret = make([]byte, c.hash.Size()) - } - return hkdf.Extract(c.hash.New, newSecret, currentSecret) -} - -// nextTrafficSecret generates the next traffic secret, given the current one, -// according to RFC 8446, Section 7.2. -func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) nextTrafficSecret(trafficSecret []byte) []byte { - return c.expandLabel(trafficSecret, trafficUpdateLabel, nil, c.hash.Size()) -} - -// trafficKey generates traffic keys according to RFC 8446, Section 7.3. -func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) trafficKey(trafficSecret []byte) (key, iv []byte) { - key = c.expandLabel(trafficSecret, "key", nil, c.keyLen) - iv = c.expandLabel(trafficSecret, "iv", nil, aeadNonceLength) - return -} - -// finishedHash generates the Finished verify_data or PskBinderEntry according -// to RFC 8446, Section 4.4.4. See sections 4.4 and 4.2.11.2 for the baseKey -// selection. -func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) finishedHash(baseKey []byte, transcript hash.Hash) []byte { - finishedKey := c.expandLabel(baseKey, "finished", nil, c.hash.Size()) - verifyData := hmac.New(c.hash.New, finishedKey) - verifyData.Write(transcript.Sum(nil)) - return verifyData.Sum(nil) -} - -// exportKeyingMaterial implements RFC5705 exporters for TLS 1.3 according to -// RFC 8446, Section 7.5. -func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) exportKeyingMaterial(masterSecret []byte, transcript hash.Hash) func(string, []byte, int) ([]byte, error) { - expMasterSecret := c.deriveSecret(masterSecret, exporterLabel, transcript) - return func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) { - secret := c.deriveSecret(expMasterSecret, label, nil) - h := c.hash.New() - h.Write(context) - return c.expandLabel(secret, "exporter", h.Sum(nil), length), nil - } -} - -// ecdheParameters implements Diffie-Hellman with either NIST curves or X25519, -// according to RFC 8446, Section 4.2.8.2. -type ecdheParameters interface { - CurveID() CurveID - PublicKey() []byte - SharedKey(peerPublicKey []byte) []byte -} - -func generateECDHEParameters(rand io.Reader, curveID CurveID) (ecdheParameters, error) { - if curveID == X25519 { - privateKey := make([]byte, curve25519.ScalarSize) - if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, privateKey); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - publicKey, err := curve25519.X25519(privateKey, curve25519.Basepoint) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - return &x25519Parameters{privateKey: privateKey, publicKey: publicKey}, nil - } - - curve, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID) - if !ok { - return nil, errors.New("tls: internal error: unsupported curve") - } - - p := &nistParameters{curveID: curveID} - var err error - p.privateKey, p.x, p.y, err = elliptic.GenerateKey(curve, rand) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - return p, nil -} - -func curveForCurveID(id CurveID) (elliptic.Curve, bool) { - switch id { - case CurveP256: - return elliptic.P256(), true - case CurveP384: - return elliptic.P384(), true - case CurveP521: - return elliptic.P521(), true - default: - return nil, false - } -} - -type nistParameters struct { - privateKey []byte - x, y *big.Int // public key - curveID CurveID -} - -func (p *nistParameters) CurveID() CurveID { - return p.curveID -} - -func (p *nistParameters) PublicKey() []byte { - curve, _ := curveForCurveID(p.curveID) - return elliptic.Marshal(curve, p.x, p.y) -} - -func (p *nistParameters) SharedKey(peerPublicKey []byte) []byte { - curve, _ := curveForCurveID(p.curveID) - // Unmarshal also checks whether the given point is on the curve. - x, y := elliptic.Unmarshal(curve, peerPublicKey) - if x == nil { - return nil - } - - xShared, _ := curve.ScalarMult(x, y, p.privateKey) - sharedKey := make([]byte, (curve.Params().BitSize+7)/8) - return xShared.FillBytes(sharedKey) -} - -type x25519Parameters struct { - privateKey []byte - publicKey []byte -} - -func (p *x25519Parameters) CurveID() CurveID { - return X25519 -} - -func (p *x25519Parameters) PublicKey() []byte { - return p.publicKey[:] -} - -func (p *x25519Parameters) SharedKey(peerPublicKey []byte) []byte { - sharedKey, err := curve25519.X25519(p.privateKey, peerPublicKey) - if err != nil { - return nil - } - return sharedKey -} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/notboring.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/notboring.go deleted file mode 100644 index f292e4f0..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/notboring.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package qtls - -func needFIPS() bool { return false } - -func supportedSignatureAlgorithms() []SignatureScheme { - return defaultSupportedSignatureAlgorithms -} - -func fipsMinVersion(c *config) uint16 { panic("fipsMinVersion") } -func fipsMaxVersion(c *config) uint16 { panic("fipsMaxVersion") } -func fipsCurvePreferences(c *config) []CurveID { panic("fipsCurvePreferences") } -func fipsCipherSuites(c *config) []uint16 { panic("fipsCipherSuites") } - -var fipsSupportedSignatureAlgorithms []SignatureScheme diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/prf.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/prf.go deleted file mode 100644 index 9eb0221a..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/prf.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,283 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package qtls - -import ( - "crypto" - "crypto/hmac" - "crypto/md5" - "crypto/sha1" - "crypto/sha256" - "crypto/sha512" - "errors" - "fmt" - "hash" -) - -// Split a premaster secret in two as specified in RFC 4346, Section 5. -func splitPreMasterSecret(secret []byte) (s1, s2 []byte) { - s1 = secret[0 : (len(secret)+1)/2] - s2 = secret[len(secret)/2:] - return -} - -// pHash implements the P_hash function, as defined in RFC 4346, Section 5. -func pHash(result, secret, seed []byte, hash func() hash.Hash) { - h := hmac.New(hash, secret) - h.Write(seed) - a := h.Sum(nil) - - j := 0 - for j < len(result) { - h.Reset() - h.Write(a) - h.Write(seed) - b := h.Sum(nil) - copy(result[j:], b) - j += len(b) - - h.Reset() - h.Write(a) - a = h.Sum(nil) - } -} - -// prf10 implements the TLS 1.0 pseudo-random function, as defined in RFC 2246, Section 5. -func prf10(result, secret, label, seed []byte) { - hashSHA1 := sha1.New - hashMD5 := md5.New - - labelAndSeed := make([]byte, len(label)+len(seed)) - copy(labelAndSeed, label) - copy(labelAndSeed[len(label):], seed) - - s1, s2 := splitPreMasterSecret(secret) - pHash(result, s1, labelAndSeed, hashMD5) - result2 := make([]byte, len(result)) - pHash(result2, s2, labelAndSeed, hashSHA1) - - for i, b := range result2 { - result[i] ^= b - } -} - -// prf12 implements the TLS 1.2 pseudo-random function, as defined in RFC 5246, Section 5. -func prf12(hashFunc func() hash.Hash) func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) { - return func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) { - labelAndSeed := make([]byte, len(label)+len(seed)) - copy(labelAndSeed, label) - copy(labelAndSeed[len(label):], seed) - - pHash(result, secret, labelAndSeed, hashFunc) - } -} - -const ( - masterSecretLength = 48 // Length of a master secret in TLS 1.1. - finishedVerifyLength = 12 // Length of verify_data in a Finished message. -) - -var masterSecretLabel = []byte("master secret") -var keyExpansionLabel = []byte("key expansion") -var clientFinishedLabel = []byte("client finished") -var serverFinishedLabel = []byte("server finished") - -func prfAndHashForVersion(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite) (func(result, secret, label, seed []byte), crypto.Hash) { - switch version { - case VersionTLS10, VersionTLS11: - return prf10, crypto.Hash(0) - case VersionTLS12: - if suite.flags&suiteSHA384 != 0 { - return prf12(sha512.New384), crypto.SHA384 - } - return prf12(sha256.New), crypto.SHA256 - default: - panic("unknown version") - } -} - -func prfForVersion(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite) func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) { - prf, _ := prfAndHashForVersion(version, suite) - return prf -} - -// masterFromPreMasterSecret generates the master secret from the pre-master -// secret. See RFC 5246, Section 8.1. -func masterFromPreMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, preMasterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte) []byte { - seed := make([]byte, 0, len(clientRandom)+len(serverRandom)) - seed = append(seed, clientRandom...) - seed = append(seed, serverRandom...) - - masterSecret := make([]byte, masterSecretLength) - prfForVersion(version, suite)(masterSecret, preMasterSecret, masterSecretLabel, seed) - return masterSecret -} - -// keysFromMasterSecret generates the connection keys from the master -// secret, given the lengths of the MAC key, cipher key and IV, as defined in -// RFC 2246, Section 6.3. -func keysFromMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte, macLen, keyLen, ivLen int) (clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV []byte) { - seed := make([]byte, 0, len(serverRandom)+len(clientRandom)) - seed = append(seed, serverRandom...) - seed = append(seed, clientRandom...) - - n := 2*macLen + 2*keyLen + 2*ivLen - keyMaterial := make([]byte, n) - prfForVersion(version, suite)(keyMaterial, masterSecret, keyExpansionLabel, seed) - clientMAC = keyMaterial[:macLen] - keyMaterial = keyMaterial[macLen:] - serverMAC = keyMaterial[:macLen] - keyMaterial = keyMaterial[macLen:] - clientKey = keyMaterial[:keyLen] - keyMaterial = keyMaterial[keyLen:] - serverKey = keyMaterial[:keyLen] - keyMaterial = keyMaterial[keyLen:] - clientIV = keyMaterial[:ivLen] - keyMaterial = keyMaterial[ivLen:] - serverIV = keyMaterial[:ivLen] - return -} - -func newFinishedHash(version uint16, cipherSuite *cipherSuite) finishedHash { - var buffer []byte - if version >= VersionTLS12 { - buffer = []byte{} - } - - prf, hash := prfAndHashForVersion(version, cipherSuite) - if hash != 0 { - return finishedHash{hash.New(), hash.New(), nil, nil, buffer, version, prf} - } - - return finishedHash{sha1.New(), sha1.New(), md5.New(), md5.New(), buffer, version, prf} -} - -// A finishedHash calculates the hash of a set of handshake messages suitable -// for including in a Finished message. -type finishedHash struct { - client hash.Hash - server hash.Hash - - // Prior to TLS 1.2, an additional MD5 hash is required. - clientMD5 hash.Hash - serverMD5 hash.Hash - - // In TLS 1.2, a full buffer is sadly required. - buffer []byte - - version uint16 - prf func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) -} - -func (h *finishedHash) Write(msg []byte) (n int, err error) { - h.client.Write(msg) - h.server.Write(msg) - - if h.version < VersionTLS12 { - h.clientMD5.Write(msg) - h.serverMD5.Write(msg) - } - - if h.buffer != nil { - h.buffer = append(h.buffer, msg...) - } - - return len(msg), nil -} - -func (h finishedHash) Sum() []byte { - if h.version >= VersionTLS12 { - return h.client.Sum(nil) - } - - out := make([]byte, 0, md5.Size+sha1.Size) - out = h.clientMD5.Sum(out) - return h.client.Sum(out) -} - -// clientSum returns the contents of the verify_data member of a client's -// Finished message. -func (h finishedHash) clientSum(masterSecret []byte) []byte { - out := make([]byte, finishedVerifyLength) - h.prf(out, masterSecret, clientFinishedLabel, h.Sum()) - return out -} - -// serverSum returns the contents of the verify_data member of a server's -// Finished message. -func (h finishedHash) serverSum(masterSecret []byte) []byte { - out := make([]byte, finishedVerifyLength) - h.prf(out, masterSecret, serverFinishedLabel, h.Sum()) - return out -} - -// hashForClientCertificate returns the handshake messages so far, pre-hashed if -// necessary, suitable for signing by a TLS client certificate. -func (h finishedHash) hashForClientCertificate(sigType uint8, hashAlg crypto.Hash, masterSecret []byte) []byte { - if (h.version >= VersionTLS12 || sigType == signatureEd25519) && h.buffer == nil { - panic("tls: handshake hash for a client certificate requested after discarding the handshake buffer") - } - - if sigType == signatureEd25519 { - return h.buffer - } - - if h.version >= VersionTLS12 { - hash := hashAlg.New() - hash.Write(h.buffer) - return hash.Sum(nil) - } - - if sigType == signatureECDSA { - return h.server.Sum(nil) - } - - return h.Sum() -} - -// discardHandshakeBuffer is called when there is no more need to -// buffer the entirety of the handshake messages. -func (h *finishedHash) discardHandshakeBuffer() { - h.buffer = nil -} - -// noExportedKeyingMaterial is used as a value of -// ConnectionState.ekm when renegotiation is enabled and thus -// we wish to fail all key-material export requests. -func noExportedKeyingMaterial(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) { - return nil, errors.New("crypto/tls: ExportKeyingMaterial is unavailable when renegotiation is enabled") -} - -// ekmFromMasterSecret generates exported keying material as defined in RFC 5705. -func ekmFromMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte) func(string, []byte, int) ([]byte, error) { - return func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) { - switch label { - case "client finished", "server finished", "master secret", "key expansion": - // These values are reserved and may not be used. - return nil, fmt.Errorf("crypto/tls: reserved ExportKeyingMaterial label: %s", label) - } - - seedLen := len(serverRandom) + len(clientRandom) - if context != nil { - seedLen += 2 + len(context) - } - seed := make([]byte, 0, seedLen) - - seed = append(seed, clientRandom...) - seed = append(seed, serverRandom...) - - if context != nil { - if len(context) >= 1<<16 { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("crypto/tls: ExportKeyingMaterial context too long") - } - seed = append(seed, byte(len(context)>>8), byte(len(context))) - seed = append(seed, context...) - } - - keyMaterial := make([]byte, length) - prfForVersion(version, suite)(keyMaterial, masterSecret, []byte(label), seed) - return keyMaterial, nil - } -} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/ticket.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/ticket.go deleted file mode 100644 index fe1c7a88..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/ticket.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,277 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package qtls - -import ( - "bytes" - "crypto/aes" - "crypto/cipher" - "crypto/hmac" - "crypto/sha256" - "crypto/subtle" - "encoding/binary" - "errors" - "io" - "time" - - "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte" -) - -// sessionState contains the information that is serialized into a session -// ticket in order to later resume a connection. -type sessionState struct { - vers uint16 - cipherSuite uint16 - createdAt uint64 - masterSecret []byte // opaque master_secret<1..2^16-1>; - // struct { opaque certificate<1..2^24-1> } Certificate; - certificates [][]byte // Certificate certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; - - // usedOldKey is true if the ticket from which this session came from - // was encrypted with an older key and thus should be refreshed. - usedOldKey bool -} - -func (m *sessionState) marshal() ([]byte, error) { - var b cryptobyte.Builder - b.AddUint16(m.vers) - b.AddUint16(m.cipherSuite) - addUint64(&b, m.createdAt) - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(m.masterSecret) - }) - b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - for _, cert := range m.certificates { - b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(cert) - }) - } - }) - return b.Bytes() -} - -func (m *sessionState) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { - *m = sessionState{usedOldKey: m.usedOldKey} - s := cryptobyte.String(data) - if ok := s.ReadUint16(&m.vers) && - s.ReadUint16(&m.cipherSuite) && - readUint64(&s, &m.createdAt) && - readUint16LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.masterSecret) && - len(m.masterSecret) != 0; !ok { - return false - } - var certList cryptobyte.String - if !s.ReadUint24LengthPrefixed(&certList) { - return false - } - for !certList.Empty() { - var cert []byte - if !readUint24LengthPrefixed(&certList, &cert) { - return false - } - m.certificates = append(m.certificates, cert) - } - return s.Empty() -} - -// sessionStateTLS13 is the content of a TLS 1.3 session ticket. Its first -// version (revision = 0) doesn't carry any of the information needed for 0-RTT -// validation and the nonce is always empty. -// version (revision = 1) carries the max_early_data_size sent in the ticket. -// version (revision = 2) carries the ALPN sent in the ticket. -type sessionStateTLS13 struct { - // uint8 version = 0x0304; - // uint8 revision = 2; - cipherSuite uint16 - createdAt uint64 - resumptionSecret []byte // opaque resumption_master_secret<1..2^8-1>; - certificate Certificate // CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; - maxEarlyData uint32 - alpn string - - appData []byte -} - -func (m *sessionStateTLS13) marshal() ([]byte, error) { - var b cryptobyte.Builder - b.AddUint16(VersionTLS13) - b.AddUint8(2) // revision - b.AddUint16(m.cipherSuite) - addUint64(&b, m.createdAt) - b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(m.resumptionSecret) - }) - marshalCertificate(&b, m.certificate) - b.AddUint32(m.maxEarlyData) - b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes([]byte(m.alpn)) - }) - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(m.appData) - }) - return b.Bytes() -} - -func (m *sessionStateTLS13) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { - *m = sessionStateTLS13{} - s := cryptobyte.String(data) - var version uint16 - var revision uint8 - var alpn []byte - ret := s.ReadUint16(&version) && - version == VersionTLS13 && - s.ReadUint8(&revision) && - revision == 2 && - s.ReadUint16(&m.cipherSuite) && - readUint64(&s, &m.createdAt) && - readUint8LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.resumptionSecret) && - len(m.resumptionSecret) != 0 && - unmarshalCertificate(&s, &m.certificate) && - s.ReadUint32(&m.maxEarlyData) && - readUint8LengthPrefixed(&s, &alpn) && - readUint16LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.appData) && - s.Empty() - m.alpn = string(alpn) - return ret -} - -func (c *Conn) encryptTicket(state []byte) ([]byte, error) { - if len(c.ticketKeys) == 0 { - return nil, errors.New("tls: internal error: session ticket keys unavailable") - } - - encrypted := make([]byte, ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize+len(state)+sha256.Size) - keyName := encrypted[:ticketKeyNameLen] - iv := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen : ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize] - macBytes := encrypted[len(encrypted)-sha256.Size:] - - if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), iv); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - key := c.ticketKeys[0] - copy(keyName, key.keyName[:]) - block, err := aes.NewCipher(key.aesKey[:]) - if err != nil { - return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to create cipher while encrypting ticket: " + err.Error()) - } - cipher.NewCTR(block, iv).XORKeyStream(encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize:], state) - - mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key.hmacKey[:]) - mac.Write(encrypted[:len(encrypted)-sha256.Size]) - mac.Sum(macBytes[:0]) - - return encrypted, nil -} - -func (c *Conn) decryptTicket(encrypted []byte) (plaintext []byte, usedOldKey bool) { - if len(encrypted) < ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize+sha256.Size { - return nil, false - } - - keyName := encrypted[:ticketKeyNameLen] - iv := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen : ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize] - macBytes := encrypted[len(encrypted)-sha256.Size:] - ciphertext := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize : len(encrypted)-sha256.Size] - - keyIndex := -1 - for i, candidateKey := range c.ticketKeys { - if bytes.Equal(keyName, candidateKey.keyName[:]) { - keyIndex = i - break - } - } - if keyIndex == -1 { - return nil, false - } - key := &c.ticketKeys[keyIndex] - - mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key.hmacKey[:]) - mac.Write(encrypted[:len(encrypted)-sha256.Size]) - expected := mac.Sum(nil) - - if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(macBytes, expected) != 1 { - return nil, false - } - - block, err := aes.NewCipher(key.aesKey[:]) - if err != nil { - return nil, false - } - plaintext = make([]byte, len(ciphertext)) - cipher.NewCTR(block, iv).XORKeyStream(plaintext, ciphertext) - - return plaintext, keyIndex > 0 -} - -func (c *Conn) getSessionTicketMsg(appData []byte) (*newSessionTicketMsgTLS13, error) { - m := new(newSessionTicketMsgTLS13) - - var certsFromClient [][]byte - for _, cert := range c.peerCertificates { - certsFromClient = append(certsFromClient, cert.Raw) - } - state := sessionStateTLS13{ - cipherSuite: c.cipherSuite, - createdAt: uint64(c.config.time().Unix()), - resumptionSecret: c.resumptionSecret, - certificate: Certificate{ - Certificate: certsFromClient, - OCSPStaple: c.ocspResponse, - SignedCertificateTimestamps: c.scts, - }, - appData: appData, - alpn: c.clientProtocol, - } - if c.extraConfig != nil { - state.maxEarlyData = c.extraConfig.MaxEarlyData - } - stateBytes, err := state.marshal() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - m.label, err = c.encryptTicket(stateBytes) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - m.lifetime = uint32(maxSessionTicketLifetime / time.Second) - - // ticket_age_add is a random 32-bit value. See RFC 8446, section 4.6.1 - // The value is not stored anywhere; we never need to check the ticket age - // because 0-RTT is not supported. - ageAdd := make([]byte, 4) - _, err = c.config.rand().Read(ageAdd) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - m.ageAdd = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(ageAdd) - - // ticket_nonce, which must be unique per connection, is always left at - // zero because we only ever send one ticket per connection. - - if c.extraConfig != nil { - m.maxEarlyData = c.extraConfig.MaxEarlyData - } - return m, nil -} - -// GetSessionTicket generates a new session ticket. -// It should only be called after the handshake completes. -// It can only be used for servers, and only if the alternative record layer is set. -// The ticket may be nil if config.SessionTicketsDisabled is set, -// or if the client isn't able to receive session tickets. -func (c *Conn) GetSessionTicket(appData []byte) ([]byte, error) { - if c.isClient || !c.handshakeComplete() || c.extraConfig == nil || c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer == nil { - return nil, errors.New("GetSessionTicket is only valid for servers after completion of the handshake, and if an alternative record layer is set.") - } - if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled { - return nil, nil - } - - m, err := c.getSessionTicketMsg(appData) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - return m.marshal() -} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/tls.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/tls.go deleted file mode 100644 index 42207c23..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/tls.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,362 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -// package qtls partially implements TLS 1.2, as specified in RFC 5246, -// and TLS 1.3, as specified in RFC 8446. -package qtls - -// BUG(agl): The crypto/tls package only implements some countermeasures -// against Lucky13 attacks on CBC-mode encryption, and only on SHA1 -// variants. See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/TLStiming.pdf and -// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html. - -import ( - "bytes" - "context" - "crypto" - "crypto/ecdsa" - "crypto/ed25519" - "crypto/rsa" - "crypto/x509" - "encoding/pem" - "errors" - "fmt" - "net" - "os" - "strings" -) - -// Server returns a new TLS server side connection -// using conn as the underlying transport. -// The configuration config must be non-nil and must include -// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate. -func Server(conn net.Conn, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *Conn { - c := &Conn{ - conn: conn, - config: fromConfig(config), - extraConfig: extraConfig, - } - c.handshakeFn = c.serverHandshake - return c -} - -// Client returns a new TLS client side connection -// using conn as the underlying transport. -// The config cannot be nil: users must set either ServerName or -// InsecureSkipVerify in the config. -func Client(conn net.Conn, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *Conn { - c := &Conn{ - conn: conn, - config: fromConfig(config), - extraConfig: extraConfig, - isClient: true, - } - c.handshakeFn = c.clientHandshake - return c -} - -// A listener implements a network listener (net.Listener) for TLS connections. -type listener struct { - net.Listener - config *Config - extraConfig *ExtraConfig -} - -// Accept waits for and returns the next incoming TLS connection. -// The returned connection is of type *Conn. -func (l *listener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) { - c, err := l.Listener.Accept() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - return Server(c, l.config, l.extraConfig), nil -} - -// NewListener creates a Listener which accepts connections from an inner -// Listener and wraps each connection with Server. -// The configuration config must be non-nil and must include -// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate. -func NewListener(inner net.Listener, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) net.Listener { - l := new(listener) - l.Listener = inner - l.config = config - l.extraConfig = extraConfig - return l -} - -// Listen creates a TLS listener accepting connections on the -// given network address using net.Listen. -// The configuration config must be non-nil and must include -// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate. -func Listen(network, laddr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (net.Listener, error) { - if config == nil || len(config.Certificates) == 0 && - config.GetCertificate == nil && config.GetConfigForClient == nil { - return nil, errors.New("tls: neither Certificates, GetCertificate, nor GetConfigForClient set in Config") - } - l, err := net.Listen(network, laddr) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - return NewListener(l, config, extraConfig), nil -} - -type timeoutError struct{} - -func (timeoutError) Error() string { return "tls: DialWithDialer timed out" } -func (timeoutError) Timeout() bool { return true } -func (timeoutError) Temporary() bool { return true } - -// DialWithDialer connects to the given network address using dialer.Dial and -// then initiates a TLS handshake, returning the resulting TLS connection. Any -// timeout or deadline given in the dialer apply to connection and TLS -// handshake as a whole. -// -// DialWithDialer interprets a nil configuration as equivalent to the zero -// configuration; see the documentation of Config for the defaults. -// -// DialWithDialer uses context.Background internally; to specify the context, -// use Dialer.DialContext with NetDialer set to the desired dialer. -func DialWithDialer(dialer *net.Dialer, network, addr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (*Conn, error) { - return dial(context.Background(), dialer, network, addr, config, extraConfig) -} - -func dial(ctx context.Context, netDialer *net.Dialer, network, addr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (*Conn, error) { - if netDialer.Timeout != 0 { - var cancel context.CancelFunc - ctx, cancel = context.WithTimeout(ctx, netDialer.Timeout) - defer cancel() - } - - if !netDialer.Deadline.IsZero() { - var cancel context.CancelFunc - ctx, cancel = context.WithDeadline(ctx, netDialer.Deadline) - defer cancel() - } - - rawConn, err := netDialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - colonPos := strings.LastIndex(addr, ":") - if colonPos == -1 { - colonPos = len(addr) - } - hostname := addr[:colonPos] - - if config == nil { - config = defaultConfig() - } - // If no ServerName is set, infer the ServerName - // from the hostname we're connecting to. - if config.ServerName == "" { - // Make a copy to avoid polluting argument or default. - c := config.Clone() - c.ServerName = hostname - config = c - } - - conn := Client(rawConn, config, extraConfig) - if err := conn.HandshakeContext(ctx); err != nil { - rawConn.Close() - return nil, err - } - return conn, nil -} - -// Dial connects to the given network address using net.Dial -// and then initiates a TLS handshake, returning the resulting -// TLS connection. -// Dial interprets a nil configuration as equivalent to -// the zero configuration; see the documentation of Config -// for the defaults. -func Dial(network, addr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (*Conn, error) { - return DialWithDialer(new(net.Dialer), network, addr, config, extraConfig) -} - -// Dialer dials TLS connections given a configuration and a Dialer for the -// underlying connection. -type Dialer struct { - // NetDialer is the optional dialer to use for the TLS connections' - // underlying TCP connections. - // A nil NetDialer is equivalent to the net.Dialer zero value. - NetDialer *net.Dialer - - // Config is the TLS configuration to use for new connections. - // A nil configuration is equivalent to the zero - // configuration; see the documentation of Config for the - // defaults. - Config *Config - - ExtraConfig *ExtraConfig -} - -// Dial connects to the given network address and initiates a TLS -// handshake, returning the resulting TLS connection. -// -// The returned Conn, if any, will always be of type *Conn. -// -// Dial uses context.Background internally; to specify the context, -// use DialContext. -func (d *Dialer) Dial(network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { - return d.DialContext(context.Background(), network, addr) -} - -func (d *Dialer) netDialer() *net.Dialer { - if d.NetDialer != nil { - return d.NetDialer - } - return new(net.Dialer) -} - -// DialContext connects to the given network address and initiates a TLS -// handshake, returning the resulting TLS connection. -// -// The provided Context must be non-nil. If the context expires before -// the connection is complete, an error is returned. Once successfully -// connected, any expiration of the context will not affect the -// connection. -// -// The returned Conn, if any, will always be of type *Conn. -func (d *Dialer) DialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { - c, err := dial(ctx, d.netDialer(), network, addr, d.Config, d.ExtraConfig) - if err != nil { - // Don't return c (a typed nil) in an interface. - return nil, err - } - return c, nil -} - -// LoadX509KeyPair reads and parses a public/private key pair from a pair -// of files. The files must contain PEM encoded data. The certificate file -// may contain intermediate certificates following the leaf certificate to -// form a certificate chain. On successful return, Certificate.Leaf will -// be nil because the parsed form of the certificate is not retained. -func LoadX509KeyPair(certFile, keyFile string) (Certificate, error) { - certPEMBlock, err := os.ReadFile(certFile) - if err != nil { - return Certificate{}, err - } - keyPEMBlock, err := os.ReadFile(keyFile) - if err != nil { - return Certificate{}, err - } - return X509KeyPair(certPEMBlock, keyPEMBlock) -} - -// X509KeyPair parses a public/private key pair from a pair of -// PEM encoded data. On successful return, Certificate.Leaf will be nil because -// the parsed form of the certificate is not retained. -func X509KeyPair(certPEMBlock, keyPEMBlock []byte) (Certificate, error) { - fail := func(err error) (Certificate, error) { return Certificate{}, err } - - var cert Certificate - var skippedBlockTypes []string - for { - var certDERBlock *pem.Block - certDERBlock, certPEMBlock = pem.Decode(certPEMBlock) - if certDERBlock == nil { - break - } - if certDERBlock.Type == "CERTIFICATE" { - cert.Certificate = append(cert.Certificate, certDERBlock.Bytes) - } else { - skippedBlockTypes = append(skippedBlockTypes, certDERBlock.Type) - } - } - - if len(cert.Certificate) == 0 { - if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 0 { - return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find any PEM data in certificate input")) - } - if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 1 && strings.HasSuffix(skippedBlockTypes[0], "PRIVATE KEY") { - return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find certificate PEM data in certificate input, but did find a private key; PEM inputs may have been switched")) - } - return fail(fmt.Errorf("tls: failed to find \"CERTIFICATE\" PEM block in certificate input after skipping PEM blocks of the following types: %v", skippedBlockTypes)) - } - - skippedBlockTypes = skippedBlockTypes[:0] - var keyDERBlock *pem.Block - for { - keyDERBlock, keyPEMBlock = pem.Decode(keyPEMBlock) - if keyDERBlock == nil { - if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 0 { - return fail(errors.New("tls: failed to find any PEM data in key input")) - } - if len(skippedBlockTypes) == 1 && skippedBlockTypes[0] == "CERTIFICATE" { - return fail(errors.New("tls: found a certificate rather than a key in the PEM for the private key")) - } - return fail(fmt.Errorf("tls: failed to find PEM block with type ending in \"PRIVATE KEY\" in key input after skipping PEM blocks of the following types: %v", skippedBlockTypes)) - } - if keyDERBlock.Type == "PRIVATE KEY" || strings.HasSuffix(keyDERBlock.Type, " PRIVATE KEY") { - break - } - skippedBlockTypes = append(skippedBlockTypes, keyDERBlock.Type) - } - - // We don't need to parse the public key for TLS, but we so do anyway - // to check that it looks sane and matches the private key. - x509Cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(cert.Certificate[0]) - if err != nil { - return fail(err) - } - - cert.PrivateKey, err = parsePrivateKey(keyDERBlock.Bytes) - if err != nil { - return fail(err) - } - - switch pub := x509Cert.PublicKey.(type) { - case *rsa.PublicKey: - priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey) - if !ok { - return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type")) - } - if pub.N.Cmp(priv.N) != 0 { - return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key")) - } - case *ecdsa.PublicKey: - priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey) - if !ok { - return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type")) - } - if pub.X.Cmp(priv.X) != 0 || pub.Y.Cmp(priv.Y) != 0 { - return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key")) - } - case ed25519.PublicKey: - priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(ed25519.PrivateKey) - if !ok { - return fail(errors.New("tls: private key type does not match public key type")) - } - if !bytes.Equal(priv.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey), pub) { - return fail(errors.New("tls: private key does not match public key")) - } - default: - return fail(errors.New("tls: unknown public key algorithm")) - } - - return cert, nil -} - -// Attempt to parse the given private key DER block. OpenSSL 0.9.8 generates -// PKCS #1 private keys by default, while OpenSSL 1.0.0 generates PKCS #8 keys. -// OpenSSL ecparam generates SEC1 EC private keys for ECDSA. We try all three. -func parsePrivateKey(der []byte) (crypto.PrivateKey, error) { - if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(der); err == nil { - return key, nil - } - if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(der); err == nil { - switch key := key.