mirror of
https://github.com/refraction-networking/utls.git
synced 2025-04-03 20:17:36 +03:00
Support for Ed25519 certificates was added in CL 175478, this wires them up into the TLS stack according to RFC 8422 (TLS 1.2) and RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3). RFC 8422 also specifies support for TLS 1.0 and 1.1, and I initially implemented that, but even OpenSSL doesn't take the complexity, so I just dropped it. It would have required keeping a buffer of the handshake transcript in order to do the direct Ed25519 signatures. We effectively need to support TLS 1.2 because it shares ClientHello signature algorithms with TLS 1.3. While at it, reordered the advertised signature algorithms in the rough order we would want to use them, also based on what curves have fast constant-time implementations. Client and client auth tests changed because of the change in advertised signature algorithms in ClientHello and CertificateRequest. Fixes #25355 Change-Id: I9fdd839afde4fd6b13fcbc5cc7017fd8c35085ee Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/177698 Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
825 lines
22 KiB
Go
825 lines
22 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package tls
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import (
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"crypto"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"crypto/x509"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"sync/atomic"
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)
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// serverHandshakeState contains details of a server handshake in progress.
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// It's discarded once the handshake has completed.
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type serverHandshakeState struct {
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c *Conn
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clientHello *clientHelloMsg
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hello *serverHelloMsg
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suite *cipherSuite
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ecdhOk bool
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ecSignOk bool
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rsaDecryptOk bool
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rsaSignOk bool
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sessionState *sessionState
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finishedHash finishedHash
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masterSecret []byte
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cert *Certificate
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}
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// serverHandshake performs a TLS handshake as a server.
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func (c *Conn) serverHandshake() error {
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// If this is the first server handshake, we generate a random key to
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// encrypt the tickets with.
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c.config.serverInitOnce.Do(func() { c.config.serverInit(nil) })
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clientHello, err := c.readClientHello()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if c.vers == VersionTLS13 {
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hs := serverHandshakeStateTLS13{
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c: c,
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clientHello: clientHello,
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}
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return hs.handshake()
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}
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hs := serverHandshakeState{
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c: c,
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clientHello: clientHello,
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}
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return hs.handshake()
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}
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) handshake() error {
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c := hs.c
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if err := hs.processClientHello(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// For an overview of TLS handshaking, see RFC 5246, Section 7.3.
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c.buffering = true
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if hs.checkForResumption() {
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// The client has included a session ticket and so we do an abbreviated handshake.
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if err := hs.doResumeHandshake(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// ticketSupported is set in a resumption handshake if the
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// ticket from the client was encrypted with an old session
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// ticket key and thus a refreshed ticket should be sent.
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if hs.hello.ticketSupported {
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if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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if err := hs.sendFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false
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if err := hs.readFinished(nil); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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c.didResume = true
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} else {
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// The client didn't include a session ticket, or it wasn't
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// valid so we do a full handshake.
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if err := hs.pickCipherSuite(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.readFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true
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c.buffering = true
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if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.sendFinished(nil); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
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atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1)
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return nil
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}
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// readClientHello reads a ClientHello message and selects the protocol version.
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func (c *Conn) readClientHello() (*clientHelloMsg, error) {
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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clientHello, ok := msg.(*clientHelloMsg)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return nil, unexpectedMessageError(clientHello, msg)
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}
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if c.config.GetConfigForClient != nil {
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chi := clientHelloInfo(c, clientHello)
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if newConfig, err := c.config.GetConfigForClient(chi); err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return nil, err
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} else if newConfig != nil {
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newConfig.serverInitOnce.Do(func() { newConfig.serverInit(c.config) })
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c.config = newConfig
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}
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}
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clientVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions
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if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 {
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clientVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers)
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}
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c.vers, ok = c.config.mutualVersion(false, clientVersions)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered only unsupported versions: %x", clientVersions)
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}
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c.haveVers = true
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c.in.version = c.vers
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c.out.version = c.vers
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return clientHello, nil
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}
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) processClientHello() error {
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c := hs.c
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hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg)
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hs.hello.vers = c.vers
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supportedCurve := false
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preferredCurves := c.config.curvePreferences()
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Curves:
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for _, curve := range hs.clientHello.supportedCurves {
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for _, supported := range preferredCurves {
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if supported == curve {
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supportedCurve = true
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break Curves
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}
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}
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}
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supportedPointFormat := false
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for _, pointFormat := range hs.clientHello.supportedPoints {
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if pointFormat == pointFormatUncompressed {
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supportedPointFormat = true
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break
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}
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}
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hs.ecdhOk = supportedCurve && supportedPointFormat
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foundCompression := false
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// We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it.
