[release-branch.go1.21] crypto/tls: QUIC: fix panics when processing post-handshake messages
The check for fragmentary post-handshake messages in QUICConn.HandleData
was reversed, resulting in a potential panic when HandleData receives
a partial message.
In addition, HandleData wasn't checking the size of buffered
post-handshake messages. Produce an error when a post-handshake
message is larger than maxHandshake.
TestQUICConnectionState was using an onHandleCryptoData hook
in runTestQUICConnection that was never being called.
(I think it was inadvertently removed at some point while
the CL was in review.) Fix this test while making the hook
more general.
For #62266Fixes#62290
Change-Id: I210b70634e50beb456ab3977eb11272b8724c241
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/522595
Run-TryBot: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
(cherry picked from commit e92c0f8)
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/523039
Auto-Submit: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Co-authored-by: Damien Neil <52544+neild@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: GopherBot <8566911+gopherbot@users.noreply.github.com>
* sync: Go 1.21rc3, QUIC support added (#207)
* sync: merge with upstream tag/go-1.21rc3 (#11)
* fix: all tests pass
* impl: UQUIC Transport
* deps: bump up min Go version
* new: uquic
* fix: add QUICTransportParameter
* deprecated: Go 1.19 no longer supported
Go 1.19 will fail to build or pass the test once we bump up to the new version.
* sync: crypto/tls: restrict RSA keys in certificates to <= 8192 bits (#209)
* [release-branch.go1.21] crypto/tls: restrict RSA keys in certificates to <= 8192 bits
Extremely large RSA keys in certificate chains can cause a client/server
to expend significant CPU time verifying signatures. Limit this by
restricting the size of RSA keys transmitted during handshakes to <=
8192 bits.
Based on a survey of publicly trusted RSA keys, there are currently only
three certificates in circulation with keys larger than this, and all
three appear to be test certificates that are not actively deployed. It
is possible there are larger keys in use in private PKIs, but we target
the web PKI, so causing breakage here in the interests of increasing the
default safety of users of crypto/tls seems reasonable.
Thanks to Mateusz Poliwczak for reporting this issue.
Fixes CVE-2023-29409
* build: [ci skip] boring not included
* fix: typo [ci skip]
* docs: replenish readme [ci skip]
replace old build status badge with new ones, bump up required version noted in docs, update developer contact to reflect current status.