(type) { - case *rsa.PrivateKey, *ecdsa.PrivateKey, ed25519.PrivateKey: - return key, nil - default: - return nil, errors.New("tls: found unknown private key type in PKCS#8 wrapping") - } - } - if key, err := x509.ParseECPrivateKey(der); err == nil { - return key, nil - } - - return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to parse private key") -} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/unsafe.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/unsafe.go deleted file mode 100644 index 55fa01b3..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19/unsafe.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,96 +0,0 @@ -package qtls - -import ( - "crypto/tls" - "reflect" - "unsafe" -) - -func init() { - if !structsEqual(&tls.ConnectionState{}, &connectionState{}) { - panic("qtls.ConnectionState doesn't match") - } - if !structsEqual(&tls.ClientSessionState{}, &clientSessionState{}) { - panic("qtls.ClientSessionState doesn't match") - } - if !structsEqual(&tls.CertificateRequestInfo{}, &certificateRequestInfo{}) { - panic("qtls.CertificateRequestInfo doesn't match") - } - if !structsEqual(&tls.Config{}, &config{}) { - panic("qtls.Config doesn't match") - } - if !structsEqual(&tls.ClientHelloInfo{}, &clientHelloInfo{}) { - panic("qtls.ClientHelloInfo doesn't match") - } -} - -func toConnectionState(c connectionState) ConnectionState { - return *(*ConnectionState)(unsafe.Pointer(&c)) -} - -func toClientSessionState(s *clientSessionState) *ClientSessionState { - return (*ClientSessionState)(unsafe.Pointer(s)) -} - -func fromClientSessionState(s *ClientSessionState) *clientSessionState { - return (*clientSessionState)(unsafe.Pointer(s)) -} - -func toCertificateRequestInfo(i *certificateRequestInfo) *CertificateRequestInfo { - return (*CertificateRequestInfo)(unsafe.Pointer(i)) -} - -func toConfig(c *config) *Config { - return (*Config)(unsafe.Pointer(c)) -} - -func fromConfig(c *Config) *config { - return (*config)(unsafe.Pointer(c)) -} - -func toClientHelloInfo(chi *clientHelloInfo) *ClientHelloInfo { - return (*ClientHelloInfo)(unsafe.Pointer(chi)) -} - -func structsEqual(a, b interface{}) bool { - return compare(reflect.ValueOf(a), reflect.ValueOf(b)) -} - -func compare(a, b reflect.Value) bool { - sa := a.Elem() - sb := b.Elem() - if sa.NumField() != sb.NumField() { - return false - } - for i := 0; i < sa.NumField(); i++ { - fa := sa.Type().Field(i) - fb := sb.Type().Field(i) - if !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Index, fb.Index) || fa.Name != fb.Name || fa.Anonymous != fb.Anonymous || fa.Offset != fb.Offset || !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Type, fb.Type) { - if fa.Type.Kind() != fb.Type.Kind() { - return false - } - if fa.Type.Kind() == reflect.Slice { - if !compareStruct(fa.Type.Elem(), fb.Type.Elem()) { - return false - } - continue - } - return false - } - } - return true -} - -func compareStruct(a, b reflect.Type) bool { - if a.NumField() != b.NumField() { - return false - } - for i := 0; i < a.NumField(); i++ { - fa := a.Field(i) - fb := b.Field(i) - if !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Index, fb.Index) || fa.Name != fb.Name || fa.Anonymous != fb.Anonymous || fa.Offset != fb.Offset || !reflect.DeepEqual(fa.Type, fb.Type) { - return false - } - } - return true -} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/alert.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/alert.go index 3feac79b..687ada84 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/alert.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/alert.go @@ -6,10 +6,17 @@ package qtls import "strconv" -type alert uint8 +// An AlertError is a TLS alert. +// +// When using a QUIC transport, QUICConn methods will return an error +// which wraps AlertError rather than sending a TLS alert. +type AlertError uint8 -// Alert is a TLS alert -type Alert = alert +func (e AlertError) Error() string { + return alert(e).String() +} + +type alert uint8 const ( // alert level diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cipher_suites.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cipher_suites.go index 43d21315..2946ffb3 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cipher_suites.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cipher_suites.go @@ -15,8 +15,10 @@ import ( "crypto/sha256" "fmt" "hash" + "runtime" "golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305" + "golang.org/x/sys/cpu" ) // CipherSuite is a TLS cipher suite. Note that most functions in this package @@ -195,17 +197,6 @@ type cipherSuiteTLS13 struct { hash crypto.Hash } -type CipherSuiteTLS13 struct { - ID uint16 - KeyLen int - Hash crypto.Hash - AEAD func(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD -} - -func (c *CipherSuiteTLS13) IVLen() int { - return aeadNonceLength -} - var cipherSuitesTLS13 = []*cipherSuiteTLS13{ // TODO: replace with a map. {TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, aeadAESGCMTLS13, crypto.SHA256}, {TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, 32, aeadChaCha20Poly1305, crypto.SHA256}, @@ -362,6 +353,18 @@ var defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES = []uint16{ TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, } +var ( + hasGCMAsmAMD64 = cpu.X86.HasAES && cpu.X86.HasPCLMULQDQ + hasGCMAsmARM64 = cpu.ARM64.HasAES && cpu.ARM64.HasPMULL + // Keep in sync with crypto/aes/cipher_s390x.go. + hasGCMAsmS390X = cpu.S390X.HasAES && cpu.S390X.HasAESCBC && cpu.S390X.HasAESCTR && + (cpu.S390X.HasGHASH || cpu.S390X.HasAESGCM) + + hasAESGCMHardwareSupport = runtime.GOARCH == "amd64" && hasGCMAsmAMD64 || + runtime.GOARCH == "arm64" && hasGCMAsmARM64 || + runtime.GOARCH == "s390x" && hasGCMAsmS390X +) + var aesgcmCiphers = map[uint16]bool{ // TLS 1.2 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: true, @@ -519,11 +522,6 @@ func aeadAESGCM(key, noncePrefix []byte) aead { return ret } -// AEADAESGCMTLS13 creates a new AES-GCM AEAD for TLS 1.3 -func AEADAESGCMTLS13(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD { - return aeadAESGCMTLS13(key, fixedNonce) -} - func aeadAESGCMTLS13(key, nonceMask []byte) aead { if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength { panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length") diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/common.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/common.go index 074dd9dc..66901636 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/common.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/common.go @@ -82,11 +82,6 @@ const ( compressionNone uint8 = 0 ) -type Extension struct { - Type uint16 - Data []byte -} - // TLS extension numbers const ( extensionServerName uint16 = 0 @@ -105,6 +100,7 @@ const ( extensionCertificateAuthorities uint16 = 47 extensionSignatureAlgorithmsCert uint16 = 50 extensionKeyShare uint16 = 51 + extensionQUICTransportParameters uint16 = 57 extensionRenegotiationInfo uint16 = 0xff01 ) @@ -113,14 +109,6 @@ const ( scsvRenegotiation uint16 = 0x00ff ) -type EncryptionLevel uint8 - -const ( - EncryptionHandshake EncryptionLevel = iota - Encryption0RTT - EncryptionApplication -) - // CurveID is a tls.CurveID type CurveID = tls.CurveID @@ -294,12 +282,6 @@ type connectionState struct { ekm func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) } -type ConnectionStateWith0RTT struct { - ConnectionState - - Used0RTT bool // true if 0-RTT was both offered and accepted -} - // ClientAuthType is tls.ClientAuthType type ClientAuthType = tls.ClientAuthType @@ -349,8 +331,6 @@ type clientSessionState struct { // goroutines. Up to TLS 1.2, only ticket-based resumption is supported, not // SessionID-based resumption. In TLS 1.3 they were merged into PSK modes, which // are supported via this interface. -// -//go:generate sh -c "mockgen -package qtls -destination mock_client_session_cache_test.go github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20 ClientSessionCache" type ClientSessionCache = tls.ClientSessionCache // SignatureScheme is a tls.SignatureScheme @@ -736,64 +716,22 @@ type config struct { autoSessionTicketKeys []ticketKey } -// A RecordLayer handles encrypting and decrypting of TLS messages. -type RecordLayer interface { - SetReadKey(encLevel EncryptionLevel, suite *CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte) - SetWriteKey(encLevel EncryptionLevel, suite *CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte) - ReadHandshakeMessage() ([]byte, error) - WriteRecord([]byte) (int, error) - SendAlert(uint8) -} - type ExtraConfig struct { - // GetExtensions, if not nil, is called before a message that allows - // sending of extensions is sent. - // Currently only implemented for the ClientHello message (for the client) - // and for the EncryptedExtensions message (for the server). - // Only valid for TLS 1.3. - GetExtensions func(handshakeMessageType uint8) []Extension - - // ReceivedExtensions, if not nil, is called when a message that allows the - // inclusion of extensions is received. - // It is called with an empty slice of extensions, if the message didn't - // contain any extensions. - // Currently only implemented for the ClientHello message (sent by the - // client) and for the EncryptedExtensions message (sent by the server). - // Only valid for TLS 1.3. - ReceivedExtensions func(handshakeMessageType uint8, exts []Extension) - - // AlternativeRecordLayer is used by QUIC - AlternativeRecordLayer RecordLayer - - // Enforce the selection of a supported application protocol. - // Only works for TLS 1.3. - // If enabled, client and server have to agree on an application protocol. - // Otherwise, connection establishment fails. - EnforceNextProtoSelection bool - - // If MaxEarlyData is greater than 0, the client will be allowed to send early - // data when resuming a session. - // Requires the AlternativeRecordLayer to be set. + // If Enable0RTT is enabled, the client will be allowed to send early data when resuming a session. // // It has no meaning on the client. - MaxEarlyData uint32 + Enable0RTT bool + + // GetAppDataForSessionTicket requests application data to be sent with a session ticket. + // + // It has no meaning on the client. + GetAppDataForSessionTicket func() []byte // The Accept0RTT callback is called when the client offers 0-RTT. // The server then has to decide if it wants to accept or reject 0-RTT. // It is only used for servers. Accept0RTT func(appData []byte) bool - // 0RTTRejected is called when the server rejectes 0-RTT. - // It is only used for clients. - Rejected0RTT func() - - // If set, the client will export the 0-RTT key when resuming a session that - // allows sending of early data. - // Requires the AlternativeRecordLayer to be set. - // - // It has no meaning to the server. - Enable0RTT bool - // Is called when the client saves a session ticket to the session ticket. // This gives the application the opportunity to save some data along with the ticket, // which can be restored when the session ticket is used. @@ -807,23 +745,14 @@ type ExtraConfig struct { // Clone clones. func (c *ExtraConfig) Clone() *ExtraConfig { return &ExtraConfig{ - GetExtensions: c.GetExtensions, - ReceivedExtensions: c.ReceivedExtensions, - AlternativeRecordLayer: c.AlternativeRecordLayer, - EnforceNextProtoSelection: c.EnforceNextProtoSelection, - MaxEarlyData: c.MaxEarlyData, Enable0RTT: c.Enable0RTT, + GetAppDataForSessionTicket: c.GetAppDataForSessionTicket, Accept0RTT: c.Accept0RTT, - Rejected0RTT: c.Rejected0RTT, GetAppDataForSessionState: c.GetAppDataForSessionState, SetAppDataFromSessionState: c.SetAppDataFromSessionState, } } -func (c *ExtraConfig) usesAlternativeRecordLayer() bool { - return c != nil && c.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil -} - const ( // ticketKeyNameLen is the number of bytes of identifier that is prepended to // an encrypted session ticket in order to identify the key used to encrypt it. @@ -1384,7 +1313,6 @@ func (c *config) BuildNameToCertificate() { const ( keyLogLabelTLS12 = "CLIENT_RANDOM" - keyLogLabelEarlyTraffic = "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET" keyLogLabelClientHandshake = "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET" keyLogLabelServerHandshake = "SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET" keyLogLabelClientTraffic = "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0" diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/conn.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/conn.go index 656c83c7..b7ebdb0a 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/conn.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/conn.go @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ type Conn struct { conn net.Conn isClient bool handshakeFn func(context.Context) error // (*Conn).clientHandshake or serverHandshake + quic *quicState // nil for non-QUIC connections // isHandshakeComplete is true if the connection is currently transferring // application data (i.e. is not currently processing a handshake). @@ -40,11 +41,10 @@ type Conn struct { vers uint16 // TLS version haveVers bool // version has been negotiated config *config // configuration passed to constructor + extraConfig *ExtraConfig // handshakes counts the number of handshakes performed on the // connection so far. If renegotiation is disabled then this is either // zero or one. - extraConfig *ExtraConfig - handshakes int didResume bool // whether this connection was a session resumption cipherSuite uint16 @@ -65,13 +65,8 @@ type Conn struct { secureRenegotiation bool // ekm is a closure for exporting keying material. ekm func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) - // For the client: // resumptionSecret is the resumption_master_secret for handling - // NewSessionTicket messages. nil if config.SessionTicketsDisabled. - // For the server: - // resumptionSecret is the resumption_master_secret for generating - // NewSessionTicket messages. Only used when the alternative record - // layer is set. nil if config.SessionTicketsDisabled. + // or sending NewSessionTicket messages. resumptionSecret []byte // ticketKeys is the set of active session ticket keys for this @@ -123,12 +118,7 @@ type Conn struct { // the rest of the bits are the number of goroutines in Conn.Write. activeCall atomic.Int32 - used0RTT bool - tmp [16]byte - - connStateMutex sync.Mutex - connState ConnectionStateWith0RTT } // Access to net.Conn methods. @@ -188,9 +178,8 @@ type halfConn struct { nextCipher any // next encryption state nextMac hash.Hash // next MAC algorithm - trafficSecret []byte // current TLS 1.3 traffic secret - - setKeyCallback func(encLevel EncryptionLevel, suite *CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte) + level QUICEncryptionLevel // current QUIC encryption level + trafficSecret []byte // current TLS 1.3 traffic secret } type permanentError struct { @@ -235,20 +224,9 @@ func (hc *halfConn) changeCipherSpec() error { return nil } -func (hc *halfConn) exportKey(encLevel EncryptionLevel, suite *cipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte) { - if hc.setKeyCallback != nil { - s := &CipherSuiteTLS13{ - ID: suite.id, - KeyLen: suite.keyLen, - Hash: suite.hash, - AEAD: func(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD { return suite.aead(key, fixedNonce) }, - } - hc.setKeyCallback(encLevel, s, trafficSecret) - } -} - -func (hc *halfConn) setTrafficSecret(suite *cipherSuiteTLS13, secret []byte) { +func (hc *halfConn) setTrafficSecret(suite *cipherSuiteTLS13, level QUICEncryptionLevel, secret []byte) { hc.trafficSecret = secret + hc.level = level key, iv := suite.trafficKey(secret) hc.cipher = suite.aead(key, iv) for i := range hc.seq { @@ -481,13 +459,6 @@ func (hc *halfConn) decrypt(record []byte) ([]byte, recordType, error) { return plaintext, typ, nil } -func (c *Conn) setAlternativeRecordLayer() { - if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil { - c.in.setKeyCallback = c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer.SetReadKey - c.out.setKeyCallback = c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer.SetWriteKey - } -} - // sliceForAppend extends the input slice by n bytes. head is the full extended // slice, while tail is the appended part. If the original slice has sufficient // capacity no allocation is performed. @@ -646,6 +617,10 @@ func (c *Conn) readRecordOrCCS(expectChangeCipherSpec bool) error { } c.input.Reset(nil) + if c.quic != nil { + return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: internal error: attempted to read record with QUIC transport")) + } + // Read header, payload. if err := c.readFromUntil(c.conn, recordHeaderLen); err != nil { // RFC 8446, Section 6.1 suggests that EOF without an alertCloseNotify @@ -729,6 +704,9 @@ func (c *Conn) readRecordOrCCS(expectChangeCipherSpec bool) error { return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) case recordTypeAlert: + if c.quic != nil { + return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) + } if len(data) != 2 { return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) } @@ -846,6 +824,9 @@ func (c *Conn) readFromUntil(r io.Reader, n int) error { // sendAlert sends a TLS alert message. func (c *Conn) sendAlertLocked(err alert) error { + if c.quic != nil { + return c.out.setErrorLocked(&net.OpError{Op: "local error", Err: err}) + } switch err { case alertNoRenegotiation, alertCloseNotify: c.tmp[0] = alertLevelWarning @@ -865,11 +846,6 @@ func (c *Conn) sendAlertLocked(err alert) error { // sendAlert sends a TLS alert message. func (c *Conn) sendAlert(err alert) error { - if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil { - c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer.SendAlert(uint8(err)) - return &net.OpError{Op: "local error", Err: err} - } - c.out.Lock() defer c.out.Unlock() return c.sendAlertLocked(err) @@ -985,6 +961,19 @@ var outBufPool = sync.Pool{ // writeRecordLocked writes a TLS record with the given type and payload to the // connection and updates the record layer state. func (c *Conn) writeRecordLocked(typ recordType, data []byte) (int, error) { + if c.quic != nil { + if typ != recordTypeHandshake { + return 0, errors.New("tls: internal error: sending non-handshake message to QUIC transport") + } + c.quicWriteCryptoData(c.out.level, data) + if !c.buffering { + if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { + return 0, err + } + } + return len(data), nil + } + outBufPtr := outBufPool.Get().(*[]byte) outBuf := *outBufPtr defer func() { @@ -1046,69 +1035,63 @@ func (c *Conn) writeRecordLocked(typ recordType, data []byte) (int, error) { // the record layer state. If transcript is non-nil the marshalled message is // written to it. func (c *Conn) writeHandshakeRecord(msg handshakeMessage, transcript transcriptHash) (int, error) { + c.out.Lock() + defer c.out.Unlock() + data, err := msg.marshal() if err != nil { return 0, err } - - c.out.Lock() - defer c.out.Unlock() - if transcript != nil { transcript.Write(data) } - if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil { - return c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer.WriteRecord(data) - } - return c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeHandshake, data) } // writeChangeCipherRecord writes a ChangeCipherSpec message to the connection and // updates the record layer state. func (c *Conn) writeChangeCipherRecord() error { - if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil { - return nil - } - c.out.Lock() defer c.out.Unlock() _, err := c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}) return err } +// readHandshakeBytes reads handshake data until c.hand contains at least n bytes. +func (c *Conn) readHandshakeBytes(n int) error { + if c.quic != nil { + return c.quicReadHandshakeBytes(n) + } + for c.hand.Len() < n { + if err := c.readRecord(); err != nil { + return err + } + } + return nil +} + // readHandshake reads the next handshake message from // the record layer. If transcript is non-nil, the message // is written to the passed transcriptHash. func (c *Conn) readHandshake(transcript transcriptHash) (any, error) { - var data []byte - if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil { - var err error - data, err = c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer.ReadHandshakeMessage() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - } else { - for c.hand.Len() < 4 { - if err := c.readRecord(); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - } - - data = c.hand.Bytes() - n := int(data[1])<<16 | int(data[2])<<8 | int(data[3]) - if n > maxHandshake { - c.sendAlertLocked(alertInternalError) - return nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("tls: handshake message of length %d bytes exceeds maximum of %d bytes", n, maxHandshake)) - } - for c.hand.Len() < 4+n { - if err := c.readRecord(); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - } - data = c.hand.Next(4 + n) + if err := c.readHandshakeBytes(4); err != nil { + return nil, err } + data := c.hand.Bytes() + n := int(data[1])<<16 | int(data[2])<<8 | int(data[3]) + if n > maxHandshake { + c.sendAlertLocked(alertInternalError) + return nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("tls: handshake message of length %d bytes exceeds maximum of %d bytes", n, maxHandshake)) + } + if err := c.readHandshakeBytes(4 + n); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + data = c.hand.Next(4 + n) + return c.unmarshalHandshakeMessage(data, transcript) +} + +func (c *Conn) unmarshalHandshakeMessage(data []byte, transcript transcriptHash) (handshakeMessage, error) { var m handshakeMessage switch data[0] { case typeHelloRequest: @@ -1288,10 +1271,6 @@ func (c *Conn) handleRenegotiation() error { return c.handshakeErr } -func (c *Conn) HandlePostHandshakeMessage() error { - return c.handlePostHandshakeMessage() -} - // handlePostHandshakeMessage processes a handshake message arrived after the // handshake is complete. Up to TLS 1.2, it indicates the start of a renegotiation. func (c *Conn) handlePostHandshakeMessage() error { @@ -1303,7 +1282,6 @@ func (c *Conn) handlePostHandshakeMessage() error { if err != nil { return err } - c.retryCount++ if c.retryCount > maxUselessRecords { c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) @@ -1315,20 +1293,28 @@ func (c *Conn) handlePostHandshakeMessage() error { return c.handleNewSessionTicket(msg) case *keyUpdateMsg: return c.handleKeyUpdate(msg) - default: - c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) - return fmt.Errorf("tls: received unexpected handshake message of type %T", msg) } + // The QUIC layer is supposed to treat an unexpected post-handshake CertificateRequest + // as a QUIC-level PROTOCOL_VIOLATION error (RFC 9001, Section 4.4). Returning an + // unexpected_message alert here doesn't provide it with enough information to distinguish + // this condition from other unexpected messages. This is probably fine. + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return fmt.Errorf("tls: received unexpected handshake message of type %T", msg) } func (c *Conn) handleKeyUpdate(keyUpdate *keyUpdateMsg) error { + if c.quic != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: received unexpected key update message")) + } + cipherSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(c.cipherSuite) if cipherSuite == nil { return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)) } newSecret := cipherSuite.nextTrafficSecret(c.in.trafficSecret) - c.in.setTrafficSecret(cipherSuite, newSecret) + c.in.setTrafficSecret(cipherSuite, QUICEncryptionLevelInitial, newSecret) if keyUpdate.updateRequested { c.out.Lock() @@ -1347,7 +1333,7 @@ func (c *Conn) handleKeyUpdate(keyUpdate *keyUpdateMsg) error { } newSecret := cipherSuite.nextTrafficSecret(c.out.trafficSecret) - c.out.setTrafficSecret(cipherSuite, newSecret) + c.out.setTrafficSecret(cipherSuite, QUICEncryptionLevelInitial, newSecret) } return nil @@ -1508,12 +1494,15 @@ func (c *Conn) handshakeContext(ctx context.Context) (ret error) { // this cancellation. In the former case, we need to close the connection. defer cancel() - // Start the "interrupter" goroutine, if this context might be canceled. - // (The background context cannot). - // - // The interrupter goroutine waits for the input context to be done and - // closes the connection if this happens before the function returns. - if ctx.Done() != nil { + if c.quic != nil { + c.quic.cancelc = handshakeCtx.Done() + c.quic.cancel = cancel + } else if ctx.Done() != nil { + // Start the "interrupter" goroutine, if this context might be canceled. + // (The background context cannot). + // + // The interrupter goroutine waits for the input context to be done and + // closes the connection if this happens before the function returns. done := make(chan struct{}) interruptRes := make(chan error, 1) defer func() { @@ -1564,21 +1553,38 @@ func (c *Conn) handshakeContext(ctx context.Context) (ret error) { panic("tls: internal error: handshake returned an error but is marked successful") } + if c.quic != nil { + if c.handshakeErr == nil { + c.quicHandshakeComplete() + // Provide the 1-RTT read secret now that the handshake is complete. + // The QUIC layer MUST NOT decrypt 1-RTT packets prior to completing + // the handshake (RFC 9001, Section 5.7). + c.quicSetReadSecret(QUICEncryptionLevelApplication, c.cipherSuite, c.in.trafficSecret) + } else { + var a alert + c.out.Lock() + if !errors.As(c.out.err, &a) { + a = alertInternalError + } + c.out.Unlock() + // Return an error which wraps both the handshake error and + // any alert error we may have sent, or alertInternalError + // if we didn't send an alert. + // Truncate the text of the alert to 0 characters. + c.handshakeErr = fmt.Errorf("%w%.0w", c.handshakeErr, AlertError(a)) + } + close(c.quic.blockedc) + close(c.quic.signalc) + } + return c.handshakeErr } // ConnectionState returns basic TLS details about the connection. func (c *Conn) ConnectionState() ConnectionState { - c.connStateMutex.Lock() - defer c.connStateMutex.Unlock() - return c.connState.ConnectionState -} - -// ConnectionStateWith0RTT returns basic TLS details (incl. 0-RTT status) about the connection. -func (c *Conn) ConnectionStateWith0RTT() ConnectionStateWith0RTT { - c.connStateMutex.Lock() - defer c.connStateMutex.Unlock() - return c.connState + c.handshakeMutex.Lock() + defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock() + return c.connectionStateLocked() } func (c *Conn) connectionStateLocked() ConnectionState { @@ -1609,15 +1615,6 @@ func (c *Conn) connectionStateLocked() ConnectionState { return toConnectionState(state) } -func (c *Conn) updateConnectionState() { - c.connStateMutex.Lock() - defer c.connStateMutex.Unlock() - c.connState = ConnectionStateWith0RTT{ - Used0RTT: c.used0RTT, - ConnectionState: c.connectionStateLocked(), - } -} - // OCSPResponse returns the stapled OCSP response from the TLS server, if // any. (Only valid for client connections.) func (c *Conn) OCSPResponse() []byte { diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cpu.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cpu.go deleted file mode 100644 index 12194508..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cpu.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,22 +0,0 @@ -//go:build !js -// +build !js - -package qtls - -import ( - "runtime" - - "golang.org/x/sys/cpu" -) - -var ( - hasGCMAsmAMD64 = cpu.X86.HasAES && cpu.X86.HasPCLMULQDQ - hasGCMAsmARM64 = cpu.ARM64.HasAES && cpu.ARM64.HasPMULL - // Keep in sync with crypto/aes/cipher_s390x.go. - hasGCMAsmS390X = cpu.S390X.HasAES && cpu.S390X.HasAESCBC && cpu.S390X.HasAESCTR && - (cpu.S390X.HasGHASH || cpu.S390X.HasAESGCM) - - hasAESGCMHardwareSupport = runtime.GOARCH == "amd64" && hasGCMAsmAMD64 || - runtime.GOARCH == "arm64" && hasGCMAsmARM64 || - runtime.GOARCH == "s390x" && hasGCMAsmS390X -) diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cpu_other.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cpu_other.go deleted file mode 100644 index 33f7d219..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/cpu_other.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12 +0,0 @@ -//go:build js -// +build js - -package qtls - -var ( - hasGCMAsmAMD64 = false - hasGCMAsmARM64 = false - hasGCMAsmS390X = false - - hasAESGCMHardwareSupport = false -) diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_client.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_client.go index 1a26e413..ad1be6bd 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_client.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_client.go @@ -58,23 +58,12 @@ func (c *Conn) makeClientHello() (*clientHelloMsg, *ecdh.PrivateKey, error) { return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: NextProtos values too large") } - var supportedVersions []uint16 - var clientHelloVersion uint16 - if c.extraConfig.usesAlternativeRecordLayer() { - if config.maxSupportedVersion(roleClient) < VersionTLS13 { - return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: MaxVersion prevents QUIC from using TLS 1.3") - } - // Only offer TLS 1.3 when QUIC is used. - supportedVersions = []uint16{VersionTLS13} - clientHelloVersion = VersionTLS13 - } else { - supportedVersions = config.supportedVersions(roleClient) - if len(supportedVersions) == 0 { - return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: no supported versions satisfy MinVersion and MaxVersion") - } - clientHelloVersion = config.maxSupportedVersion(roleClient) + supportedVersions := config.supportedVersions(roleClient) + if len(supportedVersions) == 0 { + return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: no supported versions satisfy MinVersion and MaxVersion") } + clientHelloVersion := config.maxSupportedVersion(roleClient) // The version at the beginning of the ClientHello was capped at TLS 1.2 // for compatibility reasons. The supported_versions extension is used // to negotiate versions now. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.1. @@ -128,7 +117,9 @@ func (c *Conn) makeClientHello() (*clientHelloMsg, *ecdh.PrivateKey, error) { // A random session ID is used to detect when the server accepted a ticket // and is resuming a session (see RFC 5077). In TLS 1.3, it's always set as // a compatibility measure (see RFC 8446, Section 4.1.2). - if c.extraConfig == nil || c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer == nil { + // + // The session ID is not set for QUIC connections (see RFC 9001, Section 8.4). + if c.quic == nil { hello.sessionId = make([]byte, 32) if _, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), hello.sessionId); err != nil { return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error()) @@ -164,8 +155,15 @@ func (c *Conn) makeClientHello() (*clientHelloMsg, *ecdh.PrivateKey, error) { hello.keyShares = []keyShare{{group: curveID, data: key.PublicKey().Bytes()}} } - if hello.supportedVersions[0] == VersionTLS13 && c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.GetExtensions != nil { - hello.additionalExtensions = c.extraConfig.GetExtensions(typeClientHello) + if c.quic != nil { + p, err := c.quicGetTransportParameters() + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + if p == nil { + p = []byte{} + } + hello.quicTransportParameters = p } return hello, key, nil @@ -175,7 +173,6 @@ func (c *Conn) clientHandshake(ctx context.Context) (err error) { if c.config == nil { c.config = fromConfig(defaultConfig()) } - c.setAlternativeRecordLayer() // This may be a renegotiation handshake, in which case some fields // need to be reset. @@ -192,45 +189,33 @@ func (c *Conn) clientHandshake(ctx context.Context) (err error) { return err } if cacheKey != "" && session != nil { - var deletedTicket bool - if session.vers == VersionTLS13 && hello.earlyData && c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.Enable0RTT { - // don't reuse a session ticket that enabled 0-RTT - c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, nil) - deletedTicket = true - - if suite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(session.cipherSuite); suite != nil { - h := suite.hash.New() - helloBytes, err := hello.marshal() - if err != nil { - return err - } - h.Write(helloBytes) - clientEarlySecret := suite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, "c e traffic", h) - c.out.exportKey(Encryption0RTT, suite, clientEarlySecret) - if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelEarlyTraffic, hello.random, clientEarlySecret); err != nil { - return err - } + defer func() { + // If we got a handshake failure when resuming a session, throw away + // the session ticket. See RFC 5077, Section 3.2. + // + // RFC 8446 makes no mention of dropping tickets on failure, but it + // does require servers to abort on invalid binders, so we need to + // delete tickets to recover from a corrupted PSK. + if err != nil { + c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, nil) } - } - if !deletedTicket { - defer func() { - // If we got a handshake failure when resuming a session, throw away - // the session ticket. See RFC 5077, Section 3.2. - // - // RFC 8446 makes no mention of dropping tickets on failure, but it - // does require servers to abort on invalid binders, so we need to - // delete tickets to recover from a corrupted PSK. - if err != nil { - c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, nil) - } - }() - } + }() } if _, err := c.writeHandshakeRecord(hello, nil); err != nil { return err } + if hello.earlyData { + suite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(session.cipherSuite) + transcript := suite.hash.New() + if err := transcriptMsg(hello, transcript); err != nil { + return err + } + earlyTrafficSecret := suite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, clientEarlyTrafficLabel, transcript) + c.quicSetWriteSecret(QUICEncryptionLevelEarly, suite.id, earlyTrafficSecret) + } + // serverHelloMsg is not included in the transcript msg, err := c.readHandshake(nil) if err != nil { @@ -293,7 +278,6 @@ func (c *Conn) clientHandshake(ctx context.Context) (err error) { c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, toClientSessionState(hs.session)) } - c.updateConnectionState() return nil } @@ -346,7 +330,10 @@ func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string, } // Try to resume a previously negotiated TLS session, if available. - cacheKey = clientSessionCacheKey(c.conn.RemoteAddr(), c.config) + cacheKey = c.clientSessionCacheKey() + if cacheKey == "" { + return "", nil, nil, nil, nil + } sess, ok := c.config.ClientSessionCache.Get(cacheKey) if !ok || sess == nil { return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil @@ -430,6 +417,13 @@ func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string, return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil, nil } + if c.quic != nil && maxEarlyData > 0 { + // For 0-RTT, the cipher suite has to match exactly. + if mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(hello.cipherSuites, session.cipherSuite) != nil { + hello.earlyData = true + } + } + // Set the pre_shared_key extension. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.11.1. ticketAge := uint32(c.config.time().Sub(session.receivedAt) / time.Millisecond) identity := pskIdentity{ @@ -444,9 +438,6 @@ func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string, session.nonce, cipherSuite.hash.Size()) earlySecret = cipherSuite.extract(psk, nil) binderKey = cipherSuite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, resumptionBinderLabel, nil) - if c.extraConfig != nil { - hello.earlyData = c.extraConfig.Enable0RTT && maxEarlyData > 0 - } transcript := cipherSuite.hash.New() helloBytes, err := hello.marshalWithoutBinders() if err != nil { @@ -815,7 +806,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) processServerHello() (bool, error) { } } - if err := checkALPN(hs.hello.alpnProtocols, hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol); err != nil { + if err := checkALPN(hs.hello.alpnProtocols, hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol, false); err != nil { c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension) return false, err } @@ -853,8 +844,12 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) processServerHello() (bool, error) { // checkALPN ensure that the server's choice of ALPN protocol is compatible with // the protocols that we advertised in the Client Hello. -func checkALPN(clientProtos []string, serverProto string) error { +func checkALPN(clientProtos []string, serverProto string, quic bool) error { if serverProto == "" { + if quic && len(clientProtos) > 0 { + // RFC 9001, Section 8.1 + return errors.New("tls: server did not select an ALPN protocol") + } return nil } if len(clientProtos) == 0 { @@ -1094,15 +1089,16 @@ func (c *Conn) getClientCertificate(cri *CertificateRequestInfo) (*Certificate, return new(Certificate), nil } -const clientSessionCacheKeyPrefix = "qtls-" - // clientSessionCacheKey returns a key used to cache sessionTickets that could // be used to resume previously negotiated TLS sessions with a server. -func clientSessionCacheKey(serverAddr net.Addr, config *config) string { - if len(config.ServerName) > 0 { - return clientSessionCacheKeyPrefix + config.ServerName +func (c *Conn) clientSessionCacheKey() string { + if len(c.config.ServerName) > 0 { + return c.config.ServerName } - return clientSessionCacheKeyPrefix + serverAddr.String() + if c.conn != nil { + return c.conn.RemoteAddr().String() + } + return "" } // hostnameInSNI converts name into an appropriate hostname for SNI. diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_client_tls13.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_client_tls13.go index 60ae2995..e9d0a533 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_client_tls13.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_client_tls13.go @@ -87,7 +87,6 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error { if err := hs.processServerHello(); err != nil { return err } - c.updateConnectionState() if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil { return err } @@ -100,7 +99,6 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error { if err := hs.readServerCertificate(); err != nil { return err } - c.updateConnectionState() if err := hs.readServerFinished(); err != nil { return err } @@ -115,7 +113,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error { } c.isHandshakeComplete.Store(true) - c.updateConnectionState() + return nil } @@ -177,6 +175,9 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) checkServerHelloOrHRR() error { // sendDummyChangeCipherSpec sends a ChangeCipherSpec record for compatibility // with middleboxes that didn't implement TLS correctly. See RFC 8446, Appendix D.4. func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendDummyChangeCipherSpec() error { + if hs.c.quic != nil { + return nil + } if hs.sentDummyCCS { return nil } @@ -264,7 +265,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processHelloRetryRequest() error { transcript := hs.suite.hash.New() transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))}) transcript.Write(chHash) - if err := transcriptMsg(hs.serverHello, hs.transcript); err != nil { + if err := transcriptMsg(hs.serverHello, transcript); err != nil { return err } helloBytes, err := hs.hello.marshalWithoutBinders() @@ -283,10 +284,11 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processHelloRetryRequest() error { } } - if hs.hello.earlyData && c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT != nil { - c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT() + if hs.hello.earlyData { + hs.hello.earlyData = false + c.quicRejectedEarlyData() } - hs.hello.earlyData = false // disable 0-RTT + if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(hs.hello, hs.transcript); err != nil { return err } @@ -392,12 +394,18 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) establishHandshakeKeys() error { clientSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(handshakeSecret, clientHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript) - c.out.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, clientSecret) - c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, clientSecret) + c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake, clientSecret) serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(handshakeSecret, serverHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript) - c.in.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, serverSecret) - c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret) + c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake, serverSecret) + + if c.quic != nil { + if c.hand.Len() != 0 { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + } + c.quicSetWriteSecret(QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake, hs.suite.id, clientSecret) + c.quicSetReadSecret(QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake, hs.suite.id, serverSecret) + } err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientHandshake, hs.hello.random, clientSecret) if err != nil { @@ -429,28 +437,35 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerParameters() error { c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) return unexpectedMessageError(encryptedExtensions, msg) } - // Notify the caller if 0-RTT was rejected. - if !encryptedExtensions.earlyData && hs.hello.earlyData && c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT != nil { - c.extraConfig.Rejected0RTT() - } - c.used0RTT = encryptedExtensions.earlyData - if hs.c.extraConfig != nil && hs.c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions != nil { - hs.c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions(typeEncryptedExtensions, encryptedExtensions.additionalExtensions) - } - if err := checkALPN(hs.hello.alpnProtocols, encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol); err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension) + if err := checkALPN(hs.hello.alpnProtocols, encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol, c.quic != nil); err != nil { + // RFC 8446 specifies that no_application_protocol is sent by servers, but + // does not specify how clients handle the selection of an incompatible protocol. + // RFC 9001 Section 8.1 specifies that QUIC clients send no_application_protocol + // in this case. Always sending no_application_protocol seems reasonable. + c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol) return err } c.clientProtocol = encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol - if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.EnforceNextProtoSelection { - if len(encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol) == 0 { - // the server didn't select an ALPN - c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol) - return errors.New("ALPN negotiation failed. Server didn't offer any protocols") + if c.quic != nil { + if encryptedExtensions.quicTransportParameters == nil { + // RFC 9001 Section 8.2. + c.sendAlert(alertMissingExtension) + return errors.New("tls: server did not send a quic_transport_parameters extension") + } + c.quicSetTransportParameters(encryptedExtensions.quicTransportParameters) + } else { + if encryptedExtensions.quicTransportParameters != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension) + return errors.New("tls: server sent an unexpected quic_transport_parameters extension") } } + + if hs.hello.earlyData && !encryptedExtensions.earlyData { + c.quicRejectedEarlyData() + } + return nil } @@ -578,8 +593,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerFinished() error { clientApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript) serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret, serverApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript) - c.in.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, serverSecret) - c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret) + c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, QUICEncryptionLevelApplication, serverSecret) err = c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientTraffic, hs.hello.random, hs.trafficSecret) if err != nil { @@ -675,14 +689,20 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientFinished() error { return err } - c.out.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret) - c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret) + c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, QUICEncryptionLevelApplication, hs.trafficSecret) if !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled && c.config.ClientSessionCache != nil { c.resumptionSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret, resumptionLabel, hs.transcript) } + if c.quic != nil { + if c.hand.Len() != 0 { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + } + c.quicSetWriteSecret(QUICEncryptionLevelApplication, hs.suite.id, hs.trafficSecret) + } + return nil } @@ -753,8 +773,10 @@ func (c *Conn) handleNewSessionTicket(msg *newSessionTicketMsgTLS13) error { scts: c.scts, } - cacheKey := clientSessionCacheKey(c.conn.RemoteAddr(), c.config) - c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, toClientSessionState(session)) + cacheKey := c.clientSessionCacheKey() + if cacheKey != "" { + c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, toClientSessionState(session)) + } return nil } diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_messages.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_messages.go index c69fcefd..37b01236 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_messages.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_messages.go @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ type clientHelloMsg struct { pskModes []uint8 pskIdentities []pskIdentity pskBinders [][]byte - additionalExtensions []Extension + quicTransportParameters []byte } func (m *clientHelloMsg) marshal() ([]byte, error) { @@ -247,10 +247,11 @@ func (m *clientHelloMsg) marshal() ([]byte, error) { }) }) } - for _, ext := range m.additionalExtensions { - exts.AddUint16(ext.Type) + if m.quicTransportParameters != nil { // marshal zero-length parameters when present + // RFC 9001, Section 8.2 + exts.AddUint16(extensionQUICTransportParameters) exts.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(exts *cryptobyte.Builder) { - exts.AddBytes(ext.Data) + exts.AddBytes(m.quicTransportParameters) }) } if len(m.pskIdentities) > 0 { // pre_shared_key must be the last extension @@ -567,6 +568,11 @@ func (m *clientHelloMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { if !readUint8LengthPrefixed(&extData, &m.pskModes) { return false } + case extensionQUICTransportParameters: + m.quicTransportParameters = make([]byte, len(extData)) + if !extData.CopyBytes(m.quicTransportParameters) { + return false + } case extensionPreSharedKey: // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.11 if !extensions.Empty() { @@ -598,7 +604,7 @@ func (m *clientHelloMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { m.pskBinders = append(m.pskBinders, binder) } default: - m.additionalExtensions = append(m.additionalExtensions, Extension{Type: extension, Data: extData}) + // Ignore unknown extensions. continue } @@ -867,11 +873,10 @@ func (m *serverHelloMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { } type encryptedExtensionsMsg struct { - raw []byte - alpnProtocol string - earlyData bool - - additionalExtensions []Extension + raw []byte + alpnProtocol string + quicTransportParameters []byte + earlyData bool } func (m *encryptedExtensionsMsg) marshal() ([]byte, error) { @@ -893,17 +898,18 @@ func (m *encryptedExtensionsMsg) marshal() ([]byte, error) { }) }) } + if m.quicTransportParameters != nil { // marshal zero-length parameters when present + // draft-ietf-quic-tls-32, Section 8.2 + b.AddUint16(extensionQUICTransportParameters) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(m.quicTransportParameters) + }) + } if m.earlyData { // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.10 b.AddUint16(extensionEarlyData) b.AddUint16(0) // empty extension_data } - for _, ext := range m.additionalExtensions { - b.AddUint16(ext.Type) - b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { - b.AddBytes(ext.Data) - }) - } }) }) @@ -923,14 +929,14 @@ func (m *encryptedExtensionsMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { } for !extensions.Empty() { - var ext uint16 + var extension uint16 var extData cryptobyte.String - if !extensions.ReadUint16(&ext) || + if !extensions.ReadUint16(&extension) || !extensions.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extData) { return false } - switch ext { + switch extension { case extensionALPN: var protoList cryptobyte.String if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&protoList) || protoList.Empty() { @@ -942,10 +948,15 @@ func (m *encryptedExtensionsMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { return false } m.alpnProtocol = string(proto) + case extensionQUICTransportParameters: + m.quicTransportParameters = make([]byte, len(extData)) + if !extData.CopyBytes(m.quicTransportParameters) { + return false + } case extensionEarlyData: m.earlyData = true default: - m.additionalExtensions = append(m.additionalExtensions, Extension{Type: ext, Data: extData}) + // Ignore unknown extensions. continue } diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_server.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_server.go index 3443e85a..ae7cb835 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_server.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_server.go @@ -39,8 +39,6 @@ type serverHandshakeState struct { // serverHandshake performs a TLS handshake as a server. func (c *Conn) serverHandshake(ctx context.Context) error { - c.setAlternativeRecordLayer() - clientHello, err := c.readClientHello(ctx) if err != nil { return err @@ -53,12 +51,6 @@ func (c *Conn) serverHandshake(ctx context.Context) error { clientHello: clientHello, } return hs.handshake() - } else if c.extraConfig.usesAlternativeRecordLayer() { - // This should already have been caught by the check that the ClientHello doesn't - // offer any (supported) versions older than TLS 1.3. - // Check again to make sure we can't be tricked into using an older version. - c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) - return errors.New("tls: negotiated TLS < 1.3 when using QUIC") } hs := serverHandshakeState{ @@ -131,7 +123,6 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) handshake() error { c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random) c.isHandshakeComplete.Store(true) - c.updateConnectionState() return nil } @@ -167,27 +158,6 @@ func (c *Conn) readClientHello(ctx context.Context) (*clientHelloMsg, error) { if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 { clientVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers) } - if c.extraConfig.usesAlternativeRecordLayer() { - // In QUIC, the client MUST NOT offer any old TLS versions. - // Here, we can only check that none of the other supported versions of this library - // (TLS 1.0 - TLS 1.2) is offered. We don't check for any SSL versions here. - for _, ver := range clientVersions { - if ver == VersionTLS13 { - continue - } - for _, v := range supportedVersions { - if ver == v { - c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) - return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered old TLS version %#x", ver) - } - } - } - // Make the config we're using allows us to use TLS 1.3. - if c.config.maxSupportedVersion(roleServer) < VersionTLS13 { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return nil, errors.New("tls: MaxVersion prevents QUIC from using TLS 1.3") - } - } c.vers, ok = c.config.mutualVersion(roleServer, clientVersions) if !ok { c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) @@ -249,7 +219,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) processClientHello() error { c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName } - selectedProto, err := negotiateALPN(c.config.NextProtos, hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols) + selectedProto, err := negotiateALPN(c.config.NextProtos, hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols, false) if err != nil { c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol) return err @@ -310,8 +280,12 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) processClientHello() error { // negotiateALPN picks a shared ALPN protocol that both sides support in server // preference order. If ALPN is not configured or the peer doesn't support it, // it returns "" and no error. -func negotiateALPN(serverProtos, clientProtos []string) (string, error) { +func negotiateALPN(serverProtos, clientProtos []string, quic bool) (string, error) { if len(serverProtos) == 0 || len(clientProtos) == 0 { + if quic && len(serverProtos) != 0 { + // RFC 9001, Section 8.1 + return "", fmt.Errorf("tls: client did not request an application protocol") + } return "", nil } var http11fallback bool diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_server_tls13.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_server_tls13.go index 6189c780..03bc5eb5 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_server_tls13.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/handshake_server_tls13.go @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ type serverHandshakeStateTLS13 struct { trafficSecret []byte // client_application_traffic_secret_0 transcript hash.Hash clientFinished []byte + earlyData bool } func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error { @@ -56,7 +57,6 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error { if err := hs.checkForResumption(); err != nil { return err } - c.updateConnectionState() if err := hs.pickCertificate(); err != nil { return err } @@ -79,13 +79,12 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error { if err := hs.readClientCertificate(); err != nil { return err } - c.updateConnectionState() if err := hs.readClientFinished(); err != nil { return err } c.isHandshakeComplete.Store(true) - c.updateConnectionState() + return nil } @@ -219,13 +218,23 @@ GroupSelection: return errors.New("tls: invalid client key share") } - c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName - - if c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions != nil { - c.extraConfig.ReceivedExtensions(typeClientHello, hs.clientHello.additionalExtensions) + if c.quic != nil { + if hs.clientHello.quicTransportParameters == nil { + // RFC 9001 Section 8.2. + c.sendAlert(alertMissingExtension) + return errors.New("tls: client did not send a quic_transport_parameters extension") + } + c.quicSetTransportParameters(hs.clientHello.quicTransportParameters) + } else { + if hs.clientHello.quicTransportParameters != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension) + return errors.New("tls: client sent an unexpected quic_transport_parameters extension") + } } - selectedProto, err := negotiateALPN(c.config.NextProtos, hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols) + c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName + + selectedProto, err := negotiateALPN(c.config.NextProtos, hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols, c.quic != nil) if err != nil { hs.alpnNegotiationErr = err } @@ -282,10 +291,9 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) checkForResumption() error { } if hs.alpnNegotiationErr == nil && sessionState.alpn == c.clientProtocol && - c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.MaxEarlyData > 0 && + c.extraConfig != nil && c.extraConfig.Enable0RTT && c.extraConfig.Accept0RTT != nil && c.extraConfig.Accept0RTT(sessionState.appData) { hs.encryptedExtensions.earlyData = true - c.used0RTT = true } } @@ -337,27 +345,23 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) checkForResumption() error { return errors.New("tls: invalid PSK binder") } + if c.quic != nil && hs.clientHello.earlyData && hs.encryptedExtensions.earlyData && i == 0 && + sessionState.maxEarlyData > 0 && sessionState.cipherSuite == hs.suite.id { + hs.earlyData = true + + transcript := hs.suite.hash.New() + if err := transcriptMsg(hs.clientHello, transcript); err != nil { + return err + } + earlyTrafficSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.earlySecret, clientEarlyTrafficLabel, transcript) + c.quicSetReadSecret(QUICEncryptionLevelEarly, hs.suite.id, earlyTrafficSecret) + } + c.didResume = true if err := c.processCertsFromClient(sessionState.certificate); err != nil { return err } - h := cloneHash(hs.transcript, hs.suite.hash) - clientHelloWithBindersBytes, err := hs.clientHello.marshal() - if err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return err - } - h.Write(clientHelloWithBindersBytes) - if hs.encryptedExtensions.earlyData { - clientEarlySecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.earlySecret, "c e traffic", h) - c.in.exportKey(Encryption0RTT, hs.suite, clientEarlySecret) - if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelEarlyTraffic, hs.clientHello.random, clientEarlySecret); err != nil { - c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) - return err - } - } - hs.hello.selectedIdentityPresent = true hs.hello.selectedIdentity = uint16(i) hs.usingPSK = true @@ -432,6 +436,9 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) pickCertificate() error { // sendDummyChangeCipherSpec sends a ChangeCipherSpec record for compatibility // with middleboxes that didn't implement TLS correctly. See RFC 8446, Appendix D.4. func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendDummyChangeCipherSpec() error { + if hs.c.quic != nil { + return nil + } if hs.sentDummyCCS { return nil } @@ -498,9 +505,9 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) doHelloRetryRequest(selectedGroup CurveID) return errors.New("tls: client illegally modified second ClientHello") } - if clientHello.earlyData { + if illegalClientHelloChange(clientHello, hs.clientHello) { c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) - return errors.New("tls: client offered 0-RTT data in second ClientHello") + return errors.New("tls: client illegally modified second ClientHello") } hs.clientHello = clientHello @@ -588,12 +595,18 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerParameters() error { clientSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.handshakeSecret, clientHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript) - c.in.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, clientSecret) - c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, clientSecret) + c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake, clientSecret) serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.handshakeSecret, serverHandshakeTrafficLabel, hs.transcript) - c.out.exportKey(EncryptionHandshake, hs.suite, serverSecret) - c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret) + c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake, serverSecret) + + if c.quic != nil { + if c.hand.Len() != 0 { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + } + c.quicSetWriteSecret(QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake, hs.suite.id, serverSecret) + c.quicSetReadSecret(QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake, hs.suite.id, clientSecret) + } err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientHandshake, hs.clientHello.random, clientSecret) if err != nil { @@ -606,12 +619,20 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerParameters() error { return err } - if hs.alpnNegotiationErr != nil { + selectedProto, err := negotiateALPN(c.config.NextProtos, hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols, c.quic != nil) + if err != nil { c.sendAlert(alertNoApplicationProtocol) - return hs.alpnNegotiationErr + return err } - if hs.c.extraConfig != nil && hs.c.extraConfig.GetExtensions != nil { - hs.encryptedExtensions.additionalExtensions = hs.c.extraConfig.GetExtensions(typeEncryptedExtensions) + hs.encryptedExtensions.alpnProtocol = selectedProto + c.clientProtocol = selectedProto + + if c.quic != nil { + p, err := c.quicGetTransportParameters() + if err != nil { + return err + } + hs.encryptedExtensions.quicTransportParameters = p } if _, err := hs.c.writeHandshakeRecord(hs.encryptedExtensions, hs.transcript); err != nil { @@ -712,8 +733,15 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerFinished() error { clientApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript) serverSecret := hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret, serverApplicationTrafficLabel, hs.transcript) - c.out.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, serverSecret) - c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, serverSecret) + c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, QUICEncryptionLevelApplication, serverSecret) + + if c.quic != nil { + if c.hand.Len() != 0 { + // TODO: Handle this in setTrafficSecret? + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + } + c.quicSetWriteSecret(QUICEncryptionLevelApplication, hs.suite.id, serverSecret) + } err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelClientTraffic, hs.clientHello.random, hs.trafficSecret) if err != nil { @@ -745,6 +773,10 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) shouldSendSessionTickets() bool { return false } + // QUIC tickets are sent by QUICConn.SendSessionTicket, not automatically. + if hs.c.quic != nil { + return false + } // Don't send tickets the client wouldn't use. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.9. for _, pskMode := range hs.clientHello.pskModes { if pskMode == pskModeDHE { @@ -764,25 +796,66 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendSessionTickets() error { if err := transcriptMsg(finishedMsg, hs.transcript); err != nil { return err } + c.resumptionSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret, + resumptionLabel, hs.transcript) if !hs.shouldSendSessionTickets() { return nil } + return c.sendSessionTicket(false) +} - c.resumptionSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret, - resumptionLabel, hs.transcript) - - // Don't send session tickets when the alternative record layer is set. - // Instead, save the resumption secret on the Conn. - // Session tickets can then be generated by calling Conn.GetSessionTicket(). - if hs.c.extraConfig != nil && hs.c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer != nil { - return nil +func (c *Conn) sendSessionTicket(earlyData bool) error { + suite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(c.cipherSuite) + if suite == nil { + return errors.New("tls: internal error: unknown cipher suite") } - m, err := hs.c.getSessionTicketMsg(nil) + m := new(newSessionTicketMsgTLS13) + + var certsFromClient [][]byte + for _, cert := range c.peerCertificates { + certsFromClient = append(certsFromClient, cert.Raw) + } + state := sessionStateTLS13{ + cipherSuite: suite.id, + createdAt: uint64(c.config.time().Unix()), + resumptionSecret: c.resumptionSecret, + certificate: Certificate{ + Certificate: certsFromClient, + OCSPStaple: c.ocspResponse, + SignedCertificateTimestamps: c.scts, + }, + alpn: c.clientProtocol, + } + if earlyData { + state.maxEarlyData = 0xffffffff + state.appData = c.extraConfig.GetAppDataForSessionTicket() + } + stateBytes, err := state.marshal() + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return err + } + m.label, err = c.encryptTicket(stateBytes) if err != nil { return err } + m.lifetime = uint32(maxSessionTicketLifetime / time.Second) + + // ticket_age_add is a random 32-bit value. See RFC 8446, section 4.6.1 + // The value is not stored anywhere; we never need to check the ticket age + // because 0-RTT is not supported. + ageAdd := make([]byte, 4) + _, err = c.config.rand().Read(ageAdd) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + if earlyData { + // RFC 9001, Section 4.6.1 + m.maxEarlyData = 0xffffffff + } if _, err := c.writeHandshakeRecord(m, nil); err != nil { return err @@ -900,8 +973,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientFinished() error { return errors.New("tls: invalid client finished hash") } - c.in.exportKey(EncryptionApplication, hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret) - c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret) + c.in.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, QUICEncryptionLevelApplication, hs.trafficSecret) return nil } diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/key_schedule.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/key_schedule.go index c410a3e8..a4568933 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/key_schedule.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/key_schedule.go @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import ( const ( resumptionBinderLabel = "res binder" + clientEarlyTrafficLabel = "c e traffic" clientHandshakeTrafficLabel = "c hs traffic" serverHandshakeTrafficLabel = "s hs traffic" clientApplicationTrafficLabel = "c ap traffic" diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/quic.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/quic.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6be1e919 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/quic.go @@ -0,0 +1,412 @@ +// Copyright 2023 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package qtls + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" +) + +// QUICEncryptionLevel represents a QUIC encryption level used to transmit +// handshake messages. +type QUICEncryptionLevel int + +const ( + QUICEncryptionLevelInitial = QUICEncryptionLevel(iota) + QUICEncryptionLevelEarly + QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake + QUICEncryptionLevelApplication +) + +func (l QUICEncryptionLevel) String() string { + switch l { + case QUICEncryptionLevelInitial: + return "Initial" + case QUICEncryptionLevelEarly: + return "Early" + case QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake: + return "Handshake" + case QUICEncryptionLevelApplication: + return "Application" + default: + return fmt.Sprintf("QUICEncryptionLevel(%v)", int(l)) + } +} + +// A QUICConn represents a connection which uses a QUIC implementation as the underlying +// transport as described in RFC 9001. +// +// Methods of QUICConn are not safe for concurrent use. +type QUICConn struct { + conn *Conn + + sessionTicketSent bool +} + +// A QUICConfig configures a QUICConn. +type QUICConfig struct { + TLSConfig *Config + ExtraConfig *ExtraConfig +} + +// A QUICEventKind is a type of operation on a QUIC connection. +type QUICEventKind int + +const ( + // QUICNoEvent indicates that there are no events available. + QUICNoEvent QUICEventKind = iota + + // QUICSetReadSecret and QUICSetWriteSecret provide the read and write + // secrets for a given encryption level. + // QUICEvent.Level, QUICEvent.Data, and QUICEvent.Suite are set. + // + // Secrets for the Initial encryption level are derived from the initial + // destination connection ID, and are not provided by the QUICConn. + QUICSetReadSecret + QUICSetWriteSecret + + // QUICWriteData provides data to send to the peer in CRYPTO frames. + // QUICEvent.Data is set. + QUICWriteData + + // QUICTransportParameters provides the peer's QUIC transport parameters. + // QUICEvent.Data is set. + QUICTransportParameters + + // QUICTransportParametersRequired indicates that the caller must provide + // QUIC transport parameters to send to the peer. The caller should set + // the transport parameters with QUICConn.SetTransportParameters and call + // QUICConn.NextEvent again. + // + // If transport parameters are set before calling QUICConn.Start, the + // connection will never generate a QUICTransportParametersRequired event. + QUICTransportParametersRequired + + // QUICRejectedEarlyData indicates that the server rejected 0-RTT data even + // if we offered it. It's returned before QUICEncryptionLevelApplication + // keys are returned. + QUICRejectedEarlyData + + // QUICHandshakeDone indicates that the TLS handshake has completed. + QUICHandshakeDone +) + +// A QUICEvent is an event occurring on a QUIC connection. +// +// The type of event is specified by the Kind field. +// The contents of the other fields are kind-specific. +type QUICEvent struct { + Kind QUICEventKind + + // Set for QUICSetReadSecret, QUICSetWriteSecret, and QUICWriteData. + Level QUICEncryptionLevel + + // Set for QUICTransportParameters, QUICSetReadSecret, QUICSetWriteSecret, and QUICWriteData. + // The contents are owned by crypto/tls, and are valid until the next NextEvent call. + Data []byte + + // Set for QUICSetReadSecret and QUICSetWriteSecret. + Suite uint16 +} + +type quicState struct { + events []QUICEvent + nextEvent int + + // eventArr is a statically allocated event array, large enough to handle + // the usual maximum number of events resulting from a single call: transport + // parameters, Initial data, Early read secret, Handshake write and read + // secrets, Handshake data, Application write secret, Application data. + eventArr [8]QUICEvent + + started bool + signalc chan struct{} // handshake data is available to be read + blockedc chan struct{} // handshake is waiting for data, closed when done + cancelc <-chan struct{} // handshake has been canceled + cancel context.CancelFunc + + // readbuf is shared between HandleData and the handshake goroutine. + // HandshakeCryptoData passes ownership to the handshake goroutine by + // reading from signalc, and reclaims ownership by reading from blockedc. + readbuf []byte + + transportParams []byte // to send to the peer +} + +// QUICClient returns a new TLS client side connection using QUICTransport as the +// underlying transport. The config cannot be nil. +// +// The config's MinVersion must be at least TLS 1.3. +func QUICClient(config *QUICConfig) *QUICConn { + return newQUICConn(Client(nil, config.TLSConfig), config.ExtraConfig) +} + +// QUICServer returns a new TLS server side connection using QUICTransport as the +// underlying transport. The config cannot be nil. +// +// The config's MinVersion must be at least TLS 1.3. +func QUICServer(config *QUICConfig) *QUICConn { + return newQUICConn(Server(nil, config.TLSConfig), config.ExtraConfig) +} + +func newQUICConn(conn *Conn, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *QUICConn { + conn.quic = &quicState{ + signalc: make(chan struct{}), + blockedc: make(chan struct{}), + } + conn.quic.events = conn.quic.eventArr[:0] + conn.extraConfig = extraConfig + return &QUICConn{ + conn: conn, + } +} + +// Start starts the client or server handshake protocol. +// It may produce connection events, which may be read with NextEvent. +// +// Start must be called at most once. +func (q *QUICConn) Start(ctx context.Context) error { + if q.conn.quic.started { + return quicError(errors.New("tls: Start called more than once")) + } + q.conn.quic.started = true + if q.conn.config.MinVersion < VersionTLS13 { + return quicError(errors.New("tls: Config MinVersion must be at least TLS 1.13")) + } + go q.conn.HandshakeContext(ctx) + if _, ok := <-q.conn.quic.blockedc; !ok { + return q.conn.handshakeErr + } + return nil +} + +// NextEvent returns the next event occurring on the connection. +// It returns an event with a Kind of QUICNoEvent when no events are available. +func (q *QUICConn) NextEvent() QUICEvent { + qs := q.conn.quic + if last := qs.nextEvent - 1; last >= 0 && len(qs.events[last].Data) > 0 { + // Write over some of the previous event's data, + // to catch callers erroniously retaining it. + qs.events[last].Data[0] = 0 + } + if qs.nextEvent >= len(qs.events) { + qs.events = qs.events[:0] + qs.nextEvent = 0 + return QUICEvent{Kind: QUICNoEvent} + } + e := qs.events[qs.nextEvent] + qs.events[qs.nextEvent] = QUICEvent{} // zero out references to data + qs.nextEvent++ + return e +} + +// Close closes the connection and stops any in-progress handshake. +func (q *QUICConn) Close() error { + if q.conn.quic.cancel == nil { + return nil // never started + } + q.conn.quic.cancel() + for range q.conn.quic.blockedc { + // Wait for the handshake goroutine to return. + } + return q.conn.handshakeErr +} + +// HandleData handles handshake bytes received from the peer. +// It may produce connection events, which may be read with NextEvent. +func (q *QUICConn) HandleData(level QUICEncryptionLevel, data []byte) error { + c := q.conn + if c.in.level != level { + return quicError(c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: handshake data received at wrong level"))) + } + c.quic.readbuf = data + <-c.quic.signalc + _, ok := <-c.quic.blockedc + if ok { + // The handshake goroutine is waiting for more data. + return nil + } + // The handshake goroutine has exited. + c.hand.Write(c.quic.readbuf) + c.quic.readbuf = nil + for q.conn.hand.Len() >= 4 && q.conn.handshakeErr == nil { + b := q.conn.hand.Bytes() + n := int(b[1])<<16 | int(b[2])<<8 | int(b[3]) + if 4+n < len(b) { + return nil + } + if err := q.conn.handlePostHandshakeMessage(); err != nil { + return quicError(err) + } + } + if q.conn.handshakeErr != nil { + return quicError(q.conn.handshakeErr) + } + return nil +} + +// SendSessionTicket sends a session ticket to the client. +// It produces connection events, which may be read with NextEvent. +// Currently, it can only be called once. +func (q *QUICConn) SendSessionTicket(earlyData bool) error { + c := q.conn + if !c.isHandshakeComplete.Load() { + return quicError(errors.New("tls: SendSessionTicket called before handshake completed")) + } + if c.isClient { + return quicError(errors.New("tls: SendSessionTicket called on the client")) + } + if q.sessionTicketSent { + return quicError(errors.New("tls: SendSessionTicket called multiple times")) + } + q.sessionTicketSent = true + return quicError(c.sendSessionTicket(earlyData)) +} + +// ConnectionState returns basic TLS details about the connection. +func (q *QUICConn) ConnectionState() ConnectionState { + return q.conn.ConnectionState() +} + +// SetTransportParameters sets the transport parameters to send to the peer. +// +// Server connections may delay setting the transport parameters until after +// receiving the client's transport parameters. See QUICTransportParametersRequired. +func (q *QUICConn) SetTransportParameters(params []byte) { + if params == nil { + params = []byte{} + } + q.conn.quic.transportParams = params + if q.conn.quic.started { + <-q.conn.quic.signalc + <-q.conn.quic.blockedc + } +} + +// quicError ensures err is an AlertError. +// If err is not already, quicError wraps it with alertInternalError. +func quicError(err error) error { + if err == nil { + return nil + } + var ae AlertError + if errors.As(err, &ae) { + return err + } + var a alert + if !errors.As(err, &a) { + a = alertInternalError + } + // Return an error wrapping the original error and an AlertError. + // Truncate the text of the alert to 0 characters. + return fmt.Errorf("%w%.0w", err, AlertError(a)) +} + +func (c *Conn) quicReadHandshakeBytes(n int) error { + for c.hand.Len() < n { + if err := c.quicWaitForSignal(); err != nil { + return err + } + } + return nil +} + +func (c *Conn) quicSetReadSecret(level QUICEncryptionLevel, suite uint16, secret []byte) { + c.quic.events = append(c.quic.events, QUICEvent{ + Kind: QUICSetReadSecret, + Level: level, + Suite: suite, + Data: secret, + }) +} + +func (c *Conn) quicSetWriteSecret(level QUICEncryptionLevel, suite uint16, secret []byte) { + c.quic.events = append(c.quic.events, QUICEvent{ + Kind: QUICSetWriteSecret, + Level: level, + Suite: suite, + Data: secret, + }) +} + +func (c *Conn) quicWriteCryptoData(level QUICEncryptionLevel, data []byte) { + var last *QUICEvent + if len(c.quic.events) > 0 { + last = &c.quic.events[len(c.quic.events)-1] + } + if last == nil || last.Kind != QUICWriteData || last.Level != level { + c.quic.events = append(c.quic.events, QUICEvent{ + Kind: QUICWriteData, + Level: level, + }) + last = &c.quic.events[len(c.quic.events)-1] + } + last.Data = append(last.Data, data...) +} + +func (c *Conn) quicSetTransportParameters(params []byte) { + c.quic.events = append(c.quic.events, QUICEvent{ + Kind: QUICTransportParameters, + Data: params, + }) +} + +func (c *Conn) quicGetTransportParameters() ([]byte, error) { + if c.quic.transportParams == nil { + c.quic.events = append(c.quic.events, QUICEvent{ + Kind: QUICTransportParametersRequired, + }) + } + for c.quic.transportParams == nil { + if err := c.quicWaitForSignal(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + return c.quic.transportParams, nil +} + +func (c *Conn) quicHandshakeComplete() { + c.quic.events = append(c.quic.events, QUICEvent{ + Kind: QUICHandshakeDone, + }) +} + +func (c *Conn) quicRejectedEarlyData() { + c.quic.events = append(c.quic.events, QUICEvent{ + Kind: QUICRejectedEarlyData, + }) +} + +// quicWaitForSignal notifies the QUICConn that handshake progress is blocked, +// and waits for a signal that the handshake should proceed. +// +// The handshake may become blocked waiting for handshake bytes +// or for the user to provide transport parameters. +func (c *Conn) quicWaitForSignal() error { + // Drop the handshake mutex while blocked to allow the user + // to call ConnectionState before the handshake completes. + c.handshakeMutex.Unlock() + defer c.handshakeMutex.Lock() + // Send on blockedc to notify the QUICConn that the handshake is blocked. + // Exported methods of QUICConn wait for the handshake to become blocked + // before returning to the user. + select { + case c.quic.blockedc <- struct{}{}: + case <-c.quic.cancelc: + return c.sendAlertLocked(alertCloseNotify) + } + // The QUICConn reads from signalc to notify us that the handshake may + // be able to proceed. (The QUICConn reads, because we close signalc to + // indicate that the handshake has completed.) + select { + case c.quic.signalc <- struct{}{}: + c.hand.Write(c.quic.readbuf) + c.quic.readbuf = nil + case <-c.quic.cancelc: + return c.sendAlertLocked(alertCloseNotify) + } + return nil +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/ticket.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/ticket.go index 1b9289c2..36662070 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/ticket.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/ticket.go @@ -11,12 +11,9 @@ import ( "crypto/hmac" "crypto/sha256" "crypto/subtle" - "encoding/binary" "errors" - "io" - "time" - "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte" + "io" ) // sessionState contains the information that is serialized into a session @@ -204,74 +201,3 @@ func (c *Conn) decryptTicket(encrypted []byte) (plaintext []byte, usedOldKey boo return plaintext, keyIndex > 0 } - -func (c *Conn) getSessionTicketMsg(appData []byte) (*newSessionTicketMsgTLS13, error) { - m := new(newSessionTicketMsgTLS13) - - var certsFromClient [][]byte - for _, cert := range c.peerCertificates { - certsFromClient = append(certsFromClient, cert.Raw) - } - state := sessionStateTLS13{ - cipherSuite: c.cipherSuite, - createdAt: uint64(c.config.time().Unix()), - resumptionSecret: c.resumptionSecret, - certificate: Certificate{ - Certificate: certsFromClient, - OCSPStaple: c.ocspResponse, - SignedCertificateTimestamps: c.scts, - }, - appData: appData, - alpn: c.clientProtocol, - } - if c.extraConfig != nil { - state.maxEarlyData = c.extraConfig.MaxEarlyData - } - stateBytes, err := state.marshal() - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - m.label, err = c.encryptTicket(stateBytes) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - m.lifetime = uint32(maxSessionTicketLifetime / time.Second) - - // ticket_age_add is a random 32-bit value. See RFC 8446, section 4.6.1 - // The value is not stored anywhere; we never need to check the ticket age - // because 0-RTT is not supported. - ageAdd := make([]byte, 4) - _, err = c.config.rand().Read(ageAdd) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - m.ageAdd = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(ageAdd) - - // ticket_nonce, which must be unique per connection, is always left at - // zero because we only ever send one ticket per connection. - - if c.extraConfig != nil { - m.maxEarlyData = c.extraConfig.MaxEarlyData - } - return m, nil -} - -// GetSessionTicket generates a new session ticket. -// It should only be called after the handshake completes. -// It can only be used for servers, and only if the alternative record layer is set. -// The ticket may be nil if config.SessionTicketsDisabled is set, -// or if the client isn't able to receive session tickets. -func (c *Conn) GetSessionTicket(appData []byte) ([]byte, error) { - if c.isClient || !c.isHandshakeComplete.Load() || c.extraConfig == nil || c.extraConfig.AlternativeRecordLayer == nil { - return nil, errors.New("GetSessionTicket is only valid for servers after completion of the handshake, and if an alternative record layer is set.") - } - if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled { - return nil, nil - } - - m, err := c.getSessionTicketMsg(appData) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - return m.marshal() -} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/tls.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/tls.go index 42207c23..47eed085 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/tls.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/tls.go @@ -31,11 +31,10 @@ import ( // using conn as the underlying transport. // The configuration config must be non-nil and must include // at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate. -func Server(conn net.Conn, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *Conn { +func Server(conn net.Conn, config *Config) *Conn { c := &Conn{ - conn: conn, - config: fromConfig(config), - extraConfig: extraConfig, + conn: conn, + config: fromConfig(config), } c.handshakeFn = c.serverHandshake return c @@ -45,12 +44,11 @@ func Server(conn net.Conn, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *Conn { // using conn as the underlying transport. // The config cannot be nil: users must set either ServerName or // InsecureSkipVerify in the config. -func Client(conn net.Conn, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *Conn { +func Client(conn net.Conn, config *Config) *Conn { c := &Conn{ - conn: conn, - config: fromConfig(config), - extraConfig: extraConfig, - isClient: true, + conn: conn, + config: fromConfig(config), + isClient: true, } c.handshakeFn = c.clientHandshake return c @@ -59,8 +57,7 @@ func Client(conn net.Conn, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *Conn { // A listener implements a network listener (net.Listener) for TLS connections. type listener struct { net.Listener - config *Config - extraConfig *ExtraConfig + config *Config } // Accept waits for and returns the next incoming TLS connection. @@ -70,18 +67,17 @@ func (l *listener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) { if err != nil { return nil, err } - return Server(c, l.config, l.extraConfig), nil + return Server(c, l.config), nil } // NewListener creates a Listener which accepts connections from an inner // Listener and wraps each connection with Server. // The configuration config must be non-nil and must include // at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate. -func NewListener(inner net.Listener, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) net.Listener { +func NewListener(inner net.Listener, config *Config) net.Listener { l := new(listener) l.Listener = inner l.config = config - l.extraConfig = extraConfig return l } @@ -89,7 +85,7 @@ func NewListener(inner net.Listener, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) n // given network address using net.Listen. // The configuration config must be non-nil and must include // at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate. -func Listen(network, laddr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (net.Listener, error) { +func Listen(network, laddr string, config *Config) (net.Listener, error) { if config == nil || len(config.Certificates) == 0 && config.GetCertificate == nil && config.GetConfigForClient == nil { return nil, errors.New("tls: neither Certificates, GetCertificate, nor GetConfigForClient set in Config") @@ -98,7 +94,7 @@ func Listen(network, laddr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (ne if err != nil { return nil, err } - return NewListener(l, config, extraConfig), nil + return NewListener(l, config), nil } type timeoutError struct{} @@ -117,11 +113,11 @@ func (timeoutError) Temporary() bool { return true } // // DialWithDialer uses context.Background internally; to specify the context, // use Dialer.DialContext with NetDialer set to the desired dialer. -func DialWithDialer(dialer *net.Dialer, network, addr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (*Conn, error) { - return dial(context.Background(), dialer, network, addr, config, extraConfig) +func DialWithDialer(dialer *net.Dialer, network, addr string, config *Config) (*Conn, error) { + return dial(context.Background(), dialer, network, addr, config) } -func dial(ctx context.Context, netDialer *net.Dialer, network, addr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (*Conn, error) { +func dial(ctx context.Context, netDialer *net.Dialer, network, addr string, config *Config) (*Conn, error) { if netDialer.Timeout != 0 { var cancel context.CancelFunc ctx, cancel = context.WithTimeout(ctx, netDialer.Timeout) @@ -157,7 +153,7 @@ func dial(ctx context.Context, netDialer *net.Dialer, network, addr string, conf config = c } - conn := Client(rawConn, config, extraConfig) + conn := Client(rawConn, config) if err := conn.HandshakeContext(ctx); err != nil { rawConn.Close() return nil, err @@ -171,8 +167,8 @@ func dial(ctx context.Context, netDialer *net.Dialer, network, addr string, conf // Dial interprets a nil configuration as equivalent to // the zero configuration; see the documentation of Config // for the defaults. -func Dial(network, addr string, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) (*Conn, error) { - return DialWithDialer(new(net.Dialer), network, addr, config, extraConfig) +func Dial(network, addr string, config *Config) (*Conn, error) { + return DialWithDialer(new(net.Dialer), network, addr, config) } // Dialer dials TLS connections given a configuration and a Dialer for the @@ -188,8 +184,6 @@ type Dialer struct { // configuration; see the documentation of Config for the // defaults. Config *Config - - ExtraConfig *ExtraConfig } // Dial connects to the given network address and initiates a TLS @@ -220,7 +214,7 @@ func (d *Dialer) netDialer() *net.Dialer { // // The returned Conn, if any, will always be of type *Conn. func (d *Dialer) DialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { - c, err := dial(ctx, d.netDialer(), network, addr, d.Config, d.ExtraConfig) + c, err := dial(ctx, d.netDialer(), network, addr, d.Config) if err != nil { // Don't return c (a typed nil) in an interface. return nil, err diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/unsafe.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/unsafe.go index 55fa01b3..67a75677 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/unsafe.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20/unsafe.go @@ -94,3 +94,8 @@ func compareStruct(a, b reflect.Type) bool { } return true } + +// InitSessionTicketKeys triggers the initialization of session ticket keys. +func InitSessionTicketKeys(conf *Config) { + fromConfig(conf).ticketKeys(nil) +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/.golangci.yml b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/.golangci.yml index 7820be8c..1315759b 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/.golangci.yml +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/.golangci.yml @@ -1,4 +1,6 @@ run: + skip-files: + - internal/handshake/cipher_suite.go linters-settings: depguard: type: blacklist diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/README.md b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/README.md index 53638882..3eaf0583 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/README.md +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/README.md @@ -12,10 +12,6 @@ In addition to these base RFCs, it also implements the following RFCs: * Datagram Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery (DPLPMTUD, [RFC 8899](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8899)) * QUIC Version 2 ([RFC 9369](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9369)) -In addition to the RFCs listed above, it currently implements the [IETF QUIC draft-29](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-transport-29). Support for draft-29 will eventually be dropped, as it is phased out of the ecosystem. - -This repository provides both a QUIC implementation, located in the `quic` package, as well as an HTTP/3 implementation, located in the `http3` package. - ## Using QUIC ### Running a Server @@ -136,7 +132,7 @@ The `quic.Transport` contains a few configuration options that don't apply to an #### When the remote Peer closes the Connection -In case the peer closes the QUIC connection, all calls to open streams, accept streams, as well as all methods on streams immediately return an error. Users can use errors assertions to find out what exactly went wrong: +In case the peer closes the QUIC connection, all calls to open streams, accept streams, as well as all methods on streams immediately return an error. Additionally, it is set as cancellation cause of the connection context. Users can use errors assertions to find out what exactly went wrong: * `quic.VersionNegotiationError`: Happens during the handshake, if there is no overlap between our and the remote's supported QUIC versions. * `quic.HandshakeTimeoutError`: Happens if the QUIC handshake doesn't complete within the time specified in `quic.Config.HandshakeTimeout`. @@ -224,7 +220,8 @@ quic-go always aims to support the latest two Go releases. ### Dependency on forked crypto/tls -Since the standard library didn't provide any QUIC APIs before the Go 1.21 release, we had to fork crypto/tls to add the required APIs ourselves: [qtls for Go 1.20](https://github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20) and [qtls for Go 1.19](https://github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19). This had led to a lot of pain in the Go ecosystem, and we're happy that we can rely on Go 1.21 going forward. +Since the standard library didn't provide any QUIC APIs before the Go 1.21 release, we had to fork crypto/tls to add the required APIs ourselves: [qtls for Go 1.20](https://github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20). +This had led to a lot of pain in the Go ecosystem, and we're happy that we can rely on Go 1.21 going forward. ## Contributing diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/codecov.yml b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/codecov.yml index 074d9832..69435150 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/codecov.yml +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/codecov.yml @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ coverage: - http3/gzip_reader.go - interop/ - internal/ackhandler/packet_linkedlist.go + - internal/handshake/cipher_suite.go - internal/utils/byteinterval_linkedlist.go - internal/utils/newconnectionid_linkedlist.go - internal/utils/packetinterval_linkedlist.go diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/connection.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/connection.go index c544b591..bb4d691e 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/connection.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/connection.go @@ -52,11 +52,13 @@ type streamManager interface { } type cryptoStreamHandler interface { - RunHandshake() + StartHandshake() error ChangeConnectionID(protocol.ConnectionID) SetLargest1RTTAcked(protocol.PacketNumber) error SetHandshakeConfirmed() GetSessionTicket() ([]byte, error) + NextEvent() handshake.Event + DiscardInitialKeys() io.Closer ConnectionState() handshake.ConnectionState } @@ -96,18 +98,6 @@ type connRunner interface { RemoveResetToken(protocol.StatelessResetToken) } -type handshakeRunner struct { - onReceivedParams func(*wire.TransportParameters) - onError func(error) - dropKeys func(protocol.EncryptionLevel) - onHandshakeComplete func() -} - -func (r *handshakeRunner) OnReceivedParams(tp *wire.TransportParameters) { r.onReceivedParams(tp) } -func (r *handshakeRunner) OnError(e error) { r.onError(e) } -func (r *handshakeRunner) DropKeys(el protocol.EncryptionLevel) { r.dropKeys(el) } -func (r *handshakeRunner) OnHandshakeComplete() { r.onHandshakeComplete() } - type closeError struct { err error remote bool @@ -165,6 +155,8 @@ type connection struct { packer packer mtuDiscoverer mtuDiscoverer // initialized when the handshake completes + initialStream cryptoStream + handshakeStream cryptoStream oneRTTStream cryptoStream // only set for the server cryptoStreamHandler cryptoStreamHandler @@ -176,19 +168,17 @@ type connection struct { closeChan chan closeError ctx context.Context - ctxCancel context.CancelFunc + ctxCancel context.CancelCauseFunc handshakeCtx context.Context handshakeCtxCancel context.CancelFunc undecryptablePackets []receivedPacket // undecryptable packets, waiting for a change in encryption level undecryptablePacketsToProcess []receivedPacket - clientHelloWritten <-chan *wire.TransportParameters - earlyConnReadyChan chan struct{} - handshakeCompleteChan chan struct{} // is closed when the handshake completes - sentFirstPacket bool - handshakeComplete bool - handshakeConfirmed bool + earlyConnReadyChan chan struct{} + sentFirstPacket bool + handshakeComplete bool + handshakeConfirmed bool receivedRetry bool versionNegotiated bool @@ -248,17 +238,16 @@ var newConnection = func( v protocol.VersionNumber, ) quicConn { s := &connection{ - conn: conn, - config: conf, - handshakeDestConnID: destConnID, - srcConnIDLen: srcConnID.Len(), - tokenGenerator: tokenGenerator, - oneRTTStream: newCryptoStream(), - perspective: protocol.PerspectiveServer, - handshakeCompleteChan: make(chan struct{}), - tracer: tracer, - logger: logger, - version: v, + conn: conn, + config: conf, + handshakeDestConnID: destConnID, + srcConnIDLen: srcConnID.Len(), + tokenGenerator: tokenGenerator, + oneRTTStream: newCryptoStream(), + perspective: protocol.PerspectiveServer, + tracer: tracer, + logger: logger, + version: v, } if origDestConnID.Len() > 0 { s.logID = origDestConnID.String() @@ -283,7 +272,7 @@ var newConnection = func( connIDGenerator, ) s.preSetup() - s.ctx, s.ctxCancel = context.WithCancel(context.WithValue(context.Background(), ConnectionTracingKey, tracingID)) + s.ctx, s.ctxCancel = context.WithCancelCause(context.WithValue(context.Background(), ConnectionTracingKey, tracingID)) s.sentPacketHandler, s.receivedPacketHandler = ackhandler.NewAckHandler( 0, getMaxPacketSize(s.conn.RemoteAddr()), @@ -294,8 +283,6 @@ var newConnection = func( s.logger, ) s.mtuDiscoverer = newMTUDiscoverer(s.rttStats, getMaxPacketSize(s.conn.RemoteAddr()), s.sentPacketHandler.SetMaxDatagramSize) - initialStream := newCryptoStream() - handshakeStream := newCryptoStream() params := &wire.TransportParameters{ InitialMaxStreamDataBidiLocal: protocol.ByteCount(s.config.InitialStreamReceiveWindow), InitialMaxStreamDataBidiRemote: protocol.ByteCount(s.config.InitialStreamReceiveWindow), @@ -327,21 +314,8 @@ var newConnection = func( s.tracer.SentTransportParameters(params) } cs := handshake.NewCryptoSetupServer( - initialStream, - handshakeStream, clientDestConnID, - conn.LocalAddr(), - conn.RemoteAddr(), params, - &handshakeRunner{ - onReceivedParams: s.handleTransportParameters, - onError: s.closeLocal, - dropKeys: s.dropEncryptionLevel, - onHandshakeComplete: func() { - runner.Retire(clientDestConnID) - close(s.handshakeCompleteChan) - }, - }, tlsConf, conf.Allow0RTT, s.rttStats, @@ -350,9 +324,9 @@ var newConnection = func( s.version, ) s.cryptoStreamHandler = cs - s.packer = newPacketPacker(srcConnID, s.connIDManager.Get, initialStream, handshakeStream, s.sentPacketHandler, s.retransmissionQueue, cs, s.framer, s.receivedPacketHandler, s.datagramQueue, s.perspective) + s.packer = newPacketPacker(srcConnID, s.connIDManager.Get, s.initialStream, s.handshakeStream, s.sentPacketHandler, s.retransmissionQueue, cs, s.framer, s.receivedPacketHandler, s.datagramQueue, s.perspective) s.unpacker = newPacketUnpacker(cs, s.srcConnIDLen) - s.cryptoStreamManager = newCryptoStreamManager(cs, initialStream, handshakeStream, s.oneRTTStream) + s.cryptoStreamManager = newCryptoStreamManager(cs, s.initialStream, s.handshakeStream, s.oneRTTStream) return s } @@ -374,18 +348,17 @@ var newClientConnection = func( v protocol.VersionNumber, ) quicConn { s := &connection{ - conn: conn, - config: conf, - origDestConnID: destConnID, - handshakeDestConnID: destConnID, - srcConnIDLen: srcConnID.Len(), - perspective: protocol.PerspectiveClient, - handshakeCompleteChan: make(chan struct{}), - logID: destConnID.String(), - logger: logger, - tracer: tracer, - versionNegotiated: hasNegotiatedVersion, - version: v, + conn: conn, + config: conf, + origDestConnID: destConnID, + handshakeDestConnID: destConnID, + srcConnIDLen: srcConnID.Len(), + perspective: protocol.PerspectiveClient, + logID: destConnID.String(), + logger: logger, + tracer: tracer, + versionNegotiated: hasNegotiatedVersion, + version: v, } s.connIDManager = newConnIDManager( destConnID, @@ -405,7 +378,7 @@ var newClientConnection = func( connIDGenerator, ) s.preSetup() - s.ctx, s.ctxCancel = context.WithCancel(context.WithValue(context.Background(), ConnectionTracingKey, tracingID)) + s.ctx, s.ctxCancel = context.WithCancelCause(context.WithValue(context.Background(), ConnectionTracingKey, tracingID)) s.sentPacketHandler, s.receivedPacketHandler = ackhandler.NewAckHandler( initialPacketNumber, getMaxPacketSize(s.conn.RemoteAddr()), @@ -416,8 +389,7 @@ var newClientConnection = func( s.logger, ) s.mtuDiscoverer = newMTUDiscoverer(s.rttStats, getMaxPacketSize(s.conn.RemoteAddr()), s.sentPacketHandler.SetMaxDatagramSize) - initialStream := newCryptoStream() - handshakeStream := newCryptoStream() + oneRTTStream := newCryptoStream() params := &wire.TransportParameters{ InitialMaxStreamDataBidiRemote: protocol.ByteCount(s.config.InitialStreamReceiveWindow), InitialMaxStreamDataBidiLocal: protocol.ByteCount(s.config.InitialStreamReceiveWindow), @@ -445,19 +417,9 @@ var newClientConnection = func( if s.tracer != nil { s.tracer.SentTransportParameters(params) } - cs, clientHelloWritten := handshake.NewCryptoSetupClient( - initialStream, - handshakeStream, + cs := handshake.NewCryptoSetupClient( destConnID, - conn.LocalAddr(), - conn.RemoteAddr(), params, - &handshakeRunner{ - onReceivedParams: s.handleTransportParameters, - onError: s.closeLocal, - dropKeys: s.dropEncryptionLevel, - onHandshakeComplete: func() { close(s.handshakeCompleteChan) }, - }, tlsConf, enable0RTT, s.rttStats, @@ -465,11 +427,10 @@ var newClientConnection = func( logger, s.version, ) - s.clientHelloWritten = clientHelloWritten s.cryptoStreamHandler = cs - s.cryptoStreamManager = newCryptoStreamManager(cs, initialStream, handshakeStream, newCryptoStream()) + s.cryptoStreamManager = newCryptoStreamManager(cs, s.initialStream, s.handshakeStream, oneRTTStream) s.unpacker = newPacketUnpacker(cs, s.srcConnIDLen) - s.packer = newPacketPacker(srcConnID, s.connIDManager.Get, initialStream, handshakeStream, s.sentPacketHandler, s.retransmissionQueue, cs, s.framer, s.receivedPacketHandler, s.datagramQueue, s.perspective) + s.packer = newPacketPacker(srcConnID, s.connIDManager.Get, s.initialStream, s.handshakeStream, s.sentPacketHandler, s.retransmissionQueue, cs, s.framer, s.receivedPacketHandler, s.datagramQueue, s.perspective) if len(tlsConf.ServerName) > 0 { s.tokenStoreKey = tlsConf.ServerName } else { @@ -484,6 +445,8 @@ var newClientConnection = func( } func (s *connection) preSetup() { + s.initialStream = newCryptoStream() + s.handshakeStream = newCryptoStream() s.sendQueue = newSendQueue(s.conn) s.retransmissionQueue = newRetransmissionQueue() s.frameParser = wire.NewFrameParser(s.config.EnableDatagrams) @@ -526,15 +489,19 @@ func (s *connection) preSetup() { // run the connection main loop func (s *connection) run() error { - defer s.ctxCancel() + var closeErr closeError + defer func() { + s.ctxCancel(closeErr.err) + }() s.timer = *newTimer() - handshaking := make(chan struct{}) - go func() { - defer close(handshaking) - s.cryptoStreamHandler.RunHandshake() - }() + if err := s.cryptoStreamHandler.StartHandshake(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := s.handleHandshakeEvents(); err != nil { + return err + } go func() { if err := s.sendQueue.Run(); err != nil { s.destroyImpl(err) @@ -542,23 +509,10 @@ func (s *connection) run() error { }() if s.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient { - select { - case zeroRTTParams := <-s.clientHelloWritten: - s.scheduleSending() - if zeroRTTParams != nil { - s.restoreTransportParameters(zeroRTTParams) - close(s.earlyConnReadyChan) - } - case closeErr := <-s.closeChan: - // put the close error back into the channel, so that the run loop can receive it - s.closeChan <- closeErr - } + s.scheduleSending() // so the ClientHello actually gets sent } - var ( - closeErr closeError - sendQueueAvailable <-chan struct{} - ) + var sendQueueAvailable <-chan struct{} runLoop: for { @@ -566,8 +520,6 @@ runLoop: select { case closeErr = <-s.closeChan: break runLoop - case <-s.handshakeCompleteChan: - s.handleHandshakeComplete() default: } @@ -638,8 +590,6 @@ runLoop: if !wasProcessed { continue } - case <-s.handshakeCompleteChan: - s.handleHandshakeComplete() } } @@ -686,7 +636,6 @@ runLoop: } s.cryptoStreamHandler.Close() - <-handshaking s.sendQueue.Close() // close the send queue before sending the CONNECTION_CLOSE s.handleCloseError(&closeErr) if e := (&errCloseForRecreating{}); !errors.As(closeErr.err, &e) && s.tracer != nil { @@ -717,7 +666,9 @@ func (s *connection) supportsDatagrams() bool { func (s *connection) ConnectionState() ConnectionState { s.connStateMutex.Lock() defer s.connStateMutex.Unlock() - s.connState.TLS = s.cryptoStreamHandler.ConnectionState() + cs := s.cryptoStreamHandler.ConnectionState() + s.connState.TLS = cs.ConnectionState + s.connState.Used0RTT = cs.Used0RTT return s.connState } @@ -764,9 +715,8 @@ func (s *connection) idleTimeoutStartTime() time.Time { return utils.MaxTime(s.lastPacketReceivedTime, s.firstAckElicitingPacketAfterIdleSentTime) } -func (s *connection) handleHandshakeComplete() { +func (s *connection) handleHandshakeComplete() error { s.handshakeComplete = true - s.handshakeCompleteChan = nil // prevent this case from ever being selected again defer s.handshakeCtxCancel() // Once the handshake completes, we have derived 1-RTT keys. // There's no point in queueing undecryptable packets for later decryption any more. @@ -777,16 +727,18 @@ func (s *connection) handleHandshakeComplete() { if s.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient { s.applyTransportParameters() - return + return nil } - s.handleHandshakeConfirmed() + if err := s.handleHandshakeConfirmed(); err != nil { + return err + } ticket, err := s.cryptoStreamHandler.GetSessionTicket() if err != nil { - s.closeLocal(err) + return err } - if ticket != nil { + if ticket != nil { // may be nil if session tickets are disabled via tls.Config.SessionTicketsDisabled s.oneRTTStream.Write(ticket) for s.oneRTTStream.HasData() { s.queueControlFrame(s.oneRTTStream.PopCryptoFrame(protocol.MaxPostHandshakeCryptoFrameSize)) @@ -794,13 +746,18 @@ func (s *connection) handleHandshakeComplete() { } token, err := s.tokenGenerator.NewToken(s.conn.RemoteAddr()) if err != nil { - s.closeLocal(err) + return err } s.queueControlFrame(&wire.NewTokenFrame{Token: token}) s.queueControlFrame(&wire.HandshakeDoneFrame{}) + return nil } -func (s *connection) handleHandshakeConfirmed() { +func (s *connection) handleHandshakeConfirmed() error { + if err := s.dropEncryptionLevel(protocol.EncryptionHandshake); err != nil { + return err + } + s.handshakeConfirmed = true s.sentPacketHandler.SetHandshakeConfirmed() s.cryptoStreamHandler.SetHandshakeConfirmed() @@ -812,6 +769,7 @@ func (s *connection) handleHandshakeConfirmed() { } s.mtuDiscoverer.Start(utils.Min(maxPacketSize, protocol.MaxPacketBufferSize)) } + return nil } func (s *connection) handlePacketImpl(rp receivedPacket) bool { @@ -1213,6 +1171,14 @@ func (s *connection) handleUnpackedLongHeaderPacket( } } + if s.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveServer && packet.encryptionLevel == protocol.EncryptionHandshake { + // On the server side, Initial keys are dropped as soon as the first Handshake packet is received. + // See Section 4.9.1 of RFC 9001. + if err := s.dropEncryptionLevel(protocol.EncryptionInitial); err != nil { + return err + } + } + s.lastPacketReceivedTime = rcvTime s.firstAckElicitingPacketAfterIdleSentTime = time.Time{} s.keepAlivePingSent = false @@ -1378,16 +1344,41 @@ func (s *connection) handleConnectionCloseFrame(frame *wire.ConnectionCloseFrame } func (s *connection) handleCryptoFrame(frame *wire.CryptoFrame, encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel) error { - encLevelChanged, err := s.cryptoStreamManager.HandleCryptoFrame(frame, encLevel) - if err != nil { + if err := s.cryptoStreamManager.HandleCryptoFrame(frame, encLevel); err != nil { return err } - if encLevelChanged { - // Queue all packets for decryption that have been undecryptable so far. - s.undecryptablePacketsToProcess = s.undecryptablePackets - s.undecryptablePackets = nil + return s.handleHandshakeEvents() +} + +func (s *connection) handleHandshakeEvents() error { + for { + ev := s.cryptoStreamHandler.NextEvent() + var err error + switch ev.Kind { + case handshake.EventNoEvent: + return nil + case handshake.EventHandshakeComplete: + err = s.handleHandshakeComplete() + case handshake.EventReceivedTransportParameters: + err = s.handleTransportParameters(ev.TransportParameters) + case handshake.EventRestoredTransportParameters: + s.restoreTransportParameters(ev.TransportParameters) + close(s.earlyConnReadyChan) + case handshake.EventReceivedReadKeys: + // Queue all packets for decryption that have been undecryptable so far. + s.undecryptablePacketsToProcess = s.undecryptablePackets + s.undecryptablePackets = nil + case handshake.EventDiscard0RTTKeys: + err = s.dropEncryptionLevel(protocol.Encryption0RTT) + case handshake.EventWriteInitialData: + _, err = s.initialStream.Write(ev.Data) + case handshake.EventWriteHandshakeData: + _, err = s.handshakeStream.Write(ev.Data) + } + if err != nil { + return err + } } - return nil } func (s *connection) handleStreamFrame(frame *wire.StreamFrame) error { @@ -1496,7 +1487,9 @@ func (s *connection) handleAckFrame(frame *wire.AckFrame, encLevel protocol.Encr return nil } if s.