mirror of
https://github.com/refraction-networking/utls.git
synced 2025-04-03 20:17:36 +03:00
Since TLS 1.3 delivers handshake messages (including KeyUpdate) after the handshake, the want argument to readRecord had became almost pointless: it only meant something when set to recordTypeChangeCipherSpec. Replaced it with a bool to reflect that, and added two shorthands to avoid anonymous bools in calls. Took the occasion to simplify and formalize the invariants of readRecord. The maxConsecutiveEmptyRecords loop became useless when readRecord started retrying on any non-advancing record in CL 145297. Replaced panics with errors, because failure is better than undefined behavior, but contained failure is better than a DoS vulnerability. For example, I suspect the panic at the top of readRecord was reachable from handleRenegotiation, which calls readHandshake with handshakeComplete false. Thankfully it was not a panic in 1.11, and it's allowed now. Removed Client-TLSv13-RenegotiationRejected because OpenSSL isn't actually willing to ask for renegotiation over TLS 1.3, the expected error was due to NewSessionTicket messages, which didn't break the rest of the tests because they stop too soon. Updates #9671 Change-Id: I297a81bde5c8020a962a92891b70d6d70b90f5e3 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/147418 Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
812 lines
22 KiB
Go
812 lines
22 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package tls
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import (
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"crypto"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"crypto/x509"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"sync/atomic"
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)
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// serverHandshakeState contains details of a server handshake in progress.
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// It's discarded once the handshake has completed.
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type serverHandshakeState struct {
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c *Conn
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clientHello *clientHelloMsg
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hello *serverHelloMsg
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suite *cipherSuite
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ellipticOk bool
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ecdsaOk bool
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rsaDecryptOk bool
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rsaSignOk bool
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sessionState *sessionState
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finishedHash finishedHash
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masterSecret []byte
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certsFromClient [][]byte
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cert *Certificate
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}
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// serverHandshake performs a TLS handshake as a server.
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func (c *Conn) serverHandshake() error {
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// If this is the first server handshake, we generate a random key to
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// encrypt the tickets with.
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c.config.serverInitOnce.Do(func() { c.config.serverInit(nil) })
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clientHello, err := c.readClientHello()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if c.vers == VersionTLS13 {
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hs := serverHandshakeStateTLS13{
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c: c,
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clientHello: clientHello,
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}
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return hs.handshake()
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}
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hs := serverHandshakeState{
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c: c,
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clientHello: clientHello,
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}
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return hs.handshake()
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}
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) handshake() error {
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c := hs.c
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if err := hs.processClientHello(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// For an overview of TLS handshaking, see RFC 5246, Section 7.3.
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c.buffering = true
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if hs.checkForResumption() {
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// The client has included a session ticket and so we do an abbreviated handshake.
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if err := hs.doResumeHandshake(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// ticketSupported is set in a resumption handshake if the
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// ticket from the client was encrypted with an old session
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// ticket key and thus a refreshed ticket should be sent.
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if hs.hello.ticketSupported {
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if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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if err := hs.sendFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false
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if err := hs.readFinished(nil); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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c.didResume = true
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} else {
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// The client didn't include a session ticket, or it wasn't
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// valid so we do a full handshake.
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if err := hs.pickCipherSuite(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.readFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true
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c.buffering = true
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if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.sendFinished(nil); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
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atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1)
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return nil
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}
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// readClientHello reads a ClientHello message and selects the protocol version.
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func (c *Conn) readClientHello() (*clientHelloMsg, error) {
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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clientHello, ok := msg.(*clientHelloMsg)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return nil, unexpectedMessageError(clientHello, msg)
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}
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if c.config.GetConfigForClient != nil {
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chi := clientHelloInfo(c, clientHello)
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if newConfig, err := c.config.GetConfigForClient(chi); err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return nil, err
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} else if newConfig != nil {
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newConfig.serverInitOnce.Do(func() { newConfig.serverInit(c.config) })
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c.config = newConfig
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}
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}
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clientVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions
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if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 {
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clientVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers)
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}
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c.vers, ok = c.config.mutualVersion(false, clientVersions)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered only unsupported versions: %x", clientVersions)
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}
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c.haveVers = true
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c.in.version = c.vers
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c.out.version = c.vers
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return clientHello, nil
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}
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) processClientHello() error {
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c := hs.c
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hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg)
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hs.hello.vers = c.vers
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supportedCurve := false
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preferredCurves := c.config.curvePreferences()
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Curves:
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for _, curve := range hs.clientHello.supportedCurves {
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for _, supported := range preferredCurves {
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if supported == curve {
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supportedCurve = true
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break Curves
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}
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}
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}
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supportedPointFormat := false
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for _, pointFormat := range hs.clientHello.supportedPoints {
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if pointFormat == pointFormatUncompressed {
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supportedPointFormat = true
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break
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}
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}
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hs.ellipticOk = supportedCurve && supportedPointFormat
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foundCompression := false
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// We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it.
