Adds support for server-side ECH.
We make a couple of implementation decisions that are not completely
in-line with the spec. In particular, we don't enforce that the SNI
matches the ECHConfig public_name, and we implement a hybrid
shared/backend mode (rather than shared or split mode, as described in
Section 7). Both of these match the behavior of BoringSSL.
The hybrid server mode will either act as a shared mode server, where-in
the server accepts "outer" client hellos and unwraps them before
processing the "inner" hello, or accepts bare "inner" hellos initially.
This lets the server operate either transparently as a shared mode
server, or a backend server, in Section 7 terminology. This seems like
the best implementation choice for a TLS library.
Fixes#68500
Change-Id: Ife69db7c1886610742e95e76b0ca92587e6d7ed4
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/623576
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
Auto-Submit: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
This enables JA3 and JA4 TLS fingerprinting to be implemented from
the GetCertificate callback, similar to what BoringSSL provides with
its SSL_CTX_set_dos_protection_cb hook.
fixes#32936
Change-Id: Idb54ebcb43075582fcef0ac6438727f494543424
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/471396
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
This CL adds a (very opinionated) client-side ECH implementation.
In particular, if a user configures a ECHConfigList, by setting the
Config.EncryptedClientHelloConfigList, but we determine that none of
the configs are appropriate, we will not fallback to plaintext SNI, and
will instead return an error. It is then up to the user to decide if
they wish to fallback to plaintext themselves (by removing the config
list).
Additionally if Config.EncryptedClientHelloConfigList is provided, we
will not offer TLS support lower than 1.3, since negotiating any other
version, while offering ECH, is a hard error anyway. Similarly, if a
user wishes to fallback to plaintext SNI by using 1.2, they may do so
by removing the config list.
With regard to PSK GREASE, we match the boringssl behavior, which does
not include PSK identities/binders in the outer hello when doing ECH.
If the server rejects ECH, we will return a ECHRejectionError error,
which, if provided by the server, will contain a ECHConfigList in the
RetryConfigList field containing configs that should be used if the user
wishes to retry. It is up to the user to replace their existing
Config.EncryptedClientHelloConfigList with the retry config list.
Fixes#63369
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.golang.try:gotip-linux-amd64-longtest
Change-Id: I9bc373c044064221a647a388ac61624efd6bbdbf
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/578575
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Than McIntosh <thanm@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
We used to inconsistently run certificate verification on the server on
resumption, but not on the client. This made TLS 1.3 resumption pretty
much useless, as it didn't save bytes, CPU, or round-trips.
This requires serializing the verified chains into the session ticket,
so it's a tradeoff making the ticket bigger to save computation (and for
consistency).
The previous behavior also had a "stickyness" issue: if a ticket
contained invalid certificates, they would be used even if the client
had in the meantime configured valid certificates for a full handshake.
We also didn't check expiration on the client side on resumption if
InsecureSkipVerify was set. Again for consistency, we do that now.
Also, we used to run VerifyPeerCertificates on resumption even if
NoClientCerts was set.
Fixes#31641
Change-Id: Icc88269ea4adb544fa81158114aae76f3c91a15f
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/497895
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
All OpenSSL tests now test operation with EMS. To test a handshake
*without* EMS we need to pass -Options=-ExtendedMasterSecret which is
only available in OpenSSL 3.1, which breaks a number of other tests.
Updates #43922
Change-Id: Ib9ac79a1d03fab6bfba5fe9cd66689cff661cda7
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/497376
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
This can be used by applications to store additional data in a session.
Fixes#57753
For #60105
Change-Id: Ib42387ad64750fa8dbbdf51de5e9c86378bef0ee
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/496822
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Dempsky <mdempsky@google.com>
Another internal change, that allows exposing the new APIs easily in
following CLs.
For #60105
Change-Id: I9c61b9f6e9d29af633f952444f514bcbbe82fe4e
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/496819
Reviewed-by: Matthew Dempsky <mdempsky@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
This change by itself is useless, because the application has no way to
access or provide SessionStates to crypto/tls, but they will be provided
in following CLs.