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient && !s.handshakeConfirmed { - s.handleHandshakeConfirmed() + if err := s.handleHandshakeConfirmed(); err != nil { + return err + } } return s.cryptoStreamHandler.SetLargest1RTTAcked(frame.LargestAcked()) } @@ -1628,21 +1621,24 @@ func (s *connection) handleCloseError(closeErr *closeError) { s.connIDGenerator.ReplaceWithClosed(s.perspective, connClosePacket) } -func (s *connection) dropEncryptionLevel(encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel) { - s.sentPacketHandler.DropPackets(encLevel) - s.receivedPacketHandler.DropPackets(encLevel) +func (s *connection) dropEncryptionLevel(encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel) error { if s.tracer != nil { s.tracer.DroppedEncryptionLevel(encLevel) } - if encLevel == protocol.Encryption0RTT { + s.sentPacketHandler.DropPackets(encLevel) + s.receivedPacketHandler.DropPackets(encLevel) + //nolint:exhaustive // only Initial and 0-RTT need special treatment + switch encLevel { + case protocol.EncryptionInitial: + s.cryptoStreamHandler.DiscardInitialKeys() + case protocol.Encryption0RTT: s.streamsMap.ResetFor0RTT() if err := s.connFlowController.Reset(); err != nil { - s.closeLocal(err) - } - if err := s.framer.Handle0RTTRejection(); err != nil { - s.closeLocal(err) + return err } + return s.framer.Handle0RTTRejection() } + return s.cryptoStreamManager.Drop(encLevel) } // is called for the client, when restoring transport parameters saved for 0-RTT @@ -1660,13 +1656,12 @@ func (s *connection) restoreTransportParameters(params *wire.TransportParameters s.connStateMutex.Unlock() } -func (s *connection) handleTransportParameters(params *wire.TransportParameters) { +func (s *connection) handleTransportParameters(params *wire.TransportParameters) error { if err := s.checkTransportParameters(params); err != nil { - s.closeLocal(&qerr.TransportError{ + return &qerr.TransportError{ ErrorCode: qerr.TransportParameterError, ErrorMessage: err.Error(), - }) - return + } } s.peerParams = params // On the client side we have to wait for handshake completion. @@ -1681,6 +1676,7 @@ func (s *connection) handleTransportParameters(params *wire.TransportParameters) s.connStateMutex.Lock() s.connState.SupportsDatagrams = s.supportsDatagrams() s.connStateMutex.Unlock() + return nil } func (s *connection) checkTransportParameters(params *wire.TransportParameters) error { @@ -1817,6 +1813,9 @@ func (s *connection) sendPackets(now time.Time) error { s.framer.QueueControlFrame(&wire.DataBlockedFrame{MaximumData: offset}) } s.windowUpdateQueue.QueueAll() + if cf := s.cryptoStreamManager.GetPostHandshakeData(protocol.MaxPostHandshakeCryptoFrameSize); cf != nil { + s.queueControlFrame(cf) + } if !s.handshakeConfirmed { packet, err := s.packer.PackCoalescedPacket(false, s.mtuDiscoverer.CurrentSize(), s.version) @@ -1824,7 +1823,9 @@ func (s *connection) sendPackets(now time.Time) error { return err } s.sentFirstPacket = true - s.sendPackedCoalescedPacket(packet, now) + if err := s.sendPackedCoalescedPacket(packet, now); err != nil { + return err + } sendMode := s.sentPacketHandler.SendMode(now) if sendMode == ackhandler.SendPacingLimited { s.resetPacingDeadline() @@ -1944,8 +1945,7 @@ func (s *connection) maybeSendAckOnlyPacket(now time.Time) error { if packet == nil { return nil } - s.sendPackedCoalescedPacket(packet, time.Now()) - return nil + return s.sendPackedCoalescedPacket(packet, time.Now()) } p, buf, err := s.packer.PackAckOnlyPacket(s.mtuDiscoverer.CurrentSize(), s.version) @@ -1989,8 +1989,7 @@ func (s *connection) sendProbePacket(encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel, now time if packet == nil || (len(packet.longHdrPackets) == 0 && packet.shortHdrPacket == nil) { return fmt.Errorf("connection BUG: couldn't pack %s probe packet", encLevel) } - s.sendPackedCoalescedPacket(packet, now) - return nil + return s.sendPackedCoalescedPacket(packet, now) } // appendPacket appends a new packet to the given packetBuffer. @@ -2020,7 +2019,7 @@ func (s *connection) registerPackedShortHeaderPacket(p shortHeaderPacket, now ti s.connIDManager.SentPacket() } -func (s *connection) sendPackedCoalescedPacket(packet *coalescedPacket, now time.Time) { +func (s *connection) sendPackedCoalescedPacket(packet *coalescedPacket, now time.Time) error { s.logCoalescedPacket(packet) for _, p := range packet.longHdrPackets { if s.firstAckElicitingPacketAfterIdleSentTime.IsZero() && p.IsAckEliciting() { @@ -2031,6 +2030,13 @@ func (s *connection) sendPackedCoalescedPacket(packet *coalescedPacket, now time largestAcked = p.ack.LargestAcked() } s.sentPacketHandler.SentPacket(now, p.header.PacketNumber, largestAcked, p.streamFrames, p.frames, p.EncryptionLevel(), p.length, false) + if s.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient && p.EncryptionLevel() == protocol.EncryptionHandshake { + // On the client side, Initial keys are dropped as soon as the first Handshake packet is sent. + // See Section 4.9.1 of RFC 9001. + if err := s.dropEncryptionLevel(protocol.EncryptionInitial); err != nil { + return err + } + } } if p := packet.shortHdrPacket; p != nil { if s.firstAckElicitingPacketAfterIdleSentTime.IsZero() && p.IsAckEliciting() { @@ -2044,6 +2050,7 @@ func (s *connection) sendPackedCoalescedPacket(packet *coalescedPacket, now time } s.connIDManager.SentPacket() s.sendQueue.Send(packet.buffer, packet.buffer.Len()) + return nil } func (s *connection) sendConnectionClose(e error) ([]byte, error) { @@ -2078,6 +2085,9 @@ func (s *connection) logLongHeaderPacket(p *longHeaderPacket) { for _, frame := range p.frames { wire.LogFrame(s.logger, frame.Frame, true) } + for _, frame := range p.streamFrames { + wire.LogFrame(s.logger, frame.Frame, true) + } } // tracing @@ -2086,6 +2096,9 @@ func (s *connection) logLongHeaderPacket(p *longHeaderPacket) { for _, f := range p.frames { frames = append(frames, logutils.ConvertFrame(f.Frame)) } + for _, f := range p.streamFrames { + frames = append(frames, logutils.ConvertFrame(f.Frame)) + } var ack *logging.AckFrame if p.ack != nil { ack = logutils.ConvertAckFrame(p.ack) @@ -2296,11 +2309,11 @@ func (s *connection) SendMessage(p []byte) error { return s.datagramQueue.AddAndWait(f) } -func (s *connection) ReceiveMessage() ([]byte, error) { +func (s *connection) ReceiveMessage(ctx context.Context) ([]byte, error) { if !s.config.EnableDatagrams { return nil, errors.New("datagram support disabled") } - return s.datagramQueue.Receive() + return s.datagramQueue.Receive(ctx) } func (s *connection) LocalAddr() net.Addr { diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/crypto_stream.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/crypto_stream.go index f10e9120..4be2a07a 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/crypto_stream.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/crypto_stream.go @@ -71,17 +71,9 @@ func (s *cryptoStreamImpl) HandleCryptoFrame(f *wire.CryptoFrame) error { // GetCryptoData retrieves data that was received in CRYPTO frames func (s *cryptoStreamImpl) GetCryptoData() []byte { - if len(s.msgBuf) < 4 { - return nil - } - msgLen := 4 + int(s.msgBuf[1])<<16 + int(s.msgBuf[2])<<8 + int(s.msgBuf[3]) - if len(s.msgBuf) < msgLen { - return nil - } - msg := make([]byte, msgLen) - copy(msg, s.msgBuf[:msgLen]) - s.msgBuf = s.msgBuf[msgLen:] - return msg + b := s.msgBuf + s.msgBuf = nil + return b } func (s *cryptoStreamImpl) Finish() error { diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/crypto_stream_manager.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/crypto_stream_manager.go index 91946acf..c48e238a 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/crypto_stream_manager.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/crypto_stream_manager.go @@ -3,12 +3,14 @@ package quic import ( "fmt" + "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/wire" ) type cryptoDataHandler interface { - HandleMessage([]byte, protocol.EncryptionLevel) bool + HandleMessage([]byte, protocol.EncryptionLevel) error + NextEvent() handshake.Event } type cryptoStreamManager struct { @@ -33,7 +35,7 @@ func newCryptoStreamManager( } } -func (m *cryptoStreamManager) HandleCryptoFrame(frame *wire.CryptoFrame, encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel) (bool /* encryption level changed */, error) { +func (m *cryptoStreamManager) HandleCryptoFrame(frame *wire.CryptoFrame, encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel) error { var str cryptoStream //nolint:exhaustive // CRYPTO frames cannot be sent in 0-RTT packets. switch encLevel { @@ -44,18 +46,37 @@ func (m *cryptoStreamManager) HandleCryptoFrame(frame *wire.CryptoFrame, encLeve case protocol.Encryption1RTT: str = m.oneRTTStream default: - return false, fmt.Errorf("received CRYPTO frame with unexpected encryption level: %s", encLevel) + return fmt.Errorf("received CRYPTO frame with unexpected encryption level: %s", encLevel) } if err := str.HandleCryptoFrame(frame); err != nil { - return false, err + return err } for { data := str.GetCryptoData() if data == nil { - return false, nil + return nil } - if encLevelFinished := m.cryptoHandler.HandleMessage(data, encLevel); encLevelFinished { - return true, str.Finish() + if err := m.cryptoHandler.HandleMessage(data, encLevel); err != nil { + return err } } } + +func (m *cryptoStreamManager) GetPostHandshakeData(maxSize protocol.ByteCount) *wire.CryptoFrame { + if !m.oneRTTStream.HasData() { + return nil + } + return m.oneRTTStream.PopCryptoFrame(maxSize) +} + +func (m *cryptoStreamManager) Drop(encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel) error { + //nolint:exhaustive // 1-RTT keys should never get dropped. + switch encLevel { + case protocol.EncryptionInitial: + return m.initialStream.Finish() + case protocol.EncryptionHandshake: + return m.handshakeStream.Finish() + default: + panic(fmt.Sprintf("dropped unexpected encryption level: %s", encLevel)) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/datagram_queue.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/datagram_queue.go index 59c7d069..ca80d404 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/datagram_queue.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/datagram_queue.go @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ package quic import ( + "context" "sync" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol" @@ -98,7 +99,7 @@ func (h *datagramQueue) HandleDatagramFrame(f *wire.DatagramFrame) { } // Receive gets a received DATAGRAM frame. -func (h *datagramQueue) Receive() ([]byte, error) { +func (h *datagramQueue) Receive(ctx context.Context) ([]byte, error) { for { h.rcvMx.Lock() if len(h.rcvQueue) > 0 { @@ -113,6 +114,8 @@ func (h *datagramQueue) Receive() ([]byte, error) { continue case <-h.closed: return nil, h.closeErr + case <-ctx.Done(): + return nil, ctx.Err() } } } diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/client.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/client.go index c54de5ea..d53391f0 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/client.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/client.go @@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ import ( "github.com/quic-go/quic-go" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol" - "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/quicvarint" @@ -328,31 +327,43 @@ func (c *client) RoundTripOpt(req *http.Request, opt RoundTripOpt) (*http.Respon return rsp, rerr.err } -func (c *client) sendRequestBody(str Stream, body io.ReadCloser) error { - defer body.Close() - b := make([]byte, bodyCopyBufferSize) - for { - n, rerr := body.Read(b) - if n == 0 { - if rerr == nil { - continue - } - if rerr == io.EOF { - break - } - } - if _, err := str.Write(b[:n]); err != nil { - return err - } - if rerr != nil { - if rerr == io.EOF { - break - } - str.CancelWrite(quic.StreamErrorCode(ErrCodeRequestCanceled)) - return rerr - } +// cancelingReader reads from the io.Reader. +// It cancels writing on the stream if any error other than io.EOF occurs. +type cancelingReader struct { + r io.Reader + str Stream +} + +func (r *cancelingReader) Read(b []byte) (int, error) { + n, err := r.r.Read(b) + if err != nil && err != io.EOF { + r.str.CancelWrite(quic.StreamErrorCode(ErrCodeRequestCanceled)) } - return nil + return n, err +} + +func (c *client) sendRequestBody(str Stream, body io.ReadCloser, contentLength int64) error { + defer body.Close() + buf := make([]byte, bodyCopyBufferSize) + sr := &cancelingReader{str: str, r: body} + if contentLength == -1 { + _, err := io.CopyBuffer(str, sr, buf) + return err + } + + // make sure we don't send more bytes than the content length + n, err := io.CopyBuffer(str, io.LimitReader(sr, contentLength), buf) + if err != nil { + return err + } + var extra int64 + extra, err = io.CopyBuffer(io.Discard, sr, buf) + n += extra + if n > contentLength { + str.CancelWrite(quic.StreamErrorCode(ErrCodeRequestCanceled)) + return fmt.Errorf("http: ContentLength=%d with Body length %d", contentLength, n) + } + return err } func (c *client) doRequest(req *http.Request, conn quic.EarlyConnection, str quic.Stream, opt RoundTripOpt, reqDone chan<- struct{}) (*http.Response, requestError) { @@ -372,7 +383,13 @@ func (c *client) doRequest(req *http.Request, conn quic.EarlyConnection, str qui if req.Body != nil { // send the request body asynchronously go func() { - if err := c.sendRequestBody(hstr, req.Body); err != nil { + contentLength := int64(-1) + // According to the documentation for http.Request.ContentLength, + // a value of 0 with a non-nil Body is also treated as unknown content length. + if req.ContentLength > 0 { + contentLength = req.ContentLength + } + if err := c.sendRequestBody(hstr, req.Body, contentLength); err != nil { c.logger.Errorf("Error writing request: %s", err) } if !opt.DontCloseRequestStream { @@ -402,28 +419,22 @@ func (c *client) doRequest(req *http.Request, conn quic.EarlyConnection, str qui return nil, newConnError(ErrCodeGeneralProtocolError, err) } - connState := qtls.ToTLSConnectionState(conn.ConnectionState().TLS) - res := &http.Response{ - Proto: "HTTP/3.0", - ProtoMajor: 3, - Header: http.Header{}, - TLS: &connState, - Request: req, + res, err := responseFromHeaders(hfs) + if err != nil { + return nil, newStreamError(ErrCodeMessageError, err) } - for _, hf := range hfs { - switch hf.Name { - case ":status": - status, err := strconv.Atoi(hf.Value) - if err != nil { - return nil, newStreamError(ErrCodeGeneralProtocolError, errors.New("malformed non-numeric status pseudo header")) - } - res.StatusCode = status - res.Status = hf.Value + " " + http.StatusText(status) - default: - res.Header.Add(hf.Name, hf.Value) - } + connState := conn.ConnectionState().TLS + res.TLS = &connState + res.Request = req + // Check that the server doesn't send more data in DATA frames than indicated by the Content-Length header (if set). + // See section 4.1.2 of RFC 9114. + var httpStr Stream + if _, ok := req.Header["Content-Length"]; ok && req.ContentLength >= 0 { + httpStr = newLengthLimitedStream(hstr, req.ContentLength) + } else { + httpStr = hstr } - respBody := newResponseBody(hstr, conn, reqDone) + respBody := newResponseBody(httpStr, conn, reqDone) // Rules for when to set Content-Length are defined in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-3.3.2. _, hasTransferEncoding := res.Header["Transfer-Encoding"] diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/headers.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/headers.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..79c070b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/headers.go @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +package http3 + +import ( + "errors" + "fmt" + "net/http" + "net/url" + "strconv" + "strings" + + "golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts" + + "github.com/quic-go/qpack" +) + +type header struct { + // Pseudo header fields defined in RFC 9114 + Path string + Method string + Authority string + Scheme string + Status string + // for Extended connect + Protocol string + // parsed and deduplicated + ContentLength int64 + // all non-pseudo headers + Headers http.Header +} + +func parseHeaders(headers []qpack.HeaderField, isRequest bool) (header, error) { + hdr := header{Headers: make(http.Header, len(headers))} + var readFirstRegularHeader, readContentLength bool + var contentLengthStr string + for _, h := range headers { + // field names need to be lowercase, see section 4.2 of RFC 9114 + if strings.ToLower(h.Name) != h.Name { + return header{}, fmt.Errorf("header field is not lower-case: %s", h.Name) + } + if !httpguts.ValidHeaderFieldValue(h.Value) { + return header{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid header field value for %s: %q", h.Name, h.Value) + } + if h.IsPseudo() { + if readFirstRegularHeader { + // all pseudo headers must appear before regular header fields, see section 4.3 of RFC 9114 + return header{}, fmt.Errorf("received pseudo header %s after a regular header field", h.Name) + } + var isResponsePseudoHeader bool // pseudo headers are either valid for requests or for responses + switch h.Name { + case ":path": + hdr.Path = h.Value + case ":method": + hdr.Method = h.Value + case ":authority": + hdr.Authority = h.Value + case ":protocol": + hdr.Protocol = h.Value + case ":scheme": + hdr.Scheme = h.Value + case ":status": + hdr.Status = h.Value + isResponsePseudoHeader = true + default: + return header{}, fmt.Errorf("unknown pseudo header: %s", h.Name) + } + if isRequest && isResponsePseudoHeader { + return header{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid request pseudo header: %s", h.Name) + } + if !isRequest && !isResponsePseudoHeader { + return header{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid response pseudo header: %s", h.Name) + } + } else { + if !httpguts.ValidHeaderFieldName(h.Name) { + return header{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid header field name: %q", h.Name) + } + readFirstRegularHeader = true + switch h.Name { + case "content-length": + // Ignore duplicate Content-Length headers. + // Fail if the duplicates differ. + if !readContentLength { + readContentLength = true + contentLengthStr = h.Value + } else if contentLengthStr != h.Value { + return header{}, fmt.Errorf("contradicting content lengths (%s and %s)", contentLengthStr, h.Value) + } + default: + hdr.Headers.Add(h.Name, h.Value) + } + } + } + if len(contentLengthStr) > 0 { + // use ParseUint instead of ParseInt, so that parsing fails on negative values + cl, err := strconv.ParseUint(contentLengthStr, 10, 63) + if err != nil { + return header{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid content length: %w", err) + } + hdr.Headers.Set("Content-Length", contentLengthStr) + hdr.ContentLength = int64(cl) + } + return hdr, nil +} + +func requestFromHeaders(headerFields []qpack.HeaderField) (*http.Request, error) { + hdr, err := parseHeaders(headerFields, true) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // concatenate cookie headers, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6265#section-5.4 + if len(hdr.Headers["Cookie"]) > 0 { + hdr.Headers.Set("Cookie", strings.Join(hdr.Headers["Cookie"], "; ")) + } + + isConnect := hdr.Method == http.MethodConnect + // Extended CONNECT, see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8441#section-4 + isExtendedConnected := isConnect && hdr.Protocol != "" + if isExtendedConnected { + if hdr.Scheme == "" || hdr.Path == "" || hdr.Authority == "" { + return nil, errors.New("extended CONNECT: :scheme, :path and :authority must not be empty") + } + } else if isConnect { + if hdr.Path != "" || hdr.Authority == "" { // normal CONNECT + return nil, errors.New(":path must be empty and :authority must not be empty") + } + } else if len(hdr.Path) == 0 || len(hdr.Authority) == 0 || len(hdr.Method) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New(":path, :authority and :method must not be empty") + } + + var u *url.URL + var requestURI string + var protocol string + + if isConnect { + u = &url.URL{} + if isExtendedConnected { + u, err = url.ParseRequestURI(hdr.Path) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } else { + u.Path = hdr.Path + } + u.Scheme = hdr.Scheme + u.Host = hdr.Authority + requestURI = hdr.Authority + protocol = hdr.Protocol + } else { + protocol = "HTTP/3.0" + u, err = url.ParseRequestURI(hdr.Path) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid content length: %w", err) + } + requestURI = hdr.Path + } + + return &http.Request{ + Method: hdr.Method, + URL: u, + Proto: protocol, + ProtoMajor: 3, + ProtoMinor: 0, + Header: hdr.Headers, + Body: nil, + ContentLength: hdr.ContentLength, + Host: hdr.Authority, + RequestURI: requestURI, + }, nil +} + +func hostnameFromRequest(req *http.Request) string { + if req.URL != nil { + return req.URL.Host + } + return "" +} + +func responseFromHeaders(headerFields []qpack.HeaderField) (*http.Response, error) { + hdr, err := parseHeaders(headerFields, false) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if hdr.Status == "" { + return nil, errors.New("missing status field") + } + rsp := &http.Response{ + Proto: "HTTP/3.0", + ProtoMajor: 3, + Header: hdr.Headers, + ContentLength: hdr.ContentLength, + } + status, err := strconv.Atoi(hdr.Status) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid status code: %w", err) + } + rsp.StatusCode = status + rsp.Status = hdr.Status + " " + http.StatusText(status) + return rsp, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/http_stream.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/http_stream.go index 2799e2b3..1c0ec4f1 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/http_stream.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/http_stream.go @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@ package http3 import ( + "errors" "fmt" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go" + "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils" ) // A Stream is a HTTP/3 stream. @@ -66,6 +68,10 @@ func (s *stream) Read(b []byte) (int, error) { return n, err } +func (s *stream) hasMoreData() bool { + return s.bytesRemainingInFrame > 0 +} + func (s *stream) Write(b []byte) (int, error) { s.buf = s.buf[:0] s.buf = (&dataFrame{Length: uint64(len(b))}).Append(s.buf) @@ -74,3 +80,45 @@ func (s *stream) Write(b []byte) (int, error) { } return s.Stream.Write(b) } + +var errTooMuchData = errors.New("peer sent too much data") + +type lengthLimitedStream struct { + *stream + contentLength int64 + read int64 + resetStream bool +} + +var _ Stream = &lengthLimitedStream{} + +func newLengthLimitedStream(str *stream, contentLength int64) *lengthLimitedStream { + return &lengthLimitedStream{ + stream: str, + contentLength: contentLength, + } +} + +func (s *lengthLimitedStream) checkContentLengthViolation() error { + if s.read > s.contentLength || s.read == s.contentLength && s.hasMoreData() { + if !s.resetStream { + s.CancelRead(quic.StreamErrorCode(ErrCodeMessageError)) + s.CancelWrite(quic.StreamErrorCode(ErrCodeMessageError)) + s.resetStream = true + } + return errTooMuchData + } + return nil +} + +func (s *lengthLimitedStream) Read(b []byte) (int, error) { + if err := s.checkContentLengthViolation(); err != nil { + return 0, err + } + n, err := s.stream.Read(b[:utils.Min(int64(len(b)), s.contentLength-s.read)]) + s.read += int64(n) + if err := s.checkContentLengthViolation(); err != nil { + return n, err + } + return n, err +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/request.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/request.go deleted file mode 100644 index 9af25a57..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/request.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,111 +0,0 @@ -package http3 - -import ( - "errors" - "net/http" - "net/url" - "strconv" - "strings" - - "github.com/quic-go/qpack" -) - -func requestFromHeaders(headers []qpack.HeaderField) (*http.Request, error) { - var path, authority, method, protocol, scheme, contentLengthStr string - - httpHeaders := http.Header{} - for _, h := range headers { - switch h.Name { - case ":path": - path = h.Value - case ":method": - method = h.Value - case ":authority": - authority = h.Value - case ":protocol": - protocol = h.Value - case ":scheme": - scheme = h.Value - case "content-length": - contentLengthStr = h.Value - default: - if !h.IsPseudo() { - httpHeaders.Add(h.Name, h.Value) - } - } - } - - // concatenate cookie headers, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6265#section-5.4 - if len(httpHeaders["Cookie"]) > 0 { - httpHeaders.Set("Cookie", strings.Join(httpHeaders["Cookie"], "; ")) - } - - isConnect := method == http.MethodConnect - // Extended CONNECT, see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8441#section-4 - isExtendedConnected := isConnect && protocol != "" - if isExtendedConnected { - if scheme == "" || path == "" || authority == "" { - return nil, errors.New("extended CONNECT: :scheme, :path and :authority must not be empty") - } - } else if isConnect { - if path != "" || authority == "" { // normal CONNECT - return nil, errors.New(":path must be empty and :authority must not be empty") - } - } else if len(path) == 0 || len(authority) == 0 || len(method) == 0 { - return nil, errors.New(":path, :authority and :method must not be empty") - } - - var u *url.URL - var requestURI string - var err error - - if isConnect { - u = &url.URL{} - if isExtendedConnected { - u, err = url.ParseRequestURI(path) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - } else { - u.Path = path - } - u.Scheme = scheme - u.Host = authority - requestURI = authority - } else { - protocol = "HTTP/3.0" - u, err = url.ParseRequestURI(path) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - requestURI = path - } - - var contentLength int64 - if len(contentLengthStr) > 0 { - contentLength, err = strconv.ParseInt(contentLengthStr, 10, 64) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - } - - return &http.Request{ - Method: method, - URL: u, - Proto: protocol, - ProtoMajor: 3, - ProtoMinor: 0, - Header: httpHeaders, - Body: nil, - ContentLength: contentLength, - Host: authority, - RequestURI: requestURI, - }, nil -} - -func hostnameFromRequest(req *http.Request) string { - if req.URL != nil { - return req.URL.Host - } - return "" -} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/request_writer.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/request_writer.go index fcff6a1f..875f4031 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/request_writer.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/request_writer.go @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package http3 import ( "bytes" + "errors" "fmt" "io" "net" @@ -81,6 +82,9 @@ func (w *requestWriter) encodeHeaders(req *http.Request, addGzipHeader bool, tra if err != nil { return err } + if !httpguts.ValidHostHeader(host) { + return errors.New("http3: invalid Host header") + } // http.NewRequest sets this field to HTTP/1.1 isExtendedConnect := req.Method == http.MethodConnect && req.Proto != "" && req.Proto != "HTTP/1.1" diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/response_writer.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/response_writer.go index b7c79d50..3d927185 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/response_writer.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/response_writer.go @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package http3 import ( "bufio" "bytes" + "fmt" "net/http" "strconv" "strings" @@ -23,6 +24,8 @@ type responseWriter struct { header http.Header status int // status code passed to WriteHeader headerWritten bool + contentLen int64 // if handler set valid Content-Length header + numWritten int64 // bytes written logger utils.Logger } @@ -53,8 +56,30 @@ func (w *responseWriter) WriteHeader(status int) { return } - if status < 100 || status >= 200 { + // http status must be 3 digits + if status < 100 || status > 999 { + panic(fmt.Sprintf("invalid WriteHeader code %v", status)) + } + + if status >= 200 { w.headerWritten = true + // Add Date header. + // This is what the standard library does. + // Can be disabled by setting the Date header to nil. + if _, ok := w.header["Date"]; !ok { + w.header.Set("Date", time.Now().UTC().Format(http.TimeFormat)) + } + // Content-Length checking + // use ParseUint instead of ParseInt, as negative values are invalid + if clen := w.header.Get("Content-Length"); clen != "" { + if cl, err := strconv.ParseUint(clen, 10, 63); err == nil { + w.contentLen = int64(cl) + } else { + // emit a warning for malformed Content-Length and remove it + w.logger.Errorf("Malformed Content-Length %s", clen) + w.header.Del("Content-Length") + } + } } w.status = status @@ -105,6 +130,12 @@ func (w *responseWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { if !bodyAllowed { return 0, http.ErrBodyNotAllowed } + + w.numWritten += int64(len(p)) + if w.contentLen != 0 && w.numWritten > w.contentLen { + return 0, http.ErrContentLength + } + df := &dataFrame{Length: uint64(len(p))} w.buf = w.buf[:0] w.buf = df.Append(w.buf) @@ -114,8 +145,12 @@ func (w *responseWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return w.bufferedStr.Write(p) } +func (w *responseWriter) FlushError() error { + return w.bufferedStr.Flush() +} + func (w *responseWriter) Flush() { - if err := w.bufferedStr.Flush(); err != nil { + if err := w.FlushError(); err != nil { w.logger.Errorf("could not flush to stream: %s", err.Error()) } } diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/server.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/server.go index a03b1fc5..b90c850c 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/server.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3/server.go @@ -62,8 +62,6 @@ func versionToALPN(v protocol.VersionNumber) string { switch v { case protocol.Version1, protocol.Version2: return NextProtoH3 - case protocol.VersionDraft29: - return NextProtoH3Draft29 default: return "" } @@ -575,14 +573,22 @@ func (s *Server) handleRequest(conn quic.Connection, str quic.Stream, decoder *q } req, err := requestFromHeaders(hfs) if err != nil { - // TODO: use the right error code - return newStreamError(ErrCodeGeneralProtocolError, err) + return newStreamError(ErrCodeMessageError, err) } - connState := conn.ConnectionState().TLS.ConnectionState + connState := conn.ConnectionState().TLS req.TLS = &connState req.RemoteAddr = conn.RemoteAddr().String() - body := newRequestBody(newStream(str, onFrameError)) + + // Check that the client doesn't send more data in DATA frames than indicated by the Content-Length header (if set). + // See section 4.1.2 of RFC 9114. + var httpStr Stream + if _, ok := req.Header["Content-Length"]; ok && req.ContentLength >= 0 { + httpStr = newLengthLimitedStream(newStream(str, onFrameError), req.ContentLength) + } else { + httpStr = newStream(str, onFrameError) + } + body := newRequestBody(httpStr) req.Body = body if s.logger.Debug() { @@ -596,7 +602,6 @@ func (s *Server) handleRequest(conn quic.Connection, str quic.Stream, decoder *q ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, http.LocalAddrContextKey, conn.LocalAddr()) req = req.WithContext(ctx) r := newResponseWriter(str, conn, s.logger) - defer r.Flush() handler := s.Handler if handler == nil { handler = http.DefaultServeMux @@ -624,10 +629,10 @@ func (s *Server) handleRequest(conn quic.Connection, str quic.Stream, decoder *q return requestError{err: errHijacked} } - if panicked { - r.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError) - } else { + // only write response when there is no panic + if !panicked { r.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) + r.Flush() } // If the EOF was read by the handler, CancelRead() is a no-op. str.CancelRead(quic.StreamErrorCode(ErrCodeNoError)) diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/interface.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/interface.go index 8486c7fe..c3fb2b10 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/interface.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/interface.go @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package quic import ( "context" + "crypto/tls" "errors" "io" "net" @@ -19,10 +20,9 @@ type StreamID = protocol.StreamID type VersionNumber = protocol.VersionNumber const ( - // VersionDraft29 is IETF QUIC draft-29 - VersionDraft29 = protocol.VersionDraft29 // Version1 is RFC 9000 Version1 = protocol.Version1 + // Version2 is RFC 9369 Version2 = protocol.Version2 ) @@ -122,6 +122,8 @@ type SendStream interface { // The Context is canceled as soon as the write-side of the stream is closed. // This happens when Close() or CancelWrite() is called, or when the peer // cancels the read-side of their stream. + // The cancellation cause is set to the error that caused the stream to + // close, or `context.Canceled` in case the stream is closed without error. Context() context.Context // SetWriteDeadline sets the deadline for future Write calls // and any currently-blocked Write call. @@ -178,6 +180,8 @@ type Connection interface { // The error string will be sent to the peer. CloseWithError(ApplicationErrorCode, string) error // Context returns a context that is cancelled when the connection is closed. + // The cancellation cause is set to the error that caused the connection to + // close, or `context.Canceled` in case the listener is closed first. Context() context.Context // ConnectionState returns basic details about the QUIC connection. // Warning: This API should not be considered stable and might change soon. @@ -186,7 +190,7 @@ type Connection interface { // SendMessage sends a message as a datagram, as specified in RFC 9221. SendMessage([]byte) error // ReceiveMessage gets a message received in a datagram, as specified in RFC 9221. - ReceiveMessage() ([]byte, error) + ReceiveMessage(context.Context) ([]byte, error) } // An EarlyConnection is a connection that is handshaking. @@ -337,12 +341,14 @@ type ClientHelloInfo struct { // ConnectionState records basic details about a QUIC connection type ConnectionState struct { // TLS contains information about the TLS connection state, incl. the tls.ConnectionState. - TLS handshake.ConnectionState + TLS tls.ConnectionState // SupportsDatagrams says if support for QUIC datagrams (RFC 9221) was negotiated. // This requires both nodes to support and enable the datagram extensions (via Config.EnableDatagrams). // If datagram support was negotiated, datagrams can be sent and received using the // SendMessage and ReceiveMessage methods on the Connection. SupportsDatagrams bool + // Used0RTT says if 0-RTT resumption was used. + Used0RTT bool // Version is the QUIC version of the QUIC connection. Version VersionNumber } diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/ackhandler/received_packet_handler.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/ackhandler/received_packet_handler.go index 3675694f..e11ee1ee 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/ackhandler/received_packet_handler.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/ackhandler/received_packet_handler.go @@ -47,6 +47,11 @@ func (h *receivedPacketHandler) ReceivedPacket( case protocol.EncryptionInitial: return h.initialPackets.ReceivedPacket(pn, ecn, rcvTime, shouldInstigateAck) case protocol.EncryptionHandshake: + // The Handshake packet number space might already have been dropped as a result + // of processing the CRYPTO frame that was contained in this packet. + if h.handshakePackets == nil { + return nil + } return h.handshakePackets.ReceivedPacket(pn, ecn, rcvTime, shouldInstigateAck) case protocol.Encryption0RTT: if h.lowest1RTTPacket != protocol.InvalidPacketNumber && pn > h.lowest1RTTPacket { diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/ackhandler/sent_packet_handler.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/ackhandler/sent_packet_handler.go index 07978910..c955da6e 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/ackhandler/sent_packet_handler.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/ackhandler/sent_packet_handler.go @@ -136,16 +136,6 @@ func newSentPacketHandler( } } -func (h *sentPacketHandler) DropPackets(encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel) { - if h.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient && encLevel == protocol.EncryptionInitial { - // This function is called when the crypto setup seals a Handshake packet. - // If this Handshake packet is coalesced behind an Initial packet, we would drop the Initial packet number space - // before SentPacket() was called for that Initial packet. - return - } - h.dropPackets(encLevel) -} - func (h *sentPacketHandler) removeFromBytesInFlight(p *packet) { if p.includedInBytesInFlight { if p.Length > h.bytesInFlight { @@ -156,7 +146,7 @@ func (h *sentPacketHandler) removeFromBytesInFlight(p *packet) { } } -func (h *sentPacketHandler) dropPackets(encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel) { +func (h *sentPacketHandler) DropPackets(encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel) { // The server won't await address validation after the handshake is confirmed. // This applies even if we didn't receive an ACK for a Handshake packet. if h.