utls/handshake_server.go
Filippo Valsorda 0c490ab182 crypto/tls: refactor certificate and signature algorithm logic
This refactors a lot of the certificate support logic to make it cleaner
and reusable where possible. These changes will make the following CLs
much simpler.

In particular, the heavily overloaded pickSignatureAlgorithm is gone.
That function used to cover both signing and verifying side, would work
both for pre-signature_algorithms TLS 1.0/1.1 and TLS 1.2, and returned
sigalg, type and hash.

Now, TLS 1.0/1.1 and 1.2 are differentiated at the caller, as they have
effectively completely different logic. TLS 1.0/1.1 simply use
legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey as they employ a fixed hash function and
signature algorithm for each public key type. TLS 1.2 is instead routed
through selectSignatureScheme (on the signing side) or
isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm (on the verifying side) and
typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme, like TLS 1.3.

On the signing side, signatureSchemesForCertificate was already version
aware (for PKCS#1 v1.5 vs PSS support), so selectSignatureScheme just
had to learn the Section 7.4.1.4.1 defaults for a missing
signature_algorithms to replace pickSignatureAlgorithm.

On the verifying side, pickSignatureAlgorithm was also checking the
public key type, while isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm +
typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme are not, but that check was redundant
with the one in verifyHandshakeSignature.

There should be no major change in behavior so far. A few minor changes
came from the refactor: we now correctly require signature_algorithms in
TLS 1.3 when using a certificate; we won't use Ed25519 in TLS 1.2 if the
client didn't send signature_algorithms; and we don't send
ec_points_format in the ServerHello (a compatibility measure) if we are
not doing ECDHE anyway because there are no mutually supported curves.

The tests also got simpler because they test simpler functions. The
caller logic switching between TLS 1.0/1.1 and 1.2 is tested by the
transcript tests.

Updates #32426

Change-Id: Ice9dcaea78d204718f661f8d60efdb408ba41577
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/205061
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
2019-11-12 01:07:15 +00:00