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for _, compression := range hs.clientHello.compressionMethods {
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if compression == compressionNone {
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foundCompression = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !foundCompression {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return errors.New("tls: client does not support uncompressed connections")
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}
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hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32)
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_, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hs.hello.random)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return err
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}
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if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension")
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}
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hs.hello.secureRenegotiationSupported = hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiationSupported
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hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone
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if len(hs.clientHello.serverName) > 0 {
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c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName
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}
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if len(hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols) > 0 {
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if selectedProto, fallback := mutualProtocol(hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols, c.config.NextProtos); !fallback {
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hs.hello.alpnProtocol = selectedProto
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c.clientProtocol = selectedProto
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}
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} else {
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// Although sending an empty NPN extension is reasonable, Firefox has
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// had a bug around this. Best to send nothing at all if
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// c.config.NextProtos is empty. See
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// https://golang.org/issue/5445.
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if hs.clientHello.nextProtoNeg && len(c.config.NextProtos) > 0 {
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hs.hello.nextProtoNeg = true
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hs.hello.nextProtos = c.config.NextProtos
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}
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}
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hs.cert, err = c.config.getCertificate(clientHelloInfo(c, hs.clientHello))
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return err
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}
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if hs.clientHello.scts {
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hs.hello.scts = hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps
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}
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if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer); ok {
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switch priv.Public().(type) {
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case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
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hs.ecdsaOk = true
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case *rsa.PublicKey:
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hs.rsaSignOk = true
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default:
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported signing key type (%T)", priv.Public())
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}
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}
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if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter); ok {
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switch priv.Public().(type) {
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case *rsa.PublicKey:
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hs.rsaDecryptOk = true
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default:
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported decryption key type (%T)", priv.Public())
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) pickCipherSuite() error {
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c := hs.c
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var preferenceList, supportedList []uint16
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if c.config.PreferServerCipherSuites {
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preferenceList = c.config.cipherSuites()
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supportedList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites
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} else {
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preferenceList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites
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supportedList = c.config.cipherSuites()
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}
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for _, id := range preferenceList {
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if hs.setCipherSuite(id, supportedList, c.vers) {
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break
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}
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}
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if hs.suite == nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server")
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}
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// See RFC 7507.
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for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
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if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV {
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// The client is doing a fallback connection.
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if hs.clientHello.vers < c.config.supportedVersions(false)[0] {
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c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback)
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return errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback")
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}
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break
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// checkForResumption reports whether we should perform resumption on this connection.
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkForResumption() bool {
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c := hs.c
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if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
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return false
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}
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var ok bool
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var sessionTicket = append([]uint8{}, hs.clientHello.sessionTicket...)
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if hs.sessionState, ok = c.decryptTicket(sessionTicket); !ok {
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return false
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}
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// Never resume a session for a different TLS version.
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if c.vers != hs.sessionState.vers {
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return false
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}
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cipherSuiteOk := false
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// Check that the client is still offering the ciphersuite in the session.
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for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
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if id == hs.sessionState.cipherSuite {
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cipherSuiteOk = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !cipherSuiteOk {
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return false
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}
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// Check that we also support the ciphersuite from the session.