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient && encLevel == protocol.EncryptionHandshake { @@ -165,6 +155,10 @@ func (h *sentPacketHandler) dropPackets(encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel) { // remove outstanding packets from bytes_in_flight if encLevel == protocol.EncryptionInitial || encLevel == protocol.EncryptionHandshake { pnSpace := h.getPacketNumberSpace(encLevel) + // We might already have dropped this packet number space. + if pnSpace == nil { + return + } pnSpace.history.Iterate(func(p *packet) (bool, error) { h.removeFromBytesInFlight(p) return true, nil @@ -238,10 +232,6 @@ func (h *sentPacketHandler) SentPacket( isPathMTUProbePacket bool, ) { h.bytesSent += size - // For the client, drop the Initial packet number space when the first Handshake packet is sent. - if h.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient && encLevel == protocol.EncryptionHandshake && h.initialPackets != nil { - h.dropPackets(protocol.EncryptionInitial) - } pnSpace := h.getPacketNumberSpace(encLevel) if h.logger.Debug() && pnSpace.history.HasOutstandingPackets() { @@ -884,6 +874,12 @@ func (h *sentPacketHandler) ResetForRetry() error { } func (h *sentPacketHandler) SetHandshakeConfirmed() { + if h.initialPackets != nil { + panic("didn't drop initial correctly") + } + if h.handshakePackets != nil { + panic("didn't drop handshake correctly") + } h.handshakeConfirmed = true // We don't send PTOs for application data packets before the handshake completes. // Make sure the timer is armed now, if necessary. diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/aead.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/aead.go index 410745f1..6aa89fb3 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/aead.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/aead.go @@ -5,11 +5,10 @@ import ( "encoding/binary" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol" - "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils" ) -func createAEAD(suite *qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte, v protocol.VersionNumber) cipher.AEAD { +func createAEAD(suite *cipherSuite, trafficSecret []byte, v protocol.VersionNumber) cipher.AEAD { keyLabel := hkdfLabelKeyV1 ivLabel := hkdfLabelIVV1 if v == protocol.Version2 { @@ -93,69 +92,3 @@ func (o *longHeaderOpener) Open(dst, src []byte, pn protocol.PacketNumber, ad [] func (o *longHeaderOpener) DecryptHeader(sample []byte, firstByte *byte, pnBytes []byte) { o.headerProtector.DecryptHeader(sample, firstByte, pnBytes) } - -type handshakeSealer struct { - LongHeaderSealer - - dropInitialKeys func() - dropped bool -} - -func newHandshakeSealer( - aead cipher.AEAD, - headerProtector headerProtector, - dropInitialKeys func(), - perspective protocol.Perspective, -) LongHeaderSealer { - sealer := newLongHeaderSealer(aead, headerProtector) - // The client drops Initial keys when sending the first Handshake packet. - if perspective == protocol.PerspectiveServer { - return sealer - } - return &handshakeSealer{ - LongHeaderSealer: sealer, - dropInitialKeys: dropInitialKeys, - } -} - -func (s *handshakeSealer) Seal(dst, src []byte, pn protocol.PacketNumber, ad []byte) []byte { - data := s.LongHeaderSealer.Seal(dst, src, pn, ad) - if !s.dropped { - s.dropInitialKeys() - s.dropped = true - } - return data -} - -type handshakeOpener struct { - LongHeaderOpener - - dropInitialKeys func() - dropped bool -} - -func newHandshakeOpener( - aead cipher.AEAD, - headerProtector headerProtector, - dropInitialKeys func(), - perspective protocol.Perspective, -) LongHeaderOpener { - opener := newLongHeaderOpener(aead, headerProtector) - // The server drops Initial keys when first successfully processing a Handshake packet. - if perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient { - return opener - } - return &handshakeOpener{ - LongHeaderOpener: opener, - dropInitialKeys: dropInitialKeys, - } -} - -func (o *handshakeOpener) Open(dst, src []byte, pn protocol.PacketNumber, ad []byte) ([]byte, error) { - dec, err := o.LongHeaderOpener.Open(dst, src, pn, ad) - if err == nil && !o.dropped { - o.dropInitialKeys() - o.dropped = true - } - return dec, err -} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/cipher_suite.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/cipher_suite.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..608d5ea0 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/cipher_suite.go @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +package handshake + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/aes" + "crypto/cipher" + "crypto/tls" + "fmt" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305" +) + +// These cipher suite implementations are copied from the standard library crypto/tls package. + +const aeadNonceLength = 12 + +type cipherSuite struct { + ID uint16 + Hash crypto.Hash + KeyLen int + AEAD func(key, nonceMask []byte) cipher.AEAD +} + +func (s cipherSuite) IVLen() int { return aeadNonceLength } + +func getCipherSuite(id uint16) *cipherSuite { + switch id { + case tls.TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + return &cipherSuite{ID: tls.TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, Hash: crypto.SHA256, KeyLen: 16, AEAD: aeadAESGCMTLS13} + case tls.TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: + return &cipherSuite{ID: tls.TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, Hash: crypto.SHA256, KeyLen: 32, AEAD: aeadChaCha20Poly1305} + case tls.TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + return &cipherSuite{ID: tls.TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, Hash: crypto.SHA256, KeyLen: 32, AEAD: aeadAESGCMTLS13} + default: + panic(fmt.Sprintf("unknown cypher suite: %d", id)) + } +} + +func aeadAESGCMTLS13(key, nonceMask []byte) cipher.AEAD { + if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength { + panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length") + } + aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(aes) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + + ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead} + copy(ret.nonceMask[:], nonceMask) + return ret +} + +func aeadChaCha20Poly1305(key, nonceMask []byte) cipher.AEAD { + if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength { + panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length") + } + aead, err := chacha20poly1305.New(key) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + + ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead} + copy(ret.nonceMask[:], nonceMask) + return ret +} + +// xorNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD by XORing in a fixed pattern to the nonce +// before each call. +type xorNonceAEAD struct { + nonceMask [aeadNonceLength]byte + aead cipher.AEAD +} + +func (f *xorNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int { return 8 } // 64-bit sequence number +func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Overhead() int { return f.aead.Overhead() } +func (f *xorNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return 0 } + +func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte { + for i, b := range nonce { + f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b + } + result := f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonceMask[:], plaintext, additionalData) + for i, b := range nonce { + f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b + } + + return result +} + +func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) { + for i, b := range nonce { + f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b + } + result, err := f.aead.Open(out, f.nonceMask[:], ciphertext, additionalData) + for i, b := range nonce { + f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b + } + + return result, err +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/crypto_setup.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/crypto_setup.go index 8c9c2a8f..66ed04d6 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/crypto_setup.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/crypto_setup.go @@ -6,10 +6,8 @@ import ( "crypto/tls" "errors" "fmt" - "io" - "math" - "net" "sync" + "sync/atomic" "time" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol" @@ -25,98 +23,21 @@ type quicVersionContextKey struct{} var QUICVersionContextKey = &quicVersionContextKey{} -// TLS unexpected_message alert -const alertUnexpectedMessage uint8 = 10 - -type messageType uint8 - -// TLS handshake message types. -const ( - typeClientHello messageType = 1 - typeServerHello messageType = 2 - typeNewSessionTicket messageType = 4 - typeEncryptedExtensions messageType = 8 - typeCertificate messageType = 11 - typeCertificateRequest messageType = 13 - typeCertificateVerify messageType = 15 - typeFinished messageType = 20 -) - -func (m messageType) String() string { - switch m { - case typeClientHello: - return "ClientHello" - case typeServerHello: - return "ServerHello" - case typeNewSessionTicket: - return "NewSessionTicket" - case typeEncryptedExtensions: - return "EncryptedExtensions" - case typeCertificate: - return "Certificate" - case typeCertificateRequest: - return "CertificateRequest" - case typeCertificateVerify: - return "CertificateVerify" - case typeFinished: - return "Finished" - default: - return fmt.Sprintf("unknown message type: %d", m) - } -} - const clientSessionStateRevision = 3 -type conn struct { - localAddr, remoteAddr net.Addr -} - -var _ net.Conn = &conn{} - -func newConn(local, remote net.Addr) net.Conn { - return &conn{ - localAddr: local, - remoteAddr: remote, - } -} - -func (c *conn) Read([]byte) (int, error) { return 0, nil } -func (c *conn) Write([]byte) (int, error) { return 0, nil } -func (c *conn) Close() error { return nil } -func (c *conn) RemoteAddr() net.Addr { return c.remoteAddr } -func (c *conn) LocalAddr() net.Addr { return c.localAddr } -func (c *conn) SetReadDeadline(time.Time) error { return nil } -func (c *conn) SetWriteDeadline(time.Time) error { return nil } -func (c *conn) SetDeadline(time.Time) error { return nil } - type cryptoSetup struct { - tlsConf *tls.Config - extraConf *qtls.ExtraConfig - conn *qtls.Conn + tlsConf *tls.Config + conn *qtls.QUICConn + + events []Event version protocol.VersionNumber - messageChan chan []byte - isReadingHandshakeMessage chan struct{} - readFirstHandshakeMessage bool - ourParams *wire.TransportParameters peerParams *wire.TransportParameters - paramsChan <-chan []byte - runner handshakeRunner - - alertChan chan uint8 - // handshakeDone is closed as soon as the go routine running qtls.Handshake() returns - handshakeDone chan struct{} - // is closed when Close() is called - closeChan chan struct{} - - zeroRTTParameters *wire.TransportParameters - clientHelloWritten bool - clientHelloWrittenChan chan struct{} // is closed as soon as the ClientHello is written - zeroRTTParametersChan chan<- *wire.TransportParameters - allow0RTT bool + zeroRTTParameters *wire.TransportParameters + allow0RTT bool rttStats *utils.RTTStats @@ -129,73 +50,61 @@ type cryptoSetup struct { handshakeCompleteTime time.Time - readEncLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel - writeEncLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel - zeroRTTOpener LongHeaderOpener // only set for the server zeroRTTSealer LongHeaderSealer // only set for the client - initialStream io.Writer initialOpener LongHeaderOpener initialSealer LongHeaderSealer - handshakeStream io.Writer handshakeOpener LongHeaderOpener handshakeSealer LongHeaderSealer + used0RTT atomic.Bool + aead *updatableAEAD has1RTTSealer bool has1RTTOpener bool } -var ( - _ qtls.RecordLayer = &cryptoSetup{} - _ CryptoSetup = &cryptoSetup{} -) +var _ CryptoSetup = &cryptoSetup{} // NewCryptoSetupClient creates a new crypto setup for the client func NewCryptoSetupClient( - initialStream io.Writer, - handshakeStream io.Writer, connID protocol.ConnectionID, - localAddr net.Addr, - remoteAddr net.Addr, tp *wire.TransportParameters, - runner handshakeRunner, tlsConf *tls.Config, enable0RTT bool, rttStats *utils.RTTStats, tracer logging.ConnectionTracer, logger utils.Logger, version protocol.VersionNumber, -) (CryptoSetup, <-chan *wire.TransportParameters /* ClientHello written. Receive nil for non-0-RTT */) { - cs, clientHelloWritten := newCryptoSetup( - initialStream, - handshakeStream, +) CryptoSetup { + cs := newCryptoSetup( connID, tp, - runner, - tlsConf, - enable0RTT, rttStats, tracer, logger, protocol.PerspectiveClient, version, ) - cs.conn = qtls.Client(newConn(localAddr, remoteAddr), cs.tlsConf, cs.extraConf) - return cs, clientHelloWritten + + tlsConf = tlsConf.Clone() + tlsConf.MinVersion = tls.VersionTLS13 + quicConf := &qtls.QUICConfig{TLSConfig: tlsConf} + qtls.SetupConfigForClient(quicConf, cs.marshalDataForSessionState, cs.handleDataFromSessionState) + cs.tlsConf = tlsConf + + cs.conn = qtls.QUICClient(quicConf) + cs.conn.SetTransportParameters(cs.ourParams.Marshal(protocol.PerspectiveClient)) + + return cs } // NewCryptoSetupServer creates a new crypto setup for the server func NewCryptoSetupServer( - initialStream io.Writer, - handshakeStream io.Writer, connID protocol.ConnectionID, - localAddr net.Addr, - remoteAddr net.Addr, tp *wire.TransportParameters, - runner handshakeRunner, tlsConf *tls.Config, allow0RTT bool, rttStats *utils.RTTStats, @@ -203,88 +112,52 @@ func NewCryptoSetupServer( logger utils.Logger, version protocol.VersionNumber, ) CryptoSetup { - cs, _ := newCryptoSetup( - initialStream, - handshakeStream, + cs := newCryptoSetup( connID, tp, - runner, - tlsConf, - allow0RTT, rttStats, tracer, logger, protocol.PerspectiveServer, version, ) - cs.conn = qtls.Server(newConn(localAddr, remoteAddr), cs.tlsConf, cs.extraConf) + cs.allow0RTT = allow0RTT + + quicConf := &qtls.QUICConfig{TLSConfig: tlsConf} + qtls.SetupConfigForServer(quicConf, cs.allow0RTT, cs.getDataForSessionTicket, cs.accept0RTT) + + cs.tlsConf = quicConf.TLSConfig + cs.conn = qtls.QUICServer(quicConf) + return cs } func newCryptoSetup( - initialStream io.Writer, - handshakeStream io.Writer, connID protocol.ConnectionID, tp *wire.TransportParameters, - runner handshakeRunner, - tlsConf *tls.Config, - enable0RTT bool, rttStats *utils.RTTStats, tracer logging.ConnectionTracer, logger utils.Logger, perspective protocol.Perspective, version protocol.VersionNumber, -) (*cryptoSetup, <-chan *wire.TransportParameters /* ClientHello written. Receive nil for non-0-RTT */) { +) *cryptoSetup { initialSealer, initialOpener := NewInitialAEAD(connID, perspective, version) if tracer != nil { tracer.UpdatedKeyFromTLS(protocol.EncryptionInitial, protocol.PerspectiveClient) tracer.UpdatedKeyFromTLS(protocol.EncryptionInitial, protocol.PerspectiveServer) } - extHandler := newExtensionHandler(tp.Marshal(perspective), perspective, version) - zeroRTTParametersChan := make(chan *wire.TransportParameters, 1) - cs := &cryptoSetup{ - tlsConf: tlsConf, - initialStream: initialStream, - initialSealer: initialSealer, - initialOpener: initialOpener, - handshakeStream: handshakeStream, - aead: newUpdatableAEAD(rttStats, tracer, logger, version), - readEncLevel: protocol.EncryptionInitial, - writeEncLevel: protocol.EncryptionInitial, - runner: runner, - allow0RTT: enable0RTT, - ourParams: tp, - paramsChan: extHandler.TransportParameters(), - rttStats: rttStats, - tracer: tracer, - logger: logger, - perspective: perspective, - handshakeDone: make(chan struct{}), - alertChan: make(chan uint8), - clientHelloWrittenChan: make(chan struct{}), - zeroRTTParametersChan: zeroRTTParametersChan, - messageChan: make(chan []byte, 1), - isReadingHandshakeMessage: make(chan struct{}), - closeChan: make(chan struct{}), - version: version, + return &cryptoSetup{ + initialSealer: initialSealer, + initialOpener: initialOpener, + aead: newUpdatableAEAD(rttStats, tracer, logger, version), + events: make([]Event, 0, 16), + ourParams: tp, + rttStats: rttStats, + tracer: tracer, + logger: logger, + perspective: perspective, + version: version, } - var maxEarlyData uint32 - if enable0RTT { - maxEarlyData = math.MaxUint32 - } - cs.extraConf = &qtls.ExtraConfig{ - GetExtensions: extHandler.GetExtensions, - ReceivedExtensions: extHandler.ReceivedExtensions, - AlternativeRecordLayer: cs, - EnforceNextProtoSelection: true, - MaxEarlyData: maxEarlyData, - Accept0RTT: cs.accept0RTT, - Rejected0RTT: cs.rejected0RTT, - Enable0RTT: enable0RTT, - GetAppDataForSessionState: cs.marshalDataForSessionState, - SetAppDataFromSessionState: cs.handleDataFromSessionState, - } - return cs, zeroRTTParametersChan } func (h *cryptoSetup) ChangeConnectionID(id protocol.ConnectionID) { @@ -301,142 +174,109 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) SetLargest1RTTAcked(pn protocol.PacketNumber) error { return h.aead.SetLargestAcked(pn) } -func (h *cryptoSetup) RunHandshake() { - // Handle errors that might occur when HandleData() is called. - handshakeComplete := make(chan struct{}) - handshakeErrChan := make(chan error, 1) - go func() { - defer close(h.handshakeDone) - if err := h.conn.HandshakeContext(context.WithValue(context.Background(), QUICVersionContextKey, h.version)); err != nil { - handshakeErrChan <- err - return +func (h *cryptoSetup) StartHandshake() error { + err := h.conn.Start(context.WithValue(context.Background(), QUICVersionContextKey, h.version)) + if err != nil { + return wrapError(err) + } + for { + ev := h.conn.NextEvent() + done, err := h.handleEvent(ev) + if err != nil { + return wrapError(err) } - close(handshakeComplete) - }() - + if done { + break + } + } if h.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient { - select { - case err := <-handshakeErrChan: - h.onError(0, err.Error()) - return - case <-h.clientHelloWrittenChan: + if h.zeroRTTSealer != nil && h.zeroRTTParameters != nil { + h.logger.Debugf("Doing 0-RTT.") + h.events = append(h.events, Event{Kind: EventRestoredTransportParameters, TransportParameters: h.zeroRTTParameters}) + } else { + h.logger.Debugf("Not doing 0-RTT. Has sealer: %t, has params: %t", h.zeroRTTSealer != nil, h.zeroRTTParameters != nil) } } - - select { - case <-handshakeComplete: // return when the handshake is done - h.mutex.Lock() - h.handshakeCompleteTime = time.Now() - h.mutex.Unlock() - h.runner.OnHandshakeComplete() - case <-h.closeChan: - // wait until the Handshake() go routine has returned - <-h.handshakeDone - case alert := <-h.alertChan: - handshakeErr := <-handshakeErrChan - h.onError(alert, handshakeErr.Error()) - } -} - -func (h *cryptoSetup) onError(alert uint8, message string) { - var err error - if alert == 0 { - err = &qerr.TransportError{ErrorCode: qerr.InternalError, ErrorMessage: message} - } else { - err = qerr.NewLocalCryptoError(alert, message) - } - h.runner.OnError(err) + return nil } // Close closes the crypto setup. // It aborts the handshake, if it is still running. -// It must only be called once. func (h *cryptoSetup) Close() error { - close(h.closeChan) - // wait until qtls.Handshake() actually returned - <-h.handshakeDone - return nil + return h.conn.Close() } -// handleMessage handles a TLS handshake message. +// HandleMessage handles a TLS handshake message. // It is called by the crypto streams when a new message is available. -// It returns if it is done with messages on the same encryption level. -func (h *cryptoSetup) HandleMessage(data []byte, encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel) bool /* stream finished */ { - msgType := messageType(data[0]) - h.logger.Debugf("Received %s message (%d bytes, encryption level: %s)", msgType, len(data), encLevel) - if err := h.checkEncryptionLevel(msgType, encLevel); err != nil { - h.onError(alertUnexpectedMessage, err.Error()) - return false - } - if encLevel != protocol.Encryption1RTT { - select { - case h.messageChan <- data: - case <-h.handshakeDone: // handshake errored, nobody is going to consume this message - return false - } - } - if encLevel == protocol.Encryption1RTT { - h.messageChan <- data - h.handlePostHandshakeMessage() - return false - } -readLoop: - for { - select { - case data := <-h.paramsChan: - if data == nil { - h.onError(0x6d, "missing quic_transport_parameters extension") - } else { - h.handleTransportParameters(data) - } - case <-h.isReadingHandshakeMessage: - break readLoop - case <-h.handshakeDone: - break readLoop - case <-h.closeChan: - break readLoop - } - } - // We're done with the Initial encryption level after processing a ClientHello / ServerHello, - // but only if a handshake opener and sealer was created. - // Otherwise, a HelloRetryRequest was performed. - // We're done with the Handshake encryption level after processing the Finished message. - return ((msgType == typeClientHello || msgType == typeServerHello) && h.handshakeOpener != nil && h.handshakeSealer != nil) || - msgType == typeFinished -} - -func (h *cryptoSetup) checkEncryptionLevel(msgType messageType, encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel) error { - var expected protocol.EncryptionLevel - switch msgType { - case typeClientHello, typeServerHello: - expected = protocol.EncryptionInitial - case typeEncryptedExtensions, - typeCertificate, - typeCertificateRequest, - typeCertificateVerify, - typeFinished: - expected = protocol.EncryptionHandshake - case typeNewSessionTicket: - expected = protocol.Encryption1RTT - default: - return fmt.Errorf("unexpected handshake message: %d", msgType) - } - if encLevel != expected { - return fmt.Errorf("expected handshake message %s to have encryption level %s, has %s", msgType, expected, encLevel) +func (h *cryptoSetup) HandleMessage(data []byte, encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel) error { + if err := h.handleMessage(data, encLevel); err != nil { + return wrapError(err) } return nil } -func (h *cryptoSetup) handleTransportParameters(data []byte) { +func (h *cryptoSetup) handleMessage(data []byte, encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel) error { + if err := h.conn.HandleData(qtls.ToTLSEncryptionLevel(encLevel), data); err != nil { + return err + } + for { + ev := h.conn.NextEvent() + done, err := h.handleEvent(ev) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if done { + return nil + } + } +} + +func (h *cryptoSetup) handleEvent(ev qtls.QUICEvent) (done bool, err error) { + switch ev.Kind { + case qtls.QUICNoEvent: + return true, nil + case qtls.QUICSetReadSecret: + h.SetReadKey(ev.Level, ev.Suite, ev.Data) + return false, nil + case qtls.QUICSetWriteSecret: + h.SetWriteKey(ev.Level, ev.Suite, ev.Data) + return false, nil + case qtls.QUICTransportParameters: + return false, h.handleTransportParameters(ev.Data) + case qtls.QUICTransportParametersRequired: + h.conn.SetTransportParameters(h.ourParams.Marshal(h.perspective)) + return false, nil + case qtls.QUICRejectedEarlyData: + h.rejected0RTT() + return false, nil + case qtls.QUICWriteData: + h.WriteRecord(ev.Level, ev.Data) + return false, nil + case qtls.QUICHandshakeDone: + h.handshakeComplete() + return false, nil + default: + return false, fmt.Errorf("unexpected event: %d", ev.Kind) + } +} + +func (h *cryptoSetup) NextEvent() Event { + if len(h.events) == 0 { + return Event{Kind: EventNoEvent} + } + ev := h.events[0] + h.events = h.events[1:] + return ev +} + +func (h *cryptoSetup) handleTransportParameters(data []byte) error { var tp wire.TransportParameters if err := tp.Unmarshal(data, h.perspective.Opposite()); err != nil { - h.runner.OnError(&qerr.TransportError{ - ErrorCode: qerr.TransportParameterError, - ErrorMessage: err.Error(), - }) + return err } h.peerParams = &tp - h.runner.OnReceivedParams(h.peerParams) + h.events = append(h.events, Event{Kind: EventReceivedTransportParameters, TransportParameters: h.peerParams}) + return nil } // must be called after receiving the transport parameters @@ -477,17 +317,32 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) handleDataFromSessionStateImpl(data []byte) (*wire.Transpo return &tp, nil } -// only valid for the server +func (h *cryptoSetup) getDataForSessionTicket() []byte { + return (&sessionTicket{ + Parameters: h.ourParams, + RTT: h.rttStats.SmoothedRTT(), + }).Marshal() +} + +// GetSessionTicket generates a new session ticket. +// Due to limitations in crypto/tls, it's only possible to generate a single session ticket per connection. +// It is only valid for the server. func (h *cryptoSetup) GetSessionTicket() ([]byte, error) { - var appData []byte - // Save transport parameters to the session ticket if we're allowing 0-RTT. - if h.extraConf.MaxEarlyData > 0 { - appData = (&sessionTicket{ - Parameters: h.ourParams, - RTT: h.rttStats.SmoothedRTT(), - }).Marshal() + if h.tlsConf.SessionTicketsDisabled { + return nil, nil } - return h.conn.GetSessionTicket(appData) + if err := h.conn.SendSessionTicket(h.allow0RTT); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + ev := h.conn.NextEvent() + if ev.Kind != qtls.QUICWriteData || ev.Level != qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelApplication { + panic("crypto/tls bug: where's my session ticket?") + } + ticket := ev.Data + if ev := h.conn.NextEvent(); ev.Kind != qtls.QUICNoEvent { + panic("crypto/tls bug: why more than one ticket?") + } + return ticket, nil } // accept0RTT is called for the server when receiving the client's session ticket. @@ -522,64 +377,16 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) rejected0RTT() { h.mutex.Unlock() if had0RTTKeys { - h.runner.DropKeys(protocol.Encryption0RTT) + h.events = append(h.events, Event{Kind: EventDiscard0RTTKeys}) } } -func (h *cryptoSetup) handlePostHandshakeMessage() { - // make sure the handshake has already completed - <-h.handshakeDone - - done := make(chan struct{}) - defer close(done) - - // h.alertChan is an unbuffered channel. - // If an error occurs during conn.HandlePostHandshakeMessage, - // it will be sent on this channel. - // Read it from a go-routine so that HandlePostHandshakeMessage doesn't deadlock. - alertChan := make(chan uint8, 1) - go func() { - <-h.isReadingHandshakeMessage - select { - case alert := <-h.alertChan: - alertChan <- alert - case <-done: - } - }() - - if err := h.conn.HandlePostHandshakeMessage(); err != nil { - select { - case <-h.closeChan: - case alert := <-alertChan: - h.onError(alert, err.Error()) - } - } -} - -// ReadHandshakeMessage is called by TLS. -// It blocks until a new handshake message is available. -func (h *cryptoSetup) ReadHandshakeMessage() ([]byte, error) { - if !h.readFirstHandshakeMessage { - h.readFirstHandshakeMessage = true - } else { - select { - case h.isReadingHandshakeMessage <- struct{}{}: - case <-h.closeChan: - return nil, errors.New("error while handling the handshake message") - } - } - select { - case msg := <-h.messageChan: - return msg, nil - case <-h.closeChan: - return nil, errors.New("error while handling the handshake message") - } -} - -func (h *cryptoSetup) SetReadKey(encLevel qtls.EncryptionLevel, suite *qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte) { +func (h *cryptoSetup) SetReadKey(el qtls.QUICEncryptionLevel, suiteID uint16, trafficSecret []byte) { + suite := getCipherSuite(suiteID) h.mutex.Lock() - switch encLevel { - case qtls.Encryption0RTT: + //nolint:exhaustive // The TLS stack doesn't export Initial keys. + switch el { + case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelEarly: if h.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient { panic("Received 0-RTT read key for the client") } @@ -587,27 +394,19 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) SetReadKey(encLevel qtls.EncryptionLevel, suite *qtls.Ciph createAEAD(suite, trafficSecret, h.version), newHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, true, h.version), ) - h.mutex.Unlock() + h.used0RTT.Store(true) if h.logger.Debug() { h.logger.Debugf("Installed 0-RTT Read keys (using %s)", tls.CipherSuiteName(suite.ID)) } - if h.tracer != nil { - h.tracer.UpdatedKeyFromTLS(protocol.Encryption0RTT, h.perspective.Opposite()) - } - return - case qtls.EncryptionHandshake: - h.readEncLevel = protocol.EncryptionHandshake - h.handshakeOpener = newHandshakeOpener( + case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake: + h.handshakeOpener = newLongHeaderOpener( createAEAD(suite, trafficSecret, h.version), newHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, true, h.version), - h.dropInitialKeys, - h.perspective, ) if h.logger.Debug() { h.logger.Debugf("Installed Handshake Read keys (using %s)", tls.CipherSuiteName(suite.ID)) } - case qtls.EncryptionApplication: - h.readEncLevel = protocol.Encryption1RTT + case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelApplication: h.aead.SetReadKey(suite, trafficSecret) h.has1RTTOpener = true if h.logger.Debug() { @@ -617,15 +416,18 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) SetReadKey(encLevel qtls.EncryptionLevel, suite *qtls.Ciph panic("unexpected read encryption level") } h.mutex.Unlock() + h.events = append(h.events, Event{Kind: EventReceivedReadKeys}) if h.tracer != nil { - h.tracer.UpdatedKeyFromTLS(h.readEncLevel, h.perspective.Opposite()) + h.tracer.UpdatedKeyFromTLS(qtls.FromTLSEncryptionLevel(el), h.perspective.Opposite()) } } -func (h *cryptoSetup) SetWriteKey(encLevel qtls.EncryptionLevel, suite *qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte) { +func (h *cryptoSetup) SetWriteKey(el qtls.QUICEncryptionLevel, suiteID uint16, trafficSecret []byte) { + suite := getCipherSuite(suiteID) h.mutex.Lock() - switch encLevel { - case qtls.Encryption0RTT: + //nolint:exhaustive // The TLS stack doesn't export Initial keys. + switch el { + case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelEarly: if h.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveServer { panic("Received 0-RTT write key for the server") } @@ -640,26 +442,25 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) SetWriteKey(encLevel qtls.EncryptionLevel, suite *qtls.Cip if h.tracer != nil { h.tracer.UpdatedKeyFromTLS(protocol.Encryption0RTT, h.perspective) } + // don't set used0RTT here. 0-RTT might still get rejected. return - case qtls.EncryptionHandshake: - h.writeEncLevel = protocol.EncryptionHandshake - h.handshakeSealer = newHandshakeSealer( + case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake: + h.handshakeSealer = newLongHeaderSealer( createAEAD(suite, trafficSecret, h.version), newHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, true, h.version), - h.dropInitialKeys, - h.perspective, ) if h.logger.Debug() { h.logger.Debugf("Installed Handshake Write keys (using %s)", tls.CipherSuiteName(suite.ID)) } - case qtls.EncryptionApplication: - h.writeEncLevel = protocol.Encryption1RTT + case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelApplication: h.aead.SetWriteKey(suite, trafficSecret) h.has1RTTSealer = true if h.logger.Debug() { h.logger.Debugf("Installed 1-RTT Write keys (using %s)", tls.CipherSuiteName(suite.ID)) } if h.zeroRTTSealer != nil { + // Once we receive handshake keys, we know that 0-RTT was not rejected. + h.used0RTT.Store(true) h.zeroRTTSealer = nil h.logger.Debugf("Dropping 0-RTT keys.") if h.tracer != nil { @@ -671,55 +472,39 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) SetWriteKey(encLevel qtls.EncryptionLevel, suite *qtls.Cip } h.mutex.Unlock() if h.tracer != nil { - h.tracer.UpdatedKeyFromTLS(h.writeEncLevel, h.perspective) + h.tracer.UpdatedKeyFromTLS(qtls.FromTLSEncryptionLevel(el), h.perspective) } } // WriteRecord is called when TLS writes data -func (h *cryptoSetup) WriteRecord(p []byte) (int, error) { - h.mutex.Lock() - defer h.mutex.Unlock() - - //nolint:exhaustive // LS records can only be written for Initial and Handshake. - switch h.writeEncLevel { - case protocol.EncryptionInitial: - // assume that the first WriteRecord call contains the ClientHello - n, err := h.initialStream.Write(p) - if !h.clientHelloWritten && h.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient { - h.clientHelloWritten = true - close(h.clientHelloWrittenChan) - if h.zeroRTTSealer != nil && h.zeroRTTParameters != nil { - h.logger.Debugf("Doing 0-RTT.") - h.zeroRTTParametersChan <- h.zeroRTTParameters - } else { - h.logger.Debugf("Not doing 0-RTT.") - h.zeroRTTParametersChan <- nil - } - } - return n, err - case protocol.EncryptionHandshake: - return h.handshakeStream.Write(p) +func (h *cryptoSetup) WriteRecord(encLevel qtls.QUICEncryptionLevel, p []byte) { + //nolint:exhaustive // handshake records can only be written for Initial and Handshake. + switch encLevel { + case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelInitial: + h.events = append(h.events, Event{Kind: EventWriteInitialData, Data: p}) + case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake: + h.events = append(h.events, Event{Kind: EventWriteHandshakeData, Data: p}) + case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelApplication: + panic("unexpected write") default: - panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected write encryption level: %s", h.writeEncLevel)) + panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected write encryption level: %s", encLevel)) } } -func (h *cryptoSetup) SendAlert(alert uint8) { - select { - case h.alertChan <- alert: - case <-h.closeChan: - // no need to send an alert when we've already closed - } -} - -// used a callback in the handshakeSealer and handshakeOpener -func (h *cryptoSetup) dropInitialKeys() { +func (h *cryptoSetup) DiscardInitialKeys() { h.mutex.Lock() + dropped := h.initialOpener != nil h.initialOpener = nil h.initialSealer = nil h.mutex.Unlock() - h.runner.DropKeys(protocol.EncryptionInitial) - h.logger.Debugf("Dropping Initial keys.") + if dropped { + h.logger.Debugf("Dropping Initial keys.") + } +} + +func (h *cryptoSetup) handshakeComplete() { + h.handshakeCompleteTime = time.Now() + h.events = append(h.events, Event{Kind: EventHandshakeComplete}) } func (h *cryptoSetup) SetHandshakeConfirmed() { @@ -734,7 +519,6 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) SetHandshakeConfirmed() { } h.mutex.Unlock() if dropped { - h.runner.DropKeys(protocol.EncryptionHandshake) h.logger.Debugf("Dropping Handshake keys.") } } @@ -839,5 +623,15 @@ func (h *cryptoSetup) Get1RTTOpener() (ShortHeaderOpener, error) { } func (h *cryptoSetup) ConnectionState() ConnectionState { - return qtls.GetConnectionState(h.conn) + return ConnectionState{ + ConnectionState: h.conn.ConnectionState(), + Used0RTT: h.used0RTT.Load(), + } +} + +func wrapError(err error) error { + if alertErr := qtls.AlertError(0); errors.As(err, &alertErr) && alertErr != 80 { + return qerr.NewLocalCryptoError(uint8(alertErr), err.Error()) + } + return &qerr.TransportError{ErrorCode: qerr.InternalError, ErrorMessage: err.Error()} } diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/header_protector.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/header_protector.go index 274fb30c..fb6092e0 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/header_protector.