For #60105
Change-Id: I8d5de79b1eda0a778420134cf6f346246a1bb296
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/496818
Reviewed-by: Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Dempsky <mdempsky@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Add a QUICConn type for use by QUIC implementations.
A QUICConn provides unencrypted handshake bytes and connection
secrets to the QUIC layer, and receives handshake bytes.
For #44886
Change-Id: I859dda4cc6d466a1df2fb863a69d3a2a069110d5
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/493655
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Dempsky <mdempsky@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>
Message marshalling makes use of BytesOrPanic a lot, under the
assumption that it will never panic. This assumption was incorrect, and
specifically crafted handshakes could trigger panics. Rather than just
surgically replacing the usages of BytesOrPanic in paths that could
panic, replace all usages of it with proper error returns in case there
are other ways of triggering panics which we didn't find.
In one specific case, the tree routed by expandLabel, we replace the
usage of BytesOrPanic, but retain a panic. This function already
explicitly panicked elsewhere, and returning an error from it becomes
rather painful because it requires changing a large number of APIs.
The marshalling is unlikely to ever panic, as the inputs are all either
fixed length, or already limited to the sizes required. If it were to
panic, it'd likely only be during development. A close inspection shows
no paths for a user to cause a panic currently.
This patches ends up being rather large, since it requires routing
errors back through functions which previously had no error returns.
Where possible I've tried to use helpers that reduce the verbosity
of frequently repeated stanzas, and to make the diffs as minimal as
possible.
Thanks to Marten Seemann for reporting this issue.
Fixes#58001
Fixes CVE-2022-41724
Change-Id: Ieb55867ef0a3e1e867b33f09421932510cb58851
Reviewed-on: 1679436
Reviewed-by: Julie Qiu <julieqiu@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Security TryBots <security-trybots@go-security-trybots.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/468125
Run-TryBot: Michael Pratt <mpratt@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Than McIntosh <thanm@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Michael Pratt <mpratt@google.com>
Does what it says on the tin.
Fixes#51088
Change-Id: I12c0fa6bba1c1ce96c1ad31ba387c77a93f801c9
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/384894
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
And then revert the bootstrap cmd directories and certain testdata.
And adjust tests as needed.
Not reverting the changes in std that are bootstrapped,
because some of those changes would appear in API docs,
and we want to use any consistently.
Instead, rewrite 'any' to 'interface{}' in cmd/dist for those directories
when preparing the bootstrap copy.
A few files changed as a result of running gofmt -w
not because of interface{} -> any but because they
hadn't been updated for the new //go:build lines.
Fixes#49884.
Change-Id: Ie8045cba995f65bd79c694ec77a1b3d1fe01bb09
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/368254
Trust: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Griesemer <gri@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Also encode the certificates in a way that's more
consistent with TLS 1.3 (with a 24 byte length prefix).
Note that this will have an additional performance cost
requiring clients to do a full handshake every 7 days
where previously they were able to use the same ticket
indefinitely.
Updates #25256
Change-Id: Ic4d1ba0d92773c490b33b5f6c1320d557cc7347d
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/231317
Run-TryBot: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Signing-side signature algorithm selection moved to
selectSignatureScheme, so add FIPS logic there.
Change-Id: I827e7296d01ecfd36072e2139e74603ef42c6b24
Follow the recommandation from RFC 8422, section 5.1.2 of sending back the
ec_points_format extension when requested by the client. This is to fix
some clients declining the handshake if omitted.
Fixes#31943
Change-Id: I7b04dbac6f9af75cda094073defe081e1e9a295d
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/176418
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Olivier Poitrey <rs@rhapsodyk.net>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Note that the SignatureSchemes passed to GetClientCertificate in TLS 1.2
are now filtered by the requested certificate type. This feels like an
improvement anyway, and the full list can be surfaced as well when
support for signature_algorithms_cert is added, which actually matches
the semantics of the CertificateRequest signature_algorithms in TLS 1.2.