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for _, compression := range hs.clientHello.compressionMethods {
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if compression == compressionNone {
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foundCompression = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !foundCompression {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return errors.New("tls: client does not support uncompressed connections")
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}
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hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32)
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serverRandom := hs.hello.random
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// Downgrade protection canaries. See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.3.
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maxVers := c.config.maxSupportedVersion(false)
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if maxVers >= VersionTLS12 && c.vers < maxVers {
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if c.vers == VersionTLS12 {
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copy(serverRandom[24:], downgradeCanaryTLS12)
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} else {
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copy(serverRandom[24:], downgradeCanaryTLS11)
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}
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serverRandom = serverRandom[:24]
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}
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_, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), serverRandom)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return err
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}
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if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension")
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}
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hs.hello.secureRenegotiationSupported = hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiationSupported
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hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone
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if len(hs.clientHello.serverName) > 0 {
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c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName
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}
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if len(hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols) > 0 {
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if selectedProto, fallback := mutualProtocol(hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols, c.config.NextProtos); !fallback {
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hs.hello.alpnProtocol = selectedProto
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c.clientProtocol = selectedProto
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}
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} else {
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// Although sending an empty NPN extension is reasonable, Firefox has
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// had a bug around this. Best to send nothing at all if
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// c.config.NextProtos is empty. See
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// https://golang.org/issue/5445.
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if hs.clientHello.nextProtoNeg && len(c.config.NextProtos) > 0 {
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hs.hello.nextProtoNeg = true
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hs.hello.nextProtos = c.config.NextProtos
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}
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}
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hs.cert, err = c.config.getCertificate(clientHelloInfo(c, hs.clientHello))
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return err
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}
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if hs.clientHello.scts {
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hs.hello.scts = hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps
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}
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if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer); ok {
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switch priv.Public().(type) {
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case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
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hs.ecSignOk = true
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case ed25519.PublicKey:
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hs.ecSignOk = true
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case *rsa.PublicKey:
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hs.rsaSignOk = true
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default:
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported signing key type (%T)", priv.Public())
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}
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}
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if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter); ok {
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switch priv.Public().(type) {
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case *rsa.PublicKey:
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hs.rsaDecryptOk = true
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default:
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported decryption key type (%T)", priv.Public())
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) pickCipherSuite() error {
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c := hs.c
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var preferenceList, supportedList []uint16
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if c.config.PreferServerCipherSuites {
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preferenceList = c.config.cipherSuites()
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supportedList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites
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} else {
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preferenceList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites
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supportedList = c.config.cipherSuites()
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}
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for _, id := range preferenceList {
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if hs.setCipherSuite(id, supportedList, c.vers) {
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break
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}
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}
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if hs.suite == nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server")
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}
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for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
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if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV {
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// The client is doing a fallback connection. See RFC 7507.
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if hs.clientHello.vers < c.config.maxSupportedVersion(false) {
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c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback)
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return errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback")
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}
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break
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// checkForResumption reports whether we should perform resumption on this connection.
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkForResumption() bool {
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c := hs.c
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if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
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return false
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}
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plaintext, usedOldKey := c.decryptTicket(hs.clientHello.sessionTicket)
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if plaintext == nil {
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return false
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}
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hs.sessionState = &sessionState{usedOldKey: usedOldKey}
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ok := hs.sessionState.unmarshal(plaintext)
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if !ok {
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return false
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}
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// Never resume a session for a different TLS version.
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if c.vers != hs.sessionState.vers {
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return false
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}
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cipherSuiteOk := false
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// Check that the client is still offering the ciphersuite in the session.
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for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
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if id == hs.sessionState.cipherSuite {
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cipherSuiteOk = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !cipherSuiteOk {
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return false
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}
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// Check that we also support the ciphersuite from the session.
