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Fork of the Go standard TLS library, providing low-level access to the ClientHello for mimicry purposes.
anticensorshipcipher-suitesclienthellocryptogolanghandshakelow-level-tlsobfuscationparrottlstls-extension
ECDSA is unsafe to use if an entropy source produces predictable output for the ephemeral nonces. E.g., [Nguyen]. A simple countermeasure is to hash the secret key, the message, and entropy together to seed a CSPRNG, from which the ephemeral key is derived. Fixes #9452 -- This is a minimalist (in terms of patch size) solution, though not the most parsimonious in its use of primitives: - csprng_key = ChopMD-256(SHA2-512(priv.D||entropy||hash)) - reader = AES-256-CTR(k=csprng_key) This, however, provides at most 128-bit collision-resistance, so that Adv will have a term related to the number of messages signed that is significantly worse than plain ECDSA. This does not seem to be of any practical importance. ChopMD-256(SHA2-512(x)) is used, rather than SHA2-256(x), for two sets of reasons: *Practical:* SHA2-512 has a larger state and 16 more rounds; it is likely non-generically stronger than SHA2-256. And, AFAIK, cryptanalysis backs this up. (E.g., [Biryukov] gives a distinguisher on 47-round SHA2-256 with cost < 2^85.) This is well below a reasonable security-strength target. *Theoretical:* [Coron] and [Chang] show that Chop-MD(F(x)) is indifferentiable from a random oracle for slightly beyond the birthday barrier. It seems likely that this makes a generic security proof that this construction remains UF-CMA is possible in the indifferentiability framework. -- Many thanks to Payman Mohassel for reviewing this construction; any mistakes are mine, however. And, as he notes, reusing the private key in this way means that the generic-group (non-RO) proof of ECDSA's security given in [Brown] no longer directly applies. -- [Brown]: http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/techreports/2000/corr2000-54.ps "Brown. The exact security of ECDSA. 2000" [Coron]: https://www.cs.nyu.edu/~puniya/papers/merkle.pdf "Coron et al. Merkle-Damgard revisited. 2005" [Chang]: |
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testdata | ||
alert.go | ||
cipher_suites.go | ||
common.go | ||
conn.go | ||
conn_test.go | ||
example_test.go | ||
generate_cert.go | ||
handshake_client.go | ||
handshake_client_test.go | ||
handshake_messages.go | ||
handshake_messages_test.go | ||
handshake_server.go | ||
handshake_server_test.go | ||
handshake_test.go | ||
key_agreement.go | ||
prf.go | ||
prf_test.go | ||
ticket.go | ||
tls.go | ||
tls_test.go |