Also, note a subtle behavior change in server side resumption: if a
certificate is requested but not required, and the resumed session did
not include one, it used not to invoke VerifyPeerCertificate. However,
if the resumed session did include a certificate, it would. (If a
certificate was required but not in the session, the session is rejected
in checkForResumption.) This inconsistency could be unexpected, even
dangerous, so now VerifyPeerCertificate is always invoked. Still not
consistent with the client behavior, which does not ever invoke
VerifyPeerCertificate on resumption, but it felt too surprising to
entirely change either.
Updates #9671
Change-Id: Ib2b0dbc30e659208dca3ac07d6c687a407d7aaaf
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/147599
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Added some assertions to testHandshake, but avoided checking the error
of one of the Close() because the one that would lose the race would
write the closeNotify to a connection closed on the other side which is
broken on js/wasm (#28650). Moved that Close() after the chan sync to
ensure it happens second.
Accepting a ticket with client certificates when NoClientCert is
configured is probably not a problem, and we could hide them to avoid
confusing the application, but the current behavior is to skip the
ticket, and I'd rather keep behavior changes to a minimum.
Updates #9671
Change-Id: I93b56e44ddfe3d48c2bef52c83285ba2f46f297a
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/147445
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Note that there is significant code duplication due to extensions with
the same format appearing in different messages in TLS 1.3. This will be
cleaned up in a future refactor once CL 145317 is merged.
Enforcing the presence/absence of each extension in each message is left
to the upper layer, based on both protocol version and extensions
advertised in CH and CR. Duplicated extensions and unknown extensions in
SH, EE, HRR, and CT will be tightened up in a future CL.
The TLS 1.2 CertificateStatus message was restricted to accepting only
type OCSP as any other type (none of which are specified so far) would
have to be negotiated.
Updates #9671
Change-Id: I7c42394c5cc0af01faa84b9b9f25fdc6e7cfbb9e
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/145477
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
As a first round, rewrite those handshake message types which can be
reused in TLS 1.3 with golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte. All other types
changed significantly in TLS 1.3 and will require separate
implementations. They will be ported to cryptobyte in a later CL.
The only semantic changes should be enforcing the random length on the
marshaling side, enforcing a couple more "must not be empty" on the
unmarshaling side, and checking the rest of the SNI list even if we only
take the first.
Change-Id: Idd2ced60c558fafcf02ee489195b6f3b4735fe22
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/144115
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
The equal methods were only there for testing, and I remember regularly
getting them wrong while developing tls-tris. Replace them with simple
reflect.DeepEqual calls.
The only special thing that equal() would do is ignore the difference
between a nil and a zero-length slice. Fixed the Generate methods so
that they create the same value that unmarshal will decode. The
difference is not important: it wasn't tested, all checks are
"len(slice) > 0", and all cases in which presence matters are
accompanied by a boolean.
Change-Id: Iaabf56ea17c2406b5107c808c32f6c85b611aaa8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/144114
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Use the format "RFC XXXX, Section X.X" (or "Appendix Y.X") as it fits
more properly in prose than a link, is more future-proof, and as there
are multiple ways to render an RFC. Capital "S" to follow the quoting
standard of RFCs themselves.
Applied the new goimports grouping to all files in those packages, too.
Change-Id: I01267bb3a3b02664f8f822e97b129075bb14d404
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/141918
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@golang.org>
According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3, the SCT
must be at least one byte long. The parsing code correctly checks for
this condition, but rarely the test does generate an empty SCT.
Change-Id: If36a34985b4470a5a9f96affc159195c04f6bfad
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/129755
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
This is a git merge of master into dev.boringcrypto.
The branch was previously based on release-branch.go1.9,
so there are a handful of spurious conflicts that would
also arise if trying to merge master into release-branch.go1.9
(which we never do). Those have all been resolved by taking
the original file from master, discarding any Go 1.9-specific
edits.
all.bash passes on darwin/amd64, which is to say without
actually using BoringCrypto.
Go 1.10-related fixes to BoringCrypto itself will be in a followup CL.
This CL is just the merge.
Change-Id: I4c97711fec0fb86761913dcde28d25c001246c35
Consolidate the signature and hash fields (SignatureAndHashAlgorithm in
TLS 1.2) into a single uint16 (SignatureScheme in TLS 1.3 draft 21).
