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uTLS: X25519Kyber768Draft00 hybrid post-quantum key agreement by cloudflare/go (#222)
* crypto/tls: Add hybrid post-quantum key agreement (#13) * import: client-side KEM from cloudflare/go * import: server-side KEM from cloudflare/go * fix: modify test to get rid of CFEvents. Note: uTLS does not promise any server-side functionality, and this change is made to be able to conduct unit tests which requires both side to be able to handle KEM Curves. Co-authored-by: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> Co-Authored-By: Bas Westerbaan <bas@westerbaan.name> ---- Based on: * crypto/tls: Add hybrid post-quantum key agreement Adds X25519Kyber512Draft00, X25519Kyber768Draft00, and P256Kyber768Draft00 hybrid post-quantum key agreements with temporary group identifiers. The hybrid post-quantum key exchanges uses plain X{25519,448} instead of HPKE, which we assume will be more likely to be adopted. The order is chosen to match CECPQ2. Not enabled by default. Adds CFEvents to detect `HelloRetryRequest`s and to signal which key agreement was used. Co-authored-by: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net> [bas, 1.20.1: also adds P256Kyber768Draft00] [pwu, 1.20.4: updated circl to v1.3.3, moved code to cfevent.go] * crypto: add support for CIRCL signature schemes * only partially port the commit from cloudflare/go. We would stick to the official x509 at the cost of incompatibility. Co-Authored-By: Bas Westerbaan <bas@westerbaan.name> Co-Authored-By: Christopher Patton <3453007+cjpatton@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl> * crypto/tls: add new X25519Kyber768Draft00 code point Ported from cloudflare/go to support the upcoming new post-quantum keyshare. ---- * Point tls.X25519Kyber768Draft00 to the new 0x6399 identifier while the old 0xfe31 identifier is available as tls.X25519Kyber768Draft00Old. * Make sure that the kem.PrivateKey can always be mapped to the CurveID that was linked to it. This is needed since we now have two ID aliasing to the same scheme, and clients need to be able to detect whether the key share presented by the server actually matches the key share that the client originally sent. * Update tests, add the new identifier and remove unnecessary code. Link: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/HAWpNpgptl--UZNSYuvsjB-Pc2k/ Link: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tls-westerbaan-xyber768d00/02/ Co-Authored-By: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl> Co-Authored-By: Bas Westerbaan <bas@westerbaan.name> --------- Co-authored-by: Bas Westerbaan <bas@westerbaan.name> Co-authored-by: Christopher Patton <3453007+cjpatton@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
This commit is contained in:
Gaukas Wang
parent
2078e0ca41
commit
6c1a910019
19 changed files with 590 additions and 77 deletions
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@ -35,17 +35,19 @@ func (keymap KeySharesEcdheParameters) GetPublicEcdheParams(curveID CurveID) (pa
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// [uTLS SECTION END]
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type clientHandshakeStateTLS13 struct {
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c *Conn
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ctx context.Context
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serverHello *serverHelloMsg
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hello *clientHelloMsg
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ecdheKey *ecdh.PrivateKey
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c *Conn
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ctx context.Context
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serverHello *serverHelloMsg
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hello *clientHelloMsg
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ecdheKey *ecdh.PrivateKey
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keySharesEcdheParams KeySharesEcdheParameters // [uTLS]
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kemKey *kemPrivateKey // [uTLS]
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// keySharesCirclParams KeySharesCirclParameters // [uTLS] TODO: perhaps implement?
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session *SessionState
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earlySecret []byte
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binderKey []byte
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session *SessionState
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earlySecret []byte
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binderKey []byte
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selectedGroup CurveID
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certReq *certificateRequestMsgTLS13
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usingPSK bool
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@ -83,7 +85,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
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// [uTLS SECTION END]
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// Consistency check on the presence of a keyShare and its parameters.
