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crypto/tls: add support for Ed25519 certificates in TLS 1.2 and 1.3
Support for Ed25519 certificates was added in CL 175478, this wires them up into the TLS stack according to RFC 8422 (TLS 1.2) and RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3). RFC 8422 also specifies support for TLS 1.0 and 1.1, and I initially implemented that, but even OpenSSL doesn't take the complexity, so I just dropped it. It would have required keeping a buffer of the handshake transcript in order to do the direct Ed25519 signatures. We effectively need to support TLS 1.2 because it shares ClientHello signature algorithms with TLS 1.3. While at it, reordered the advertised signature algorithms in the rough order we would want to use them, also based on what curves have fast constant-time implementations. Client and client auth tests changed because of the change in advertised signature algorithms in ClientHello and CertificateRequest. Fixes #25355 Change-Id: I9fdd839afde4fd6b13fcbc5cc7017fd8c35085ee Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/177698 Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
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84 changed files with 4977 additions and 3938 deletions
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@ -43,11 +43,11 @@ const (
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// client indicates that it supports ECC with a curve and point format
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// that we're happy with.
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suiteECDHE = 1 << iota
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// suiteECDSA indicates that the cipher suite involves an ECDSA
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// signature and therefore may only be selected when the server's
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// certificate is ECDSA. If this is not set then the cipher suite is
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// RSA based.
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suiteECDSA
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// suiteECSign indicates that the cipher suite involves an ECDSA or
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// EdDSA signature and therefore may only be selected when the server's
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// certificate is ECDSA or EdDSA. If this is not set then the cipher suite
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// is RSA based.
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suiteECSign
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// suiteTLS12 indicates that the cipher suite should only be advertised
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// and accepted when using TLS 1.2.
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suiteTLS12
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@ -78,17 +78,17 @@ var cipherSuites = []*cipherSuite{
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// Ciphersuite order is chosen so that ECDHE comes before plain RSA and
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// AEADs are the top preference.
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12 | suiteDefaultOff, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA | suiteTLS12 | suiteDefaultOff, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12 | suiteDefaultOff, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, rsaKA, suiteTLS12 | suiteDefaultOff, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil},
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@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ var cipherSuites = []*cipherSuite{
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// RC4-based cipher suites are disabled by default.
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{TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, rsaKA, suiteDefaultOff, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteDefaultOff, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA | suiteDefaultOff, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
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{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteDefaultOff, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
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}
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// A cipherSuiteTLS13 defines only the pair of the AEAD algorithm and hash
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