This makes it easier to add RSASSA-PSS for TLS 1.2 in the future.
Fields were named like "signatureAlgorithm" rather than
"signatureScheme" since that name is also used throughout the 1.3 draft.
The only new public symbol is ECDSAWithSHA1, other than that this is an
internal change with no new functionality.
Change-Id: Iba63d262ab1af895420583ac9e302d9705a7e0f0
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/62210
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
It was causing mysterious fuzzing failure because it affects the
unmarshaling of the secureNegotiationSupported field.
Change-Id: Id396b84eab90a3b22fb6e306b10bdd7e39707012
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/60912
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <hi@filippo.io>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
SNI values may not include a trailing dot according to
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-3. Although crypto/tls
handled this correctly as a client, it didn't reject this as a server.
This change makes sending an SNI value with a trailing dot a fatal
error.
Updates #18114.
Change-Id: Ib7897ab40e98d4a7a4646ff8469a55233621f631
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/33904
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
The SignedCertificateTimestampList[1] specifies that both the list and
each element must not be empty. Checking that the list is not empty was
handled in [2] and this change checks that the SCTs themselves are not
zero-length.
[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3
[2] https://golang.org/cl/33265
Change-Id: Iabaae7a15f6d111eb079e5086e0bd2005fae9e48
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/33355
Run-TryBot: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
When the CT extension is enabled but no SCTs are present, the existing
code calls "continue" which causes resizing the data byte slice to be
skipped. In fact, such extensions should be rejected.
Fixes#17958
Change-Id: Iad12da10d1ea72d04ae2e1012c28bb2636f06bcd
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/33265
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Prior to TLS 1.2, the handshake had a pleasing property that one could
incrementally hash it and, from that, get the needed hashes for both
the CertificateVerify and Finished messages.
TLS 1.2 introduced negotiation for the signature and hash and it became
possible for the handshake hash to be, say, SHA-384, but for the
CertificateVerify to sign the handshake with SHA-1. The problem is that
one doesn't know in advance which hashes will be needed and thus the
handshake needs to be buffered.
Go ignored this, always kept a single handshake hash, and any signatures
over the handshake had to use that hash.
However, there are a set of servers that inspect the client's offered
signature hash functions and will abort the handshake if one of the
server's certificates is signed with a hash function outside of that
set. https://robertsspaceindustries.com/ is an example of such a server.
Clearly not a lot of thought happened when that server code was written,
but its out there and we have to deal with it.
This change decouples the handshake hash from the CertificateVerify
hash. This lays the groundwork for advertising support for SHA-384 but
doesn't actually make that change in the interests of reviewability.
Updating the advertised hash functions will cause changes in many of the
testdata/ files and some errors might get lost in the noise. This change
only needs to update four testdata/ files: one because a SHA-384-based
handshake is now being signed with SHA-256 and the others because the
TLS 1.2 CertificateRequest message now includes SHA-1.
This change also has the effect of adding support for
client-certificates in SSLv3 servers. However, SSLv3 is now disabled by
default so this should be moot.
It would be possible to avoid much of this change and just support
SHA-384 for the ServerKeyExchange as the SKX only signs over the nonces
and SKX params (a design mistake in TLS). However, that would leave Go
in the odd situation where it advertised support for SHA-384, but would
only use the handshake hash when signing client certificates. I fear
that'll just cause problems in the future.
Much of this code was written by davidben@ for the purposes of testing
BoringSSL.
Partly addresses #9757
Change-Id: I5137a472b6076812af387a5a69fc62c7373cd485
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/9415
Run-TryBot: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
This change adds support for serving and receiving Signed Certificate
Timestamps as described in RFC 6962.
The server is now capable of serving SCTs listed in the Certificate
structure. The client now asks for SCTs and, if any are received,
they are exposed in the ConnectionState structure.
Fixes#10201
Change-Id: Ib3adae98cb4f173bc85cec04d2bdd3aa0fec70bb
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/8988
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Rudenberg <jonathan@titanous.com>