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if !hs.setCipherSuite(hs.sessionState.cipherSuite, c.config.cipherSuites(), hs.sessionState.vers) {
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return false
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}
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sessionHasClientCerts := len(hs.sessionState.certificates) != 0
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needClientCerts := requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth)
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if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts {
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return false
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}
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if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
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return false
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}
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return true
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}
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doResumeHandshake() error {
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c := hs.c
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hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
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// We echo the client's session ID in the ServerHello to let it know
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// that we're doing a resumption.
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hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId
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hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.sessionState.usedOldKey
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hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite)
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hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
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hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
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hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{
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Certificate: hs.sessionState.certificates,
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}); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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hs.masterSecret = hs.sessionState.masterSecret
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return nil
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}
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
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c := hs.c
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if hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0 {
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hs.hello.ocspStapling = true
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}
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hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.clientHello.ticketSupported && !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled
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hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
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hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(hs.c.vers, hs.suite)
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if c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
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// No need to keep a full record of the handshake if client
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// certificates won't be used.
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hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
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hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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certMsg := new(certificateMsg)
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certMsg.certificates = hs.cert.Certificate
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if hs.hello.ocspStapling {
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certStatus := new(certificateStatusMsg)
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certStatus.response = hs.cert.OCSPStaple
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certStatus.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certStatus.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers)
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skx, err := keyAgreement.generateServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, hs.clientHello, hs.hello)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return err
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}
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if skx != nil {
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hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, skx.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
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// Request a client certificate
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certReq := new(certificateRequestMsg)
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certReq.certificateTypes = []byte{
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byte(certTypeRSASign),
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byte(certTypeECDSASign),
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}
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if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
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certReq.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true
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certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms
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}
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// An empty list of certificateAuthorities signals to
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// the client that it may send any certificate in response
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// to our request. When we know the CAs we trust, then
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// we can send them down, so that the client can choose
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// an appropriate certificate to give to us.
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if c.config.ClientCAs != nil {
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certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects()
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg)
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hs.finishedHash.Write(helloDone.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloDone.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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var pub crypto.PublicKey // public key for client auth, if any
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a
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// certificate message, even if it's empty.
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if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
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certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
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if err := c.processCertsFromClient(Certificate{
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Certificate: certMsg.certificates,
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}); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if len(certMsg.certificates) != 0 {
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pub = c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey
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}
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get client key exchange
|
|
ckx, ok := msg.(*clientKeyExchangeMsg)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
|
return unexpectedMessageError(ckx, msg)
|
|
}
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
|
|
|
|
preMasterSecret, err := keyAgreement.processClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, ckx, c.vers)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
|
|
if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelTLS12, hs.clientHello.random, hs.masterSecret); err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If we received a client cert in response to our certificate request message,
|
|
// the client will send us a certificateVerifyMsg immediately after the
|
|
// clientKeyExchangeMsg. This message is a digest of all preceding
|
|
// handshake-layer messages that is signed using the private key corresponding
|
|
// to the client's certificate. This allows us to verify that the client is in
|
|
// possession of the private key of the certificate.
|
|
if len(c.peerCertificates) > 0 {
|
|
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
|
return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Determine the signature type.
