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Use `interface{}` for backwards compatibility
This commit is contained in:
Gaukas Wang 2022-09-13 15:12:57 -06:00
parent 25e8029abf
commit 21225f20e5
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9 changed files with 55 additions and 54 deletions
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63
cipher_suites.go
View file

@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ type cipherSuite struct {
ka func(version uint16) keyAgreement
// flags is a bitmask of the suite* values, above.
flags int
cipher func(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any
cipher func(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) interface{}
mac func(key []byte) hash.Hash
aead func(key, fixedNonce []byte) aead
}
@ -218,57 +218,56 @@ var cipherSuitesTLS13 = []*cipherSuiteTLS13{ // TODO: replace with a map.
//
// - Anything else comes before RC4
//
// RC4 has practically exploitable biases. See https://www.rc4nomore.com.
// RC4 has practically exploitable biases. See https://www.rc4nomore.com.
//
// - Anything else comes before CBC_SHA256
//
// SHA-256 variants of the CBC ciphersuites don't implement any Lucky13
// countermeasures. See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/Lucky13.html and
// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html.
// SHA-256 variants of the CBC ciphersuites don't implement any Lucky13
// countermeasures. See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/Lucky13.html and
// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html.
//
// - Anything else comes before 3DES
//
// 3DES has 64-bit blocks, which makes it fundamentally susceptible to
// birthday attacks. See https://sweet32.info.
// 3DES has 64-bit blocks, which makes it fundamentally susceptible to
// birthday attacks. See https://sweet32.info.
//
// - ECDHE comes before anything else
//
// Once we got the broken stuff out of the way, the most important
// property a cipher suite can have is forward secrecy. We don't
// implement FFDHE, so that means ECDHE.
// Once we got the broken stuff out of the way, the most important
// property a cipher suite can have is forward secrecy. We don't
// implement FFDHE, so that means ECDHE.
//
// - AEADs come before CBC ciphers
//
// Even with Lucky13 countermeasures, MAC-then-Encrypt CBC cipher suites
// are fundamentally fragile, and suffered from an endless sequence of
// padding oracle attacks. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1129,
// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/12/08/poodleagain.html, and
// https://blog.cloudflare.com/yet-another-padding-oracle-in-openssl-cbc-ciphersuites/.
// Even with Lucky13 countermeasures, MAC-then-Encrypt CBC cipher suites
// are fundamentally fragile, and suffered from an endless sequence of
// padding oracle attacks. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1129,
// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/12/08/poodleagain.html, and
// https://blog.cloudflare.com/yet-another-padding-oracle-in-openssl-cbc-ciphersuites/.
//
// - AES comes before ChaCha20
//
// When AES hardware is available, AES-128-GCM and AES-256-GCM are faster
// than ChaCha20Poly1305.
// When AES hardware is available, AES-128-GCM and AES-256-GCM are faster
// than ChaCha20Poly1305.
//
// When AES hardware is not available, AES-128-GCM is one or more of: much
// slower, way more complex, and less safe (because not constant time)
// than ChaCha20Poly1305.
// When AES hardware is not available, AES-128-GCM is one or more of: much
// slower, way more complex, and less safe (because not constant time)
// than ChaCha20Poly1305.
//
// We use this list if we think both peers have AES hardware, and
// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES otherwise.
// We use this list if we think both peers have AES hardware, and
// cipherSuitesPreferenceOrderNoAES otherwise.
//
// - AES-128 comes before AES-256
//
// The only potential advantages of AES-256 are better multi-target
// margins, and hypothetical post-quantum properties. Neither apply to
// TLS, and AES-256 is slower due to its four extra rounds (which don't
// contribute to the advantages above).
// The only potential advantages of AES-256 are better multi-target
// margins, and hypothetical post-quantum properties. Neither apply to
// TLS, and AES-256 is slower due to its four extra rounds (which don't
// contribute to the advantages above).
//
// - ECDSA comes before RSA
//
// The relative order of ECDSA and RSA cipher suites doesn't matter,
// as they depend on the certificate. Pick one to get a stable order.
//
// The relative order of ECDSA and RSA cipher suites doesn't matter,
// as they depend on the certificate. Pick one to get a stable order.
var cipherSuitesPreferenceOrder = []uint16{
// AEADs w/ ECDHE
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
@ -400,12 +399,12 @@ func aesgcmPreferred(ciphers []uint16) bool {
return false
}
func cipherRC4(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
func cipherRC4(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) interface{} {
cipher, _ := rc4.NewCipher(key)
return cipher
}
func cipher3DES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
func cipher3DES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) interface{} {
block, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(key)
if isRead {
return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv)
@ -413,7 +412,7 @@ func cipher3DES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv)
}
func cipherAES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) any {
func cipherAES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) interface{} {
block, _ := aes.NewCipher(key)
if isRead {
return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv)

2
common.go
View file

@ -1467,7 +1467,7 @@ func defaultConfig() *Config {
return &emptyConfig
}
func unexpectedMessageError(wanted, got any) error {
func unexpectedMessageError(wanted, got interface{}) error {
return fmt.Errorf("tls: received unexpected handshake message of type %T when waiting for %T", got, wanted)
}