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if hs.ecdheKey == nil || len(hs.hello.keyShares) < 1 { // [uTLS]
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if (hs.ecdheKey == nil && hs.kemKey == nil) || len(hs.hello.keyShares) < 1 { // [uTLS]
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// keyshares "< 1" instead of "!= 1", as uTLS may send multiple
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return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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}
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@ -268,21 +270,55 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processHelloRetryRequest() error {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported group")
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}
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if sentID, _ := curveIDForCurve(hs.ecdheKey.Curve()); sentID == curveID {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: server sent an unnecessary HelloRetryRequest key_share")
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}
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if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); !ok {
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// [UTLS SECTION BEGINS]
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// ported from cloudflare/go, slightly modified to maintain compatibility with crypto/tls upstream
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if hs.ecdheKey != nil {
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if sentID, _ := curveIDForCurve(hs.ecdheKey.Curve()); sentID == curveID {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: server sent an unnecessary HelloRetryRequest key_share")
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}
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} else if hs.kemKey != nil {
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if clientKeySharePrivateCurveID(hs.kemKey) == curveID {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: server sent an unnecessary HelloRetryRequest key_share")
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}
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} else {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve")
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return errors.New("tls: ecdheKey and kemKey are both nil")
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}
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key, err := generateECDHEKey(c.config.rand(), curveID)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return err
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if scheme := curveIdToCirclScheme(curveID); scheme != nil {
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pk, sk, err := generateKemKeyPair(scheme, curveID, c.config.rand())
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return fmt.Errorf("HRR generateKemKeyPair %s: %w",
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scheme.Name(), err)
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}
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packedPk, err := pk.MarshalBinary()
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return fmt.Errorf("HRR pack circl public key %s: %w",
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scheme.Name(), err)
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}
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hs.kemKey = sk
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hs.ecdheKey = nil // unset ecdheKey if any
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hs.hello.keyShares = []keyShare{{group: curveID, data: packedPk}}
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} else {
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if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve")
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}
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key, err := generateECDHEKey(c.config.rand(), curveID)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return err
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}
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hs.ecdheKey = key
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hs.kemKey = nil // unset kemKey if any
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hs.hello.keyShares = []keyShare{{group: curveID, data: key.PublicKey().Bytes()}}
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}
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hs.ecdheKey = key
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hs.hello.keyShares = []keyShare{{group: curveID, data: key.PublicKey().Bytes()}}
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// [UTLS SECTION ENDS]
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}
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hs.hello.raw = nil
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@ -430,9 +466,19 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processServerHello() error {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: server did not send a key share")
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}
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if sentID, _ := curveIDForCurve(hs.ecdheKey.Curve()); hs.serverHello.serverShare.group != sentID {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported group")
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if hs.ecdheKey != nil {
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if sentID, _ := curveIDForCurve(hs.ecdheKey.Curve()); hs.serverHello.serverShare.group != sentID {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported group")
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}
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} else if hs.kemKey != nil {
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if clientKeySharePrivateCurveID(hs.kemKey) != hs.serverHello.serverShare.group {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported group")
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}
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} else {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return errors.New("tls: ecdheKey and kemKey are both nil")
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}
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if !hs.serverHello.selectedIdentityPresent {
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@ -469,16 +515,34 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processServerHello() error {
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func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) establishHandshakeKeys() error {
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c := hs.c
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peerKey, err := hs.ecdheKey.Curve().NewPublicKey(hs.serverHello.serverShare.data)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: invalid server key share")
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}
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sharedKey, err := hs.ecdheKey.ECDH(peerKey)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: invalid server key share")
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// [UTLS SECTION BEGINS]
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// ported from cloudflare/go, slightly modified to maintain compatibility with crypto/tls upstream
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var sharedKey []byte
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var err error
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if hs.ecdheKey != nil {
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peerKey, err := hs.ecdheKey.Curve().NewPublicKey(hs.serverHello.serverShare.data)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: invalid server key share")
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}
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sharedKey, err = hs.ecdheKey.ECDH(peerKey)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: invalid server key share")
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}
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} else if hs.kemKey != nil {
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sk := hs.kemKey.secretKey
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sharedKey, err = sk.Scheme().Decapsulate(sk, hs.serverHello.serverShare.data)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return fmt.Errorf("%s decaps: %w", sk.Scheme().Name(), err)
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}
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} else {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return errors.New("tls: ecdheKey and circlKey are both nil")
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}
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// [UTLS SECTION ENDS]
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earlySecret := hs.earlySecret
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if !hs.usingPSK {
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@ -680,7 +744,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerCertificate() error {
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}
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// See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3.
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if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, supportedSignatureAlgorithms()) {
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if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, c.config.supportedSignatureAlgorithms()) { // [UTLS] ported from cloudflare/go
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
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}
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