|
|
_, sigType, hashFunc, err := pickSignatureAlgorithm(pub, []SignatureScheme{certVerify.signatureAlgorithm}, supportedSignatureAlgorithms, c.vers)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
signed, err := hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(sigType, hashFunc, hs.masterSecret)
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
err = verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, pub, hashFunc, signed, certVerify.signature)
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
|
return errors.New("tls: could not validate signature of connection nonces: " + err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) establishKeys() error {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
|
|
keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen)
|
|
|
|
var clientCipher, serverCipher interface{}
|
|
var clientHash, serverHash macFunction
|
|
|
|
if hs.suite.aead == nil {
|
|
clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, true /* for reading */)
|
|
clientHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, clientMAC)
|
|
serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, false /* not for reading */)
|
|
serverHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, serverMAC)
|
|
} else {
|
|
clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV)
|
|
serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash)
|
|
c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash)
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
if err := c.readChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if hs.hello.nextProtoNeg {
|
|
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
nextProto, ok := msg.(*nextProtoMsg)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
|
return unexpectedMessageError(nextProto, msg)
|
|
}
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(nextProto.marshal())
|
|
c.clientProtocol = nextProto.proto
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
clientFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
|
return unexpectedMessageError(clientFinished, msg)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
verify := hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret)
|
|
if len(verify) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) ||
|
|
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
|
return errors.New("tls: client's Finished message is incorrect")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(clientFinished.marshal())
|
|
copy(out, verify)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendSessionTicket() error {
|
|
if !hs.hello.ticketSupported {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
m := new(newSessionTicketMsg)
|
|
|
|
var certsFromClient [][]byte
|
|
for _, cert := range c.peerCertificates {
|
|
certsFromClient = append(certsFromClient, cert.Raw)
|
|
}
|
|
state := sessionState{
|
|
vers: c.vers,
|
|
cipherSuite: hs.suite.id,
|
|
masterSecret: hs.masterSecret,
|
|
certificates: certsFromClient,
|
|
}
|
|
var err error
|
|
m.ticket, err = c.encryptTicket(state.marshal())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(m.marshal())
|
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
finished := new(finishedMsg)
|
|
finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret)
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
|
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
|
|
copy(out, finished.verifyData)
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// processCertsFromClient takes a chain of client certificates either from a
|
|
// Certificates message or from a sessionState and verifies them. It returns
|
|
// the public key of the leaf certificate.
|
|
func (c *Conn) processCertsFromClient(certificate Certificate) error {
|
|
certificates := certificate.Certificate
|
|
certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certificates))
|
|
var err error
|
|
for i, asn1Data := range certificates {
|
|
if certs[i], err = x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data); err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
|
return errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate: " + err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(certs) == 0 && requiresClientCert(c.config.ClientAuth) {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
|
return errors.New("tls: client didn't provide a certificate")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if c.config.ClientAuth >= VerifyClientCertIfGiven && len(certs) > 0 {
|
|
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
|
|
Roots: c.config.ClientCAs,
|
|
CurrentTime: c.config.time(),
|
|
Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
|
|
KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, cert := range certs[1:] {
|
|
opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
chains, err := certs[0].Verify(opts)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
|
return errors.New("tls: failed to verify client's certificate: " + err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.verifiedChains = chains
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil {
|
|
if err := c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate(certificates, c.verifiedChains); err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(certs) == 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) {
|
|
case *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey, ed25519.PublicKey:
|
|
default:
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("tls: client's certificate contains an unsupported public key of type %T", certs[0].PublicKey)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.peerCertificates = certs
|
|
c.ocspResponse = certificate.OCSPStaple
|
|
c.scts = certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// setCipherSuite sets a cipherSuite with the given id as the serverHandshakeState
|
|
// suite if that cipher suite is acceptable to use.
|
|
// It returns a bool indicating if the suite was set.
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) setCipherSuite(id uint16, supportedCipherSuites []uint16, version uint16) bool {
|
|
for _, supported := range supportedCipherSuites {
|
|
if id != supported {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
candidate := cipherSuiteByID(id)
|
|
if candidate == nil {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
// Don't select a ciphersuite which we can't
|
|
// support for this client.
|
|
if candidate.flags&suiteECDHE != 0 {
|
|
if !hs.ecdhOk {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if candidate.flags&suiteECSign != 0 {
|
|
if !hs.ecSignOk {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
} else if !hs.rsaSignOk {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
} else if !hs.rsaDecryptOk {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if version < VersionTLS12 && candidate.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
hs.suite = candidate
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func clientHelloInfo(c *Conn, clientHello *clientHelloMsg) *ClientHelloInfo {
|
|
supportedVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions
|
|
if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 {
|
|
supportedVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return &ClientHelloInfo{
|
|
CipherSuites: clientHello.cipherSuites,
|
|
ServerName: clientHello.serverName,
|
|
SupportedCurves: clientHello.supportedCurves,
|
|
SupportedPoints: clientHello.supportedPoints,
|
|
SignatureSchemes: clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms,
|
|
SupportedProtos: clientHello.alpnProtocols,
|
|
SupportedVersions: supportedVersions,
|
|
Conn: c.conn,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|