22
conn.go
View file

@ -164,16 +164,16 @@ func (c *Conn) NetConn() net.Conn {
type halfConn struct {
sync.Mutex
err error // first permanent error
version uint16 // protocol version
cipher any // cipher algorithm
err error // first permanent error
version uint16 // protocol version
cipher interface{} // cipher algorithm
mac hash.Hash
seq [8]byte // 64-bit sequence number
scratchBuf [13]byte // to avoid allocs; interface method args escape
nextCipher any // next encryption state
nextMac hash.Hash // next MAC algorithm
nextCipher interface{} // next encryption state
nextMac hash.Hash // next MAC algorithm
trafficSecret []byte // current TLS 1.3 traffic secret
}
@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ func (hc *halfConn) setErrorLocked(err error) error {
// prepareCipherSpec sets the encryption and MAC states
// that a subsequent changeCipherSpec will use.
func (hc *halfConn) prepareCipherSpec(version uint16, cipher any, mac hash.Hash) {
func (hc *halfConn) prepareCipherSpec(version uint16, cipher interface{}, mac hash.Hash) {
hc.version = version
hc.nextCipher = cipher
hc.nextMac = mac
@ -588,12 +588,14 @@ func (c *Conn) readChangeCipherSpec() error {
// readRecordOrCCS reads one or more TLS records from the connection and
// updates the record layer state. Some invariants:
// * c.in must be locked
// * c.input must be empty
// - c.in must be locked
// - c.input must be empty
//
// During the handshake one and only one of the following will happen:
// - c.hand grows
// - c.in.changeCipherSpec is called
// - an error is returned
//
// After the handshake one and only one of the following will happen:
// - c.hand grows
// - c.input is set
@ -936,7 +938,7 @@ func (c *Conn) flush() (int, error) {
// outBufPool pools the record-sized scratch buffers used by writeRecordLocked.
var outBufPool = sync.Pool{
New: func() any {
New: func() interface{} {
return new([]byte)
},
}
@ -1012,7 +1014,7 @@ func (c *Conn) writeRecord(typ recordType, data []byte) (int, error) {
// readHandshake reads the next handshake message from
// the record layer.
func (c *Conn) readHandshake() (any, error) {
func (c *Conn) readHandshake() (interface{}, error) {
for c.hand.Len() < 4 {
if err := c.readRecord(); err != nil {
return nil, err

4
generate_cert.go
View file

@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ var (
ed25519Key = flag.Bool("ed25519", false, "Generate an Ed25519 key")
)
func publicKey(priv any) any {
func publicKey(priv interface{}) interface{} {
switch k := priv.(type) {
case *rsa.PrivateKey:
return &k.PublicKey
@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ func main() {
log.Fatalf("Missing required --host parameter")
}
var priv any
var priv interface{}
var err error
switch *ecdsaCurve {
case "":

2
handshake_client.go
View file

@ -663,7 +663,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) establishKeys() error {
clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen)
var clientCipher, serverCipher any
var clientCipher, serverCipher interface{}
var clientHash, serverHash hash.Hash
if hs.suite.cipher != nil {
clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, false /* not for reading */)

4
handshake_client_test.go
View file

@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ type clientTest struct {
cert []byte
// key, if not nil, contains either a *rsa.PrivateKey, ed25519.PrivateKey or
// *ecdsa.PrivateKey which is the private key for the reference server.
key any
key interface{}
// extensions, if not nil, contains a list of extension data to be returned
// from the ServerHello. The data should be in standard TLS format with
// a 2-byte uint16 type, 2-byte data length, followed by the extension data.
@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ func (test *clientTest) connFromCommand() (conn *recordingConn, child *exec.Cmd,
certPath := tempFile(string(cert))
defer os.Remove(certPath)
var key any = testRSAPrivateKey
var key interface{} = testRSAPrivateKey
if test.key != nil {
key = test.key
}

4
handshake_messages_test.go
View file

@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import (
"time"
)
var tests = []any{
var tests = []interface{}{
&clientHelloMsg{},
&serverHelloMsg{},
&finishedMsg{},
@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ func TestMarshalUnmarshal(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("#%d failed to unmarshal %#v %x", i, m1, marshaled)
break
}
m2.marshal() // to fill any marshal cache in the message
m2.marshal() // to fill interface{} marshal cache in the message
if !reflect.DeepEqual(m1, m2) {
t.Errorf("#%d got:%#v want:%#v %x", i, m2, m1, marshaled)

2
handshake_server.go
View file

@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) establishKeys() error {
clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen)
var clientCipher, serverCipher any
var clientCipher, serverCipher interface{}
var clientHash, serverHash hash.Hash
if hs.suite.aead == nil {

6
handshake_server_test.go
View file

@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ func TestTLS12OnlyCipherSuites(t *testing.T) {
}
c, s := localPipe(t)
replyChan := make(chan any)
replyChan := make(chan interface{})
go func() {
cli := Client(c, testConfig)
cli.vers = clientHello.vers
@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ func TestTLSPointFormats(t *testing.T) {
}
c, s := localPipe(t)
replyChan := make(chan any)
replyChan := make(chan interface{})
go func() {
cli := Client(c, testConfig)
cli.vers = clientHello.vers
@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ func (test *serverTest) connFromCommand() (conn *recordingConn, child *exec.Cmd,
return nil, nil, err
}
connChan := make(chan any, 1)
connChan := make(chan interface{}, 1)
go func() {
tcpConn, err := l.Accept()
if err != nil {