Changing "man-in-the-middle" references to "machine-in-the-middle",
it's a more inclusive term and still aligns with the MITM acronym.
Change-Id: I81f954cff3d252433443f159ff9edaf59a28ab9d
GitHub-Last-Rev: 3e8f91424a207233b537984747ae90cbc1f03755
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/go#37918
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/223897
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
This CL changes some unit test functions, making sure that these tests (and goroutines spawned during test) won't block.
Since they are just test functions, I use one CL to fix them all. I hope this won't cause trouble to reviewers and can save time for us.
There are three main categories of incorrect logic fixed by this CL:
1. Use testing.Fatal()/Fatalf() in spawned goroutines, which is forbidden by Go's document.
2. Channels are used in such a way that, when errors or timeout happen, the test will be blocked and never return.
3. Channels are used in such a way that, when errors or timeout happen, the test can return but some spawned goroutines will be leaked, occupying resource until all other tests return and the process is killed.
Change-Id: I3df931ec380794a0cf1404e632c1dd57c65d63e8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/219380
Run-TryBot: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
When run as a separate program, the code in ExampleDial panicked due to
an expired certificate. Fixed this problem by replacing the expired
certificate with a valid one.
Also added a comment in the certificate to give a hint about why it
might fail in the future.
Fixes#35706
Change-Id: I3d300f7bccae050e4b73ded28b8029aa04b480bd
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/212601
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
This CL should not change the logic at all, but it took me a while to
figure out why we use these specific SignatureSchemes, so reformulate
the comment.
Change-Id: If519a58264209e6575417be07668e92ead0e772f
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/208225
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
I noticed this leak while writing CL 214977.
Change-Id: I7566952b8e4bc58939d23435aea86576fc58ddca
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/214978
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
Move the import in cipher_suites.go up where it's less likely to ever
conflict again, and remove the equivalent import from common.go, again
to reduce the likeliness of future conflicts.
Change-Id: Ib05daba7ba6ce81f665a44185b53a6e083f7c693
Updated TestBoringServerSignatureAndHash to expect RSA-PSS to work with
TLS 1.2, and hence with FIPS mode.
Change-Id: I358271b2e4804733cf61dc132fa0c5f39c2bff19
Signing-side signature algorithm selection moved to
selectSignatureScheme, so add FIPS logic there.
Change-Id: I827e7296d01ecfd36072e2139e74603ef42c6b24
The cipher suites were apparently renamed late in the standardization
process, and we picked up the legacy name. We can't remove the old
constants, but add correctly named ones.
Fixes#32061
Change-Id: I65ee25c12c10934391af88b76b18565da67453fa
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/205068
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
TLS 1.3, which requires RSA-PSS, is now enabled without a GODEBUG
opt-out, and with the introduction of
Certificate.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms (#28660) there is a
programmatic way to avoid RSA-PSS (disable TLS 1.3 with MaxVersion and
use that field to specify only PKCS#1 v1.5 SignatureSchemes).
This effectively reverts 0b3a57b5374bba3fdf88258e2be4c8be65e6a5de,
although following CL 205061 all of the signing-side logic is
conveniently centralized in signatureSchemesForCertificate.
Fixes#32425
Change-Id: I7c9a8893bb5d518d86eae7db82612b9b2cd257d7
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/205063
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
This will let applications stop crypto/tls from using a certificate key
with an algorithm that is not supported by its crypto.Signer, like
hardware backed keys that can't do RSA-PSS.
Fixes#28660
Change-Id: I294cc06bddf813fff35c5107540c4a1788e1dace
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/205062
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Now that we have a full implementation of the logic to check certificate
compatibility, we can let applications just list multiple chains in
Certificates (for example, an RSA and an ECDSA one) and choose the most
appropriate automatically.
NameToCertificate only maps each name to one chain, so simply deprecate
it, and while at it simplify its implementation by not stripping
trailing dots from the SNI (which is specified not to have any, see RFC
6066, Section 3) and by not supporting multi-level wildcards, which are
not a thing in the WebPKI (and in crypto/x509).
The performance of SupportsCertificate without Leaf is poor, but doesn't
affect current users. For now document that, and address it properly in
the next cycle. See #35504.
While cleaning up the Certificates/GetCertificate/GetConfigForClient
behavior, also support leaving Certificates/GetCertificate nil if
GetConfigForClient is set, and send unrecognized_name when there are no
available certificates.
Fixes#29139Fixes#18377
Change-Id: I26604db48806fe4d608388e55da52f34b7ca4566
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/205059
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
Also, add Version to CertificateRequestInfo, as the semantics of
SignatureSchemes change based on version: the ECDSA SignatureSchemes are
only constrained to a specific curve in TLS 1.3.