805 lines
22 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package tls
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/subtle"
"crypto/x509"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"sync/atomic"
)
// serverHandshakeState contains details of a server handshake in progress.
// It's discarded once the handshake has completed.
type serverHandshakeState struct {
c *Conn
clientHello *clientHelloMsg
hello *serverHelloMsg
suite *cipherSuite
ecdheOk bool
ecSignOk bool
rsaDecryptOk bool
rsaSignOk bool
sessionState *sessionState
finishedHash finishedHash
masterSecret []byte
cert *Certificate
}
// serverHandshake performs a TLS handshake as a server.
func (c *Conn) serverHandshake() error {
// If this is the first server handshake, we generate a random key to
// encrypt the tickets with.
c.config.serverInitOnce.Do(func() { c.config.serverInit(nil) })
clientHello, err := c.readClientHello()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if c.vers == VersionTLS13 {
hs := serverHandshakeStateTLS13{
c: c,
clientHello: clientHello,
}
return hs.handshake()
}
hs := serverHandshakeState{
c: c,
clientHello: clientHello,
}
return hs.handshake()
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) handshake() error {
c := hs.c
if err := hs.processClientHello(); err != nil {
return err
}
// For an overview of TLS handshaking, see RFC 5246, Section 7.3.
c.buffering = true
if hs.checkForResumption() {
// The client has included a session ticket and so we do an abbreviated handshake.
if err := hs.doResumeHandshake(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
return err
}
// ticketSupported is set in a resumption handshake if the
// ticket from the client was encrypted with an old session
// ticket key and thus a refreshed ticket should be sent.
if hs.hello.ticketSupported {
if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
if err := hs.sendFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
return err
}
c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false
if err := hs.readFinished(nil); err != nil {
return err
}
c.didResume = true
} else {
// The client didn't include a session ticket, or it wasn't
// valid so we do a full handshake.
if err := hs.pickCipherSuite(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.readFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil {
return err
}
c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true
c.buffering = true
if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.sendFinished(nil); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1)
return nil
}
// readClientHello reads a ClientHello message and selects the protocol version.
func (c *Conn) readClientHello() (*clientHelloMsg, error) {
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
clientHello, ok := msg.(*clientHelloMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return nil, unexpectedMessageError(clientHello, msg)
}
if c.config.GetConfigForClient != nil {
chi := clientHelloInfo(c, clientHello)
if newConfig, err := c.config.GetConfigForClient(chi); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return nil, err
} else if newConfig != nil {
newConfig.serverInitOnce.Do(func() { newConfig.serverInit(c.config) })
c.config = newConfig
}
}
clientVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions
if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 {
clientVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers)
}
c.vers, ok = c.config.mutualVersion(clientVersions)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered only unsupported versions: %x", clientVersions)
}
c.haveVers = true
c.in.version = c.vers
c.out.version = c.vers
return clientHello, nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) processClientHello() error {
c := hs.c
hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg)
hs.hello.vers = c.vers
foundCompression := false
// We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it.
for _, compression := range hs.clientHello.compressionMethods {
if compression == compressionNone {
foundCompression = true
break
}
}
if !foundCompression {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: client does not support uncompressed connections")
}
hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32)
serverRandom := hs.hello.random
// Downgrade protection canaries. See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.3.
maxVers := c.config.maxSupportedVersion()
if maxVers >= VersionTLS12 && c.vers < maxVers {
if c.vers == VersionTLS12 {
copy(serverRandom[24:], downgradeCanaryTLS12)
} else {
copy(serverRandom[24:], downgradeCanaryTLS11)
}
serverRandom = serverRandom[:24]
}
_, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), serverRandom)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension")
}
hs.hello.secureRenegotiationSupported = hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiationSupported
hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone
if len(hs.clientHello.serverName) > 0 {
c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName
}
if len(hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols) > 0 {
if selectedProto, fallback := mutualProtocol(hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols, c.config.NextProtos); !fallback {
hs.hello.alpnProtocol = selectedProto
c.clientProtocol = selectedProto
}
}
hs.cert, err = c.config.getCertificate(clientHelloInfo(c, hs.clientHello))
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
if hs.clientHello.scts {
hs.hello.scts = hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps
}
hs.ecdheOk = supportsECDHE(c.config, hs.clientHello.supportedCurves, hs.clientHello.supportedPoints)
if hs.ecdheOk {
// Although omiting the ec_point_formats extension is permitted, some
// old OpenSSL version will refuse to handshake if not present.
//
// Per RFC 4492, section 5.1.2, implementations MUST support the
// uncompressed point format. See golang.org/issue/31943.
hs.hello.supportedPoints = []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed}
}
if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer); ok {
switch priv.Public().(type) {
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
hs.ecSignOk = true
case ed25519.PublicKey:
hs.ecSignOk = true
case *rsa.PublicKey:
hs.rsaSignOk = true
default:
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported signing key type (%T)", priv.Public())
}
}
if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter); ok {
switch priv.Public().(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey:
hs.rsaDecryptOk = true
default:
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported decryption key type (%T)", priv.Public())
}
}
return nil
}
// supportsECDHE returns whether ECDHE key exchanges can be used with this