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/header_protector.go @@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import ( "golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol" - "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls" ) type headerProtector interface { @@ -25,7 +24,7 @@ func hkdfHeaderProtectionLabel(v protocol.VersionNumber) string { return "quic hp" } -func newHeaderProtector(suite *qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte, isLongHeader bool, v protocol.VersionNumber) headerProtector { +func newHeaderProtector(suite *cipherSuite, trafficSecret []byte, isLongHeader bool, v protocol.VersionNumber) headerProtector { hkdfLabel := hkdfHeaderProtectionLabel(v) switch suite.ID { case tls.TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, tls.TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: @@ -45,7 +44,7 @@ type aesHeaderProtector struct { var _ headerProtector = &aesHeaderProtector{} -func newAESHeaderProtector(suite *qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte, isLongHeader bool, hkdfLabel string) headerProtector { +func newAESHeaderProtector(suite *cipherSuite, trafficSecret []byte, isLongHeader bool, hkdfLabel string) headerProtector { hpKey := hkdfExpandLabel(suite.Hash, trafficSecret, []byte{}, hkdfLabel, suite.KeyLen) block, err := aes.NewCipher(hpKey) if err != nil { @@ -90,7 +89,7 @@ type chachaHeaderProtector struct { var _ headerProtector = &chachaHeaderProtector{} -func newChaChaHeaderProtector(suite *qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte, isLongHeader bool, hkdfLabel string) headerProtector { +func newChaChaHeaderProtector(suite *cipherSuite, trafficSecret []byte, isLongHeader bool, hkdfLabel string) headerProtector { hpKey := hkdfExpandLabel(suite.Hash, trafficSecret, []byte{}, hkdfLabel, suite.KeyLen) p := &chachaHeaderProtector{ diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/initial_aead.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/initial_aead.go index 3967fdb8..b0377c39 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/initial_aead.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/initial_aead.go @@ -7,13 +7,11 @@ import ( "golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol" - "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls" ) var ( - quicSaltOld = []byte{0xaf, 0xbf, 0xec, 0x28, 0x99, 0x93, 0xd2, 0x4c, 0x9e, 0x97, 0x86, 0xf1, 0x9c, 0x61, 0x11, 0xe0, 0x43, 0x90, 0xa8, 0x99} - quicSaltV1 = []byte{0x38, 0x76, 0x2c, 0xf7, 0xf5, 0x59, 0x34, 0xb3, 0x4d, 0x17, 0x9a, 0xe6, 0xa4, 0xc8, 0x0c, 0xad, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0x7f, 0x0a} - quicSaltV2 = []byte{0x0d, 0xed, 0xe3, 0xde, 0xf7, 0x00, 0xa6, 0xdb, 0x81, 0x93, 0x81, 0xbe, 0x6e, 0x26, 0x9d, 0xcb, 0xf9, 0xbd, 0x2e, 0xd9} + quicSaltV1 = []byte{0x38, 0x76, 0x2c, 0xf7, 0xf5, 0x59, 0x34, 0xb3, 0x4d, 0x17, 0x9a, 0xe6, 0xa4, 0xc8, 0x0c, 0xad, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0x7f, 0x0a} + quicSaltV2 = []byte{0x0d, 0xed, 0xe3, 0xde, 0xf7, 0x00, 0xa6, 0xdb, 0x81, 0x93, 0x81, 0xbe, 0x6e, 0x26, 0x9d, 0xcb, 0xf9, 0xbd, 0x2e, 0xd9} ) const ( @@ -27,18 +25,10 @@ func getSalt(v protocol.VersionNumber) []byte { if v == protocol.Version2 { return quicSaltV2 } - if v == protocol.Version1 { - return quicSaltV1 - } - return quicSaltOld + return quicSaltV1 } -var initialSuite = &qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13{ - ID: tls.TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, - KeyLen: 16, - AEAD: qtls.AEADAESGCMTLS13, - Hash: crypto.SHA256, -} +var initialSuite = getCipherSuite(tls.TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) // NewInitialAEAD creates a new AEAD for Initial encryption / decryption. func NewInitialAEAD(connID protocol.ConnectionID, pers protocol.Perspective, v protocol.VersionNumber) (LongHeaderSealer, LongHeaderOpener) { @@ -54,8 +44,8 @@ func NewInitialAEAD(connID protocol.ConnectionID, pers protocol.Perspective, v p myKey, myIV := computeInitialKeyAndIV(mySecret, v) otherKey, otherIV := computeInitialKeyAndIV(otherSecret, v) - encrypter := qtls.AEADAESGCMTLS13(myKey, myIV) - decrypter := qtls.AEADAESGCMTLS13(otherKey, otherIV) + encrypter := initialSuite.AEAD(myKey, myIV) + decrypter := initialSuite.AEAD(otherKey, otherIV) return newLongHeaderSealer(encrypter, newHeaderProtector(initialSuite, mySecret, true, v)), newLongHeaderOpener(decrypter, newAESHeaderProtector(initialSuite, otherSecret, true, hkdfHeaderProtectionLabel(v))) diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/interface.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/interface.go index f80b6e0e..fab224f9 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/interface.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/interface.go @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ package handshake import ( + "crypto/tls" "errors" "io" "time" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol" - "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/wire" ) @@ -22,9 +22,6 @@ var ( ErrDecryptionFailed = errors.New("decryption failed") ) -// ConnectionState contains information about the state of the connection. -type ConnectionState = qtls.ConnectionState - type headerDecryptor interface { DecryptHeader(sample []byte, firstByte *byte, pnBytes []byte) } @@ -56,29 +53,54 @@ type ShortHeaderSealer interface { KeyPhase() protocol.KeyPhaseBit } -// A tlsExtensionHandler sends and received the QUIC TLS extension. -type tlsExtensionHandler interface { - GetExtensions(msgType uint8) []qtls.Extension - ReceivedExtensions(msgType uint8, exts []qtls.Extension) - TransportParameters() <-chan []byte +type ConnectionState struct { + tls.ConnectionState + Used0RTT bool } -type handshakeRunner interface { - OnReceivedParams(*wire.TransportParameters) - OnHandshakeComplete() - OnError(error) - DropKeys(protocol.EncryptionLevel) +// EventKind is the kind of handshake event. +type EventKind uint8 + +const ( + // EventNoEvent signals that there are no new handshake events + EventNoEvent EventKind = iota + 1 + // EventWriteInitialData contains new CRYPTO data to send at the Initial encryption level + EventWriteInitialData + // EventWriteHandshakeData contains new CRYPTO data to send at the Handshake encryption level + EventWriteHandshakeData + // EventReceivedReadKeys signals that new decryption keys are available. + // It doesn't say which encryption level those keys are for. + EventReceivedReadKeys + // EventDiscard0RTTKeys signals that the Handshake keys were discarded. + EventDiscard0RTTKeys + // EventReceivedTransportParameters contains the transport parameters sent by the peer. + EventReceivedTransportParameters + // EventRestoredTransportParameters contains the transport parameters restored from the session ticket. + // It is only used for the client. + EventRestoredTransportParameters + // EventHandshakeComplete signals that the TLS handshake was completed. + EventHandshakeComplete +) + +// Event is a handshake event. +type Event struct { + Kind EventKind + Data []byte + TransportParameters *wire.TransportParameters } // CryptoSetup handles the handshake and protecting / unprotecting packets type CryptoSetup interface { - RunHandshake() + StartHandshake() error io.Closer ChangeConnectionID(protocol.ConnectionID) GetSessionTicket() ([]byte, error) - HandleMessage([]byte, protocol.EncryptionLevel) bool + HandleMessage([]byte, protocol.EncryptionLevel) error + NextEvent() Event + SetLargest1RTTAcked(protocol.PacketNumber) error + DiscardInitialKeys() SetHandshakeConfirmed() ConnectionState() ConnectionState diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/mockgen.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/mockgen.go deleted file mode 100644 index 68b0988c..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/mockgen.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ -//go:build gomock || generate - -package handshake - -//go:generate sh -c "go run github.com/golang/mock/mockgen -build_flags=\"-tags=gomock\" -package handshake -destination mock_handshake_runner_test.go github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake HandshakeRunner" -type HandshakeRunner = handshakeRunner diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/retry.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/retry.go index ff14f7e0..68fa53ed 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/retry.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/retry.go @@ -11,13 +11,11 @@ import ( ) var ( - retryAEADdraft29 cipher.AEAD // used for QUIC draft versions up to 34 - retryAEADv1 cipher.AEAD // used for QUIC v1 (RFC 9000) - retryAEADv2 cipher.AEAD // used for QUIC v2 + retryAEADv1 cipher.AEAD // used for QUIC v1 (RFC 9000) + retryAEADv2 cipher.AEAD // used for QUIC v2 (RFC 9369) ) func init() { - retryAEADdraft29 = initAEAD([16]byte{0xcc, 0xce, 0x18, 0x7e, 0xd0, 0x9a, 0x09, 0xd0, 0x57, 0x28, 0x15, 0x5a, 0x6c, 0xb9, 0x6b, 0xe1}) retryAEADv1 = initAEAD([16]byte{0xbe, 0x0c, 0x69, 0x0b, 0x9f, 0x66, 0x57, 0x5a, 0x1d, 0x76, 0x6b, 0x54, 0xe3, 0x68, 0xc8, 0x4e}) retryAEADv2 = initAEAD([16]byte{0x8f, 0xb4, 0xb0, 0x1b, 0x56, 0xac, 0x48, 0xe2, 0x60, 0xfb, 0xcb, 0xce, 0xad, 0x7c, 0xcc, 0x92}) } @@ -35,11 +33,10 @@ func initAEAD(key [16]byte) cipher.AEAD { } var ( - retryBuf bytes.Buffer - retryMutex sync.Mutex - retryNonceDraft29 = [12]byte{0xe5, 0x49, 0x30, 0xf9, 0x7f, 0x21, 0x36, 0xf0, 0x53, 0x0a, 0x8c, 0x1c} - retryNonceV1 = [12]byte{0x46, 0x15, 0x99, 0xd3, 0x5d, 0x63, 0x2b, 0xf2, 0x23, 0x98, 0x25, 0xbb} - retryNonceV2 = [12]byte{0xd8, 0x69, 0x69, 0xbc, 0x2d, 0x7c, 0x6d, 0x99, 0x90, 0xef, 0xb0, 0x4a} + retryBuf bytes.Buffer + retryMutex sync.Mutex + retryNonceV1 = [12]byte{0x46, 0x15, 0x99, 0xd3, 0x5d, 0x63, 0x2b, 0xf2, 0x23, 0x98, 0x25, 0xbb} + retryNonceV2 = [12]byte{0xd8, 0x69, 0x69, 0xbc, 0x2d, 0x7c, 0x6d, 0x99, 0x90, 0xef, 0xb0, 0x4a} ) // GetRetryIntegrityTag calculates the integrity tag on a Retry packet @@ -54,14 +51,10 @@ func GetRetryIntegrityTag(retry []byte, origDestConnID protocol.ConnectionID, ve var tag [16]byte var sealed []byte - //nolint:exhaustive // These are all the versions we support - switch version { - case protocol.Version1: - sealed = retryAEADv1.Seal(tag[:0], retryNonceV1[:], nil, retryBuf.Bytes()) - case protocol.Version2: + if version == protocol.Version2 { sealed = retryAEADv2.Seal(tag[:0], retryNonceV2[:], nil, retryBuf.Bytes()) - default: - sealed = retryAEADdraft29.Seal(tag[:0], retryNonceDraft29[:], nil, retryBuf.Bytes()) + } else { + sealed = retryAEADv1.Seal(tag[:0], retryNonceV1[:], nil, retryBuf.Bytes()) } if len(sealed) != 16 { panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected Retry integrity tag length: %d", len(sealed))) diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/session_ticket.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/session_ticket.go index 56bcbcd5..d3efeb29 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/session_ticket.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/session_ticket.go @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import ( "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/quicvarint" ) -const sessionTicketRevision = 2 +const sessionTicketRevision = 3 type sessionTicket struct { Parameters *wire.TransportParameters diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/tls_extension_handler.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/tls_extension_handler.go deleted file mode 100644 index 6105fe40..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/tls_extension_handler.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,68 +0,0 @@ -package handshake - -import ( - "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol" - "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls" -) - -const ( - quicTLSExtensionTypeOldDrafts = 0xffa5 - quicTLSExtensionType = 0x39 -) - -type extensionHandler struct { - ourParams []byte - paramsChan chan []byte - - extensionType uint16 - - perspective protocol.Perspective -} - -var _ tlsExtensionHandler = &extensionHandler{} - -// newExtensionHandler creates a new extension handler -func newExtensionHandler(params []byte, pers protocol.Perspective, v protocol.VersionNumber) tlsExtensionHandler { - et := uint16(quicTLSExtensionType) - if v == protocol.VersionDraft29 { - et = quicTLSExtensionTypeOldDrafts - } - return &extensionHandler{ - ourParams: params, - paramsChan: make(chan []byte), - perspective: pers, - extensionType: et, - } -} - -func (h *extensionHandler) GetExtensions(msgType uint8) []qtls.Extension { - if (h.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient && messageType(msgType) != typeClientHello) || - (h.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveServer && messageType(msgType) != typeEncryptedExtensions) { - return nil - } - return []qtls.Extension{{ - Type: h.extensionType, - Data: h.ourParams, - }} -} - -func (h *extensionHandler) ReceivedExtensions(msgType uint8, exts []qtls.Extension) { - if (h.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveClient && messageType(msgType) != typeEncryptedExtensions) || - (h.perspective == protocol.PerspectiveServer && messageType(msgType) != typeClientHello) { - return - } - - var data []byte - for _, ext := range exts { - if ext.Type == h.extensionType { - data = ext.Data - break - } - } - - h.paramsChan <- data -} - -func (h *extensionHandler) TransportParameters() <-chan []byte { - return h.paramsChan -} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/updatable_aead.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/updatable_aead.go index ac01acdb..919b8a5b 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/updatable_aead.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake/updatable_aead.go @@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import ( "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qerr" - "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils" "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/logging" ) @@ -24,7 +23,7 @@ var KeyUpdateInterval uint64 = protocol.KeyUpdateInterval var FirstKeyUpdateInterval uint64 = 100 type updatableAEAD struct { - suite *qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13 + suite *cipherSuite keyPhase protocol.KeyPhase largestAcked protocol.PacketNumber @@ -121,7 +120,7 @@ func (a *updatableAEAD) getNextTrafficSecret(hash crypto.Hash, ts []byte) []byte // SetReadKey sets the read key. // For the client, this function is called before SetWriteKey. // For the server, this function is called after SetWriteKey. -func (a *updatableAEAD) SetReadKey(suite *qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte) { +func (a *updatableAEAD) SetReadKey(suite *cipherSuite, trafficSecret []byte) { a.rcvAEAD = createAEAD(suite, trafficSecret, a.version) a.headerDecrypter = newHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, false, a.version) if a.suite == nil { @@ -135,7 +134,7 @@ func (a *updatableAEAD) SetReadKey(suite *qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret [ // SetWriteKey sets the write key. // For the client, this function is called after SetReadKey. // For the server, this function is called before SetWriteKey. -func (a *updatableAEAD) SetWriteKey(suite *qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret []byte) { +func (a *updatableAEAD) SetWriteKey(suite *cipherSuite, trafficSecret []byte) { a.sendAEAD = createAEAD(suite, trafficSecret, a.version) a.headerEncrypter = newHeaderProtector(suite, trafficSecret, false, a.version) if a.suite == nil { @@ -146,7 +145,7 @@ func (a *updatableAEAD) SetWriteKey(suite *qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13, trafficSecret a.nextSendAEAD = createAEAD(suite, a.nextSendTrafficSecret, a.version) } -func (a *updatableAEAD) setAEADParameters(aead cipher.AEAD, suite *qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13) { +func (a *updatableAEAD) setAEADParameters(aead cipher.AEAD, suite *cipherSuite) { a.nonceBuf = make([]byte, aead.NonceSize()) a.aeadOverhead = aead.Overhead() a.suite = suite diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol/version.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol/version.go index 20e8976e..5c2decbd 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol/version.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol/version.go @@ -19,14 +19,14 @@ const ( // The version numbers, making grepping easier const ( VersionUnknown VersionNumber = math.MaxUint32 - VersionDraft29 VersionNumber = 0xff00001d + versionDraft29 VersionNumber = 0xff00001d // draft-29 used to be a widely deployed version Version1 VersionNumber = 0x1 Version2 VersionNumber = 0x6b3343cf ) // SupportedVersions lists the versions that the server supports // must be in sorted descending order -var SupportedVersions = []VersionNumber{Version1, Version2, VersionDraft29} +var SupportedVersions = []VersionNumber{Version1, Version2} // IsValidVersion says if the version is known to quic-go func IsValidVersion(v VersionNumber) bool { @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ func (vn VersionNumber) String() string { switch vn { case VersionUnknown: return "unknown" - case VersionDraft29: + case versionDraft29: return "draft-29" case Version1: return "v1" diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qerr/error_codes.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qerr/error_codes.go index cc846df6..a037acd2 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qerr/error_codes.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qerr/error_codes.go @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ func (e TransportErrorCode) Message() string { if !e.IsCryptoError() { return "" } - return qtls.Alert(e - 0x100).Error() + return qtls.AlertError(e - 0x100).Error() } func (e TransportErrorCode) String() string { diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/cipher_suite_go121.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/cipher_suite_go121.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aa8c768f --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/cipher_suite_go121.go @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +//go:build go1.21 + +package qtls + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/cipher" + "crypto/tls" + "fmt" + "unsafe" +) + +type cipherSuiteTLS13 struct { + ID uint16 + KeyLen int + AEAD func(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD + Hash crypto.Hash +} + +//go:linkname cipherSuiteTLS13ByID crypto/tls.cipherSuiteTLS13ByID +func cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 + +//go:linkname cipherSuitesTLS13 crypto/tls.cipherSuitesTLS13 +var cipherSuitesTLS13 []unsafe.Pointer + +//go:linkname defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 crypto/tls.defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 +var defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 []uint16 + +//go:linkname defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES crypto/tls.defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES +var defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES []uint16 + +var cipherSuitesModified bool + +// SetCipherSuite modifies the cipherSuiteTLS13 slice of cipher suites inside qtls +// such that it only contains the cipher suite with the chosen id. +// The reset function returned resets them back to the original value. +func SetCipherSuite(id uint16) (reset func()) { + if cipherSuitesModified { + panic("cipher suites modified multiple times without resetting") + } + cipherSuitesModified = true + + origCipherSuitesTLS13 := append([]unsafe.Pointer{}, cipherSuitesTLS13...) + origDefaultCipherSuitesTLS13 := append([]uint16{}, defaultCipherSuitesTLS13...) + origDefaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES := append([]uint16{}, defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES...) + // The order is given by the order of the slice elements in cipherSuitesTLS13 in qtls. + switch id { + case tls.TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + cipherSuitesTLS13 = cipherSuitesTLS13[:1] + case tls.TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: + cipherSuitesTLS13 = cipherSuitesTLS13[1:2] + case tls.TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + cipherSuitesTLS13 = cipherSuitesTLS13[2:] + default: + panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected cipher suite: %d", id)) + } + defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 = []uint16{id} + defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES = []uint16{id} + + return func() { + cipherSuitesTLS13 = origCipherSuitesTLS13 + defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 = origDefaultCipherSuitesTLS13 + defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES = origDefaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES + cipherSuitesModified = false + } +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/client_session_cache.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/client_session_cache.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..519895ee --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/client_session_cache.go @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +//go:build go1.21 + +package qtls + +import ( + "crypto/tls" +) + +type clientSessionCache struct { + getData func() []byte + setData func([]byte) + wrapped tls.ClientSessionCache +} + +var _ tls.ClientSessionCache = &clientSessionCache{} + +func (c clientSessionCache) Put(key string, cs *tls.ClientSessionState) { + if cs == nil { + c.wrapped.Put(key, nil) + return + } + ticket, state, err := cs.ResumptionState() + if err != nil || state == nil { + c.wrapped.Put(key, cs) + return + } + state.Extra = append(state.Extra, addExtraPrefix(c.getData())) + newCS, err := tls.NewResumptionState(ticket, state) + if err != nil { + // It's not clear why this would error. Just save the original state. + c.wrapped.Put(key, cs) + return + } + c.wrapped.Put(key, newCS) +} + +func (c clientSessionCache) Get(key string) (*tls.ClientSessionState, bool) { + cs, ok := c.wrapped.Get(key) + if !ok || cs == nil { + return cs, ok + } + ticket, state, err := cs.ResumptionState() + if err != nil { + // It's not clear why this would error. + // Remove the ticket from the session cache, so we don't run into this error over and over again + c.wrapped.Put(key, nil) + return nil, false + } + // restore QUIC transport parameters and RTT stored in state.Extra + if extra := findExtraData(state.Extra); extra != nil { + c.setData(extra) + } + session, err := tls.NewResumptionState(ticket, state) + if err != nil { + // It's not clear why this would error. + // Remove the ticket from the session cache, so we don't run into this error over and over again + c.wrapped.Put(key, nil) + return nil, false + } + return session, true +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/go119.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/go119.go deleted file mode 100644 index f040b859..00000000 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/go119.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,145 +0,0 @@ -//go:build go1.19 && !go1.20 - -package qtls - -import ( - "crypto" - "crypto/cipher" - "crypto/tls" - "fmt" - "net" - "unsafe" - - "github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19" -) - -type ( - // Alert is a TLS alert - Alert = qtls.Alert - // A Certificate is qtls.Certificate. - Certificate = qtls.Certificate - // CertificateRequestInfo contains information about a certificate request. - CertificateRequestInfo = qtls.CertificateRequestInfo - // A CipherSuiteTLS13 is a cipher suite for TLS 1.3 - CipherSuiteTLS13 = qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13 - // ClientHelloInfo contains information about a ClientHello. - ClientHelloInfo = qtls.ClientHelloInfo - // ClientSessionCache is a cache used for session resumption. - ClientSessionCache = qtls.ClientSessionCache - // ClientSessionState is a state needed for session resumption. - ClientSessionState = qtls.ClientSessionState - // A Config is a qtls.Config. - Config = qtls.Config - // A Conn is a qtls.Conn. - Conn = qtls.Conn - // ConnectionState contains information about the state of the connection. - ConnectionState = qtls.ConnectionStateWith0RTT - // EncryptionLevel is the encryption level of a message. - EncryptionLevel = qtls.EncryptionLevel - // Extension is a TLS extension - Extension = qtls.Extension - // ExtraConfig is the qtls.ExtraConfig - ExtraConfig = qtls.ExtraConfig - // RecordLayer is a qtls RecordLayer. - RecordLayer = qtls.RecordLayer -) - -const ( - // EncryptionHandshake is the Handshake encryption level - EncryptionHandshake = qtls.EncryptionHandshake - // Encryption0RTT is the 0-RTT encryption level - Encryption0RTT = qtls.Encryption0RTT - // EncryptionApplication is the application data encryption level - EncryptionApplication = qtls.EncryptionApplication -) - -// AEADAESGCMTLS13 creates a new AES-GCM AEAD for TLS 1.3 -func AEADAESGCMTLS13(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD { - return qtls.AEADAESGCMTLS13(key, fixedNonce) -} - -// Client returns a new TLS client side connection. -func Client(conn net.Conn, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *Conn { - return qtls.Client(conn, config, extraConfig) -} - -// Server returns a new TLS server side connection. -func Server(conn net.Conn, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *Conn { - return qtls.Server(conn, config, extraConfig) -} - -func GetConnectionState(conn *Conn) ConnectionState { - return conn.ConnectionStateWith0RTT() -} - -// ToTLSConnectionState extracts the tls.ConnectionState -func ToTLSConnectionState(cs ConnectionState) tls.ConnectionState { - return cs.ConnectionState -} - -type cipherSuiteTLS13 struct { - ID uint16 - KeyLen int - AEAD func(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD - Hash crypto.Hash -} - -//go:linkname cipherSuiteTLS13ByID github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19.cipherSuiteTLS13ByID -func cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 - -// CipherSuiteTLS13ByID gets a TLS 1.3 cipher suite. -func CipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id uint16) *CipherSuiteTLS13 { - val := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id) - cs := (*cipherSuiteTLS13)(unsafe.Pointer(val)) - return &qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13{ - ID: cs.ID, - KeyLen: cs.KeyLen, - AEAD: cs.AEAD, - Hash: cs.Hash, - } -} - -//go:linkname cipherSuitesTLS13 github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19.cipherSuitesTLS13 -var cipherSuitesTLS13 []unsafe.Pointer - -//go:linkname defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19.defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 -var defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 []uint16 - -//go:linkname defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19.defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES -var defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES []uint16 - -var cipherSuitesModified bool - -// SetCipherSuite modifies the cipherSuiteTLS13 slice of cipher suites inside qtls -// such that it only contains the cipher suite with the chosen id. -// The reset function returned resets them back to the original value. -func SetCipherSuite(id uint16) (reset func()) { - if cipherSuitesModified { - panic("cipher suites modified multiple times without resetting") - } - cipherSuitesModified = true - - origCipherSuitesTLS13 := append([]unsafe.Pointer{}, cipherSuitesTLS13...) - origDefaultCipherSuitesTLS13 := append([]uint16{}, defaultCipherSuitesTLS13...) - origDefaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES := append([]uint16{}, defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES...) - // The order is given by the order of the slice elements in cipherSuitesTLS13 in qtls. - switch id { - case tls.TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: - cipherSuitesTLS13 = cipherSuitesTLS13[:1] - case tls.TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: - cipherSuitesTLS13 = cipherSuitesTLS13[1:2] - case tls.TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: - cipherSuitesTLS13 = cipherSuitesTLS13[2:] - default: - panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected cipher suite: %d", id)) - } - defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 = []uint16{id} - defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES = []uint16{id} - - return func() { - cipherSuitesTLS13 = origCipherSuitesTLS13 - defaultCipherSuitesTLS13 = origDefaultCipherSuitesTLS13 - defaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES = origDefaultCipherSuitesTLS13NoAES - cipherSuitesModified = false - } -} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/go120.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/go120.go index a40146ab..595e6e66 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/go120.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/go120.go @@ -1,101 +1,97 @@ -//go:build go1.20 +//go:build go1.20 && !go1.21 package qtls import ( - "crypto" - "crypto/cipher" "crypto/tls" "fmt" - "net" "unsafe" + "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol" + "github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20" ) type ( - // Alert is a TLS alert - Alert = qtls.Alert - // A Certificate is qtls.Certificate. - Certificate = qtls.Certificate - // CertificateRequestInfo contains information about a certificate request. - CertificateRequestInfo = qtls.CertificateRequestInfo - // A CipherSuiteTLS13 is a cipher suite for TLS 1.3 - CipherSuiteTLS13 = qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13 - // ClientHelloInfo contains information about a ClientHello. - ClientHelloInfo = qtls.ClientHelloInfo - // ClientSessionCache is a cache used for session resumption. - ClientSessionCache = qtls.ClientSessionCache - // ClientSessionState is a state needed for session resumption. - ClientSessionState = qtls.ClientSessionState - // A Config is a qtls.Config. - Config = qtls.Config - // A Conn is a qtls.Conn. - Conn = qtls.Conn - // ConnectionState contains information about the state of the connection. - ConnectionState = qtls.ConnectionStateWith0RTT - // EncryptionLevel is the encryption level of a message. - EncryptionLevel = qtls.EncryptionLevel - // Extension is a TLS extension - Extension = qtls.Extension - // ExtraConfig is the qtls.ExtraConfig - ExtraConfig = qtls.ExtraConfig - // RecordLayer is a qtls RecordLayer. - RecordLayer = qtls.RecordLayer + QUICConn = qtls.QUICConn + QUICConfig = qtls.QUICConfig + QUICEvent = qtls.QUICEvent + QUICEventKind = qtls.QUICEventKind + QUICEncryptionLevel = qtls.QUICEncryptionLevel + AlertError = qtls.AlertError ) const ( - // EncryptionHandshake is the Handshake encryption level - EncryptionHandshake = qtls.EncryptionHandshake - // Encryption0RTT is the 0-RTT encryption level - Encryption0RTT = qtls.Encryption0RTT - // EncryptionApplication is the application data encryption level - EncryptionApplication = qtls.EncryptionApplication + QUICEncryptionLevelInitial = qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelInitial + QUICEncryptionLevelEarly = qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelEarly + QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake = qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake + QUICEncryptionLevelApplication = qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelApplication ) -// AEADAESGCMTLS13 creates a new AES-GCM AEAD for TLS 1.3 -func AEADAESGCMTLS13(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD { - return qtls.AEADAESGCMTLS13(key, fixedNonce) +const ( + QUICNoEvent = qtls.QUICNoEvent + QUICSetReadSecret = qtls.QUICSetReadSecret + QUICSetWriteSecret = qtls.QUICSetWriteSecret + QUICWriteData = qtls.QUICWriteData + QUICTransportParameters = qtls.QUICTransportParameters + QUICTransportParametersRequired = qtls.QUICTransportParametersRequired + QUICRejectedEarlyData = qtls.QUICRejectedEarlyData + QUICHandshakeDone = qtls.QUICHandshakeDone +) + +func SetupConfigForServer(conf *QUICConfig, enable0RTT bool, getDataForSessionTicket func() []byte, accept0RTT func([]byte) bool) { + qtls.InitSessionTicketKeys(conf.TLSConfig) + conf.TLSConfig = conf.TLSConfig.Clone() + conf.TLSConfig.MinVersion = tls.VersionTLS13 + conf.ExtraConfig = &qtls.ExtraConfig{ + Enable0RTT: enable0RTT, + Accept0RTT: accept0RTT, + GetAppDataForSessionTicket: getDataForSessionTicket, + } } -// Client returns a new TLS client side connection. -func Client(conn net.Conn, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *Conn { - return qtls.Client(conn, config, extraConfig) +func SetupConfigForClient(conf *QUICConfig, getDataForSessionState func() []byte, setDataFromSessionState func([]byte)) { + conf.ExtraConfig = &qtls.ExtraConfig{ + GetAppDataForSessionState: getDataForSessionState, + SetAppDataFromSessionState: setDataFromSessionState, + } } -// Server returns a new TLS server side connection. -func Server(conn net.Conn, config *Config, extraConfig *ExtraConfig) *Conn { - return qtls.Server(conn, config, extraConfig) +func QUICServer(config *QUICConfig) *QUICConn { + return qtls.QUICServer(config) } -func GetConnectionState(conn *Conn) ConnectionState { - return conn.ConnectionStateWith0RTT() +func QUICClient(config *QUICConfig) *QUICConn { + return qtls.QUICClient(config) } -// ToTLSConnectionState extracts the tls.ConnectionState -func ToTLSConnectionState(cs ConnectionState) tls.ConnectionState { - return cs.ConnectionState +func ToTLSEncryptionLevel(e protocol.EncryptionLevel) qtls.QUICEncryptionLevel { + switch e { + case protocol.EncryptionInitial: + return qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelInitial + case protocol.EncryptionHandshake: + return qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake + case protocol.Encryption1RTT: + return qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelApplication + case protocol.Encryption0RTT: + return qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelEarly + default: + panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected encryption level: %s", e)) + } } -type cipherSuiteTLS13 struct { - ID uint16 - KeyLen int - AEAD func(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD - Hash crypto.Hash -} - -//go:linkname cipherSuiteTLS13ByID github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20.cipherSuiteTLS13ByID -func cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 - -// CipherSuiteTLS13ByID gets a TLS 1.3 cipher suite. -func CipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id uint16) *CipherSuiteTLS13 { - val := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id) - cs := (*cipherSuiteTLS13)(unsafe.Pointer(val)) - return &qtls.CipherSuiteTLS13{ - ID: cs.ID, - KeyLen: cs.KeyLen, - AEAD: cs.AEAD, - Hash: cs.Hash, +func FromTLSEncryptionLevel(e qtls.QUICEncryptionLevel) protocol.EncryptionLevel { + switch e { + case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelInitial: + return protocol.EncryptionInitial + case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake: + return protocol.EncryptionHandshake + case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelApplication: + return protocol.Encryption1RTT + case qtls.QUICEncryptionLevelEarly: + return protocol.Encryption0RTT + default: + panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpect encryption level: %s", e)) } } diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/go121.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/go121.go index b3340639..1137556e 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/go121.