Fixes#32426
Change-Id: I7a551bea864799e98118349ac2476162893d1ffd
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/205058
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
We'll also use this function for a better selection logic from
Config.Certificates in a later CL.
Updates #32426
Change-Id: Ie239574d02eb7fd2cf025ec36721c8c7e082d0bc
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/205057
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
This refactors a lot of the certificate support logic to make it cleaner
and reusable where possible. These changes will make the following CLs
much simpler.
In particular, the heavily overloaded pickSignatureAlgorithm is gone.
That function used to cover both signing and verifying side, would work
both for pre-signature_algorithms TLS 1.0/1.1 and TLS 1.2, and returned
sigalg, type and hash.
Now, TLS 1.0/1.1 and 1.2 are differentiated at the caller, as they have
effectively completely different logic. TLS 1.0/1.1 simply use
legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey as they employ a fixed hash function and
signature algorithm for each public key type. TLS 1.2 is instead routed
through selectSignatureScheme (on the signing side) or
isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm (on the verifying side) and
typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme, like TLS 1.3.
On the signing side, signatureSchemesForCertificate was already version
aware (for PKCS#1 v1.5 vs PSS support), so selectSignatureScheme just
had to learn the Section 7.4.1.4.1 defaults for a missing
signature_algorithms to replace pickSignatureAlgorithm.
On the verifying side, pickSignatureAlgorithm was also checking the
public key type, while isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm +
typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme are not, but that check was redundant
with the one in verifyHandshakeSignature.
There should be no major change in behavior so far. A few minor changes
came from the refactor: we now correctly require signature_algorithms in
TLS 1.3 when using a certificate; we won't use Ed25519 in TLS 1.2 if the
client didn't send signature_algorithms; and we don't send
ec_points_format in the ServerHello (a compatibility measure) if we are
not doing ECDHE anyway because there are no mutually supported curves.
The tests also got simpler because they test simpler functions. The
caller logic switching between TLS 1.0/1.1 and 1.2 is tested by the
transcript tests.
Updates #32426
Change-Id: Ice9dcaea78d204718f661f8d60efdb408ba41577
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/205061
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
Setting InsecureSkipVerify and VerifyPeerCertificate is the recommended
way to customize and override certificate validation.
However, there is boilerplate involved and it usually requires first
reimplementing the default validation strategy to then customize it.
Provide an example that does the same thing as the default as a starting
point.
Examples of where we directed users to do something similar are in
issues #35467, #31791, #28754, #21971, and #24151.
Fixes#31792
Change-Id: Id033e9fa3cac9dff1f7be05c72dfb34b4f973fd4
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/193620
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Follow the recommandation from RFC 8422, section 5.1.2 of sending back the
ec_points_format extension when requested by the client. This is to fix
some clients declining the handshake if omitted.
Fixes#31943
Change-Id: I7b04dbac6f9af75cda094073defe081e1e9a295d
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/176418
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Olivier Poitrey <rs@rhapsodyk.net>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Also, fix the alert value sent when a signature by a client certificate
is invalid in TLS 1.0-1.2.
Fixes#35190
Change-Id: I2ae1d5593dfd5ee2b4d979664aec74aab4a8a704
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/204157
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
localPipe currently flakes in various crypto/tls tests. Since that
function doesn't seem to flake anywhere else, I suspect a kernel bug.
To make the test less flaky, retry the Dial if we suspect that it is
affected. (Worst case, we delay the test by a few seconds before
erroring out as usual.)
Fixes#29583
Change-Id: I357990ffa316edb471bd7d46d6404fa0884da646
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/202557
Run-TryBot: Bryan C. Mills <bcmills@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
We should keep a consistent way of formatting errors
in this file.
Fixes#34848
Change-Id: Ibb75908504f381fccab0281a42e788ef8c716b6f
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/200679
Run-TryBot: Johan Brandhorst <johan.brandhorst@gmail.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Martí <mvdan@mvdan.cc>
Use the following (suboptimal) script to obtain a list of possible
typos:
#!/usr/bin/env sh
set -x
git ls-files |\
grep -e '\.\(c\|cc\|go\)$' |\
xargs -n 1\
awk\
'/\/\// { gsub(/.*\/\//, ""); print; } /\/\*/, /\*\// { gsub(/.*\/\*/, ""); gsub(/\*\/.*/, ""); }' |\
hunspell -d en_US -l |\
grep '^[[:upper:]]\{0,1\}[[:lower:]]\{1,\}$' |\
grep -v -e '^.\{1,4\}$' -e '^.\{16,\}$' |\
sort -f |\
uniq -c |\
awk '$1 == 1 { print $2; }'
Then, go through the results manually and fix the most obvious typos in
the non-vendored code.