// pre-TLS 1.3 client.
func supportsECDHE(c *Config, supportedCurves []CurveID, supportedPoints []uint8) bool {
supportsCurve := false
for _, curve := range supportedCurves {
if c.supportsCurve(curve) {
supportsCurve = true
break
}
}
supportsPointFormat := false
for _, pointFormat := range supportedPoints {
if pointFormat == pointFormatUncompressed {
supportsPointFormat = true
break
}
}
return supportsCurve && supportsPointFormat
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) pickCipherSuite() error {
c := hs.c
var preferenceList, supportedList []uint16
if c.config.PreferServerCipherSuites {
preferenceList = c.config.cipherSuites()
supportedList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites
} else {
preferenceList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites
supportedList = c.config.cipherSuites()
}
hs.suite = selectCipherSuite(preferenceList, supportedList, hs.cipherSuiteOk)
if hs.suite == nil {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server")
}
for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV {
// The client is doing a fallback connection. See RFC 7507.
if hs.clientHello.vers < c.config.maxSupportedVersion() {
c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback)
return errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback")
}
break
}
}
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) cipherSuiteOk(c *cipherSuite) bool {
if c.flags&suiteECDHE != 0 {
if !hs.ecdheOk {
return false
}
if c.flags&suiteECSign != 0 {
if !hs.ecSignOk {
return false
}
} else if !hs.rsaSignOk {
return false
}
} else if !hs.rsaDecryptOk {
return false
}
if hs.c.vers < VersionTLS12 && c.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 {
return false
}
return true
}
// checkForResumption reports whether we should perform resumption on this connection.
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkForResumption() bool {
c := hs.c
if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
return false
}
plaintext, usedOldKey := c.decryptTicket(hs.clientHello.sessionTicket)
if plaintext == nil {
return false
}
hs.sessionState = &sessionState{usedOldKey: usedOldKey}
ok := hs.sessionState.unmarshal(plaintext)
if !ok {
return false
}
// Never resume a session for a different TLS version.
if c.vers != hs.sessionState.vers {
return false
}
cipherSuiteOk := false
// Check that the client is still offering the ciphersuite in the session.
for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
if id == hs.sessionState.cipherSuite {
cipherSuiteOk = true
break
}
}
if !cipherSuiteOk {
return false
}
// Check that we also support the ciphersuite from the session.
hs.suite = selectCipherSuite([]uint16{hs.sessionState.cipherSuite},
c.config.cipherSuites(), hs.cipherSuiteOk)
if hs.suite == nil {
return false
}
sessionHasClientCerts := len(hs.sessionState.certificates) != 0
needClientCerts := requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth)
if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts {
return false
}
if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
return false
}
return true
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doResumeHandshake() error {
c := hs.c
hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
// We echo the client's session ID in the ServerHello to let it know
// that we're doing a resumption.
hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId
hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.sessionState.usedOldKey
hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite)
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{
Certificate: hs.sessionState.certificates,
}); err != nil {
return err
}
hs.masterSecret = hs.sessionState.masterSecret
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
c := hs.c
if hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0 {
hs.hello.ocspStapling = true
}
hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.clientHello.ticketSupported && !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled
hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(hs.c.vers, hs.suite)
if c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
// No need to keep a full record of the handshake if client
// certificates won't be used.
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
certMsg := new(certificateMsg)
certMsg.certificates = hs.cert.Certificate
hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
if hs.hello.ocspStapling {
certStatus := new(certificateStatusMsg)
certStatus.response = hs.cert.OCSPStaple
hs.finishedHash.Write(certStatus.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certStatus.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
}
keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers)
skx, err := keyAgreement.generateServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, hs.clientHello, hs.hello)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return err
}
if skx != nil {
hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, skx.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
}
var certReq *certificateRequestMsg
if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
// Request a client certificate
certReq = new(certificateRequestMsg)
certReq.certificateTypes = []byte{
byte(certTypeRSASign),
byte(certTypeECDSASign),
}
if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
certReq.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true
certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithmsTLS12
}
// An empty list of certificateAuthorities signals to
// the client that it may send any certificate in response
// to our request. When we know the CAs we trust, then
// we can send them down, so that the client can choose
// an appropriate certificate to give to us.
if c.config.ClientCAs != nil {
certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects()
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
}
helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg)
hs.finishedHash.Write(helloDone.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloDone.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
return err
}
var pub crypto.PublicKey // public key for client auth, if any
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
// If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a
// certificate message, even if it's empty.
if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{
Certificate: certMsg.certificates,
}); err != nil {
return err
}
if len(certMsg.certificates) != 0 {
pub = c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
// Get client key exchange
ckx, ok := msg.(*clientKeyExchangeMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(ckx, msg)
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