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if !hs.setCipherSuite(hs.sessionState.cipherSuite, c.config.cipherSuites(), hs.sessionState.vers) {
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return false
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}
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sessionHasClientCerts := len(hs.sessionState.certificates) != 0
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needClientCerts := c.config.ClientAuth == RequireAnyClientCert || c.config.ClientAuth == RequireAndVerifyClientCert
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if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts {
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return false
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}
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if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
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return false
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}
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return true
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}
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doResumeHandshake() error {
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c := hs.c
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hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
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// We echo the client's session ID in the ServerHello to let it know
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// that we're doing a resumption.
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hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId
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hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.sessionState.usedOldKey
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hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite)
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hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
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hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
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hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if len(hs.sessionState.certificates) > 0 {
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if _, err := hs.processCertsFromClient(hs.sessionState.certificates); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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hs.masterSecret = hs.sessionState.masterSecret
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return nil
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}
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
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c := hs.c
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if hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0 {
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hs.hello.ocspStapling = true
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}
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hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.clientHello.ticketSupported && !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled
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hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
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hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(hs.c.vers, hs.suite)
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if c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
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// No need to keep a full record of the handshake if client
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// certificates won't be used.
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hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
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hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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certMsg := new(certificateMsg)
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certMsg.certificates = hs.cert.Certificate
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if hs.hello.ocspStapling {
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certStatus := new(certificateStatusMsg)
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certStatus.response = hs.cert.OCSPStaple
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certStatus.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certStatus.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers)
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skx, err := keyAgreement.generateServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, hs.clientHello, hs.hello)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return err
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}
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if skx != nil {
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hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, skx.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
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// Request a client certificate
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certReq := new(certificateRequestMsg)
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certReq.certificateTypes = []byte{
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byte(certTypeRSASign),
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byte(certTypeECDSASign),
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}
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if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
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certReq.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true
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certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms
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}
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// An empty list of certificateAuthorities signals to
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// the client that it may send any certificate in response
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// to our request. When we know the CAs we trust, then
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// we can send them down, so that the client can choose
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// an appropriate certificate to give to us.
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if c.config.ClientCAs != nil {
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certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects()
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg)
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hs.finishedHash.Write(helloDone.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloDone.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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var pub crypto.PublicKey // public key for client auth, if any
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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var ok bool
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// If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a
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// certificate message, even if it's empty.
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if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
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if certMsg, ok = msg.(*certificateMsg); !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
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if len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 {
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// The client didn't actually send a certificate
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switch c.config.ClientAuth {
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case RequireAnyClientCert, RequireAndVerifyClientCert:
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c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
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return errors.New("tls: client didn't provide a certificate")
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}
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}
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pub, err = hs.processCertsFromClient(certMsg.certificates)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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// Get client key exchange
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ckx, ok := msg.(*clientKeyExchangeMsg)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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|
return unexpectedMessageError(ckx, msg)
|
|
}
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
|
|
|
|
preMasterSecret, err := keyAgreement.processClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, ckx, c.vers)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
|
|
if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelTLS12, hs.clientHello.random, hs.masterSecret); err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If we received a client cert in response to our certificate request message,
|
|
// the client will send us a certificateVerifyMsg immediately after the
|
|
// clientKeyExchangeMsg. This message is a digest of all preceding
|
|
// handshake-layer messages that is signed using the private key corresponding
|
|
// to the client's certificate. This allows us to verify that the client is in
|
|
// possession of the private key of the certificate.
|
|
if len(c.peerCertificates) > 0 {
|
|
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
|
return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Determine the signature type.