Change-Id: I3cb5830a176850e1a0584b8a40b47bde7b260eae
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/193848
Reviewed-by: Robert Griesemer <gri@golang.org>
SSLv3 has been irreparably broken since the POODLE attack 5 years ago
and RFC 7568 (f.k.a. draft-ietf-tls-sslv3-diediedie) prohibits its use
in no uncertain terms.
As announced in the Go 1.13 release notes, remove support for it
entirely in Go 1.14.
Updates #32716
Change-Id: Id653557961d8f75f484a01e6afd2e104a4ccceaf
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/191976
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Session resumption is not a reliable TLS behavior: the server can decide
to reject a session ticket for a number of reasons, or no reason at all.
This makes this non-hermetic test extremely brittle.
It's currently broken on the builders for both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3, and
I could reproduce the issue for TLS 1.3 only. As I was debugging it, it
started passing entirely on my machine.
In practice, it doesn't get us any coverage as resumption is already
tested with the recorded exchange tests, and TestVerifyHostname still
provides a smoke test checking that we can in fact talk TLS.
Fixes#32978
Change-Id: I63505e22ff7704f25ad700d46e4ff14850ba5d3c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/186239
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan C. Mills <bcmills@google.com>
The localPipe implementation assumes that every successful net.Dial
results in exactly one successful listener.Accept. I don't believe this
is guaranteed by essentially any operating system. For this test, we're
seeing flakes on dragonfly (#29583).
But see also #19519, flakes due to the same assumption on FreeBSD
and macOS in package net's own tests.
This CL rewrites localPipe to try a few times to get a matching pair
of connections on the dial and accept side.
Fixes#29583.
Change-Id: Idb045b18c404eae457f091df20456c5ae879a291
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/184157
Run-TryBot: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan C. Mills <bcmills@google.com>
The RFC recommends checking the X25519 output to ensure it's not the
zero value, to guard against peers trying to remove contributory
behavior.
In TLS there should be enough transcript involvement to mitigate any
attack, and the RSA key exchange would suffer from the same issues by
design, so not proposing a backport.
See #31846
Change-Id: I8e657f8ee8aa72c3f8ca3b124555202638c53f5e
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/183039
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Removed cross-dependencies between handshake_server_test.go and
handshake_client_test.go; moved all initialization to TestMain; replaced
SSLKEYLOGFILE environment variable with -keylog flag.
Change-Id: Ida6712daa44e01a2c00658e8a1896087ee88bcb0
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/183057
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Signing with RSA-PSS can uncover faulty crypto.Signer implementations,
and it can fail for (broken) small keys. We'll have to take that
breakage eventually, but it would be nice for it to be opt-out at first.
TLS 1.3 requires RSA-PSS and is opt-out in Go 1.13. Instead of making a
TLS 1.3 opt-out influence a TLS 1.2 behavior, let's wait to add RSA-PSS
to TLS 1.2 until TLS 1.3 is on without opt-out.
Note that since the Client Hello is sent before a protocol version is
selected, we have to advertise RSA-PSS there to support TLS 1.3.
That means that we still support RSA-PSS on the client in TLS 1.2 for
verifying server certificates, which is fine, as all issues arise on the
signing side. We have to be careful not to pick (or consider available)
RSA-PSS on the client for client certificates, though.
We'd expect tests to change only in TLS 1.2:
* the server won't pick PSS to sign the key exchange
(Server-TLSv12-* w/ RSA, TestHandshakeServerRSAPSS);
* the server won't advertise PSS in CertificateRequest
(Server-TLSv12-ClientAuthRequested*, TestClientAuth);
* and the client won't pick PSS for its CertificateVerify
(Client-TLSv12-ClientCert-RSA-*, TestHandshakeClientCertRSAPSS,
Client-TLSv12-Renegotiate* because "R" requests a client cert).
Client-TLSv13-ClientCert-RSA-RSAPSS was updated because of a fix in the test.
This effectively reverts 88343530720a52c96b21f2bd5488c8fb607605d7.
Testing was made more complex by the undocumented semantics of OpenSSL's
-[client_]sigalgs (see openssl/openssl#9172).
Updates #32425
Change-Id: Iaddeb2df1f5c75cd090cc8321df2ac8e8e7db349
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/182339
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
As suggested by dmitshur@, move them to their own block so they don't
conflict with changes in the upstream imports.
Change-Id: Id46fb7c766066c406023b0355f4c3c860166f0fe
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/181277
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@golang.org>