preMasterSecret, err := keyAgreement.processClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, ckx, c.vers)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return err
}
hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelTLS12, hs.clientHello.random, hs.masterSecret); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
// If we received a client cert in response to our certificate request message,
// the client will send us a certificateVerifyMsg immediately after the
// clientKeyExchangeMsg. This message is a digest of all preceding
// handshake-layer messages that is signed using the private key corresponding
// to the client's certificate. This allows us to verify that the client is in
// possession of the private key of the certificate.
if len(c.peerCertificates) > 0 {
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
}
var sigType uint8
var sigHash crypto.Hash
if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm, certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return errors.New("tls: client certificate used with invalid signature algorithm")
}
sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(certVerify.signatureAlgorithm)
if err != nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
} else {
sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(pub)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return err
}
}
signed := hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(sigType, sigHash, hs.masterSecret)
if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, pub, sigHash, signed, certVerify.signature); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the client certificate: " + err.Error())
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
}
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) establishKeys() error {
c := hs.c
clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen)
var clientCipher, serverCipher interface{}
var clientHash, serverHash macFunction
if hs.suite.aead == nil {
clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, true /* for reading */)
clientHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, clientMAC)
serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, false /* not for reading */)
serverHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, serverMAC)
} else {
clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV)
serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV)
}
c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash)
c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash)
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error {
c := hs.c
if err := c.readChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
return err
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
clientFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(clientFinished, msg)
}
verify := hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret)
if len(verify) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) ||
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: client's Finished message is incorrect")
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(clientFinished.marshal())
copy(out, verify)
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendSessionTicket() error {
if !hs.hello.ticketSupported {
return nil
}
c := hs.c
m := new(newSessionTicketMsg)
var certsFromClient [][]byte
for _, cert := range c.peerCertificates {
certsFromClient = append(certsFromClient, cert.Raw)
}
state := sessionState{
vers: c.vers,
cipherSuite: hs.suite.id,
masterSecret: hs.masterSecret,
certificates: certsFromClient,
}
var err error
m.ticket, err = c.encryptTicket(state.marshal())
if err != nil {
return err
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(m.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error {
c := hs.c
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil {
return err
}
finished := new(finishedMsg)
finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret)
hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
return err
}
c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
copy(out, finished.verifyData)
return nil
}
// processCertsFromClient takes a chain of client certificates either from a
// Certificates message or from a sessionState and verifies them. It returns
// the public key of the leaf certificate.
func (c *Conn) processCertsFromClient(certificate Certificate) error {
certificates := certificate.Certificate
certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certificates))
var err error
for i, asn1Data := range certificates {
if certs[i], err = x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate: " + err.Error())
}
}
if len(certs) == 0 && requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth) {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return errors.New("tls: client didn't provide a certificate")
}
if c.config.ClientAuth >= VerifyClientCertIfGiven && len(certs) > 0 {
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
Roots: c.config.ClientCAs,
CurrentTime: c.config.time(),
Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth},
}
for _, cert := range certs[1:] {
opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
}
chains, err := certs[0].Verify(opts)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return errors.New("tls: failed to verify client certificate: " + err.Error())
}
c.verifiedChains = chains
}
if c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil {
if err := c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate(certificates, c.verifiedChains); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return err
}
}
if len(certs) == 0 {
return nil
}
switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) {
case *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey, ed25519.PublicKey:
default:
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
return fmt.Errorf("tls: client certificate contains an unsupported public key of type %T", certs[0].PublicKey)
}
c.peerCertificates = certs
c.ocspResponse = certificate.OCSPStaple
c.scts = certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps
return nil
}
func clientHelloInfo(c *Conn, clientHello *clientHelloMsg) *ClientHelloInfo {
supportedVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions
if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 {
supportedVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers)
}
return &ClientHelloInfo{
CipherSuites: clientHello.cipherSuites,
ServerName: clientHello.serverName,
SupportedCurves: clientHello.supportedCurves,
SupportedPoints: clientHello.supportedPoints,
SignatureSchemes: clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms,
SupportedProtos: clientHello.alpnProtocols,
SupportedVersions: supportedVersions,
Conn: c.conn,
}
}