|
|
_, sigType, hashFunc, err := pickSignatureAlgorithm(pub, []SignatureScheme{certVerify.signatureAlgorithm}, supportedSignatureAlgorithms, c.vers)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var digest []byte
|
|
if digest, err = hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(sigType, hashFunc, hs.masterSecret); err == nil {
|
|
err = verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, pub, hashFunc, digest, certVerify.signature)
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
|
return errors.New("tls: could not validate signature of connection nonces: " + err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) establishKeys() error {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
|
|
keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen)
|
|
|
|
var clientCipher, serverCipher interface{}
|
|
var clientHash, serverHash macFunction
|
|
|
|
if hs.suite.aead == nil {
|
|
clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, true /* for reading */)
|
|
clientHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, clientMAC)
|
|
serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, false /* not for reading */)
|
|
serverHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, serverMAC)
|
|
} else {
|
|
clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV)
|
|
serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash)
|
|
c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash)
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
if err := c.readChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if hs.hello.nextProtoNeg {
|
|
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
nextProto, ok := msg.(*nextProtoMsg)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
|
return unexpectedMessageError(nextProto, msg)
|
|
}
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(nextProto.marshal())
|
|
c.clientProtocol = nextProto.proto
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
clientFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
|
return unexpectedMessageError(clientFinished, msg)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
verify := hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret)
|
|
if len(verify) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) ||
|
|
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
|
return errors.New("tls: client's Finished message is incorrect")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(clientFinished.marshal())
|
|
copy(out, verify)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendSessionTicket() error {
|
|
if !hs.hello.ticketSupported {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
m := new(newSessionTicketMsg)
|
|
|
|
var err error
|
|
state := sessionState{
|
|
vers: c.vers,
|
|
cipherSuite: hs.suite.id,
|
|
masterSecret: hs.masterSecret,
|
|
certificates: hs.certsFromClient,
|
|
}
|
|
m.ticket, err = c.encryptTicket(&state)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(m.marshal())
|
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
finished := new(finishedMsg)
|
|
finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret)
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
|
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
|
|
copy(out, finished.verifyData)
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// processCertsFromClient takes a chain of client certificates either from a
|
|
// Certificates message or from a sessionState and verifies them. It returns
|
|
// the public key of the leaf certificate.
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) processCertsFromClient(certificates [][]byte) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
hs.certsFromClient = certificates
|
|
certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certificates))
|
|
var err error
|
|
for i, asn1Data := range certificates {
|
|
if certs[i], err = x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data); err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
|
return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate: " + err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if c.config.ClientAuth >= VerifyClientCertIfGiven && len(certs) > 0 {
|
|
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
|
|
Roots: c.config.ClientCAs,
|
|
CurrentTime: c.config.time(),
|
|
Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
|
|
KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, cert := range certs[1:] {
|
|
opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
chains, err := certs[0].Verify(opts)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
|
return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to verify client's certificate: " + err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.verifiedChains = chains
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil {
|
|
if err := c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate(certificates, c.verifiedChains); err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(certs) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var pub crypto.PublicKey
|
|
switch key := certs[0].PublicKey.(type) {
|
|
case *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey:
|
|
pub = key
|
|
default:
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client's certificate contains an unsupported public key of type %T", certs[0].PublicKey)
|
|
}
|
|
c.peerCertificates = certs
|
|
return pub, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// setCipherSuite sets a cipherSuite with the given id as the serverHandshakeState
|
|
// suite if that cipher suite is acceptable to use.
|
|
// It returns a bool indicating if the suite was set.
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) setCipherSuite(id uint16, supportedCipherSuites []uint16, version uint16) bool {
|
|
for _, supported := range supportedCipherSuites {
|
|
if id == supported {
|
|
var candidate *cipherSuite
|
|
|
|
for _, s := range cipherSuites {
|
|
if s.id == id {
|
|
candidate = s
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if candidate == nil {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
// Don't select a ciphersuite which we can't
|
|
// support for this client.
|
|
if candidate.flags&suiteECDHE != 0 {
|
|
if !hs.ellipticOk {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if candidate.flags&suiteECDSA != 0 {
|
|
if !hs.ecdsaOk {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
} else if !hs.rsaSignOk {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
} else if !hs.rsaDecryptOk {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if version < VersionTLS12 && candidate.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
hs.suite = candidate
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func clientHelloInfo(c *Conn, clientHello *clientHelloMsg) *ClientHelloInfo {
|
|
supportedVersions := clientHello.supportedVersions
|
|
if len(clientHello.supportedVersions) == 0 {
|
|
supportedVersions = supportedVersionsFromMax(clientHello.vers)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return &ClientHelloInfo{
|
|
CipherSuites: clientHello.cipherSuites,
|
|
ServerName: clientHello.serverName,
|
|
SupportedCurves: clientHello.supportedCurves,
|
|
SupportedPoints: clientHello.supportedPoints,
|
|
SignatureSchemes: clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms,
|
|
SupportedProtos: clientHello.alpnProtocols,
|
|
SupportedVersions: supportedVersions,
|
|
Conn: c.conn,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|