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/go121.go @@ -2,4 +2,153 @@ package qtls -var _ int = "The version of quic-go you're using can't be built on Go 1.21 yet. For more details, please see https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/wiki/quic-go-and-Go-versions." +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto/tls" + "fmt" + + "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol" +) + +type ( + QUICConn = tls.QUICConn + QUICConfig = tls.QUICConfig + QUICEvent = tls.QUICEvent + QUICEventKind = tls.QUICEventKind + QUICEncryptionLevel = tls.QUICEncryptionLevel + AlertError = tls.AlertError +) + +const ( + QUICEncryptionLevelInitial = tls.QUICEncryptionLevelInitial + QUICEncryptionLevelEarly = tls.QUICEncryptionLevelEarly + QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake = tls.QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake + QUICEncryptionLevelApplication = tls.QUICEncryptionLevelApplication +) + +const ( + QUICNoEvent = tls.QUICNoEvent + QUICSetReadSecret = tls.QUICSetReadSecret + QUICSetWriteSecret = tls.QUICSetWriteSecret + QUICWriteData = tls.QUICWriteData + QUICTransportParameters = tls.QUICTransportParameters + QUICTransportParametersRequired = tls.QUICTransportParametersRequired + QUICRejectedEarlyData = tls.QUICRejectedEarlyData + QUICHandshakeDone = tls.QUICHandshakeDone +) + +func QUICServer(config *QUICConfig) *QUICConn { return tls.QUICServer(config) } +func QUICClient(config *QUICConfig) *QUICConn { return tls.QUICClient(config) } + +func SetupConfigForServer(qconf *QUICConfig, _ bool, getData func() []byte, accept0RTT func([]byte) bool) { + conf := qconf.TLSConfig + + // Workaround for https://github.com/golang/go/issues/60506. + // This initializes the session tickets _before_ cloning the config. + _, _ = conf.DecryptTicket(nil, tls.ConnectionState{}) + + conf = conf.Clone() + conf.MinVersion = tls.VersionTLS13 + qconf.TLSConfig = conf + + // add callbacks to save transport parameters into the session ticket + origWrapSession := conf.WrapSession + conf.WrapSession = func(cs tls.ConnectionState, state *tls.SessionState) ([]byte, error) { + // Add QUIC transport parameters if this is a 0-RTT packet. + // TODO(#3853): also save the RTT for non-0-RTT tickets + if state.EarlyData { + state.Extra = append(state.Extra, addExtraPrefix(getData())) + } + if origWrapSession != nil { + return origWrapSession(cs, state) + } + b, err := conf.EncryptTicket(cs, state) + return b, err + } + origUnwrapSession := conf.UnwrapSession + // UnwrapSession might be called multiple times, as the client can use multiple session tickets. + // However, using 0-RTT is only possible with the first session ticket. + // crypto/tls guarantees that this callback is called in the same order as the session ticket in the ClientHello. + var unwrapCount int + conf.UnwrapSession = func(identity []byte, connState tls.ConnectionState) (*tls.SessionState, error) { + unwrapCount++ + var state *tls.SessionState + var err error + if origUnwrapSession != nil { + state, err = origUnwrapSession(identity, connState) + } else { + state, err = conf.DecryptTicket(identity, connState) + } + if err != nil || state == nil { + return nil, err + } + if state.EarlyData { + extra := findExtraData(state.Extra) + if unwrapCount == 1 && extra != nil { // first session ticket + state.EarlyData = accept0RTT(extra) + } else { // subsequent session ticket, can't be used for 0-RTT + state.EarlyData = false + } + } + return state, nil + } +} + +func SetupConfigForClient(qconf *QUICConfig, getData func() []byte, setData func([]byte)) { + conf := qconf.TLSConfig + if conf.ClientSessionCache != nil { + origCache := conf.ClientSessionCache + conf.ClientSessionCache = &clientSessionCache{ + wrapped: origCache, + getData: getData, + setData: setData, + } + } +} + +func ToTLSEncryptionLevel(e protocol.EncryptionLevel) tls.QUICEncryptionLevel { + switch e { + case protocol.EncryptionInitial: + return tls.QUICEncryptionLevelInitial + case protocol.EncryptionHandshake: + return tls.QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake + case protocol.Encryption1RTT: + return tls.QUICEncryptionLevelApplication + case protocol.Encryption0RTT: + return tls.QUICEncryptionLevelEarly + default: + panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected encryption level: %s", e)) + } +} + +func FromTLSEncryptionLevel(e tls.QUICEncryptionLevel) protocol.EncryptionLevel { + switch e { + case tls.QUICEncryptionLevelInitial: + return protocol.EncryptionInitial + case tls.QUICEncryptionLevelHandshake: + return protocol.EncryptionHandshake + case tls.QUICEncryptionLevelApplication: + return protocol.Encryption1RTT + case tls.QUICEncryptionLevelEarly: + return protocol.Encryption0RTT + default: + panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpect encryption level: %s", e)) + } +} + +const extraPrefix = "quic-go1" + +func addExtraPrefix(b []byte) []byte { + return append([]byte(extraPrefix), b...) +} + +func findExtraData(extras [][]byte) []byte { + prefix := []byte(extraPrefix) + for _, extra := range extras { + if len(extra) < len(prefix) || !bytes.Equal(prefix, extra[:len(prefix)]) { + continue + } + return extra[len(prefix):] + } + return nil +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/go_oldversion.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/go_oldversion.go index e15f0362..0fca80a3 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/go_oldversion.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qtls/go_oldversion.go @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -//go:build !go1.19 +//go:build !go1.20 package qtls diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/wire/header.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/wire/header.go index 37f48cce..e2dc72e4 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/wire/header.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/wire/header.go @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ func Is0RTTPacket(b []byte) bool { version := protocol.VersionNumber(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[1:5])) //nolint:exhaustive // We only need to test QUIC versions that we support. switch version { - case protocol.Version1, protocol.VersionDraft29: + case protocol.Version1: return b[0]>>4&0b11 == 0b01 case protocol.Version2: return b[0]>>4&0b11 == 0b10 diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/oss-fuzz.sh b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/oss-fuzz.sh new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1efe6baa --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/oss-fuzz.sh @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +#!/bin/bash + +# Install Go manually, since oss-fuzz ships with an outdated Go version. +# See https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/pull/10643. +export CXX="${CXX} -lresolv" # required by Go 1.20 +wget https://go.dev/dl/go1.20.5.linux-amd64.tar.gz \ + && mkdir temp-go \ + && rm -rf /root/.go/* \ + && tar -C temp-go/ -xzf go1.20.5.linux-amd64.tar.gz \ + && mv temp-go/go/* /root/.go/ \ + && rm -rf temp-go go1.20.5.linux-amd64.tar.gz + +( +# fuzz qpack +compile_go_fuzzer github.com/quic-go/qpack/fuzzing Fuzz qpack_fuzzer +) + +( +# fuzz quic-go +compile_go_fuzzer github.com/quic-go/quic-go/fuzzing/frames Fuzz frame_fuzzer +compile_go_fuzzer github.com/quic-go/quic-go/fuzzing/header Fuzz header_fuzzer +compile_go_fuzzer github.com/quic-go/quic-go/fuzzing/transportparameters Fuzz transportparameter_fuzzer +compile_go_fuzzer github.com/quic-go/quic-go/fuzzing/tokens Fuzz token_fuzzer +compile_go_fuzzer github.com/quic-go/quic-go/fuzzing/handshake Fuzz handshake_fuzzer + +if [ $SANITIZER == "coverage" ]; then + # no need for corpora if coverage + exit 0 +fi + +# generate seed corpora +cd $GOPATH/src/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/ +go generate -x ./fuzzing/... + +zip --quiet -r $OUT/header_fuzzer_seed_corpus.zip fuzzing/header/corpus +zip --quiet -r $OUT/frame_fuzzer_seed_corpus.zip fuzzing/frames/corpus +zip --quiet -r $OUT/transportparameter_fuzzer_seed_corpus.zip fuzzing/transportparameters/corpus +zip --quiet -r $OUT/handshake_fuzzer_seed_corpus.zip fuzzing/handshake/corpus +) + +# for debugging +ls -al $OUT diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/send_queue.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/send_queue.go index ab7a45ca..a9f7ca1a 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/send_queue.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/send_queue.go @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ func (h *sendQueue) Run() error { // 1. Checking for "datagram too large" message from the kernel, as such, // 2. Path MTU discovery,and // 3. Eventual detection of loss PingFrame. - if !isMsgSizeErr(err) { + if !isSendMsgSizeErr(err) { return err } } diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/send_stream.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/send_stream.go index 62ebe2ea..4113d9f0 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/send_stream.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/send_stream.go @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ type sendStream struct { retransmissionQueue []*wire.StreamFrame ctx context.Context - ctxCancel context.CancelFunc + ctxCancel context.CancelCauseFunc streamID protocol.StreamID sender streamSender @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ func newSendStream( writeChan: make(chan struct{}, 1), writeOnce: make(chan struct{}, 1), // cap: 1, to protect against concurrent use of Write } - s.ctx, s.ctxCancel = context.WithCancel(context.Background()) + s.ctx, s.ctxCancel = context.WithCancelCause(context.Background()) return s } @@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ func (s *sendStream) Close() error { s.mutex.Unlock() return fmt.Errorf("close called for canceled stream %d", s.streamID) } - s.ctxCancel() + s.ctxCancel(nil) s.finishedWriting = true s.mutex.Unlock() @@ -385,8 +385,8 @@ func (s *sendStream) cancelWriteImpl(errorCode qerr.StreamErrorCode, remote bool s.mutex.Unlock() return } - s.ctxCancel() s.cancelWriteErr = &StreamError{StreamID: s.streamID, ErrorCode: errorCode, Remote: remote} + s.ctxCancel(s.cancelWriteErr) s.numOutstandingFrames = 0 s.retransmissionQueue = nil newlyCompleted := s.isNewlyCompleted() @@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ func (s *sendStream) SetWriteDeadline(t time.Time) error { // The peer will NOT be informed about this: the stream is closed without sending a FIN or RST. func (s *sendStream) closeForShutdown(err error) { s.mutex.Lock() - s.ctxCancel() + s.ctxCancel(err) s.closeForShutdownErr = err s.mutex.Unlock() s.signalWrite() diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn.go index 29aa6add..414472e7 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn.go @@ -2,7 +2,11 @@ package quic import ( "fmt" + "log" "net" + "os" + "strconv" + "strings" "syscall" "time" @@ -23,27 +27,28 @@ type OOBCapablePacketConn interface { var _ OOBCapablePacketConn = &net.UDPConn{} -// OptimizeConn takes a net.PacketConn and attempts to enable various optimizations that will improve QUIC performance: -// 1. It enables the Don't Fragment (DF) bit on the IP header. -// This is required to run DPLPMTUD (Path MTU Discovery, RFC 8899). -// 2. It enables reading of the ECN bits from the IP header. -// This allows the remote node to speed up its loss detection and recovery. -// 3. It uses batched syscalls (recvmmsg) to more efficiently receive packets from the socket. -// 4. It uses Generic Segmentation Offload (GSO) to efficiently send batches of packets (on Linux). -// -// In order for this to work, the connection needs to implement the OOBCapablePacketConn interface (as a *net.UDPConn does). -// -// It's only necessary to call this function explicitly if the application calls WriteTo -// after passing the connection to the Transport. -func OptimizeConn(c net.PacketConn) (net.PacketConn, error) { - return wrapConn(c) -} +func wrapConn(pc net.PacketConn) (rawConn, error) { + if err := setReceiveBuffer(pc); err != nil { + if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "use of closed network connection") { + setBufferWarningOnce.Do(func() { + if disable, _ := strconv.ParseBool(os.Getenv("QUIC_GO_DISABLE_RECEIVE_BUFFER_WARNING")); disable { + return + } + log.Printf("%s. See https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/wiki/UDP-Buffer-Sizes for details.", err) + }) + } + } + if err := setSendBuffer(pc); err != nil { + if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "use of closed network connection") { + setBufferWarningOnce.Do(func() { + if disable, _ := strconv.ParseBool(os.Getenv("QUIC_GO_DISABLE_RECEIVE_BUFFER_WARNING")); disable { + return + } + log.Printf("%s. See https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/wiki/UDP-Buffer-Sizes for details.", err) + }) + } + } -func wrapConn(pc net.PacketConn) (interface { - net.PacketConn - rawConn -}, error, -) { conn, ok := pc.(interface { SyscallConn() (syscall.RawConn, error) }) diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_buffers.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_buffers.go index 0c4e024a..8fe49162 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_buffers.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_buffers.go @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import ( ) //go:generate sh -c "echo '// Code generated by go generate. DO NOT EDIT.\n// Source: sys_conn_buffers.go\n' > sys_conn_buffers_write.go && sed -e 's/SetReadBuffer/SetWriteBuffer/g' -e 's/setReceiveBuffer/setSendBuffer/g' -e 's/inspectReadBuffer/inspectWriteBuffer/g' -e 's/protocol\\.DesiredReceiveBufferSize/protocol\\.DesiredSendBufferSize/g' -e 's/forceSetReceiveBuffer/forceSetSendBuffer/g' -e 's/receive buffer/send buffer/g' sys_conn_buffers.go | sed '/^\\/\\/go:generate/d' >> sys_conn_buffers_write.go" -func setReceiveBuffer(c net.PacketConn, logger utils.Logger) error { +func setReceiveBuffer(c net.PacketConn) error { conn, ok := c.(interface{ SetReadBuffer(int) error }) if !ok { return errors.New("connection doesn't allow setting of receive buffer size. Not a *net.UDPConn?") @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ func setReceiveBuffer(c net.PacketConn, logger utils.Logger) error { return fmt.Errorf("failed to determine receive buffer size: %w", err) } if size >= protocol.DesiredReceiveBufferSize { - logger.Debugf("Conn has receive buffer of %d kiB (wanted: at least %d kiB)", size/1024, protocol.DesiredReceiveBufferSize/1024) + utils.DefaultLogger.Debugf("Conn has receive buffer of %d kiB (wanted: at least %d kiB)", size/1024, protocol.DesiredReceiveBufferSize/1024) return nil } // Ignore the error. We check if we succeeded by querying the buffer size afterward. @@ -63,6 +63,6 @@ func setReceiveBuffer(c net.PacketConn, logger utils.Logger) error { if newSize < protocol.DesiredReceiveBufferSize { return fmt.Errorf("failed to sufficiently increase receive buffer size (was: %d kiB, wanted: %d kiB, got: %d kiB)", size/1024, protocol.DesiredReceiveBufferSize/1024, newSize/1024) } - logger.Debugf("Increased receive buffer size to %d kiB", newSize/1024) + utils.DefaultLogger.Debugf("Increased receive buffer size to %d kiB", newSize/1024) return nil } diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_buffers_write.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_buffers_write.go index 86fead96..c01a931b 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_buffers_write.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_buffers_write.go @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import ( "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils" ) -func setSendBuffer(c net.PacketConn, logger utils.Logger) error { +func setSendBuffer(c net.PacketConn) error { conn, ok := c.(interface{ SetWriteBuffer(int) error }) if !ok { return errors.New("connection doesn't allow setting of send buffer size. Not a *net.UDPConn?") @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ func setSendBuffer(c net.PacketConn, logger utils.Logger) error { return fmt.Errorf("failed to determine send buffer size: %w", err) } if size >= protocol.DesiredSendBufferSize { - logger.Debugf("Conn has send buffer of %d kiB (wanted: at least %d kiB)", size/1024, protocol.DesiredSendBufferSize/1024) + utils.DefaultLogger.Debugf("Conn has send buffer of %d kiB (wanted: at least %d kiB)", size/1024, protocol.DesiredSendBufferSize/1024) return nil } // Ignore the error. We check if we succeeded by querying the buffer size afterward. @@ -65,6 +65,6 @@ func setSendBuffer(c net.PacketConn, logger utils.Logger) error { if newSize < protocol.DesiredSendBufferSize { return fmt.Errorf("failed to sufficiently increase send buffer size (was: %d kiB, wanted: %d kiB, got: %d kiB)", size/1024, protocol.DesiredSendBufferSize/1024, newSize/1024) } - logger.Debugf("Increased send buffer size to %d kiB", newSize/1024) + utils.DefaultLogger.Debugf("Increased send buffer size to %d kiB", newSize/1024) return nil } diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_df.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_df.go index a2189412..0db61509 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_df.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_df.go @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -//go:build !linux && !windows +//go:build !linux && !windows && !darwin package quic @@ -11,7 +11,12 @@ func setDF(syscall.RawConn) (bool, error) { return false, nil } -func isMsgSizeErr(err error) bool { +func isSendMsgSizeErr(err error) bool { + // to be implemented for more specific platforms + return false +} + +func isRecvMsgSizeErr(err error) bool { // to be implemented for more specific platforms return false } diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_df_darwin.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_df_darwin.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b51cd8f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_df_darwin.go @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +//go:build darwin + +package quic + +import ( + "errors" + "strconv" + "strings" + "syscall" + + "golang.org/x/sys/unix" + + "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils" +) + +func setDF(rawConn syscall.RawConn) (bool, error) { + // Setting DF bit is only supported from macOS11 + // https://github.com/chromium/chromium/blob/117.0.5881.2/net/socket/udp_socket_posix.cc#L555 + if supportsDF, err := isAtLeastMacOS11(); !supportsDF || err != nil { + return false, err + } + + // Enabling IP_DONTFRAG will force the kernel to return "sendto: message too long" + // and the datagram will not be fragmented + var errDFIPv4, errDFIPv6 error + if err := rawConn.Control(func(fd uintptr) { + errDFIPv4 = unix.SetsockoptInt(int(fd), unix.IPPROTO_IP, unix.IP_DONTFRAG, 1) + errDFIPv6 = unix.SetsockoptInt(int(fd), unix.IPPROTO_IPV6, unix.IPV6_DONTFRAG, 1) + }); err != nil { + return false, err + } + switch { + case errDFIPv4 == nil && errDFIPv6 == nil: + utils.DefaultLogger.Debugf("Setting DF for IPv4 and IPv6.") + case errDFIPv4 == nil && errDFIPv6 != nil: + utils.DefaultLogger.Debugf("Setting DF for IPv4.") + case errDFIPv4 != nil && errDFIPv6 == nil: + utils.DefaultLogger.Debugf("Setting DF for IPv6.") + // On macOS, the syscall for setting DF bit for IPv4 fails on dual-stack listeners. + // Treat the connection as not having DF enabled, even though the DF bit will be set + // when used for IPv6. + // See https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/issues/3793 for details. + return false, nil + case errDFIPv4 != nil && errDFIPv6 != nil: + return false, errors.New("setting DF failed for both IPv4 and IPv6") + } + return true, nil +} + +func isSendMsgSizeErr(err error) bool { + return errors.Is(err, unix.EMSGSIZE) +} + +func isRecvMsgSizeErr(error) bool { return false } + +func isAtLeastMacOS11() (bool, error) { + uname := &unix.Utsname{} + err := unix.Uname(uname) + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + + release := string(uname.Release[:]) + if idx := strings.Index(release, "."); idx != -1 { + version, err := strconv.Atoi(release[:idx]) + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + // Darwin version 20 is macOS version 11 + // https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darwin_(operating_system)#Darwin_20_onwards + return version >= 20, nil + } + return false, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_df_linux.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_df_linux.go index 92f7e725..199f6347 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_df_linux.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_df_linux.go @@ -15,11 +15,6 @@ import ( "github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils" ) -// UDP_SEGMENT controls GSO (Generic Segmentation Offload) -// -//nolint:stylecheck -const UDP_SEGMENT = 103 - func setDF(rawConn syscall.RawConn) (bool, error) { // Enabling IP_MTU_DISCOVER will force the kernel to return "sendto: message too long" // and the datagram will not be fragmented @@ -51,7 +46,7 @@ func maybeSetGSO(rawConn syscall.RawConn) bool { var setErr error if err := rawConn.Control(func(fd uintptr) { - setErr = unix.SetsockoptInt(int(fd), syscall.IPPROTO_UDP, UDP_SEGMENT, 1) + setErr = unix.SetsockoptInt(int(fd), syscall.IPPROTO_UDP, unix.UDP_SEGMENT, 1) }); err != nil { setErr = err } @@ -62,18 +57,20 @@ func maybeSetGSO(rawConn syscall.RawConn) bool { return true } -func isMsgSizeErr(err error) bool { +func isSendMsgSizeErr(err error) bool { // https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/udp.7.html return errors.Is(err, unix.EMSGSIZE) } +func isRecvMsgSizeErr(err error) bool { return false } + func appendUDPSegmentSizeMsg(b []byte, size uint16) []byte { startLen := len(b) const dataLen = 2 // payload is a uint16 b = append(b, make([]byte, unix.CmsgSpace(dataLen))...) h := (*unix.Cmsghdr)(unsafe.Pointer(&b[startLen])) h.Level = syscall.IPPROTO_UDP - h.Type = UDP_SEGMENT + h.Type = unix.UDP_SEGMENT h.SetLen(unix.CmsgLen(dataLen)) // UnixRights uses the private `data` method, but I *think* this achieves the same goal. diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_df_windows.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_df_windows.go index a7f1351a..e27635ec 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_df_windows.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_df_windows.go @@ -43,7 +43,12 @@ func setDF(rawConn syscall.RawConn) (bool, error) { return true, nil } -func isMsgSizeErr(err error) bool { +func isSendMsgSizeErr(err error) bool { + // https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/winsock/windows-sockets-error-codes-2 + return errors.Is(err, windows.WSAEMSGSIZE) +} + +func isRecvMsgSizeErr(err error) bool { // https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/winsock/windows-sockets-error-codes-2 return errors.Is(err, windows.WSAEMSGSIZE) } diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_helper_darwin.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_helper_darwin.go index 7ad5f3af..bf735f0f 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_helper_darwin.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_helper_darwin.go @@ -2,20 +2,30 @@ package quic -import "golang.org/x/sys/unix" +import ( + "encoding/binary" + "net/netip" -const msgTypeIPTOS = unix.IP_RECVTOS - -const ( - ipv4RECVPKTINFO = unix.IP_RECVPKTINFO - ipv6RECVPKTINFO = 0x3d + "golang.org/x/sys/unix" ) const ( - msgTypeIPv4PKTINFO = unix.IP_PKTINFO - msgTypeIPv6PKTINFO = 0x2e + msgTypeIPTOS = unix.IP_RECVTOS + ipv4PKTINFO = unix.IP_RECVPKTINFO ) // ReadBatch only returns a single packet on OSX, // see https://godoc.org/golang.org/x/net/ipv4#PacketConn.ReadBatch. const batchSize = 1 + +func parseIPv4PktInfo(body []byte) (ip netip.Addr, ifIndex uint32, ok bool) { + // struct in_pktinfo { + // unsigned int ipi_ifindex; /* Interface index */ + // struct in_addr ipi_spec_dst; /* Local address */ + // struct in_addr ipi_addr; /* Header Destination address */ + // }; + if len(body) != 12 { + return netip.Addr{}, 0, false + } + return netip.AddrFrom4(*(*[4]byte)(body[8:12])), binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(body), true +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_helper_freebsd.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_helper_freebsd.go index 8d16d0b9..fe5a7c20 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_helper_freebsd.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_helper_freebsd.go @@ -2,20 +2,25 @@ package quic -import "golang.org/x/sys/unix" +import ( + "net/netip" + + "golang.org/x/sys/unix" +) const ( msgTypeIPTOS = unix.IP_RECVTOS -) - -const ( - ipv4RECVPKTINFO = 0x7 - ipv6RECVPKTINFO = 0x24 -) - -const ( - msgTypeIPv4PKTINFO = 0x7 - msgTypeIPv6PKTINFO = 0x2e + ipv4PKTINFO = 0x7 ) const batchSize = 8 + +func parseIPv4PktInfo(body []byte) (ip netip.Addr, _ uint32, ok bool) { + // struct in_pktinfo { + // struct in_addr ipi_addr; /* Header Destination address */ + // }; + if len(body) != 4 { + return netip.Addr{}, 0, false + } + return netip.AddrFrom4(*(*[4]byte)(body)), 0, true +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_helper_linux.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_helper_linux.go index 2c12233c..61224eaa 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_helper_linux.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_helper_linux.go @@ -3,21 +3,16 @@ package quic import ( + "encoding/binary" + "net/netip" "syscall" "golang.org/x/sys/unix" ) -const msgTypeIPTOS = unix.IP_TOS - const ( - ipv4RECVPKTINFO = unix.IP_PKTINFO - ipv6RECVPKTINFO = unix.IPV6_RECVPKTINFO -) - -const ( - msgTypeIPv4PKTINFO = unix.IP_PKTINFO - msgTypeIPv6PKTINFO = unix.IPV6_PKTINFO + msgTypeIPTOS = unix.IP_TOS + ipv4PKTINFO = unix.IP_PKTINFO ) const batchSize = 8 // needs to smaller than MaxUint8 (otherwise the type of oobConn.readPos has to be changed) @@ -41,3 +36,15 @@ func forceSetSendBuffer(c syscall.RawConn, bytes int) error { } return serr } + +func parseIPv4PktInfo(body []byte) (ip netip.Addr, ifIndex uint32, ok bool) { + // struct in_pktinfo { + // unsigned int ipi_ifindex; /* Interface index */ + // struct in_addr ipi_spec_dst; /* Local address */ + // struct in_addr ipi_addr; /* Header Destination address */ + // }; + if len(body) != 12 { + return netip.Addr{}, 0, false + } + return netip.AddrFrom4(*(*[4]byte)(body[8:12])), binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(body), true +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_oob.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_oob.go index fc28f94b..84d5e7e6 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_oob.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/sys_conn_oob.go @@ -6,8 +6,10 @@ import ( "encoding/binary" "errors" "fmt" + "log" "net" "net/netip" + "sync" "syscall" "time" @@ -87,8 +89,8 @@ func newConn(c OOBCapablePacketConn, supportsDF bool) (*oobConn, error) { errECNIPv6 = unix.SetsockoptInt(int(fd), unix.IPPROTO_IPV6, unix.IPV6_RECVTCLASS, 1) if needsPacketInfo { - errPIIPv4 = unix.SetsockoptInt(int(fd), unix.IPPROTO_IP, ipv4RECVPKTINFO, 1) - errPIIPv6 = unix.SetsockoptInt(int(fd), unix.IPPROTO_IPV6, ipv6RECVPKTINFO, 1) + errPIIPv4 = unix.SetsockoptInt(int(fd), unix.IPPROTO_IP, ipv4PKTINFO, 1) + errPIIPv6 = unix.SetsockoptInt(int(fd), unix.IPPROTO_IPV6, unix.IPV6_RECVPKTINFO, 1) } }); err != nil { return nil, err @@ -149,6 +151,8 @@ func newConn(c OOBCapablePacketConn, supportsDF bool) (*oobConn, error) { return oobConn, nil } +var invalidCmsgOnceV4, invalidCmsgOnceV6 sync.Once + func (c *oobConn) ReadPacket() (receivedPacket, error) { if len(c.messages) == int(c.readPos) { // all messages read. Read the next batch of messages. c.messages = c.messages[:batchSize] @@ -188,38 +192,36 @@ func (c *oobConn) ReadPacket() (receivedPacket, error) { switch hdr.Type { case msgTypeIPTOS: p.ecn = protocol.ECN(body[0] & ecnMask) - case msgTypeIPv4PKTINFO: - // struct in_pktinfo { - // unsigned int ipi_ifindex; /* Interface index */ - // struct in_addr ipi_spec_dst; /* Local address */ - // struct in_addr ipi_addr; /* Header Destination - // address */ - // }; - var ip [4]byte - if len(body) == 12 { - copy(ip[:], body[8:12]) - p.info.ifIndex = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(body) - } else if len(body) == 4 { - // FreeBSD - copy(ip[:], body) + case ipv4PKTINFO: + ip, ifIndex, ok := parseIPv4PktInfo(body) + if ok { + p.info.addr = ip + p.info.ifIndex = ifIndex + } else { + invalidCmsgOnceV4.Do(func() { + log.Printf("Received invalid IPv4 packet info control message: %+x. "+ + "This should never occur, please open a new issue and include details about the architecture.", body) + }) } - p.info.addr = netip.AddrFrom4(ip) } } if hdr.Level == unix.IPPROTO_IPV6 { switch hdr.Type { case unix.IPV6_TCLASS: p.ecn = protocol.ECN(body[0] & ecnMask) - case msgTypeIPv6PKTINFO: + case unix.IPV6_PKTINFO: // struct in6_pktinfo { // struct in6_addr ipi6_addr; /* src/dst IPv6 address */ // unsigned int ipi6_ifindex; /* send/recv interface index */ // }; if len(body) == 20 { - var ip [16]byte - copy(ip[:], body[:16]) - p.info.addr = netip.AddrFrom16(ip) + p.info.addr = netip.AddrFrom16(*(*[16]byte)(body[:16])) p.info.ifIndex = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(body[16:]) + } else { + invalidCmsgOnceV6.Do(func() { + log.Printf("Received invalid IPv6 packet info control message: %+x. "+ + "This should never occur, please open a new issue and include details about the architecture.", body) + }) } } } @@ -228,13 +230,6 @@ func (c *oobConn) ReadPacket() (receivedPacket, error) { return p, nil } -// WriteTo (re)implements the net.PacketConn method. -// This is needed for users who call OptimizeConn to be able to send (non-QUIC) packets on the underlying connection. -// With GSO enabled, this would otherwise not be needed, as the kernel requires the UDP_SEGMENT message to be set. -func (c *oobConn) WriteTo(p []byte, addr net.Addr) (int, error) { - return c.WritePacket(p, uint16(len(p)), addr, nil) -} - // WritePacket writes a new packet. // If the connection supports GSO (and we activated GSO support before), // it appends the UDP_SEGMENT size message to oob. diff --git a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/transport.go b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/transport.go index 5ce02d25..290b647f 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/transport.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/transport.go @@ -5,11 +5,7 @@ import ( "crypto/rand" "crypto/tls" "errors" - "log" "net" - "os" - "strconv" - "strings" "sync" "time" @@ -30,9 +26,16 @@ type Transport struct { // A single net.PacketConn can only be handled by one Transport. // Bad things will happen if passed to multiple Transports. // - // If not done by the user, the connection is passed through OptimizeConn to enable a number of optimizations. - // After passing the connection to the Transport, it's invalid to call ReadFrom on the connection. - // Calling WriteTo is only valid on the connection returned by OptimizeConn. + // A number of optimizations will be enabled if the connections implements the OOBCapablePacketConn interface, + // as a *net.UDPConn does. + // 1. It enables the Don't Fragment (DF) bit on the IP header. + // This is required to run DPLPMTUD (Path MTU Discovery, RFC 8899). + // 2. It enables reading of the ECN bits from the IP header. + // This allows the remote node to speed up its loss detection and recovery. + // 3. It uses batched syscalls (recvmmsg) to more efficiently receive packets from the socket. + // 4. It uses Generic Segmentation Offload (GSO) to efficiently send batches of packets (on Linux). + // + // After passing the connection to the Transport, it's invalid to call ReadFrom or WriteTo on the connection. Conn net.PacketConn // The length of the connection ID in bytes. @@ -103,7 +106,7 @@ func (t *Transport) Listen(tlsConf *tls.Config, conf *Config) (*Listener, error) return nil, errListenerAlreadySet } conf = populateServerConfig(conf) - if err := t.init(true); err != nil { + if err := t.init(false); err != nil { return nil, err } s, err := newServer(t.conn, t.handlerMap, t.connIDGenerator, tlsConf, conf, t.Tracer, t.closeServer, false) @@ -132,7 +135,7 @@ func (t *Transport) ListenEarly(tlsConf *tls.Config, conf *Config) (*EarlyListen return nil, errListenerAlreadySet } conf = populateServerConfig(conf) - if err := t.init(true); err != nil { + if err := t.init(false); err != nil { return nil, err } s, err := newServer(t.conn, t.handlerMap, t.connIDGenerator, tlsConf, conf, t.Tracer, t.closeServer, true) @@ -149,13 +152,15 @@ func (t *Transport) Dial(ctx context.Context, addr net.Addr, tlsConf *tls.Config return nil, err } conf = populateConfig(conf) - if err := t.init(false); err != nil { + if err := t.init(t.isSingleUse); err != nil { return nil, err } var onClose func() if t.isSingleUse { onClose = func() { t.Close() } } + tlsConf = tlsConf.Clone() + tlsConf.MinVersion = tls.VersionTLS13 return dial(ctx, newSendConn(t.conn, addr), t.connIDGenerator, t.handlerMap, tlsConf, conf, onClose, false) } @@ -165,20 +170,20 @@ func (t *Transport) DialEarly(ctx context.Context, addr net.Addr, tlsConf *tls.C return nil, err } conf = populateConfig(conf) - if err := t.init(false); err != nil { + if err := t.init(t.isSingleUse); err != nil { return nil, err } var onClose func() if t.isSingleUse { onClose = func() { t.Close() } } + tlsConf = tlsConf.Clone() + tlsConf.MinVersion = tls.VersionTLS13 return dial(ctx, newSendConn(t.conn, addr), t.connIDGenerator, t.handlerMap, tlsConf, conf, onClose, true) } -func (t *Transport) init(isServer bool) error { +func (t *Transport) init(allowZeroLengthConnIDs bool) error { t.initOnce.Do(func() { - getMultiplexer().AddConn(t.Conn) - var conn rawConn if c, ok := t.Conn.(rawConn); ok { conn = c @@ -205,19 +210,28 @@ func (t *Transport) init(isServer bool) error { t.connIDLen = t.ConnectionIDGenerator.ConnectionIDLen() } else { connIDLen := t.ConnectionIDLength - if t.ConnectionIDLength == 0 && (!t.isSingleUse || isServer) { + if t.ConnectionIDLength == 0 && !allowZeroLengthConnIDs { connIDLen = protocol.DefaultConnectionIDLength } t.connIDLen = connIDLen t.connIDGenerator = &protocol.DefaultConnectionIDGenerator{ConnLen: t.connIDLen} } + getMultiplexer().AddConn(t.Conn) go t.listen(conn) go t.runSendQueue() }) return t.initErr } +// WriteTo sends a packet on the underlying connection. +func (t *Transport) WriteTo(b []byte, addr net.Addr) (int, error) { + if err := t.init(false); err != nil { + return 0, err + } + return t.conn.WritePacket(b, uint16(len(b)), addr, nil) +} + func (t *Transport) enqueueClosePacket(p closePacket) { select { case t.closeQueue <- p: @@ -299,27 +313,6 @@ func (t *Transport) listen(conn rawConn) { defer close(t.listening) defer getMultiplexer().RemoveConn(t.Conn) - if err := setReceiveBuffer(t.Conn, t.logger); err != nil { - if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "use of closed network connection") { - setBufferWarningOnce.Do(func() { - if disable, _ := strconv.ParseBool(os.Getenv("QUIC_GO_DISABLE_RECEIVE_BUFFER_WARNING")); disable { - return - } - log.Printf("%s. See https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/wiki/UDP-Buffer-Sizes for details.", err) - }) - } - } - if err := setSendBuffer(t.Conn, t.logger); err != nil { - if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "use of closed network connection") { - setBufferWarningOnce.Do(func() { - if disable, _ := strconv.ParseBool(os.Getenv("QUIC_GO_DISABLE_RECEIVE_BUFFER_WARNING")); disable { - return - } - log.Printf("%s. See https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/wiki/UDP-Buffer-Sizes for details.", err) - }) - } - } - for { p, err := conn.ReadPacket() //nolint:staticcheck // SA1019 ignore this! @@ -337,6 +330,10 @@ func (t *Transport) listen(conn rawConn) { continue } if err != nil { + // Windows returns an error when receiving a UDP datagram that doesn't fit into the provided buffer. + if isRecvMsgSizeErr(err) { + continue + } t.close(err) return } diff --git a/vendor/modules.txt b/vendor/modules.txt index 29b87d48..5931f32c 100644 --- a/vendor/modules.txt +++ b/vendor/modules.txt @@ -106,14 +106,11 @@ github.com/powerman/deepequal # github.com/quic-go/qpack v0.4.0 ## explicit; go 1.18 github.com/quic-go/qpack -# github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19 v0.3.2 -## explicit; go 1.19 -github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-19 -# github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20 v0.2.2 +# github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20 v0.3.0 ## explicit; go 1.20 github.com/quic-go/qtls-go1-20 -# github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.36.1 -## explicit; go 1.19 +# github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.37.0 +## explicit; go 1.20 github.com/quic-go/quic-go github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3 github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/ackhandler